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March 7, 1963 THE LISTENER Pages: 415-417.

EGYPT, THE BELOVED LAND

By Margaret Drower

Miss Drower is senior lecturer in Ancient History, University College, London, and translator (with A. R. Maxwell-Hyslop) of Pierre Montet's Everyday Life in Egypt in the Days of Ramesses the Great'

To many people the words 'ancient Egypt' conjure up a rather gloomy image: either the vision of dark tombs and grisly mummies, or perhaps a 'cinema-epic' version of long lines of slaves groaning and straining as they haul huge blocks of stone, under the lash of the merciless taskmasters of Pharaoh.

I do not think that anyone who has studied the lively little pictures carved, or painted in bright colours, on the walls of their tombs, or has read the poems, letters, and stories preserved in the papyri, can escape the impression that the ancient Egyptians were a happy people. To begin with, they were extremely fortunate in their climate. In Egypt the sun shines all the year round; there is a little rain in the north during the winter months, but none in the summer, and in Upper Egypt clouds seldom veil the sun and rain is almost unknown. Each year in the summer the gentle Nile overflows its banks and spreads its water over the land and, as the water recedes, the fertile, mineral-laden silt settles on the fields. The Egyptians did not go in constant fear of those terrible flood disasters that constantly threatened the security of the river-cities of Babylonia.

Throughout 5,000 years of recorded history, from 3,000 B.C. to the present day, and perhaps 1,000 years before history began, the life and temperament of the peasant in Egypt has been much the same; his needs have been small, his capacity for enjoyment great. Ancient Egypt was well supplied with the necessities of life. The people had a balanced diet, rich in vitamins. The river and marshes teemed with fish and wildfowl, and thickets of the tall papyrus plant supplied fibrous stems which could be put to a prospered under the benevolence of Re the sun god. Many hymns greet the sun as creator and preserver of all living things; [illegible].

Things did not always go right, of course. There were times when the government broke down, when there were two, or more, claimants to the throne, and law and order was at an end. This happened in a period of about 100 years in 2000 B.C., and again about 1700, when hated Asiatics ruled the land. During such periods of anarchy the economy suffered. In July, when the waters of the Nile began to rise, the farmer watched the river bank anxiously, and if not enough water came down to fill the canals and irrigate all the fields, crops were meagre. An efficient administration would have taken precautions and would have stocks of corn stored for an emergency, as Joseph did in the Old Testament story when he was Pharaoh's adviser.

Not many years ago, a crumpled ball of papyrus was found in the corridor of a freshly opened tomb of about 2000 B.C. in western Thebes, opposite Luxor. When smoothed out, the papyri proved to be a number of letters and other documents - waste paper, thrown away by an ancient visitor to the tomb. The writer of the letters was an official named Hekanakhte, whose home had been in the neighbourhood; he had written to his family while he was on a prolonged visit to another of his estates near Memphis in the north. The Nile was abnormally low that year, the crops to his eldest son on how best to run the estate in his absence:

How are you, how are you? are you alive, prosperous and in health? and the whole household, how are you? Do not worry about me - see,

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I am alive and well ... As for you, you have plenty to eat. The whole land is perishing, but you don't go hungry. When I last came south to you, I fixed your rations for you, as I have always looked after your nourishment. Our rations here are fixed for us according to the state of the x inundation.

Hack the ground with your noses in the work. Take great care! Hoe all my land; sieve with care! Please don't be angry about this. The whole household are to be treated like my children, and half-life is better than none --- Why, they are beginning to eat men here!

An average well-to-do household - in the house, say, of a minor official, a steward on one of the great estates perhaps, during the New Kingdom, about 1400 B.C. - would lack many of thethings we now take for granted. The dim flame of an oil-lamp would make reading by night difficult and early to bed the rule, and you would have to tell thetime by means of waterclock or sundial, or simply by observing the sun as many peasants still do.

Your dress would be loose and light, a belted loin-cloth topped by a voluminous robe of fine pleated linen. If you were a person of consequence, either man or woman, x you would wear an elaborately curled wig; this would protect your head from the sun, and at night you would take it off and sleep in your own shortly cropped hair.. Your toilet would be elaborate. You would wash often, and rub yourself with oil and scent; you would wear bracelets, and make up your face with green or black eye-paint. You would probably have been clean-shaven, though you might have worn a neat, square xkx chin-beared.


You would have lived in a house not unlike that in a village in Egypt today. It would have been built of mudbrick, plastered and whitewashed. The upper storeys would be lit by small windows, with shutters or blinds to keep out heat, dust, and flies; and in hot weather you might sleep on the roof. Inside, the walls and probably the ceiling would be painted with designs in bright colours. Your house would be simply furnished but what furniture there was would be comfortable even by modern standards - rather low chairs with a spring back, and stools with concave rush-woven seats shaped to fit the behind. As head of the house-hold you might recline on a couch upon cushions; your children would sit on stools or on the matting floor. Your bed would have been of wicker-work on a wooden frame fairly high off the floor, and, instead of a pillow, you would use a wooden headrest, made to your measure.

Your kitchen would have chairs and tables, and cooking vessels of thick pottery. You would eat three times a day, seated at a small table and eating for the most part with your fingers. The main meal of the day would consist of bread and cakes, fruit, vegetables, and perhaps fish or roast meat, washed down as a rule with beer; your beer would probably be rather flat, since it was drunk through a tube from a large earthenware jar. At parties, at which married couples sat together and shared a table, there might be wine, and the menu would contain roast duck or game, and a variety of cakes and sweetmeats. You would be entertained as you ate by a singer or musician; if you could afford it you might engage a small orchestra playing the harp, lyre, and flute, and a dancing girl or acrobat.

After the day's work at your office, you would be likely to relax at home before the evening meal in a game of checkers with your wife. If you had a day's leisure ahead of you, you might decide to go x duck-shooting in the papyrus marshes; your wife and children would accompany you to pole the skiff through the reeds, carry your throw-sticks for you and help you to retrieve the birds.

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As a man of some standing, your household would consist of your wife, perhaps four or five children, and two or three servants, besides the peasants who lived and worked as serfs on your fields. A nobleman of High rank would be likely to have a larger staff of servants, and also a number of slaves, who would be foreigners, perhaps prisoners of war brought back from campaigns in Nubia or Palestine, and probably also one or two minor wives or concubines whose position was inferior to the chief wife, or 'lady of the house'.

On the whole, one has the impression that the Egyptians enjoyed an unusually happy and harmonious family life. Statuegroups depict married couples with their arms twined around each other on terms of affectionate equality. Old people were especially cherished and respected. In one of the precepts addressed by the scribe Ani to his son, the younger man is exhorted to look after his old mother:

Double the food which you give to your mother and carry her as she once carried you. In you she had a heavy load, but she did not hand it over to me.

You came to your birth, after your months were accomplished, but you were still a burden to her, for she suckled you for three years, and her heart was never disgusted with your filth, saying 'What shall I do?'

She took you to school when you were old enough to be taught to write, and she never failed to provide you with bread and beer every day.

When you are grown up and take to yourself a wife, and are settled in your own house, remember how your mother gave birth to you and how she brought you up.

Children would be brought up to be honest, industrious, and polite to their elders. Your boys would go to school to learn to read and write. They would be taught how to draw the 700-odd picture signs that make up the repertory of Egyptian hieroglyphic writing. Having mastered their letters they would be set to copy literary texts and to learn by heart precepts of good behaviour. Your daughter would learn the domestic arts from her mother, the management of a household, and weaving and embroidery. When she was of an age to marry, you would choose a husband for her, though she might also have ideas on this subject and have made her own choice.

We have a fairly good idea how an ancient Egyptian lived and what were the material circumstances of his life. But what of his thoughts and beliefs? What, for instance, was his attitude towards those who governed him, and towards the gods? The average Egyptian regarded authority much as people do the world over. He looked to his local administration to keep law and order and maintain the irrigation system. He grudged paying his taxes and did what he could to avoid being conscripted for the labour corps and for military service. If he quarrelled with his neighbour or suffered injustice, he expected to obtain redress from the local courts. In the last resort he could appeal to the Vizier, who in theory, at any rate, walked abroad every day to hear complaints.

With one or two possible exceptions we do not hear of insurrections against a tyrannical Pharaoh. For the land of Egypt (or as people called it, 'the Beloved Land') was the domain of the gods, and above all of one particular god, Pharaoh, the incarnation of Horus who had created the world and assumed the kingship on the day of creation. This concept of the god-king had a profound influence on the entire structure of Egyptian society.

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The whole of Egypt belonged to Pharaoh, and so did its people. In theory, all the affairs of Egypt were under his sole direction; in practice, of course, he had to delegate his power. We cannot here consider in detail the elaborate structure of the administration as it finally emerged, under the two Viziers who were the king's chief deputies. Parkinson's law began to come into operation, and as the Egyptians were a methodical people and liked to record every transaction in writing, scrolls piled up in the record offices and petty officials multiplied till the administration became top-heavy. As in many Oriental countreis today, it was the ambition of everybody to become a government clerk.

In spite of the complexity of the government machinery, a high degree of centralization was at all times maintained; the country was still Pharaoh's, and orderly existence and prosperity depended on him.


This doctrine, not merely of the divine right but of the divinity and unique nature of kings, excludes the idea of tyranny, of an oppressor forcing his subjects to work for him. It was right and proper - and indeed necessary - for the king to have this great pyramid-tomb, or that that temple should glorify his name before the gods. He had been sired by a god, said the priests, and suckled by goddesses. Even after 1500 B.C., when Egypt became a world-power, and Pharaoh climbed so far down from his pedestal as to lead his army in the field, he still stood apart, a being remote, protected in battle by the gods themselves. The colossal figures of Rameses II familiar to us from the facade of the temple of Abu Simbel are not, as has often been said, witness to the megalomania of an individual - they are the visual expression of majesty, the nearest an Egyptian architect could get to expressing in stone an awesome and fundamental truth.

The utterances of Pharaoh were laws to be obeyed because his function was to maintain ma'at, a word variously translated as 'truth', 'justice', 'order'. It signified the concept of the divine cosmic order, established at the moment of creation, which embraced not only the laws of nature as expressed by the rising and setting of the sun, moon and stars, the rotation of the seasons and the annual flood cycle of the Nile, but also the laws of society and the whole ethical and social structure of Egypt. The gods, too, 'lived by Ma'at', since they were manifestations of the powers of nature and a part of the cosmic order. They must be cherished, their cults maintained, their temples embellished and their offerings constantly renewed, in order that Egypt might prosper and the Nile continue to flow.

Unless the Egyptian had some sort of honorary priestly duties he would not, I think, have been preoccupied with the worship of the great gods of the state religion. That was the affairs of the large staff of priests who were in charge of each temple. But on festival days in his local temple he would take his offerings to the temple court, then take his place in the crowd to watch the statue of the god being carried in procession through the streets, and afterwards share in the feasting and merry-making, perhaps for several days on end. Magic would have played an important part in his everyday life, as it did in Babylonia. Spells could be obtained from the priests to ward off insect pests, rats, and scorpions from the house, to protect one's children from danger and oneself from sickness. If, in spite of one's precautions, things went wrong, a particular god might be angry and special prayers, accompanied by the appropriate offering, would then have to be made to him. Letters have been found in the cemeteries, asking for special favours or for justice in the next world.

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It has often been said that the Egyptians were obsessed by death. I do not think this is true; on the contrary, I think that they were obsessed by life. The tomb-chapels of every period abound in scenes of teeming life in the marshes, of the busy life of herdsman and huntsman, of the pleasant life of the tomb owner himself. Every ancient Egyptian must have had some experience of death, of course, but in spite of this, they did not believe in it. Death cannot be the end; life must go on: the heavenly Nile will swell and fall, the heavenly fields will be tilled, the harvest reaped, and men and women will go about their daily occupations for ever. It may be that the dry, hot climate in which matter desiccates, but does not rot, contributed to this idea of continuity: certainly it must have lent credibility to the belief in bodily survival which gave rise to the strange Egyptian practice of mummification, and to the placing of food and objects of daily use in the tomb.

The theologians sought to devise some more mystical hereafter for the soul. At death, they said, the king will sail the skies as an astral body; he will encounter the perils of darkness and combat them, he will fly as a falcon to heaven, he will become united with Osiris who every year dies and is resurrected anew.

Before 2000 B.C., the commoner too was aspiring to a similar fate. He, also, would become Osiris, he would join the sun-boat in its eternal journey through night and day. Magical spells, devised first to protect and sustain the king, were in the New Kingdom inscribed on the chapel walls of all those who could afford a tomb. All the same, it is the scenes of daily life which predominate - and in spite of the priests, and the blind harper who sang at the funeral feast of the imminence of death and the finality of the tomb, the ancient Egyptians kept their happy optimism.

It is this optimism, this enjoyment of life, that makes the ancient Egyptians so attractive. The more one gets to know them, the better one likes them - for their tolerance, their gaiety, their sense of humour; for their love of beauty and symmetry, their delight in flowers and sweet smells, in bright colours and music and dancing. If I had to live in the remote past, I think I should choose ancient Egypt. - From a talk in Network Three.

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India and Egypt

Ancient Egypt might give to may people a gloomy image of Dark Tombs and grisly ~~memories~~ mummies or of ~~selves~~ slaves groaning and straining as they haul ___ as ~~the whole~~ huge blocks of stone under the lash of the ~~merciless~~ merciless task masters of Pharaoh. lying in the North-East corner of the African Continent; though, culturally it always belonged to the world of the Eastern Mediterranean ~~basing~~ base and near-East. It almost forms a continuous belt of the ~~furtile~~ fertile ~~crusent~~ crescent forming an arch of settled communities from ~~Balatine~~ Palestine and Syria across to the land of the U_____ and the D_____. It, however, continued to retain its isolationary character owing to its geographical possession and topographical features. It developed from very early times - a settled and ordered way of life along the Nile has asscertained the country.

Six thousand years ago a Hemitic people began forming the valley of the river Nile. Many States were built which were unifide under a powerful rular about ~~3x000~~ 3,200 B.C. ago. Menes ~~forward~~ forward the city of Memphis at the head of the Delta. Pharohos and Preis made use of vast temporary low labour force that became available during the Monsoon Session, helping in dam and canal construction.

King Koser (C/2780 B.C.) ordered his architect ~~Im~~ Imhotep to construct the first pyramid 200 feet above the desent level of Memphis. Trade and contact with Africa for Ebony, Ivory gold and skins and with the Syrians for cedar wood were established during this period. The ~~period~~ ~~architect~~ period covering the first and second dynasty lasted from 3188 to 2815 B.C.. The old kingdom period covering 3rd and 6th dynasties lasted from 2815 to 2294 B.C. During this period there was the great

activity of building temples and the growing power of the fuel Lords which weakened the Royal control at the end of ~~Papis~~ II, more than 98's rule. Promisial covers became powerful. Asian invaders occupied the delta. About Sarka 2020 B.C. an eclips was again ____ into many separate provinces. The end of the century saw Egypt eclips again into many separate provinces and the end of the old kingdom. During the Areade and the old kingdom period there was a strong belief in the life after death and the s____ g_____ r____. The Solar calander laid and adopted a spit through in a modifide form by Sessor, came into being. Much of the Nile valley came under cultivation and a system of canals were retaining flood waters.

The middle kingdom of 11th and 12th dynasties saw arrival of the power of the Pharaoh under Menthuhotep III, who also went on further victorious expeditions in Nubia. The rular of the 12th dynasty continued a policy of strength at home and prestige abroad. This dynasty included .....

To be continued.

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DELHI, AUGUST 4, 1967

SETBACK IN VIETNAM

U THANT holds the Americans guilty of over-simplification because they believe that they are only fighting Communism in Vietnam. But it is not certain that he is not guilty of the same offence himself. The war is not only, as he describes it, "a war of national independence against all foreigners"; much else is mixed up in it too. At one time, undoubtedly, the active principle in Vietnam was nationalism alone. So it might have remained but for an unfortunate series of mistakes first by the French and then the Americans in the age of Mr Dulles. But since long before the American military involvement in the South, from the morrow of the departure of the French, in fact, Communism, and not all of it of the indigenous variety, has been as active a principle in the Vietnam situation as nationalism. Since then, the Vietnamese have fought the war on two different planes: as nationalists, truly descended from the purer years of President Ho Chi Minh, fighting against "all foreigners", and as a people tragically caught in the coils of the mortal combat between Communism as a world power and those who oppose it.

To the latter plane belongs, on the one hand, the American presence in Vietnam, and on the other the constant and aggressive infiltration from the North and the ruthless game in which China so cynically uses Vietnam, North and South alike. One of the casualties of the war is the possibility which was clearly alive only a few years ago of Vietnam becoming a unified, independent and truly nationalist country, even if Communist by its own preference. A near casualty—only blind hope prevents us from describing it as a total casualty—is the kind of settlement which appeared to be at hand last winter and might have been achieved but for North Vietnam's intransigence and which would have seen the Americans, the only important foreigners fighting in Vietnam today, packing to go home some time ago. U.S. raids on the North had been suspended for a while and would have ended for all time if Hanoi had been free, or had felt itself to be sufficiently free from the influence of Peking, to give some sign of its willingness to reciprocate.

These are some details of the Vietnamese situation whi U Thant overlooks. But argues more soundly—far t soundly for the comfort of M Johnson—when he says th the objective in Vietnam a the task of diplomacy shou be an honourable peace whi he believes, is attainable. L many others, he too sees t an end to American bombi of the North is a necessa prelude to peace and his vo is a powerful addition others who have been maki the same demand for a lo time. So long as the USA h plausible reasons for s pecting that putting an end the bombings would be fru less, and so long as the assu ance that it would not be can only from capitals such New Delhi whose knowled of the mind of Hanoi is litt and power to influence it less, the Americans were just fied in resisting the deman But evidence accumulates i creasingly that the suspicion not justified. There has bee no direct sign from Hanoi, b so high an official as Mr Dea Rusk, U.S. Secretary of Stat now confirms that so impor ant a person as Mr Kosygi gave clear assurance at h meeting with President Joh son at Glassboro last month that if the bombings were ended negotiations would quickly follow. To militarists in the field, the assurance may not seem anything like the kind of hard-bound guarantee that militarists want. But a person of the political experience and cunning of President Johnson should see that Mr Kosygin would not have stuck his neck out in giving such a clear assurance without first arriving at an authoritative understanding with the rulers in Hanoi. Negotiations admittedly do not amount to the reduction in "military activities" which Mr Rusk demands as the price for ending air raids on the North. But they can be as substantial a step closer to "honourable peace" as can be found. The hazards involved in putting an end to the bombings are now much smaller even if the negotiations which Mr Kosygin has held to be so clearly in prospect are not immediately accompanied by a reduction in military activity; much smaller at any rate than the hazards of an endless war which draws the USA daily deeper into a crisis of conscience and the world into a swamp.

VIETNAM WAR A 'BOTTOMLESS PIT'

U.S. POLICY CRITICIZED

NEW YORK, Aug 7.—The New York Times again criticized the Johnson Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war yesterday and called it a "bottomless pit", reports UPI.

The daily commented in an editorial: "Nothing succeeds like failure in the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war. The less escalation accomplished in South-East Asia, the more convinced the White House seems to become that the answer is to escalate still further.

"President Johnson's decision to increase the U.S. fighting force in Vietnam by 45,000 to 50,000 men kills hope that Washington might make a new attempt at peace negotiations instead of plunging deeper into a war of frustration for which no one can see an end. The only prospect, as the President makes plain, is for the assignment of more troops, more guns after the present reinforcements are in place....

"Our quarrel is with the concept that expanding the scale of warfare brings the U.S. closer to attainment of its war goals. Indeed, it becomes increasingly questionable that anyone in Washington is at all clear on what it is this country is seeking to achieve in Vietnam...."

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STALEMATE IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

JERUSALEM & THE WEST BANK STAND IN THE WAY OF PEACE

From G. H. JANSEN

FROM their victories in the Six-Day War the Israelis hope that some sort of peaceful arrangement with the Arabs will emerge. So far, however, nothing of any political significance or substance has emerged to make that wish anything but a hope, a hope which is fading fast.

From the Arabs as a whole Israel will never gain acceptance: the Jewish State, with each new development, appears ever more clearly as a foreign body that the Arab world will not digest and cannot, as yet, extrude.

But what of Israel's immediate neighbours, the ones who have felt her military strength? Are they in a chastened, more realistic, mood? For Syria the answer is an immediate "no": the doctrinaire Arab nationalists of the Baath Party are committed to a total opposition to Israel. If there was any possibility of the UAR being accommodating, utterly remote as it was, the fighting along the Suez Canal has destroyed the chance and President Nasser has formally chosen the path of continued resistance.

This leaves Jordan, and the Western Press has been full of speculation that King Hussain is the one "reasonable" Arab leader prepared to come to terms with Israel.

HELPING LIFE

But with which Israel? For in Israel, as among the Arab States and leaders, there are moderates and extremists. I was reminded of this difference during a recent visit to Israel when the Israeli Press was particularly full of tough statements by Defence Minister General Dayan—that was one voice. The other voice was that of a professor in oriental studies at the Hebrew University whom I first met many years ago in Turkey and have thereafter visited whenever I have been in Jewish Jerusalem. He lives in an old Arab-style house full of books and oriental objets d'art. In all our previous discussions the professor invariably emphasized Israel's desire, her need, for peace with the Arabs. He was more than ever emphatic about it this time.

As a scholar, he could not, of course, go into the details of a possible political settlement, but what Israel really wanted, he said, was a chance to contribute to the life of the region. Israel, he claimed, was not a militaristic State, and was not interested in territorial conquests. I mentioned the bellicose statements of General Dayan but he brushed them aside: the General's whole family background, he claimed, was that of the co-operative settlement which would predispose him to construction not destruction. Subsequent events hardly support the professor's estimate of General Dayan's character.

I mentioned the atrocities committed by the Israeli Army—the bombing of hospitals, the looting, and the eviction of people from their homes, especially from the area of the Wailing Wall. He apologized for the first two and said that restitution should be made, but he merely deplored the last-named happening.

While he talked with serious intentness, I wondered whether this was not just another example of Israel's policy of the Two Voices: to the devotee of real-politik, Israel talks of its strength that will compel the Arabs to accept its existence; to the liberal-minded, Israel, in tones of conciliation, speaks of winning a place in West Asia through co-operation. At present, for instance, there is tough General Dayan and conciliatory Mr Eshkol or Mr Eban; formerly there used to be, respectively, Messrs Ben Gurion and Sharret. (I recalled how on a previous visit Mr Sharret had asked me to sound out my Arab friends on the idea of a confederal arrangement between Israel and its Arab neighbours under an Arab Head of State—the Arabs treated it with derision.)

I decided that the professor was not just a Soft Voice: he was, evidently, a member of that small group of Israelis who, while remaining firmly pro-Zionist, do genuinely and sincerely want to achieve friendship with the Arabs; they began with Judah Magnes and Martin Buber and the best-known are now associated with the Israeli magazine *New Outlook*, which had courageously campaigned for the removal of military restrictions imposed on Israel's Arab citizens. The worst of these were lifted just before the war began.

The professor made two other interesting points, one of them factual and therefore of practical significance; the other was the product of wishful thinking and therefore of little value.

His first point was a personal one. He and his wife had come to Palestine from Germany as students 33 years ago. Their children, however, knew no other country than Israel and no other language but Hebrew; one of his sons was now learning German, the mother tongue of both his parents, only because he had chosen to study philosophy at the University. Therefore, for the whole younger generation of Israelis, it was meaningless for the Arabs to talk about inviting them to go back to their countries of origin. This is a valuable point, not without its military significance also.

But then the professor went on to talk about how there had been a process of cultural osmosis, of mutual discovery, between him and his sons, Israeli Jews, and his Arab students at the University drawn from the Arab community in Israel. Could not this process, he argued, happen on a bigger scale between Israeli Jews and the more than one million Arabs of the West Bank of the Jordan now under Israeli control? And could that not, in turn, point the way to constructive Arab-Israeli co-operation in the whole area?

I did not have the heart to tell the well-meaning professor that earlier in the day in the Old City I had seen Israeli Arabs eagerly buying up every available copy of the rabble-rousing magazine produced by Haj Amin, the former Grand Mufti of Palestine, and a bitter, vicious foe of Israel. In conversation with the West Bank Arabs these Israeli Arabs were even more violent in their condemnation of the Arab governments who, through their inefficiency, had lost the war, because for 19 years the Israeli Arabs had been hoping and longing for liberation from Israeli rule.

Subsequently I learnt that quite a few Arabs from the Nazareth area, who, in spite of everything, had stayed on in Israel were now leaving simply because there was no hope of liberation any more. Clearly even Israelis like the professor lived in a totally different world from that of the average Israeli Arab.

THE WEST BANK

In the days immediately following the Israeli occupation there was some talk of a long-term arrangement between Israel and the West Bank by itself, under which the latter area would be granted local autonomy but would remain within the defence frontiers of the Jewish State. This idea—the maximum offered by the Israelis—was rejected by the leading West Bankers I met. That arrangement, they said, would make them colonial subjects of the Israelis and would make them outcasts from the Arab world to which they belonged and would continue to belong.

Yet there were some who toyed with the idea of a separate Palestine Republic serving as a bridge between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. These men were being as unrealistic as the professor: they were expecting a victorious Israel to give them more than they would get from victorious Arabs.

In any case, in the past few weeks, all such ideas have been pushed aside. West Bank leaders have come out, jointly and publicly, in opposition to the Israeli occupation. They have started with non-violent non co-operation such as a refusal to pay taxes, and violent resistance will most probably follow.

So long as the West Bank resists, any hope of a separate peace between King Hussain ruling on the East Bank, and the Israelis is obviously impossible. The solidly pro-Israeli Anglo-Saxon Press that has been playing up King Hussain's "reasonable" desire to make peace with Israel are, in effect, signing his death warrant. For if ever it appears that there is any truth in their speculations the King will be shot as was his grandfather, King Abdullah, and for the same reason.

It used to be said that the Palestinian West Bank could not break away from King Hussain's East Bank régime because if it did the Israelis would seize it: in effect fear of Israel kept the West Bank and the East Bank together. Now the worst has happened: the Israelis have the West Bank so that their veto protecting King Hussain no longer applies. The contrary is now true: growing resistance to Israel by the West Bankers, who still assert their loyalty to King Hussain, puts their veto on any separate approach by him to Israel.

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POLARIZATION OF FEELING ON ISRAEL

WEST ASIAN WAR PLAYED HAVOC WITH AFRO-ASIAN UNITY

From G. H. JANSEN

THE recent war in West Asia has played havoc with whatever little unity was left in the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations. Of the 62 members of the group no less than 28 delegations,—20 African and 8 Asian, voted in ways inimical, in varying degrees, to the Arab stand. These figures show that the group was almost evenly split,—right down the middle.

This division on the Arab-Isareli issue is unusual for the Afro-Asian group. It is true that Israel has been a cause of controversy and division since the very beginning of the Afro-Asian movement, that is, from the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947; as well as at subsequent gatherings at Colombo, Bandung and Belgrade. Yet at the second conference of the non-aligned countries at Cairo in 1965, to which almost all States of Asia and Africa were invited, a surprisingly strong resolution against Israel was passed: this went far beyond U.N. resolutions on the Palestine question and called for a restoration of the rights of the Palestine people to their homeland, and also spoke of their liberation from "colonialism and racism".

There were some observers at the Cairo conference who said at the time that the membership had been expanded so widely and indiscriminately that its non-aligned quality has been diluted beyond recognition. They have been proven correct, for in the voting at the U.N. last month there were many States which had been present at the non-aligned conference and which nevertheless voted against what was officially known as "the non-aligned resolution" which, after all, was less anti-Israeli in spirit than the resolution they had supported at Cairo.

THREE DRAFTS

In the final voting there were three important resolutions. There was the non-aligned resolution which supported the Arab stand (it was more Afro-Asian than non-aligned because except for Yugoslavia all its sponsors were from Africa or Asia). There was its direct competitor, the Latin American draft, which was generally favourable to the Israeli viewpoint. And there was the resolution on Jerusalem which declared invalid Israel's annexation of the Jordanian sector of that city.

Neither the non-aligned nor the Latin American drafts received the required two-thirds majority. And the reason for this was that while the Afro-Asian group split the 22 members of the Latin American caucus (except Cuba) voted solidly together.

The Jerusalem resolution received wide support and was passed with 99 votes in favour and none against; but with 20 very significant abstentions, significant because they showed total commitment to the Israeli position.

It is according to their votes on these three resolutions that one can evaluate the precise degree to which some of the Afro-Asians were prepared to oppose the official non-aligned position.

VOTING PATTERN

Thus eight States, all African, were among those abstaining with the United States, on the Jerusalem resolution. They are the Central African Republic, Congo Kinshasa (which later changed its vote to an affirmative), Dahomey, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi and Ruanda.

Nine Afro-Asian countries,—eight African (including Ethiopia and Ghana), and one Asian, the Philippines—voted against the non-aligned resolution. Thirteen States abstained, eight African and five Asian: Laos, Singapore, Thailand, Formosa (which is not a member of the Afro-Asian group as such) and Nepal subsequently switched to an affirmative.

The non-aligned resolution was voted on first, and after its defeat 17 Afro-Asians voted affirmatively in favour of the Latin American draft; these included three Asian countries, Japan, the Philipines and Formosa again. Eleven abstained on this resolution, among them six Asians: Burma, Cambodia, Iran, Laos, Nepal and Singapore.

From this breakdown two clear facts emerge which, indeed, have been evident for many years: there is far more support for Israel in Africa than in Asia, the continent on which it was imposed in 1948 by the votes of countries from other continents. Not one Asian country held back from condemning Israel's action on Jerusalem, and only one Asian country voted against the non-aligned resolution.

The second fact is that countries once friendly to Israel tend to move away from her after a time. The most notable examples, in Asia, are Burma, Cambodia and Turkey. Burma was the first Asian country with which Israel had diplomatic relations and, on the basis of socialism there was warm friendship between them: U Nu spoke up vigorously for Israel at Bandung and Belgrade, and Israel operated many large schemes of technical assistance in Burma. But for some time relations have been cool and distant, and as we have seen the only support Burma gave to the Israeli case was to abstain on the Latin American resolution (instead of voting against it). This is all that Cambodia did too, and that country had succeeded Burma in Israel's favour: the current Asian favourite of Israel is Thailand. Turkey was the only West Asian country to have diplomatic relations with Israel, but these have now been reduced in level and Turkey voted with the non-aligned on all the three resolutions. In Africa Tanzania and Uganda, once very friendly to Israel, are no longer so, as their voting record shows.

AMERICAN PRESSURE

When trying to find reasons for the way votes went during this Assembly session one factor is preponderant: persistent American pressure. The United States felt that its prestige was heavily committed to the outcome of what was seen as a direct struggle between her and Russia; perhaps too the White House, with Presidential elections a year away, did not wish to displease the powerful Zionist propaganda machine in the United States. Veteran U.N. diplomats testify that they had not seen such a display of American arm-twisting at any time in the last 15 years; nor was India immune from it. The British, too, threw all their diminished weight into the battle for votes.

These pressures would account for the votes of countries that are the military allies of the Anglo-American, or have Anglo-American bases on their territory, or are heavily dependent on them financially or commercially.

Of course other motivations also operated. Some of the African countries feel friendly towards Israel because of its technical assistance to them. More negatively it may be surmised that the Latin Americans took into account the friendly relations of several non-aligned countries with Cuba whom they regard as their archenemy. Kenya and Ethiopia certainly resent Arab support to Somalia with which they both have frontier disputes. Ghana doubtless still remembers the friendship between President Nasser and Nkrumah; and Dr Banda has accused the UAR of supporting the opposition in Malawi. Formosa feels obliged to contradict the vehement support given to the Arabs by Communist China, specifically on the Palestine question. In fact the reasons why delegations voted are almost anything but those given in their speeches of "explanation of vote".

An examination of the voting pattern of the non-aligned. The only countries in Europe and the Americas, to give support were the socialist or Communist States.

This pattern of voting indicates a dangerous polarization in political feelings on a world-wide scale. By almost totally withholding its support from the Arab non-aligned position it is the Western World that is emphasizing the gap between it and the Third World. This action supports the Yugoslav-Chinese thesis that the real division in the world today is not on ideological lines between the East and West but between the fat white men of the North and the thin browns and blacks of the South. It is true that the presence of some of the Africans and of all the Latin Americans, except Cuba, in the camp of the former blurs the lines of division, but what is to be noted is that in this case it was the fat whites who, as a group, drew apart.

Many decades ago Theodor Herzl, the ideological father of Israel, when speaking of the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, said "for Europe we shall constitute part of a rampart against Asia". Those were prophetic words. Israel is serving as a catalyst of political forces in action far beyond the confines of West Asia.

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MAOISM TO COMPENSATE FOR ECONOMIC FAILURE

LONG-TERM HUMILIATION OF 'THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

From ISAAC DEUTSCHER

WAS then, it may be asked, the "cultural revolution" which was proclaimed to the deafening accompaniment of all of China's drums and gongs, nothing but a huge riot designed to help Mr Mao to swamp and crush an inner party opposition? Did it have no other, wider, meaning?

As one reads the endless official reports on the "cultural upsurge of the masses" one may be tempted to dismiss that "upsurge" as mere farce. The Chinese News Agency has described in detail the "fierce offensive against all old ideas, culture, customs, and habits" that the "Red Guards have taken to the streets of Peking since 20th August". But one looks in vain for any positive indication of what are the new ideas and the new cultural customs and habits. In the name of Marxism and Leninism, the Guards have denounced Balzac and Hugo, and Shakespeare and Beethoven as the products of a rotting bourgeois culture; they have defaced Pushkin's monument in Shanghai, and have vented their contempt for the works of Chernyshevky and Herzen, the progenitors of the Russian revolutionary movement of the 19th century. Peking's "cultural revolutionaries" are, it seems, quite unaware of Marx's lifelong admiration for Shakespeare and, Balzac, of Lenin's love for Pushkin and Beethoven, and of the decisive formative influence Chernyshevsky had on him

NAME'S THE THING

We have been presented with long lists of streets and boulevards, the names of which have been changed from "Eternal Peace" to "The East is Red", from "Well of the Prince's Palace" to "Prevent Revisionism", from "Glorious Square" to "Support Vietnam", from "Eastern Peace Market" to "East Wind Market", and so on. We are asked to rejoice in the fact that certain culinary establishments are no longer called "Collection of All Virtues", but "Peking Roast Duck Restaurants".

Hosts of hairdressers and dressmakers have pledged themselves to produce no more outlandish haircuts, such as "duck tail" and "spiralling" hairdoes, and cowboy jeans and tight-fitting shirts and blouses and various kinds of Hongkong style skirts. "We should not regard these matters lightly"



thundered against "kowtowing to decadent Western culture", banned the works of Einstein, Freud, Mendel, and many other foreign thinkers, and indulged in a hysterical glorification of all things Russian.

But *Pravda* avoids drawing this parallel, because even now Russia has not fully lived down the legacy of that period, and quite a few of the old bans are still in force. But the parallel is close enough; and it suggests that the Maoist "cultural revolution" is a deadly serious affair. Its effect on China's spiritual and intellectual life is, in all probability, going to be just as devastating and lasting as were the consequences of the Stalinist witch-hunts. Its political meaning is also comparable. Like Russia in the last years of the Stalin era, so China has now plunged headlong into a self-centred isolationism and nationalism and has shut herself off more hermetically than ever from the outside world and from all its political and cultural influences. To achieve this Mr Mao had to organize a pogrom of the intelligentsia, whom he suspects of being vulnerable to foreign, especially "revisionist", influences.

This is not to say that these developments foreshadow any new aggressive phase in China's foreign policy. True, in the last few weeks Peking and Shanghai have resounded with the cry for the liberation of Taiwan (Formosa), Macao and Hongkong. But nothing indicates that Marshal Lin Piao is preparing marching orders for the liberation campaigns (even though all Chinese, Communists and anti-Communists, Maoists and anti-Maoists alike, consider these territories as belonging to their country by right). China is even less ready than Russia wa in Stalin's last years for war like adventures or territorial expansion. Her ideologica aggressiveness and her shril contempt for Western cultura values are manifestations, n doubt morbid ones, of her intensely self-defensive mood and of her sense of complete isolation in a hostile wo

mic advance is relatively much slower. The "cultural revolution" and an almost mystical apotheosis of Maoism are to provide a moral compensation for all these disappointments and frustrations.

It can be said in advance that the "positive" effect of this booster on national morale will be shortlived, but that its adverse consequences will be felt for a long time. The party, its hierarchy and cadres, will not soon recover from the humiliation the "Red Guards" have inflicted on them. The old intelligentsia, the scientists and the technicians but more especially the writers and artists, who have been associated with the broad current of the Maoist revolution and have directed the educational work among the masses since 1949, are being degraded and eliminated from their posts. They have not—or not yet—been destroyed as their counterparts were in Stalinist Russia; but they are forced to make room for a new intelligentsia, who have been brought up since the revolution and have far fewer ties either with their own native cultural tradition or with the cultural heritage of the outside world.

To some extent this change of generations is inevitable in any post-revolutionary society. But when it is carried out as abruptly, brutally and demagogically as it was in Stalinist Russia and as it is now being effected in China, the change entails an irreparable loss to the nation: a gap in its cultural consciousness, a lowering of standards, and an impoverishment of spiritual life. Post-Stalinist Russia is still smarting under the loss, and so will Maoist and post-Maoist China.—*World*

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UPHEAVAL IN CHINA—III

THE REACTION THAT AWAITS MAO'S HEIR

From ISAAC DEUTSCHER

AFTER a month of demonstrations and riots the "Red Guards" are being quietly marched off the streets of China's cities; and their members are told to go back to school or to go out to the countryside and help in bringing in the harvest.

The intoxicating holiday of the "cultural revolution" is over and prosaic workaday life begins anew. The rebellion of the youngsters having overflown all bounds, its instigators have had to bring it to an end. There have been too many alarming reports about disorders all over the country; and the army has moved in to take command of the "Red Guards" and has been appointing special officers and commissars to guide them. Thus the army's rôle in the crisis appears in sharper relief; and it is tempting to speculate about the rise of a military, "Bonapartist", dictatorship exercised by Marshal Lin Piao.

On the other hand, China's armed forces do not consist of conventional armies with a regularly constituted officers' corps—the ranks of marshal and general have been abolished; and it does not seem probable that the military should act as independent claimants to power. Mr Mao and Marshal Lin Piao have been using both the army and the "Red Guards" in order to overwhelm the opposition and regain control of the Central Committee and the party. Once they have regained it, the party hierarchy, purged and reshuffled, will probably be on top once again.

POLICY PROBLEMS

What next? It remains to be seen whether Mr Mao will proceed to stage purges in the Stalinist style or whether he will find a less bloody way of dealing with inner party opposition. Beyond these immediate issues there loom the great unresolved problems of China's domestic and foreign policy. Dwelling on the dangers threatening the country from American imperialism, Mr Mao is calling the nation to live the kind of Spartan life that the Red Partisans led during the heroic Yenan period. The newspapers have been quoting this sentence from the diary of a Maoist hero: "I must remember Mao's teachings to set myself *high* political standards and *low* living standards"; and the mass of citizens are called upon to follow this maxim. The phrase sums up a programme.

Yet it must be doubted whether the sentiment it expresses, admirable though it may be in heroic individuals, can animate an entire people and form the basis of national policy. It is an unwitting confession of how little Maoism has now to offer China. The countryside, though it no longer suffers from the mass famines so familiar under the *ancient regime* remains backward primitive, and terribly overpopulated; and in the cities industrialization is not progressing fast enough to absorb the surplus. This year a new Five Year Plan, the first since the economic disasters of 1958-1962, has been put into effect; but its industrial targets have not been announced. Is it because production statistics are considered a military secret? Or because the targets are not inspiring enough for the propagandists to make much play of them? Either explanation may be correct.

LITTLE PROGRESS

In any case, the Government is now placing far less emphasis on rapid economic development than it did in the 1950s and than Soviet Governments have done all the time. Mr Mao has not shown anything like Stalin's ruthlessness in harnessing the nation's manpower and resources and in forcing town and country alike to make the most terrible sacrifices for the sake of industrialization. Ever since the partial failure of the Great Leap, he has kept to the view that China's industrialization and modernization is a matter of many, many decades and that it may take the lifetime of two, three, or four generations to accomplish it. He does not call China "to catch up with and to surpass the capitalist West", and he does not seek to dazzle the people with promises of quick successes. Realistic though this view may be basically, it holds out no solution to China's pressing needs, no method for dealing with her overpopulation, her open or latent unemployment, with the social antagonisms between town and country, and with the demands that the international situation places on China's economy.

Behind the call for "high political standards and low living standards" is the desire and the hope to settle within the framework of what the Russians once described as "War Communism", on the basis, that is, of a roughly egalitarian distribution of extremely scarce economic resources. In Russia this policy led to an impasse and had to be abandoned only three years after the October Revolution. China is practising it —true, with considerable modifications—17 years after her revolution. But for how long can party and Government adhere to a policy which does not offer the people sufficient material incentives for development and growth? Yet, if China's rulers do not wish to embark upon forcible industrialization, they cannot initiate a more ambitious policy as long as China remains isolated and is denied foreign, especially Soviet, aid.

TIES WITH U.S.S.R.

But this only means that all issues of policy, domestic as well as foreign, lead back to the same question, namely, whether China has any possibility of emerging from isolation in the foreseeable future. Has she any chance of resuming contact with the Soviet Union and regaining massive Soviet aid? We have seen that Mr Mao has answered these questions in the negative, and that he urges China to "go it alone" economically, politically, and militarily. This, however, implies virtual reconciliation with China's economic and social backwardness.

It is difficult to believe that political stabilization can be achieved on such a basis. Pressures for a more ambitious policy of economic progress will make themselves felt. A few years ago such pressures caused Mr Mao and his colleagues to undertake the Great Leap. But the resulting disappointments brought about a pause in industrialization. Yet the slow tempo creates its own insurmountable difficulties and is certain to revive the demand for a more forward policy. Mr Mao may then call for another Great Leap or else his entire approach will have to come under review.

The fact is that, as a dynamic revolutionary Power, China cannot "go it alone"; and that the Maoist policy, committed as it is to isolationism, will be unable to cope with the crises to come. Whether these will develop in Mr Mao's lifetime or later must, of course, remain an open question.

THE FUTURE

In the inner party struggle the problem of the succession to Mr Mao has loomed large behind the more topical issues. For the time being Marshal Lin Piao has emerged as the winner, and Mr Liu Shao-chi looks like the loser. But it is perhaps too early to take the outcome of the struggle for granted. For one thing, in post-revolutionary regimes the heir-apparent appointed in the dictator's lifetime is not necessarily the man who exercises power after the dictator's death. Stalin's heir-apparent—Malenkov—did not succeed in imposing himself upon his colleagues; he had to yield his place to Mr Khrushchev who had been well below him in the party hierarchy. But even if Marshal Lin Piao were to be Mr Mao's real successor it does not follow that he will necessarily continue the policy with which he is at present associated.

When the call for a revision and change of Mr Mao's policy, the call now so furiously silenced, rises again, Marshal Lin Piao may well have to yield to it. Mr Mao's departure, even though he may still be able to swim the Yangtse is not likely to be far off; and with it some reaction against the latest version of Maoism is all too likely to set in.

The reaction need not be as severe as was the Russian revulsion against Stalinism, for Mr Mao's place in the history of the Chinese revolution, whose presiding spirit he has been for so long, is much more solidly assured than Stalin's place was in Moscow's Mausoleum. Mr Mao has been in one person China's Lenin and Stalin. But at the end of his road he shows more and more similarity to Stalin; and the latest orgy of his personality cult underlines the likeness. It is as if he has outlived himself and is already a relic of the past, an embodiment of China's backwardness and isolationism. When the reaction against these aspects of Maoism comes, his successor or successors, whoever they are, will have to act as its mouthpieces and agents. A la longue China cannot keep up her ideological aspirations and "go it alone".—*World Copyright Reserved.*

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FEARS OF CHINESE ACTIVITY IN THAILAND

BANGKOK USES AID TO TACKLE SUBVERSION AND DISCONTENT

By DILIP MUKERJEE

THAILAND is marked out by some U.S. strategists as the likely scene of the next major confrontation between China and the USA. The foreboding finds an echo within the country; Thai leaders are greatly exercised over the danger of Communist subversion.

Their fears are readily understood. The explanation lies partly in the fact that the military dictatorship running Thailand, which is unrepresentative but perhaps not unpopular, tends to put down almost any kind of dissent to Communist inspiration. The danger from Communism, real or otherwise, has been used twice in the last 10 years to justify the overthrow of the Government in power.

Another part of the explanation is the real danger of local uprisings (patterned along the lines on which Indian Communists were working in Telengana) in two areas of Thailand; the poorest and least fertile north-east province bordering on Laos, and in the forest-covered areas of the far south adjoining Malaysia. The north-east is a particularly sensitive area because airfields here are believed to serve as staging posts for American sorties into Vietnam, and for operations against the Pathet Laos. This is strongly denied in Bangkok but knowledgeable foreign observers do not take the denials seriously.

In both areas, there are economic and social factors at work which tend to put the local people at odds with the régime. A sizable proportion of the population in the north-east is of Laotian origin with closer emotional links across the border than with Bangkok. Likewise, four of the southern provinces are predominantly Muslim with racial affinities with the Malays. Both areas are economically backward. Agricultural growth in the north-east has been held back for want of access to markets and by the lack of irrigation. In the south, the declining fortunes of natural rubber —the area's main product— have accentuated economic distress.

TWO-PRONGED SCHEME

Thailand's rulers are tackling the problem of discontent in these pockets in two ways. They are, on the one hand, strengthening the security apparatus (in co-operation with Malaysia in the south), and trying, on the other, to promote quickest development to give these remote areas a greater sense of belonging. A big road-building programme is under way, while the railway network is being expanded wherever feasible. Both have undoubtedly a defence angle, but should yield also an economic bonus.

This is the more likely because Thailand is sensibly concentrating a sizable chunk of development expenditure under its seven year plan (1961-67) on the outlying areas of the country, especially the north-east. The Americans who are closely involved in many spheres of Thai life are strongly in favour of such dispersal. They are helping to build the country's largest and finest hospital at Chiengmai, the principal town of the north-east. Also noteworthy is the parallel effort on education: new universities have been started in both the disaffected areas.

quarters) has brought the country massive aid from several quarters for the improvement of transport and telecommunications.

And leaving nothing to chance, Bangkok has on hand a scheme for resettling people from the densely-populated central plains—the country's heartland—in the south. This move recalls suggestions being made in India with similar intent to encourage ex-Servicemen to take up residence in border areas.

Security measures may be important in the immediate context, but Thailand's best possible defence against subversion is provided by her remarkable economic growth. In the 10 years ended 1964, national income rose by 5.8% a year; the recent performance is even better; growth in both 1964 and 1965 exceeded 7%.

Aid has undoubtedly made an important contribution to this result. Economic assistance from the USA, mostly in the form of outright grants, has flowed in at the rate of about $30m a year since 1955, which works out to about one dollar per head. No firm figures are available for aid from other sources, but the Bank of Thailand's data for balance of payments show that the inflow of medium and long-term capital (a part of which must be on private account) has been around another $70m. In sum, the injection of foreign funds into Thailand earmarked for economic development, has averaged over $3 per head in recent years

This puts Thailand in a very happy position. Exports pay for only 75% to 85% of the imports (the fluctuations being related to the level of international prices), but the gap is more than covered by the earnings from tourism and the capital inflow. As a result, the Bank of Thailand's foreign reserves have increased in nine years out of the last 10. The total today is sufficient to pay a year's import bills (against less than two months in the case of India or Pakistan).

STRONG CURRENCY

Not surprisingly, the Thai baht is today one of the strongest Asian currencies. This remarkable change has come about in less than 10 years: it was only in September, 1955, that the Government abolished a cumbrous system of exchange controls under which there was a wide gap between the official and free market rates. All exchange transactions now take place in the free market.

Free from foreign exchange worries, Thailand is increasingly able to let imports come in without restrictions. As a Bank of Thailand official pointed out with evident satisfaction, protective tariffs on 30 items were abolished last year. Tariffs are of course levied where necessary to safeguard existing local industry, protection being one of the instruments the Government is using to encourage foreign investment.

Between 1961 and 1965, over three-quarters of the foreign investment to date. This is partly because of old connexions established in the forties when Thailand was Tokyo's ally, and its principal base for military operations in South-East Asia. The Japanese started with textile mills, but they are rapidly moving into local manufacture of light engineering products. Americans and British are coming in too; Shell, for instance, is setting up a large oil refinery some 80 miles from Bangkok. The stimulus of foreign investment, combined with local private enterprise, has given Thai industrialization an impressive but uncoordinated start.

Industrial horizons are widening. Tin ore which was formerly sent to Malaya for smelting is now to be processed at home. More important, Thailand has a high steel off-take per capita, twice as high as that of Pakistan. All this implies more capital-intensive and time-taking development in the years ahead. Almost certainly the State will have to take a hand to mobilize adequate savings; it may also have to supervise growth more closely to prevent imbalances.

MARGINAL INDUSTRY

For all the advance made in recent years, however, industry remains a marginal activity. The main thrust of growth comes from agriculture in which the Thais have achieved considerable successes. Over the 15 years 1948-63 for which comparable data are available, crop output has increased at an annual rate of 4.4% a year, only a notch below Taiwan's all-Asian record of 4.5% a year.

Thailand has chalked up this record almost without trying. Co-operative credit is practically non-existent; there is still only one rural extension worker for every 6,000 families although Americans are trying to sponsor something like an intensive agricultural programme on the Indian pattern. The use of fertilizer is extremely limited: no more than two kg per hectare compared with the Indian figure of three kg. Yet rice output has doubled in the last ten years, the increase coming almost entirely from higher yields; maize output has risen eight-fold; and jute fibres three-fold.

Thai economists are themselves at a loss to explain the phenomenon. Their best guess is that growth represents the farmers' response to increasing profitability; the steady export demand for Thai rice, maize and jute has indeed brought the farmer handsome rewards.

OWNER FARMERS

And most important, the benefits have gone to the man behind the plough. There has been no appropriation by intermediaries en route because Thailand is a peasant economy untroubled by the problem of landlordism. Secondly, the widening transport network has brought an increasing area within the ambit of market farming. Thirdly, the fact of high literacy—68% compared with India's 24% —has undoubtedly contributed something to the outcome.

But the easy phase of growth is coming to an end, and the future will depend much on the Government's ability to give the economy a sense of direction. Just now the war in Vietnam is giving the economy a fortuitous boost with the income generated by thousands of U.S. soldiers coming in for short spells of "rest and recreation" making an interesting parallel with the benefit Japan received from the Korean war in the early fifties. But "R and R" can hardly build abiding foundations for growth.

At the same time as Thailand is working out for itself a new

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FIVE COMMUNIST CONGRESSES—I

RIFTS AND REVERSALS FOLLOW STALIN'S RIGIDITY

HOPES RAISED BY KHRUSHCHEV FOILED BY DULLES

• By K. P. S. MENON

THE 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took place at the end of March; and its significance is still being assessed. In making the assessment, different standards are adopted in different parts of the world. This is natural, but the assessment is likely to prove wrong if the 23rd Congress is treated in isolation and not in relation to previous Congresses.

When I reached Moscow in the autumn of 1952, the 19th Congress was in session. When I left Moscow nine years later, preparations for the 22nd Congress were in full swing. And now the 23rd Congress has taken place. Each of these Congresses has a character of its own, derived from the internal as well as international situation. Doubtless personality has also played a part. But the personality of leaders is itself the outcome and the reflection of the times which threw them up and for which they were specially suited

For instance, Stalin was the apotheosis of the harsh post-revolution decades, when the Revolution was often in danger; Mr Khrushchev reflected the years of ferment after World War II: and the personality of Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin is suited for a period when consolidation is the crying need. Not the creation of a Communist State or the reinterpretation and revivification of the Communist creed.

Party Congresses in the Soviet Union have far greater importance than in the Western world. In the USSR the Party is the State: truly, the CPSU can exclaim, as Louis XIV did, "l'etat c'est moi". With all the criticism and self-criticism, the self-congratulation and vituperation usual on such occasions, the Party Congresses reveal the trends in the Soviet Union and the direction of the winds that blow.

STALIN'S LAST

The 19th Congress was the last in Stalin's life and the first to have been held for many years None had been held since 1939, ostensibly because of the exigencies of the War and its aftermath. Even before 1939, the Congress met at increasingly infrequent intervals. In Lenin's time, on the contrary, the Party Congress used to be an annual affair where great political and ideological issues were thrashed out in the open amidst the resounding clash of conflicting orators. But in Stalin's time the Congress became an instrument for registering his will.

The 19th Congress was no exception. It was dominated by Stalin and the domination was all the more striking because of his silence. He did not open his mouth except at the end of the Congress to thank the fraternal delegates who had come to attend it. Just before the Congress, however, he published a thesis called "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". It had hardly seen the light of day when it became a classic. Stalin dwelt at length on the growing "contradictions" in the capitalist world and predicted that the time was coming when, tired of American domination, France, and later England, would find themselves at war with the USA. This proposition at once became a canon in the Communist creed.

In the one speech that Stalin made at the end of the session he thanked the Communist parties of other countries for having stood by the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union was alone, a lonely Communist island in the seething sea of capitalism. Now that the USSR had become powerful, said Stalin, it would stand by all other Communist parties in their struggle for national liberation.

I received a telegram from Mr Tyabji, who was then Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, asking me to protest against this statement, revealing the Soviet Government's blatant intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. To this I demurred. There was no reason to think that Stalin's remark was directed specially against India; indeed, one or two stray references to India, made during the 19th Congress, were not unfriendly. I did not see why India should be so hypersensitive; and, in any case, it would have been awkward for me to begin my term in the USSR by launching an inane protest. In diplomacy I have always believed in Talleyrand's dictum: surtout, pas de zele. I was glad that Mr Nehru agreed with my views, and the instructions conveyed to me in Mr Tyabji's telegram were rescinded.

ODIOUS MEMORY

The 20th Congress was held in February, 1956. By that time Stalin was dead, and Stalinism had become a grim and almost odious memory Mr Khrushchev, with an effervescent vitality, all his own, had emerged as the leader of the country. Hundreds of concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere were closed down With the purge of Beria—the last of the purges in the Stalinist style—the Secret Police ceased to be a terror The Iron Curtain was all but dismantled Soviet citizens started travelling outside the country in increasing numbers; and Moscow became almost a Mecca for Heads of State and leaders of Governments from different parts of Asia and Africa.

Mr Khrushchev himself travelled to fraternal China, to hitherto renegade Yugoslavia and to India, Burma and Afghanistan which had been regarded as ostensibly independent, but really tied to the chariot-wheels of the West. In India, the Soviet leaders had an exuberant reception, almost as exuberant as the most friendly and tumultuous reception extended to Mr Jawaharlal Nehru in the USSR in the middle of 1955. Thus, it was in an atmosphere of elation that the 20th Congress met.

Mr Khrushchev's great merit was that he realized that Russia was now very different from what it had been when Stalin took over, a land of illiterate, superstitious, semi-barbarous moudjiks. "Barbarism". Stalin said, "must be driven out by barbarous means". Apart from barbarous means, however, Stalin adopted enlightened means of educating his people. The result was that poses, attitudes and policies which impressed an earlier generation would no longer be tolerated by the people. In other words, as Isaac Deutscher put it, Stalin himself made Stalinism impossible

The sign of an educated mind is that it begins to question dogma Three thousand years ago, a Hindu scripture compared the mechanical recitation of the Vedas to "the croaking of intoxicated frogs"—a phrase applicable to the blind upholders of any dogma, and not of Marxist dogma alone. The 20th Congress modified and even discarded some of the out-dated dogmas of Marxism. In a nuclear age, it would have been absurd to go on repeating that war is inevitable or that violence is essential for the transformation of society or that there is only one kind of socialism and one path to socialism. Such dicta, which used to be regarded as sacrosanct, were discarded at the 20th Congress; and the term peaceful co-existence which Stalin too had used when it suited him, came to have a new and profound significance, especially in the nuclear age.

BEST IN MARXISM

The 21st Congress was held in January, 1959. The atmosphere of the 21st Congress was different from that of the 20th. It may be described as a conservative Congress. Conservative not reactionary. Conservative in the sense that its main concern was to conserve what was good in Marxism, whereas the main concern of the 20th Congress was to discard what was outdated and obsolete. In particular, the 21st Congress made an effort to preserve unity.

Rifts had begun to appear in the Communist world. Soon after the 20th Congress, Poland started strutting on its own path, which it proudly called "the Polish road to socialism" Hungary did so, too, and nearly walked out of the socialist road into the delectable fields of capitalism and had to be forcefully brought back into the Communist orbit. All this gave a handle to diehards of the Communist Party such as Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, who denounced Mr Khrushchev and even tried to oust him, only to be themselves ousted from the Praesidium and the Central Committee of the Communist Party Predictions by certain foreign observers that Stalin was going to be rehabilitated at the 23rd Congress have not come true

The events in Poland and Hungary and, even more, in China—to which reference will be made later—showed that the modifications of Marxist theory, though they were necessary, inevitable and indeed beneficial to Communism and the world, had certain dangers. Therefore, at the 21st Congress, the chief enemy of Marxism was declared to be revisionism and not dogmatism; and, in order to placate China, its principal bête noire, Yugoslavia, was branded revi-

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sionist The tone towards the Western Powers, too, was harsher than at the 20th Congress. Peaceful co-existence had become a mirage.

For this, the main responsibility must be placed squarely on the shoulders of one man who dominated Western policy during this period, John Foster Dulles. "That Dulles", said the reviewer of my book, *The Flying Troika*, in the Times Literary Supplement, "was intellectually and temperamentally incapable of conceiving of co-existence is one of the most tragic accidents of personality in the whole record of post-war international relations." In the historic decisions of the 20th Congress, Dulles saw nothing more than the retreat of the Soviet Union in face of the superior strength of the West. "The Soviet Union", Dulles said, "is on the run". It is hard to think of a more colossal misjudgment of the great developments which were taking places in the Soviet Union, for they were clearly the outcome of internal urges rather than external pressure.

VISIT TO U.S.A.

Nevertheless, peaceful co-existence continued to be the order of the day in the USSR. The visit of Mr Khrushchev to the USA in September, 1959, and his talks with President Eisenhower roused hopes that there would be a gradual relaxation of tensions as a result of a series of Summit Conferences, the first of which was planned to be held in Paris in May, 1960.

Such hopes were dashed to the ground by the U-2 flight over Soviet territory and its aftermath. They were revived with the advent of President Kennedy, only to recede again as a result of such peripheral events as the Bay of Pigs incident in Cuba and the machinations of the CIA in Laos which caused the overthrow of the neutralist Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma. In the heart of Europe, too, there was an increase of tension, caused by Mr Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. This general deterioration in the international situation was reflected in the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union.

It was in this setting that the 22nd Congress met in Moscow in the autumn of 1961. The most spectacular decision taken at the 22dd Congress was to remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum in Red Square. This meant that even physically Stalin was put, once and for all, in his proper place. And his place was not by the side of the supreme leader, Lenin, in the Mausoleum, but by the side of other great Soviet leaders whose remains have been dug into the walls of the Kremlin, which Pravda once described as "The Holy of Holies of the Russian people".

OPEN BREACH

If this was the most spectacular event, the most significant was the emergence into the open of the rift between the USSR and China. Outwardly, it still took the form of an ideological dispute. The ideology of China had been undergoing various vicissitudes. From the beginning, China looked on the decisions of the 20th Congress with silent disfavour. What the Chinese could not bear was that on Stalin's death Mr Khrushchev behaved as if the mantle of Lenin and Stalin had fallen on his shoulders and not on those of Mao Tse-tung, to whom was due—according to the Chinese—the rightful rôle of High Priest of Communism.

China, however, supported Poland when she began to walk on her own road to socialism. China even cast its protective mantle over the Polish patriots and saved them from the wrath

(Continued on page 7 column 5)

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GUNS IN THE NATHU LA

THERE are several conceivable explanations of the incident in the Nathu La on Monday, described as the most serious since 1962. It may have been Peking's comment on the State visit to India by the Chogyal of Sikkim, and the warm pro-Indian sentiments expressed on that occasion. Though, as the Indian Note to China points out, the Sikkim-Tibet border is not merely well-defined but, unlike the McMahon line, recognized by the Chinese, there have been a series of incursions into Sikkimese territory since August 17, culminating in the present shooting. All this may seem to show a sense of timing. More remotely possible is that it is a reaction to the incident last Friday in Delhi, when four members of the Chinese Embassy attempted to evade the travel restrictions by flying to Calcutta without permission, and were foiled in that attempt. It would seem more likely that the Chinese would have so reacted, if they intended to do so at all, after the Embassy was attacked earlier this year by a Delhi mob, in reprisal for the beating up of Mr Raghunath and Mr Vijai; but Chinese behaviour is sometimes indirect. Though mortars and three-inch guns were used as well as rifles, and the casualties seem to have been considerable, it may have been no more than the decision of a local commander to give his troops, perhaps fresh troops, some battle training with live ammunition; in which case, it is to be hoped, he and his men got as good as they gave. All this lies within the inscrutable Chinese mind, which since the "cultural revolution" has not become easier to penetrate.

What the incident does demonstrate, and not this incident alone, is continued Chinese truculence; but perhaps a truculence indicating insecurity rather than strength. There is further evidence, in the expulsion of three Japanese Press correspondents, of a great desire to hush up what is going on inside China. There seems no doubt, at least in Japan, that these men were expelled for the same basic reason as was Mr Raghunath: that they could understand Chinese. Since many Japanese journalists can at least read Chinese characters, for the same reason they are not to be replaced; Reuter's man is still under house arrest, and the foreign Press corps in Peking continues to dwindle. Further south, the Macao border was closed on Sunday, apparently because of clashes between troops and anti-Maoists in adjacent Chinese territory. The situation in and around Canton remains confused, perhaps to an extent relieving the pressure on Hongkong. Though the Maoists claim to have recovered control of Wuhan, their position in some of the western provinces is still disputed; nor are the industrial workers in the big cities said to be greatly enamoured of the Red Guards. With all this going on, Chinese capacity for major mischief is perhaps limited.

Meanwhile, however, the incident has caught the Union Government in a very awkward position. Mrs Gandhi has not yet replaced her resigned External Affairs Minister. Accordingly the Defence Minister was scheduled to replace the now unavailable Mr Chagla at the coming U.N. session. The Home Minister had intended to go to Kashmir, but has now cancelled the trip. Several other members of the Government are, or intended to be, out of Delhi as a sort of commandos delegated to look into regional law and order. No doubt the situation will sort itself out, with people holding watching briefs for each other's departments. No doubt the armed forces are in a condition of readiness, just in case, though defence publicity as usual has not distinguished itself: Peking Radio gave exact figures, even if possibly mendacious, of Chinese casualties while New Delhi was merely talking of some Indian soldiers killed and many injured; the world, as usual, got the enemy version first. Finally, when Parliament reassembles, the Prime Minister will certainly hear more from the 70 MPs who think that diplomatic relations with China have gone on quite long enough.

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MIXED REACTIONS IN ISRAEL TO NASSER'S ROLE

PEOPLE'S MOOD NOT REFLECTED IN GOVERNMENT'S STANCE

By WAGUIH GHALI

THE most popular film in Israel just now is an Israeli documentary entitled The Six Days War. One has to fight a way through the crowds to buy a ticket. I managed to get a seat in a corner and sat imagining myself conspicuous and feeling rather sheepish at the thought of watching Israel's military glorification at the expense of my own countrymen.

Sure enough, the famous eye-patch appeared and there was clapping and cheering. Some minutes later there was a tremendous roar and tumultuous clapping. Nasser had come on to the screen. Fighting broke out in the audience and I never saw the film. This in the very heart of Israel, in its capital.

During the next few days I interviewed three very different people A high-ranking police officer, a charming Israeli Army General and one of the exiled Arab notables. Among other things, I asked the same two questions of each of them. The first question was whether they were surprised at the cheering of Nasser in Israel (by Arabs, I hasten to add).

None was surprised. The police officer told me that he knew from the "security people" that Nasser's popularity had not diminished in the least, certainly not in the Arab villages of Israel in spite of talk of "donating their blood to the Israeli troops", and that in his opinion, although the reaction to the film was controllable in Israel it would cause riots in Gaza.

Individuals in the Israeli Army are completely disarming by their candidness. From nearly all I have spoken to I get the impression they are very much above politics or propaganda. The Israeli General I spoke to told me that had he been Egyptian he would have been a Nasser man, and that if there had been no Nasser, he would have tried to be one himself.

PEACE FROM NASSER?

My second question was: "Don't you think that peace between you and us could only come through Nasser, and that the more Nasser established himself as leader of the Arab world, the more chances there would be for peace?" Both the police officer and the General thought that was the case, but they regretted the Egyptian radio broadcasts, Shukairy, the fedayeen, etc. "Although", the General admitted, "there has hardly been any penetration into Israel from Gaza in recent years".

I had great difficulty in contacting the exiled Arab and, paradoxically, we parted on very bad terms. I reached him through an old school friend, one of the Zananiris, a still powerful and rich family whether they are under Jordanian or Israeli rule. The notable was haughty but intelligent and faithful to his king. Being a genuine Hashemite, he personally disdained Nasser. Nevertheless, his conception of Israel tallied very much with what I had begun to sense.

"Of course", he said, "the riff-raff would applaud Nasser anywhere, even in the capital of Israel" To the second question, whether an understanding with [illegible] would eventually have to come through Nasser, he shook his head. "There will never be peace," he said. No doubt Nasser wants peace with Israel —he only uses Israel to gather the Arab masses behind him for his own projects; but Israel does not want peace."

I told him that I had been impressed by the fact that nearly every Israeli I had talked to seemed genuinely to yearn for peace. He did not contradict this, but on the contrary supported it by saying that he had been treated with great courtesy by the officials, by the police to whom he had to report three times a day, and by representatives of the security police who visited him. He too felt that the people really wanted peace. "But", he continued, "the Zionist movement, which is very close to and controls the Israeli Government, has a blue-print of objectives in the Middle East and they do not want peace until all these objectives are reached."

This Zionist long-drawn blueprint of objectives in the Middle East is passionately believed in by every Arab intellectual with whom I have spoken, whether Jordanian or Israeli. When I remarked that if that is the case, then the Arabs are playing right into Israel's hands by giving them excuses to carry out this plan, I was always told that most of those "so-called" provocations have been carried out by Israelis themselves; and as an early example of this, I was told about the Zionists blowing up synagogues in Iraq, many years ago, to frighten the Iraqi Jews into migrating to Israel. One very literate Arab swore Ahmad Shukairy (the Palestinian leader) is a Zionist agent. (I find this a most sensible belief.)

OUT OF TOUCH

The conception of Israel I shared with the exiled Arab notable, is that the Israeli Government's mood is completely divorced from that of the people and that it does not reflect the people's feeling in any way. Before reaching Israel, I naturally expected to see a lot of arrogance and elation among the population. I was moved and surprised to see that I had been wrong. The only arrogance I encountered came from English and American Jewish tourists living in expensive hotels, wooed by the Government and disdained by the ordinary Israelis. What was even more remarkable was that when I confessed myself to be Egyptian to groups of Israelis their only reaction was to tell me that "Nasser has good intentions for the Egyptians, but that he is making mistakes". This view, as I have already mentioned, is typical of every non-Government Israeli I have met, from taxi-drivers to generals in the army.

The contrast, when one speaks to Government officials, or examines Government policies, is striking, particularly since this is a democratic Government And, no matter how imaginary the "Midde East blueprint" is, it is very easy to believe in it.

The most unpleasant moments I spent in Israel were those when I attended meetings of some of the innumerable American Zionist organizations being addressed by Government spokesmen and by Ministers. Here, I felt, the speaker really said what he thought Biblical passages condoning everything Israel does and extending even the present borders shouts of "Aliya" (the bridge between American Jews and Israel) and pleas to come and settle in the newly acquired territories of Israel. This to an audience whose justification for settling in the Middle East is, to most Arabs, incomprehensible.

Once more from the Israeli side, I talked to a university lecturer and chief adviser to the Government on Arab affairs. "Nasser", he told me, "must concentrate on Egypt and not interfere in the affairs of other Arab States". He refused to acknowledge that Nasser has a right to care about the welfare of non-Egyptian Arabs as much as Israeli Jews care about non-Israeli Jews. I felt that he, like other Government spokesmen, believed in some Jewish divine right which is denied other people.

Gaza apart (where the population find even a temporary Israeli domination intolerable), there are three different Arab opinions about the future in what constitutes Israel at present: the Arabs who have lived in Israel for 20 years, the Old City Arabs, and the West Bank Arabs.

The Israeli Arabs, who have lived under martial law for 19 years, have been jostled from their fatalistic complacency by what they have just seen. They came into contact with prosperous Old City Arab merchants, and they are indignant at their own State. They had always been led to believe that under Israeli rule they enjoyed a very much higher standard of living to any other Arab. They also seem to be suddenly aware that they are not sharing in the Israeli standard of living (a standard of living dependent on foreign donations and unrelated to the country's productivity and earnings). Paradoxically, just when the Arabs have been devastatingly defeated, they are complaining bitterly about their fate, and they are now talking about the "struggle must go on" and cheering Nasser in the cinema—something they would not have dared to do a year ago. Passive up to now, they see the future as a militant struggle.

The Old City Arabs are very disunited in their opinions about the future. If they are prospering under the new rulers and are not worried by rumours (emanating from Amman) that their business is going to be [illegible] will [illegible] turn to Jordan. Plans for settling Jews in the Old City and in the West Bank are already under way and the pleas and encouragements to Jews abroad to settle in Israel and to populate these territories confirm that the final decision has been taken.

From *The Times*, London.

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DIALOGUE WITH THE HILLS

SIR,—Your leading article "Dialogue with the Hills" (September 1-2) reveals confused thinking. Right from the beginning a Hill State was demanded by the hill people. But the Government came out with different plans and devices—the Scottish pattern, hill Ministry, sub-State and what not.

But the thinking of the hill people is clear. They rejected the various plans. They want to be fully and truly Indian, not mere local tribes inhabiting the border. Down through the years they have been crying for a hill State and a hill State alone. Negotiations culminated in the pronouncement of January 13, 1967, by the Centre. But the Mehta Committee is still harping on ideas passing into disuse. The hill people have long ago rejected the Pataskar Commission report, yet the Mehta Committee dwells on the same rejected basis.

The hill people are fed up with the folly and tardiness of the Assam Government. The Centre should not compel them to dislike the Centre itself. Your editorial is unwholesome inasmuch as you hold that the APHLC should know that the Mehta formula emerged from the consensus of the different political parties of Assam—but indeed excluding the APHLC. Is it not a political party which commands a second place in the Assam State Assembly? Political parties other than the APHLC are all of the plains people.

But if the Centre betrays us, the hill people, by fooling and pushing us around by dubious devices, there will be no sense in further discussion by the APHLC with the Centre. Let the Mehta Committee disband itself. We want to be citizens of India completely and fully and not just local tribes hanging around. All that the so-called Assam political parties want and stress is integrity and security. Do they mean to say that by creating Maharashtra, Haryana etc the integrity of India has been jeopardized? Certainly not. India itself is a union of States, it is not a kingdom. Contented inhabitants, in a border State or a Central State, are more than an asset to the country at large.

The argument that defence will be affected when a hill State is formed has no logic or sense. Defence has never been the concern of a State. The forces on our border are not of the Assam Government's or paid for by it. Further, their stand that a hill State is not economically viable is also faliacious and unsound. Is Assam itself and, for that matter, India itself economically viable? Since we are depending on the USA, it does not mean that India should be merged in the USA or that Bhutan should be merged in India on the ground of the large-scale subsidy given.

Let the Centre not delay forming a hill State. We implore the Government of India in their wisdom to heed and respond to our needs and not to betray the trust and confidence we repose in them. At least let them be honest and keep their word. The urgency of the matter is very real.—Yours, etc., A LENGSA, K. HAJER and others.

Jorhat, Sept 2.

The Only Answer

Sir,—Economically and geographically a separate hill State will not be congenial to the interest of the hill people themselves. The pity is that even the hill people have not been able to agree on a joint formula. One should completely agree with the suggestion offered by you in your leading article "Dialogue with the Hills": "To make a separate State out of each hill district would surely be impracticable, quite apart from the undesirability of such fragmentation. In the circumstances, therefore, the greatest possible autonomy for the hill regions within a less rigid State framework than obtains elsewhere in the country seems the only answer".—Yours, etc., KALI CHARAN BANERJEE.

Calcutta, Sept 2.

Sir,—The reorganization of Assam should be regarded as a national problem because of the strategic importance of this State. The people of the Brahmaputra Valley are compelled to start a secessionist movement, as their problems were never understood by fellow Indians. The problems of Assam will be more serious if the Central Government delays in understanding the real condition of this State. The APHLC should not take an antagonistic attitude to the plains people. We the plains people are no hurdle to their development. The Mehta Committee's suggestion to give much autonomy to the hill districts is a good one. For the integration of a strategically important State, the hill people should welcome the suggestion.—Yours, etc., APURBA HAZARIKA.

Tezpur, Sept 2.

Some Salient Points

Sir,—Your leading article "Dialogue with the Hills", though constructive, fails to consider certain salient points which lie at the root of the demand for a separate hill State or a federal scheme.

In the course of these 20 years of independence, the ruling community in Assam have, by their overbearing behaviour and aggressive linguistic parochialism, failed to enlist the support of any other community in a State which, unlike any other in India, is composed of so many different communities and has done all that was possible to nip in the bud the hope and enthusiasm ushered in by independence among these communities. By totally disregarding their feelings and interests the ruling class has succeeded in alienating them and creating a sense of insecurity among them. The language riot of 1960 is an example. The ruthless pursuit of self-interest by the ruling class accounts for the distrust and the feeling of helplessness which have crystallized in the demands for a hill State, a Bodo tribal State, a Kamtapur State, etc., in Assam. These feelings have taken deep roots and are not to be removed by half-way palliative measures now. I also fail to understand why the APHLC has been made to feel that the commitments of the Centre were only to deceive them. Why should Delhi playfully turn all the hill districts into Naga hills or Mizo hills by playing fast and loose with them?

If a separate hill State or federation is not feasible, why should such units as are contiguous and part of one mountain range as the Garo hills and the K and J hills whose people are in the vanguard of the demand for a seperate State or federation, not be brought under the Central administration like Manipur or Tripura and allowed to develop according to their liking, if so desired by them, and relieved of oppressive and unsympathetic rule?—Yours, etc., MAN GOVINDA GOSWAMI.

Bilasiara (Assam), Sept 4.

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THE SOVIET VIEW

WORLD WAR THREAT IN U.S. POLICIES

DETENTE POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

By VLADLEN KACHANOV

IT is natural that in problems of war and peace, peop wherever they live, should look today to the USS and the USA—the recognized leaders of the two wor camps opposing each other—for a lead. The world's po tical weather is often determined by the barometer Soviet-American relations. And if the barometer need indicates "fair", people can rest assured that a local co flict, wherever it breaks out, will not turn into a worl disaster, that the mushroom cloud will not black out th sun tomorrow and will not reduce the fruit of man's labou to radioactive ashes.

But, alas, the needle of this barometer has long been indicating "rain".

Why are Soviet-American relations strained today? This is explained, first of all, by diametrically opposite foreign policy trends in the two countries. Underlying Soviet foreign policy is the principle of peaceful co-existence of States with different socio-economic systems. The Soviet Union has unswervingly adhered to this principle for the past 50 years.

Peaceful co-existence presupposes a renunciation of war as a means of settling international issues, and the settlement of these issues through negotiations; equality, mutual understanding and trust among States, taking each other's interests into account; non-interference in each other's affairs and the recognition of every nation's right to tackle all the problems confronting it independently; a strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; and the development of economic and cultural co-operation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.

Because it proclaims the principles of peaceful co-existence, however, the Soviet Union is not going to give up its ideology, its profound conviction that Communism will prevail in the end. Similarly, it does not demand that the Western countries should stop believing in the eternity of capitalism. Time will show who is right, whose ideology is better suited to the interests of all mankind. But a point of view should be proved only by peaceful means and not by force of arms; the latter course can only hurl mankind back by many centuries. And as long as the socialist and capitalist systems exist on our planet, the relationship between the two should, in the Soviet people's opinion, have the character not of a temporary truce before battle, but of broad, mutually advantageous economic and cultural co-operation.

CAPITAL SINS

Unfortunately, certain circles in capitalist countries, the USA above all, do not want to co-operate with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of the principle of peaceful co-existence. This is explained by the fact that the principle of peaceful co-existence is so very different from the policy conducted by the present U.S. leaders—a policy which, judging by all circumstances, they are not going to give up.

The USA is, among capitalist Powers, the most intensely opposed to the principle of peaceful co-existence which proclaims non-interference in each other's affairs and, consequently, a strict observance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. The American leaders assume, without any grounds, the right to decide for other peoples the political system that should be established in their countries. The USA interferes in the internal affairs of other nations and even sends troops abroad to prevent the collapse of regimes that are rotten through and through and have lost the confidence of their peoples.

Examples abound. The U.N. popular regimes established in certain Latin American countries, not without the assistance of American diplomats and dollars, are trusted and favoured by Washington. But the revolution in Cuba, supported by the entire people of that island, evoked the extreme displeasure of U.S. ruling circles which tried repeatedly to overthrow the people's Government.

But are such actions compatible with international law or with the U.N. Charter? Do they not contradict the numerous statements by U.S. leaders themselves to the effect that they do not want to impose their system on other peoples who are unwilling to accept it?

LATIN BACKYARD

The "doctrine of incompatibility" is a theoretical foundation for aggressive actions against any Latin American country, against any national liberation movement in that part of the world. Just recall the American intervention in the Dominican Republic or the recent statement by Mr Linovitz, U.S. representative in the Organization of American States, to the effect that his country would support any (!) action against Cuba, suggested by Venezuela. Is it not clear that Washington ignores all notions of international law and is trying to act in Latin America as if the territory was the USA's own backyard?

And now let us look at another hemisphere—where the USA is waging another undeclared war against the Vietnamese people. Whom are the Americans defending in South Vietnam? The answer is: a hateful, unpopular regime that would not have held out a week without the support of American bayonets. The USA has grossly interfered in the internal affairs of that country by trying to suppress by force the wrath of the people who rose in arms against the Saigon ruling clique, a clique that has discredited itself.

It is only natural that the Soviet Union should not put up with such imperialist plunder. Such actions are in glaring contradiction to the elementary norms of international law—in particular, with the U.N. Charter that forbids interference in the internal affairs of other States under any pretext whatsoever. Nobody can deprive a people of the right to choose either the form of government or the economic system that is best in accordance with its sovereign will. And if a nation decides that the existing form of government or the prevailing economic system no longer suits its interests, it has the right to make whatever change it considers appropriate.

RIGHT TO CHANGE

That is what the great American democrat, Thomas Jefferson, once said. He was convinced that if any form of government became ruinous and harmful to the interests of the people, the people had the right to change or destroy it and to establish a new government, basing it on those principles and organizing it in the form that would most suitably ensure the safety and happiness of the nation.

The worsening relations between the USSR and the USA in the last few years is explained precisely by the aggressive policy of the mightiest of the Western Powers and by the disregard by certain quarters in the USA of the sovereign rights and territorial inviolability of other countries and other peoples.

Pursuing the course of escalation in Vietnam, the American leaders seem to think, strangely enough, that they can at the same time broaden and improve relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. They imply that they are ready to accept the principle of peaceful co-existence between the USSR and the USA but, at the same time, discard this principle as regards small countries and replace it by a policy of direct armed interference in the people's internal affairs. President Johnson, in particular, has expressed himself in this vein.

The USSR categorically rejects the absurd point of view that the great Powers can improve relations between themselves, even though worsening relations with other countries. The principle of peaceful co-existence is of a universal character—those States that do recognize it should pursue a similar policy in their relations with both the great Powers and small countries.

The escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the intensification of bombing of North Vietnam in particular, has already led American aviation into making a piratical attack on the Soviet merchant ship "Turkestan". As a result, a Soviet sailor was killed, and several others were wounded. A little earlier, during provocative manoeuvres by American warships in the Sea of Japan near the Soviet coast, an American destroyer collided with two Soviet destroyers and seriously damaged them entirely because of the unlawful actions of the American commander. Such actions by the American military are very dangerous and are fraught with grave consequences. The Soviet people's indignation over such provocations is easy to understand. One can imagine the reaction of American public opinion if a big group of Soviet

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warships carried out manoeuvres near New York or San Francisco.

ON THE BRINK

American leaders certainly understand that the USSR has the necessary means of ensuring the safety of its ships. And if, all the same, they resort to anti-Soviet provocations, this means that they are deliberately trying to worsen Soviet-American relations and increase international tension. Washington seems to miss the old policy of brinkmanship that has long outlived its usefulness. The policy did no credit to the USA during the lifetime of John Foster Dulles; and it is not going to do the USA any credit now.

Cuba and Vietnam are by no means the only parts of the world where U.S. policy conflicts with the interests of the people; these interests have always been defended by the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, the Bonn revanchists are reaching for nuclear weapons. The USA is encouraging these ambitions, which threaten the world in every way. In the Balkans, Greek reactionaries carried out a fascist putsch with the sure knowledge of the favourable attitude of the USA. In West Asia, Israel launched into a military adventure against the Arab countries: it knows that Uncle Sam will surely take its side.

Whichever way you look at it, the USA is backing reactionary regimes and trying to dictate its will to the people of the world. As long as it conducts such a policy, the USA cannot hope for an improvement of relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union will go on resolutely fighting the policy of aggression, no matter who pursues it.

Does it follow from the above that an improvement in Soviet-American relations is impossible in the near future? No, in my opinion, it does not. Although aggressive sentiments prevail in Washington, other attitudes also exist in the American capital. For all we know, more sober-minded politicians may gain the upper hand in Washington tomorrow. Is such a supposition really fantastic? After all, the Soviet-American dialogue has developed quite favourably during certain periods. There were underwater reefs then too, but both sides somehow managed to keep clear of them.

ONE WORLD VISION

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the outstanding American President, believed that for civilization to survive, it was necessary to develop the science of human inter-relations—the ability of all peoples to live and work in one world. Unfortunately, not all of Mr Roosevelt's successors in the high office of U.S. President have followed his advice, although there has never been a lack of assurances of peace from them.

Mankind expects from the U.S. leaders not beautiful words about the desirability of a détente, but concrete deeds. And the most urgent deed of all should be to terminate U.S. aggression in Vietnam; withdraw American armed forces from that country; and to grant to the Vietnamese people their legitimate right to solve their own problems as stipulated under the 1954 Geneva agreements. It is only in this way that the international climate can be improved and, consequently, USSR-U.S. harmony promoted. This principled stand of the USSR ensues from the basic demands of the policy of peaceful co-existence.

But why has the author of this commentary not touched upon concrete problems connected with the development of Soviet-American relations in the spheres of trade, culture and other affairs? The reader may well ask this. The point is that all these problems are derivative of the cardinal problem of improving political relations between the two Powers. I am sure that as soon as they find the common language to settle their political disputes, it will not be too difficult to solve other problems to the mutual advantage of both countries.

In the wake of the disappointing outcome of the Glassboro summit, Mr Kachanov, Political Commentator for the Novosti Press Agency, explains why, in his view, the differences between the two Super Powers cannot be substantially reduced on any major issue in the present circumstances. The USA's approach to world problems, he believes, is radically different from the Soviet Union's, which he describes as peaceful co-existence. It is not impossible to bridge the gulf, but the present leaders of the USA must first believe, as President Roesevelt did, in "the ability of all peoples to live and work in one world". The test of this belief, he says, is Vietnam.

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Vicarious Satisfaction In Britain Over Israeli Victory

By ABU ABRAHAM.

TO me one of the disturbing aspects of the recent Arab-Israeli conflict was the spectacle of ordinary, normally peaceful and gentle Arabs and Jews actually itching for battle. And then when the thing blew up, the passions were violent—even here in Britain.

Socialist Jews who were prominent in anti-war demonstrations in the past were now vehement partisans. An Oxford professor was raving like a market rabble-rouser in the columns of The Times. In the House of Commons, Labour supporters of Israel were screaming at party colleagues who attempted to explain the Arab case. When Israel won the war, there was a great feeling of jubilation among some of my friends, the same people who would have been horrified at the spectacle of such militarist gloating if it had been indulged in by someone else.

While Jewish partisanship in the war was straightforward, British reactions were rather complex. Memories of Suez still rankle among the majority, and the thought of teaching Mr Nasser a lesson was an attractive one. Ogre figures are indispensable for chauvinism; the image of Mr Nasser as a ranting, fanatical enemy of the West has been built up over the years by the Press and the politicians.

Christian Complex

One had, therefore, the curious spectacle of the traditionally pro-Arab and anti-Jewish elements in Britain being fiercely on Israel's side, and the traditionally pro-Israel people, mainly Socialists who have admired the socialism of Israel's early development, being strongly critical of that country. Even such criticism of Israel as has appeared in the Press has been mild and subdued. The sense of guilt in the Christian Western world about the Jews is so enormous that it would indeed be considered bad taste to use the same language of criticism for Israeli misdeeds as for those of other nations.

For those who admire power strength, the war provided a rare moment of exhilaration. Compared to the clumsy Suez operation of 1956 at any rate, the Israeli show was quite dazzling. For the racialists as well as the empire-minded, there was satisfaction in seeing a small, white, "European" nation subduing a coloured race. "Triumph of the Civilized" was the title of one newspaper article on the morrow of victory. Vicarious imperialism is all that such people in Britain can nowadays participate in. The Empire is dead, long live the Empire! The winning of the World Cup and the heroism of Sir Francis Chichester may titillate the public's feeling of national pride, but there is no substitute for war!

The Morning After

Yet I think that as the days pass and as the martial sounds fade away, Israel will find the number of its friends slowly diminishing. Already, as newspaper reports and television films of the aftermath of the war are beginning to come in, the public is succumbing to a feeling of worry and depression, not unlike the hangover after a night of boozing.

I have been talking to a few of the reporters who have returned from Israel. The same men who were writing heroic or cold and clinical despatches are now sickened by what they saw: columns of refugees fleeing from the west bank of the Jordan river, decaying corpses lying everywhere, huts and houses destroyed and empty. In the Sinai desert the dead bodies were turned by the heat into grotesque balloons; the wreckage of lorries and tanks lay strewn over miles of tarred roads; thousands of Egyptian soldiers were dying on the fierce grey rocks and the terrible sand, having lost their way and being without food or water.

The reporters were sickened by the arrogance of the victors; a gentle people toughened over the years by the threats of their enemies as well as by their own myths and propaganda. When I was in Israel six years ago to attend the Eichmann trial, the question that young Israelis were asking was: "Why didn't our parents fight the Nazis?" The long, agonizing accounts of Nazi persecution and systematic murder left them with the impression of a passive people taking their fate passively. No doubt this hurt the national pride of the Israelis. In a similar way the past humiliations of the Arabs at the hands of Western Powers have left them with a deep sense of hurt pride and revenge.

Permanent Thinking

Excessive nationalism and admiration for military valour are not the special characteristics of any particular nation or race. They are universal. Though there are many causes of wars, one of them surely is psychological. For centuries we have been brought up on romantic stories of courage and valour on the battlefield. In spite of the fact that modern wars have made such ideas meaningless, the basic attitudes persist. Einstein once said: "The power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking".

The ultimate cure for war probably lies with psychologists and educationalists. Many famous doctors, like Pasteur, Pavlov and Schweitzer, have believed that there is a science not only of illness but also of crime and war. If governments had spent a fraction of their defence budgets on the education of children for peace, mankind could still have a future. Countries should, perhaps, abolish Victoria Crosses and Vir Chakras and instead give medals for outstanding cowardice on the battlefront. And, may be, the United Nations ought to take over as its motto the slogan of American pacifist youths: "Make Love, Not War".

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ARAB GOODWILL ESSENTIAL FOR ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL

The noted British historian, Dr Arnold Toynbee, in a copyright article written for the United Press International on the Arab-Israeli conflict says:

I will try to put, first, the Israelis' view on this as I see it, then the Arabs' view, and thirdly my own view. I am neither an Arab nor an Israeli. I am British, so I feel deeply my country's share in the responsibility for this tragic conflict between two other peoples. Britain issued the Balfour declaration in 1917. Britain was in power in Palestine for 30 years ending in 1948. Britain's precipitate abdication in Palestine after World War II left the way open in 1948 for the first of the three Arab-Israeli wars.

The Israelis' view of the conflict's history: We are Jews, the living representatives of Judah, one of the 12 tribes of Israel that conquered most of Palestine in the 13th century B.C. We held Judah's share of the conquered territory for seven centuries, till we were deported by Nebuchadnezzar in 587 B.C. We were back again within less than half a century, and we then held Judaea, once more, for the next 773 years, till we were evicted by the Romans in A.D. 135. We have never renounced our claim to the land of Israel. We have always hoped, believed, and proclaimed that we shall get this land back again. It is our land, we contend.

After another 1,883 years we did recover foothold there in 1918, and during the half century then, by devoted hard work, ability, and military valour, we have built up our present national State of Israel, and have inflicted three smashing defeats on the Arabs, who have been trying to evict us once again.

PERSECUTION

We want to have a country of our own again, like other peoples and like our own ancestors. We also need to have a country of our [illegible] because since the [illegible] of the Roman empire to Christianity in the fourth century A.D., we have been penalized and persecuted by the Western Christian majority among whom we have had to live. This persecution has culminated in the unprecedented crime of genocide which has been committed against us in our lifetime by a Western people, the Germans, in Europe. We are not going to let the Arabs commit the same crime of genocide against us here, in our own land of Israel.

ARABS' VIEW

Next, the Arabs' view of the conflict's history: In 1938, 90 per cent of the population of Palestine was Arab, and Palestine had been ours since we conquered it from the Romans in the seventh century A.D. Since 1918 a militant and aggressive foreign body has been thrust into the heart of our Arab world. This has been done, against our protests, by force of arms—British force until, under the protection of British bayonets, the Zionist Jewish intruders had built up sufficient force of their own to be more than a match for our Arab strength.

Then the British scuttled, and left us to our fate. Our fate has been that 900,000 Palestinian Arabs have been forcibly deprived of their homes and property and have been turned into refugees, living on a dole. Any Palestinian Arab refugee who tries to return home and resume possession of his property is shot by the Israelis, who have robbed us of our country and our property.

The Palestinian Arabs who have not lost their homes are being treated by the Israelis, under whose rule they have fallen, as second-class citizens. The Arab territory that the Israelis have seized by force stretches from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea at Eilath. This foreign-occupied territory cuts the Arab world in two.

The Israelis' crime against the Arabs is flagrant. But it is not the Arabs who have committed crimes against the Jews. When we conquered Palestine from the Romans, we allowed Jews to reside in Judaea again for the first time in 500 years. When we conquered Spain from the German Goths, we liberated the Jews in Spain from the Goths' Nazi-like oppression of them. The Prophet Mohammad in the Koran had commanded Muslims to tolerate and protect law-abiding Jews and Christians under Muslim rule, and our Muslim Arab record, in acting up to this commandment, has been fine compared with the Western people's treatment of the Jews. Yet now we have been made to pay for a Western people's crime against the Jews. The Germans tried to exterminate the Jews.

GERMANS' CRIME

The Western victors in the World War II, the Americans, above all, have made the Arabs, not the Germans, pay for the Germans' crime. In Western eyes, the Germans may be criminals, but they are also fellow-Westerners, so they are privileged. We Arabs do not count. We are "natives", just part of the fauna of Palestine. We have no human rights.

The Israelis, on the other hand, have the West's ear, the West's sympathy, and the West's support. In Western countries, the Jews have money power and voting power, which we Arabs do not have there. Also, the West, unlike us Arabs, had a bad conscience about its past treatment of the Jews. So the West wants to compensate the Jews—as long as this is done, not at the West's own expense, but at ours.

We are never going to submit to this injustice, the Arabs say. The Israeli intruders are the spearhead of Western neo-imperialism in the Arab world. We have suffered from Western aggression in Palestine once before. That time, it was the crusaders. We succeeded in expelling the crusaders, though that took us 200 years. We are going to expel the Israelis too, however long this may take us.

My point of view, as a British Westerner: By 1948, the Palestinian Arabs had been the inhabitants of Palestine for more than 1,300 years. This length of time has given them a prescriptive right to continue to live in Palestine and to retain their property here. As for the Jews' claim to have a right to reoccupy Palestine, the statute of limitations applies to this. The Israelis have no right to keep the Palestinian Arabs out of their homes and to rob them of their property, as they have done.

A distinction has to be drawn between two different claims put forward by the Jews. Their claim against the Germans for reparation (so far as any kind of reparation can be made for mass murder) is one hundred per cent justified. It is not at all unreasonable for the Jews to claim that their cumulative experience of criminal treatment by Westerners entitled them to have a country of their own. But then they should have been given German territory (e.g. the Rhineland), not Arab territory, as the site for a Jewish State.

JEWISH CLAIM

The Jews' claim to recover possession of Palestine after 1,883 years is different in kind from their claim against Germany, and is not of equal validity. This historical claim was justifiable in so far—but only in so far—as it was compatible with the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. The Jews do have a right of free access to the territory, in Palestine, of the ancient kingdom of Judah, which they held for two periods in the now rather distant past. They have an unquestionable right to reside in Judaea for religious purposes.

Subject to the consent of the Arab inhabitants, they also had a right to buy land in Palestine from Arab owners, and to plant Jewish settlers on purchased land in numbers that would not have threatened to swamp the Arab population but they have had no right to seize by military force the territory that has now become the State of Israel, and to turn its Arab inhabitants into either second-class citizens of Israel or into refugees from their homes and their property.

The existence and presence of the State of Israel and of the Israeli people are now facts, and it has been demonstrated that these facts cannot be undone. Moreover, if they could have been undone, the effect would have been to create a new horde of refugees—Israeli refugees this time. Yet, if you or I were Arabs, we should surely feel about Israel as the Arabs feel.

One of the two main obstacles to a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Arabs' unwillingness, so far, to accept the hard fact that the establishment of the State of Israel, within the limits set by the armistice lines agreed in 1948, is an accomplished fact which the Arabs, too, have to recognize and accept. The other obstacle is the present plight of the Palestinian Arabs. These two obstacles are interrelated, and unless and until both obstacles are overcome, the conflict will continue.

The parties who are principally responsible for this conflict are neither the Israelis nor the Arabs themselves. They are three Western peoples—the British, the Germans, the Americans. We Westerners have a major responsibility for opening the way for a reconciliation between the Israelis and the Arabs by finding ways and means of doing justice to the Palestinian Arabs—justice that will be felt to be adequate by the refugees and by the Arab world as a whole, and, at the same time, will not be a threat, as the unsolved Arab refugee problem has been so far, to Israel's security and, indeed, existence.


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Angeles Times Artist Harlan Kirby

...ing on for thirty years...

Great communist border war

by JOHN RANDOLPH

TO reach an understanding of the war in Vietnam one must realise that it is only the latest campaign in a longer and larger war that is almost 30 years old.

The details of this greater war are all on record, but the war itself has never been recognised as such. Yet it is as real as any war in history—and far bigger than most. Some day historians will disentangle it from a confusing mass of detail, give it a proper name and write books about it.

But this will take too long. We can give it a name and try to sketch it as best we can. Call it the "great communist border war," and accept the idea that it was one of four major wars of totally different origin and purpose that came together by chance and interacted with each other to become what we now call World War II.

Red base

First, there was a war growing out of tensions in the Western world, touched off by movements in Spain, Italy and Germany.

Second, there was the war started by imperial Japan, which grew out of Japan's unique development.

Third, there was the civil war in China, which likewise grew out of China's peculiar history and internal problems.

Fourth and finally, there was a very special war fought by the communist world to protect and strengthen its borders while building a powerful communist base to support, either in theory or in reality, a future world revolution.

No matter how unified World War II may appear, especially towards its end it always was made up of these four skeins of history.

Of these four wars, three have been settled. Western Europe and America have joined in the Atlantic community with Japan as an ally in the Pacific. The Chinese civil war has been resolved with the communist world capturing all but a small fragment of China.

The one war that has definitely not been settled is the great communist border war. Far from ending, it has continued to expand with the extension of the borders of world communism to include not only the Soviet Union but China and the satellites of both of them.

Since this is the war in which Vietnam is only the latest battle, we must study the nature of this greater war to see how Vietnam fits into a long historical process, and what can be done to solve the immediate problem.

The great border war has had three phases so far. The first begins shortly before World War II and ends with the German invasion of Russia. The second phase is part of World War II. The third phase opens in 1945 and continues to the present time, with Vietnam and Laos as the latest fronts.

The actual beginning, a decisive event not at all as well-known as it should be, deserves a few special words.

On May 11, 1939, the imperial Japanese Army probing west from Manchuria, collided with the Soviet Siberian army at Nomonhan in Outer Mongolia. This clash presented Stalin with an acute challenge.

Neutrality pact

Fearing war with Germany and dreading a simultaneous and fatal attack from the rear by Japan, Stalin gambled on teaching Japan a lesson before Germany could move. So he poured in armour, air, artillery and regular infantry on a scale so lavish that the usually hard-fighting Japanese were stunned, overwhelmed and smashed in a bloody four-month battle that ended in the slaughter of 20,000 Japanese troops.

The brave but not very bright generals who rule Japan took this awful beating with a surprising lack of Samurai spirit. Blind to the future implications of this Russian power, they disengaged and later sought and signed a neutrality treaty with Stalin. Then they turned their backs on Russia and plodded pig-headedly down the road through China to Pearl Harbour and Hiroshima.

At that point, with Germany out of the way, Stalin himself tore up the neutrality pact—which the Japanese had observed all through the war with touching fidelity—and sent the Red Army surging across Manchuria and on down to the 38th Parallel in Korea for the easiest pickings of the war.

Since it is not reasonable to believe that Russia—and with it the entire cause of armed communism—could have survived a well-coordinated, all-out attack by both Japan and Germany at the same time, this little-known battle of Nomonhan must rank as one of history's most decisive battles.

Encouraged by this first success, Stalin played for time by signing the more famous non-aggression pact with Hitler, and used the remaining months before the storm broke to push back as far as possible the unsatisfactory military frontiers Russia had inherited from her collapse in World War I.

The rest of this first phase was equally successful, and the enormous gains made in Eastern Europe in the second phase were even more impressive. By this time Stalin may have believed, with some justice, that he had discovered a new and relatively safe way to defend and advance communism all at the same time. In any case, he and his ally, Mao Tse-tung, pushed the border war for all it was worth in phase three—so boldly they began to suffer some defeats for the first time.

Communisation

Here then are the three phases, in order, with all the major campaigns and battles of the great border war:

First phase—Battle of Nomonhan, 1939; invasion and occupation of East Poland, 1939; war with Finland and seizure of territory as a buffer zone for Leningrad, 1939-40; annexation of the three Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, 1940; forced surrender of two Rumanian border provinces, 1940.

Second phase—Sucessive occupation and later communisation of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland and East Germany, 1944-45; support for Tito's communist victory in Yugoslavia 1945; support for communist take-over in Albania, 1945; Sakhalin and Habomai Islands and North Korea in 1945.

Third phase—Support via Manchuria for Chinese communists in war to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, 1946-49; communist Czechoslovakia, and take-over in Czechoslovakia, 1948; Chinese-Soviet support for Viet Minh against French in Vietnam, 1945-54; communist civil war in Greece, 1946-49; Berlin blockade

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1948; Korean war 1950-53; suppression of the Hungarian revolt 1956; attack on Quemoy 1958; Chinese communist occupation and later annexation of Tibet, 1951-59; Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam, 1959 to present; Berlin Wall, 1961; Chinese communist attack on India 1962.

World revolution

This is an impressive list. There are famous wars in the history books that have nothing like this to show either in hard fighting or in such enormous territorial gains. And the end is not yet.

And just for that reason this long and unusual communist war should be studied carefully and without bias. In doing this, two basic facts about world communism must be understood:

One, despite some talk of "coexistence" and advancing communism only by "just liberation wars," communism has never actually renounced its ultimate certainty and objective of a world revolution, nor its willingness to use any and all means to help it along.

Two, it is nonetheless a fact that since the more cautious policy of Stalin won out in 1927 over the unlimited revolutionary drive of Leon Trotsky, the communist world revolution has been postponed to a distant future.

Since then, communism has concentrated on the immediate and intermediate steps of building, expanding, and defending a powerful communist base. Moreover, this policy is so basic now that it has not been affected in any way by the doctrinal disputes of Russian and Chinese communism.

Annihilation

Only two times since this postponement of the world revolution has communism fought in all-out wars in which total survival had to be risked, and in both cases it is only fair to say that the communists really had no choice but to fight or be annihilated. The first case was the war against Hitler. The second was the final duel from 1946 to 1949 between Mao and Chiang for the mastery of China.

Likewise, with the same two exceptions, the non-communist world has responded to the postponement of the world revolution by postponing in turn any counter-revolutionary plan of its own for the total extermination of communism. Also since then, the non-communists world has likewise concentrated on building up its own power while "containing" communism by methods short of all-out war.

Although these two more moderate policies have delayed, if not completely eliminated, the possibility of a final war of annihilation, they have left open plenty of lesser occasions for armed conflict.

But this kind of armed conflict must be seen for what it really is—a series of limited wars and battles taking place within a larger framework of tacit agreement to avoid a war of annihilation both now and for some time to come.

What it really boils down to is this:

On one hand, the communists are actively engaged in protecting their huge "island" in Europe and Asia from being penetrated either physically or ideologically by the outside world, while snapping up every opportunity for expanding or strengthening its frontiers.

Conversely, the non-communist world is equally active in surrounding this communist island so as to "contain" and quarantine it and prevent the communists and communism from breaking out and infecting the outside world. Also, when possible, the non-communist world tries to recover lost ground.

A few times since Stalin postponed the world revolution the communists have been tempted into revolutionary adventures far from their borders or even overseas. In contrast to their remarkable success in the border war, they have in the end invariably suffered setbacks or defeats in these distant efforts. Examples are the civil war in Spain, the Huk-balahap rising in the Philippines, the communist war in Malaya, the abortive coup in Indonesia, and a number of unsuccessful manoeuvres in Africa and the Middle East.

But such remote adventures are the exception.

'Soft spots'

With the two opposed worlds in direct physical contact alone an enormous frontier that encircles the communist island for nearly 15,000 miles, it is obvious that most of the clashes will take place along this border. And it is equally obvious that since neither side wants an all-out war at present, the clashes will not come where the line is too strong for anything but a major attack, but where unstabilised "soft spots" excite an unusual fear or desire on one side or the other.

And since neither side is seeking a wider war, the opposite principle is also true—that when a "soft spot" is eliminated, either by fighting or realistic agreement that part of the border also becomes stabilised and further fighting is neither necessary nor profitable. Conflict then shifts to the next most likely "soft spot" and so on.

This leads to a generalised picture of the process, with the two worlds constantly probing for weak spots along their forntiers and on by one eliminating them, either by some mutual accommodation or else by fighting it out until nothing more can be accomplished short of all-out war.

And finally, this suggests that a day may eventually come when all the soft spots are eliminated and there will be no more occasions for such a border war. Such a condition might actually come about but it would probably be only temporary. Peoples and nations change so constantly that new "soft spots" are likely to be created.

But how are "soft spots" to be stabilised in the least painful way? And particularly how can we stabilise the biggest current "soft spot" of all—South-East Asia?

The long, vague, open borders that now exist between the communist and non-communist worlds in South-East Asia must be 'stabilised, and this means stabilisation in the physical sense. This means by troops occupying and holding the ground, by air power interdicting approach, by construction of fortified barrier zones, by convincing threats of punishing war, or by agreements that are too hardboiled and realistic to leave room for wiggling out.

Weakness

Thus, the best that can be hoped for the immediate future is the establishment of a solid, unambiguous, physical frontier between the communist and non-communist worlds. This will provide the maximum attainable guarantee of peace pending whatever final decisions lie in store on world revolution, counter-revolution, and mutual annihilation.

It is probably too optimistic to hope for easy negotiated agreements on eliminating present and future "soft spots." If the non-communist world prefers to negotiate without fighting for them the communists will see it only as a sign of weakness, and they despise weakness and move immediately to take advantage of it. Only a realistic border line will serve—and sometimes the only way to find such a line is to fight forward until you can advance no farther.

But in this kind of fighting there need by no unusual fear of detonating a great war, provided both sides keep strictly to the issue of the "soft spot" that is undergoing stabilisation.

If this process is well understood, it will relieve a great deal of needless fear. Also it will eliminate a very real danger—fighting without realisation that the stakes must be limited.

And finally, if care is taken the world revolution may recede even further into the future.—**By arrangement with the Los Angeles Times.**

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DELHI, JUNE 5, 1967

QUESTIONS OF CHOICE

THE way an intellectual will behave in sudden emergency is not necessarily either predictable or consistent. Present supporters of Lord Russell, for instance, in their enthusiasm for total nuclear disarmament and their detestation of American methods in Vietnam, find it easy to forget that, shortly after World War II, he advocated a preventive war against Russia before Stalin got the atomic bomb. Indeed Russell himself, when later confronted with the evidence, claimed to have genuinely forgotten ever having done so. But then, this particular philosopher's attitude to war has always been eclectic. He not merely disapproved of World War I, as many people did; he thought that the best outcome would be a quick German victory. He had, however, no doubt about the morality of World War II, and the desirability of a German defeat, even before some of his present bedfellows had their own misgivings resolved by the Nazi attack on Russia.

Eclectic attitudes of this nature are profoundly irritating to those who consider themselves disciplined cadres, such as Communists. This is not because their own party line is less eclectic; indeed it twists as often as a corkscrew. But the correct attitude for a disciplined cadre is that of the family sharing a bed in an overcrowded slum: "When father turns we all turn." The intellectual who refuses to submit his intellect to father's orders is indeed such a nuisance that even now, if they can get their hands on him, they jail him (they would earlier have shot him, and Chinese methods are still drastic). Where they cannot, they excommunicate him—unless he is so well known that a quarrel would be damaging to the "image".

Such a person may well at the moment be Pablo Picasso. When he and Matisse joined the Communist Party of France after World War II, they were regarded as a really magnificent catch, for whom it was even worth playing down the cruder theories of "socialist realism" in the arts. It was peace doves, peace doves all the way. Alas, the dove may now seem somewhat of a clay pigeon. Unmindful of the attitude taken by Papa Kosygin, Picasso is reported to have joined other French intellectuals in signing a manifesto which supports Israel's security and sovereignty in the current Middle East crisis. About Sartre the comrades were always rather less sure: there was, after all, the matter of "Unclean Hands", even if that play was later disowned. Yet, so soon after his services to the cause in Stockholm, it must come as something of a shock that he too is in trouble with the Arabs: Iraq has just banned all his works, together with those of his own disciplined cadre, Simone de Beauvoir. But then, the essence of existentialism was always supposed to consist in questions of choice.

DELHI, JUNE 17, 1967

FROM CHINA WITH LOVE

IN character to the end, the Red Guards on Wednesday took Mr Raghunath and Mr Vijai by the arms and the scruff of the neck, broke the former's spectacles and tore off the latter's shoes, punched, kicked and frogmarched both, waved copies of Mao Tse-tung at them and yelled "You dirty spy, get out of China". Equally in character, the Chinese Government took no steps whatever to prevent this hooliganism, and expressed no regret even in the case of Mr Vijai, whose diplomatic immunity had not been withdrawn. On the contrary, the Indians were alleged to have "provoked the masses", and the kangaroo court set up to "try" Mr Raghunath is apparently regarded as a warning to all other "imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries".

Unsurprisingly, several angry MPs wanted to know whether diplomatic relations with such people were worth retaining. In a turn of phrase unfortunate even by his standards, Mr Chagla replied that the Indian Mission was an important "window" into China and sent vital information—a remark Peking will gleefully interpret as an admission that its charges were true. When Mr Limaye's motion was pressed to a division, the Ministry had the dubious satisfaction of being supported by both kinds of Communists, and the debate was broadened to include no immediately relevant, though truculent, references to Tibet and the Aksai Chin. What seems to have emerged is that the reprisals ordered against two officials of the Chinese Embassy here are "considered adequate", and that Mr Chagla considers his policy towards China "consistent and coherent". In the sense that India has once again been submitting to "humiliating treatment" perhaps it is.

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JAPAN MAY SEEK TO REGAIN A PLACE IN THE SUN

BUT NEW ROLE IS RESTRICTED STILL TO ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

From SELIG HARRISON

TOKYO.—The idea that Japan with its burgeoning economic growth should logically play a larger rôle in the Asian scene has become one of the fashionable new stereotypes in U.S. thinking about foreign policy. But what precisely this means, appears rather murky at close range as one watches the introverted Japanese pursuit of an ever more impressive domestic prosperity.

Japan is now challenging Britain and Germany for third place in the roster of industrial nations behind the USA and the USSR and already claims Big Three rank in steel and automotive manufacture. Still, despite this industrial muscle, Tokyo has not yet made a significant effort to translate its new status into power-political terms. In the short run, Japan seems content to make the most of the economic advantage flowing from Vietnam-oriented U.S. war procurement and thus to soft-pedal its differences with Washington over Vietnam tactics. Looking beyond the war, the primary Japanese concern is clearly not so much how to assert a Great Power position as it is how to keep out of the line of fire should an over-strenuous U.S. posture in Asia provoke a conflict with China.

An interesting cause celebre here several months ago, which has still not entirely subsided, highlights prevailing attitudes in Japan on security and foreign policy issues. The central figure in the affair in question was Mr Takeso Shimoda until recently Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Ambassador-designate to Washington. At a background briefing in the Foreign Office on February 1, Mr Shimoda, speaking behind the cloak of an unnamed "high official", suggested that Japanese public opinion should ponder the implications of the national demand for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

AMERICAN TERMS

If the USA were ever to agree to give up sovereignty over Okinawa, Mr Shimoda reportedly argued, it would only be likely to do so if Japan agreed to grant the continued use of the American bases there. And since the USA has freedom to use its bases for caches of nuclear weapons and for the deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft, which are not permissible in Japan proper under the terms of the 1960 Security Treaty, the USA would also expect a continued nuclear presence as part of a reversion arrangement. In short, Mr Shimoda implied regaining Okinawa would have its price. Japan would have to take on a responsibility for the U.S. nuclear presence on Okinawa which now rests solely with the USA.

There has been a continuing discussion in political circles regarding what Mr Shimoda meant and why he made a venturesome sally into public discussion which is quite out of character for Japanese bureaucrats. One theory is that he meant precisely what he said. That is, he simply wanted to provoke a more meaningful and realistic discussion of what has long been the central issue in Japanese-U.S. relations. But this is not the dominant interpretation in political and intellectual quarters.

Not only in the Socialist Opposition, but among opinion leaders generally, one finds the assumption that Mr Shimoda had a deeper purpose. When one considers the strength of the Japanese irredentist urge to regain Okinawa, it is said, the Shimoda move can easily be viewed as the beginning of a softening-up process intended to prepare public opinion for a reversion linked to a continued U.S. nuclear presence. This, in turn, is regarded as preparation for the development of an eventual Japanese nuclear capability. For if Japan were willing to acquiesce in an American nuclear presence on its territory, or so runs this line of argument, why not go all the way and develop an independent nuclear deterrent?

DEEPER PURPOSE

Whether there was, in fact, a deeper purpose behind the February 1 briefing, the impression persists in Socialist and Opposition ranks generally that pressures will grow in the country for increasing militarization and, looking far ahead, nuclear development. Those who believe this suggest that the principal push comes from a Japanese-style "military-industrial complex" mindful of the profit potential inherent in a defence-oriented nuclear build-up with its attendant civilian nuclear industrial development.

Mixed with economic motives in this estimate are other less tangible factors: a recrudescent nationalist sentiment and anxieties concerning the direction in which a nuclear-armed China may go. But so far, at least, the nationalist resurgence has been notably slow to gain in strength and the general appraisal of the potential danger from China is not an alarmist one.

The response to the Shimoda trial balloon has made very clear indeed once again the deep-seated resistance to militarization—and nuclearization—in a country with its memories of nuclear war still fresh. While one can imagine a significant change in the temper of the country as the younger generation comes to power and influence, the dominant present mood is conditioned inescapably by the shadow of Hiroshima. With respect to the Okinawa issue, this has prompted Government officials, anxious to avoid a public storm, to defer the coming showdown on reversion until "after Vietnam". It is hoped that Japan can then get reversion on better terms possibly even on terms precluding a permanent nuclear presence. The recent request for the return of the Bonins is a side-issue intended, if anything, to forestall a major Opposition clamour over the central issue of Okinawa.

BACK TO ARMY

Even the new third five year plan of the Japanese military with its modest increase from a 171,000 to a 180,000-man army is deeply suspect as a first step down the road of a more ambitious militarization programme. The modest scope of the increase in manpower is regarded as less revealing than a projected $10 million outlay slated to include substantial air force and other modernization.

The third plan represented a compromise not only between contending views in Japan but between differing schools of thought in the military and civilian wings of the American policy-making establishment. There are some advocates of a greatly accelerated Japanese defence build-up in the Pentagon who privately bemoan the fact that Japan gets a "free ride" from the USA in the defence field despite its economic prosperity. But their rationale for a greater assumption of the Japanese military burden by Japan is that Tokyo could then fulfil some of the military responsibilities in Asia now being borne by Washington. This falls down immediately on close examination in the light of the broadly pacifist mood of the country and of the specific Japanese reaction to the bombings in North Vietnam. The State Department has had little difficulty scotching the idea that Japan could be expected to send troops in future years to assorted hot spots around Asia.

Gingerly handling of the Okinawa issue and of the expansion of the self-defence forces by the governing Liberal Democratic Party reflects a widespread public readiness to accept a continued security dependence on the USA. Thus, the probability is that a Liberal Democratic Government in 1970 would not seek to attach tighter nationalist strings to the security treaty with the USA for fear of arousing an otherwise avoidable controversy in the Diet.

TREATY CONTINUES

The 1960 Treaty will automatically continue in 1970. No act of renewal is necessary. However, after 1970 either party will have the option to terminate the treaty on a one-year notice. Rightist leaders in the LDP argue that this will create a risky situation in which the rise of an Opposition régime could threaten the continuance of the security tie with Washington. Premier Sato and most U.S. officials respond that a formal treaty clause would mean little, in any case, if a Japanese Government did not want the continuance of the treaty and that what counts is the climate of partnership.

Despite a note of anxiety and confusion in the Japanese approach to China in the wake of the cultural revolution and the Red Guards, the pervasive estimate here remains that China does not pose a direct military threat to Japan and that Japan should seek to avoid giving provocation to China through excessive hospitality to the U.S. military presence. It is against the background of this estimate that a basic distinction is made between a U.S. nuclear presence in Okinawa, which is a focus for great anxiety and a "contingency" dependence on the USA based on a conventional force presence and the capacity for nuclear intervention from Guam and elsewhere outside of the country.

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FRIENDLY TO CHINA

In an article in the current *Japan Quarterly*, Junnosuke Kishida, the respected military commentator of *Asahi Shimbun*, concludes that "it would be wise for Japan, as a medium non-nuclear Power, to emphasize the improvement of relations with China as a means of reducing China's threat. The surest way for Japan to guarantee her own security is not to turn any great nuclear Power into an enemy. Japan has concluded a security pact with the USA; but, even in a situation where this treaty continues to exist, it is possible for Japan to improve her relations stage by stage with both the Soviet Union and Communist China. Of course, Japan, while pursuing such a policy, does not have any intention of developing her own nuclear potential to counter-balance that of Communist China".

In contrast to the coldness of Japanese attitudes towards the Soviet Union and the detached, calculating manner in which the objective of improving relations wth Moscow is approached, the impulse to "normalize" relations with China has an imponderable emotional element. Japanese attitudes toward China are a complex amalgam of pragmatic factors overlain with a compulsion for a closer relationship consistent with the national sense of historic cultural kinship. There is much talk of increased trade with the Mainland. Yet for the present, the hard economic fact is that a more liberal policy toward trade with Peking built, let us say, on long-term credits of a sort not now underwritten by the Japanese Government would compete with Japanese resources available for deployment in non-Communist Asia. For all of its prosperity, Japan is still a capital-short country. Trade and investment opportunities in South-East Asia as well as in the more immediate environment of Taiwan and South Korea are yielding a substantial cash-on-the-barrelhead return.

The Japanese rôle in non-Communist Asia is actively promoted by Washington. Thus any drain on the potential of Tokyo for an active rôle in the Asian Development Bank and in beginning a meaningful aid policy—based on Government credits as against the present overwhelming accent on investment and export credits—could complicate Japanese-U.S. relations.

INVESTMENT ABROAD

Japanese statistics recently supplied to the OECD show an increase in direct investment in nine South-East Asian countries from $1.93 billion in 1963 to $2.59 billion in 1965 and, in the more important field of export credit, from $2.16 billion to $6.8 billion. In the strictly economic sense, Japan is indeed moving out again into a more ambitious rôle, one which is likely to show a special upsurge in the years immediately ahead in the green pastures of South Korea and Taiwan. But Pan-Asianism is overshadowed by hard bargaining when the countries concerned do not happen to have cash on the barrelhead, as in the case of Indonesia Mr Malik got his loan on his recent visit to Tokyo, but only after a showdown tussle between the Foreign Ministry and the sceptical Finance Ministry. There is little in the style of Japanese aid and trade relationship with Asian countries to distinguish the Tokyo presence from that of any other industrialized country, with the possible exception of the scattered Japanese "peace corps" contingents.

In the basic arithmetic of development diplomacy, it remains to be seen whether the Japanese rôle in Asia will live up to advance trumpetings. An interesting barometer to watch will be the future of the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund. This is the assigned Japanese instrument for carrying out project aid, and it is dependent for its financing, so far, on the Export-Import Bank which means that it can extend its "aid" only one stringent terms with a short repayment period.

founded on little more than opportunism has used the "Bandung spirit" to further the ends of these three aggressive countries. The "Asia for Asians" appeal is effective for the reason that the frontline of Asian defence is held in Indo-China and Malaysia by two external powers, the United States and Britain. But another semi-Asian power, the USSR, has also a major role to play. The recent growth of Chinese influence is shown by the orientation of countries like Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Cambodia towards Peking and Dr Kennedy is unfortunately right in saying that India and Japan have not yet co-operated to stop the Chinese advance. But he feels that alliances on the Dulles pattern are probably obsolete. What is more likely to evolve is the kind of informal understanding that India has built up with the Western Powers and Russia that assistance will be given in an emergency. This is a process that has to be carried forward among the Asian countries themselves. Since this book was written the China-Pak-Indonesia axis has suffered setbacks with the defeat of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and the Communist revolt in Indonesia. In Viet Nam also, the Viet Cong is on the defensive. Countries like Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and Japan could help to safeguard the security of Southern Asia if they built up larger armed forces of their own. The appendices to this book, which summarise the military strength of the various countries, reveal that the five countries (all of whom have alliances with the U.S. or Britain) have neglected their own defences. As Dr. Kennedy points out, the United States and Britain are already weary of their responsibilities in Southern Asia and disillusioned by the failure of the countries of the area to get together to defend their interests. The military threat from China and North Viet Nam would look less formidable if India, Japan, Australia, etc. were to rearm; the more serious danger is that of subversion (as we see in South Viet Nam, Laos and Indonesia to-day) but Burma, Malaya, the Philippines and India have shown that they can deal with Communist subversion. The weakest area is perhaps Thailand and South Viet Nam but the present war may cut the claws of the Viet Cong-Hanoi partnership for some time to come. Dependence on external powers like the U.S. and the USSR can, however, only be temporary, and the local powers will have to wake up to their responsibilities.

J.B.A.

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Asian Situation

UNDERCURRENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: By M. S. Venkataramani. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay-1, Rs. 14).

SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN TRANSITION: By B. R. Chatterji. (Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, Rs. 25).

A CURTAIN OF IGNORANCE: By Felix Greene (Jonathan Cape, London, 35 sh.).

STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS: By S. P. Varma (University Publishers, Delhi. Rs. 25).

THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN ASIA: By D. F. Kennedy (Chatto and Windus Ltd., London. 35 sh.).

The first two works, written by teachers at the Indian Institute of International Studies show that the Institute is promoting really useful research. Mr. Venkataramani, who started life as a reporter on this paper, is now Professor of American History and the four studies he has made in this book, especially the ones on U.S. policy during the Suez affair and the U-2 crisis, display remarkable insight as well as information about the springs of American policy-making. Such studies should help Indian readers to understand how policy is made in America. The articles on "South East Asia in Transition" though they are not contemporary, throw considerable light on the policies of Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia and Indo-China. The book is, however, poorly integrated and does not convey a single point of view. This is not the case with "A Curtain of Ignorance" where the Anglo-American journalist, Felix Greene, has composed a telling indictment of American policy towards China. Though he does succeed in exposing the failures of post-war American policy towards China, the blinkers on his eyes conceal from him the realities of the Communist regime in Peking. While American reporting on China has certainly been stereotyped and prejudiced, it does not follow that all is sweetness and light in that country. Mr. Greene thinks the Chinese are succeeding where Indians are failing, but the figures he quotes are dubious. Peking itself has admitted that its Great Leap statistics were fabricated. The Chinese people have had to pay a heavy price for the vast defence forces and strategic roads and railways that the Communists think are necessary if China is to attain Great Power status.

Prof. Varma of the University of Rajasthan has written a useful book "Struggle for the Himalayas" on Sino-Indian relations. Having taught in the United States as well as in India, Dr. Varma is able to answer all the usual criticisms made of Indian policy, especially the common allegation that Mr. Nehru was duped by the Chinese and did not understand their real intention. If this means that he was not aware of their ideological attitude to India (they had called him "the running dog of Western imperialism") it is less than fair to him. Where he erred was in believing till the last moment, that they could be won over to a policy of co-operation in Asia. He seemed on the point of success at Bandung in bringing China into the circle of Asian brotherhood (at the cost of some misunderstanding by the West) but subsequent events showed that the Chinese preferred to use their new contacts to pursue a diplomacy that would push India into the background and raise themselves to the leadership of Asia. Dr. Varma shows very clearly that over the whole period (1949-1962) the Chinese did not hesitate to exert pressure on the Indian border and seize vital positions. The flight of the Dalai Lama to India no doubt confirmed them in the view that their hold on Tibet could be secured by proving their military superiority to India.

It is not surprising that Dr. D. F. Kennedy of the University of Melbourne, should treat China as the main threat to the security of Southern Asia in a study prepared for the Institute of Strategic Studies. It is only recently that policy-makers in India have realised the importance of looking at the problem of the security of this country in the framework of the security of South-East Asia. The war in Viet Nam, the confrontation of Indonesia with Malaysia, the Chinese attack on India followed by the Pakistani aggression on Kashmir, have forced us to concentrate our attention on the whole region. The diplomatic axis formed by China, Pakistan and Indonesia although it is [illegible] obvious exaggerations for the sake of effect, the writing is uniformly good, well-informed and helpful without being patronising. It is much more than an introduction and it is one of those few books which every educated Asian must read to get a sound knowledge of his own heritage and a proper appreciation of the limitations as well as the excellences of his outlook vis-a-vis that of the Occident.

M. P. Pandit.

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA: By Victor Purcell (Thames & Hudson Ltd., London; 30s.).

From the dawn of history, thanks to its situation on the highroad of commerce and communication between East Asia and the West, if for no other reason, Malaysia has been a region of world importance. To-day, due largely to Indonesian opposition, it has also become a delicate spot calling for international attention and study. Dr. Purcell's book therefore is both timely and welcome. Though somewhat elementary, it is still an eminently readable introduction to the country, its people and their history from the ancient past to the modern present.

"Malay contacts with India probably antidated the Christian era by some centuries, but about the beginning of that era Indians arrived in South-East Asia in greater numbers—among them, priests and monks who brought a calendar, the art of writing, and new ideas of law and administration." (p. 15). Despite contacts, and even occasional diplomatic missions to and from China, it was Indian influences—Hindu and Buddhist—that made a lasting impress on local customs, habits, administration, religious beliefs, literature and Art. Even Islam reached Malaya mainly through Indian channels.


The author naturally develops his story into the British period. According to him, Britain "intervened" in Malaya, not so much for profit or expansion, but for fear that if it did not, some other Power would. Dr. Purcell claims that the British record in Malaya was a great success. By and large, it might be so He is, however, glad that the British "saw the red light just in time", and thus escaped "the fate of the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indo-China". (p. 117).

The events that led up to the independence of Malaya, and of Singapore, and those that transpired thereafter, are described in some detail. Developments in Sabah and Sarawak also receive attention. The history of their acquisition by Britain affords, by the way, an interesting sidelight into British colonial methods of the day. Indonesian 'confrontation' is not viewed with any alarm, as it can be contained. However, what is needed for Malaysia and "incumbant upon Indonesia in the interests of international law and order" is a political settlement. (The book ofcourse does not cover the recent secession of Singapore from the Federation). Ninety-eight plates, three maps and a brief Who's who enhance the book's usefulness.

N. Raghavan.

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INSIDE EGYPT

I—Industrial Spurt

By K. C. KHANNA

"The Times of India" News Service

CAIRO.

UNAFFECTED by the vagaries of fate that assail his bid for Arab unity, President Nasser is pressing ahead with socialist reconstruction at home. The results obtained so far mark the beginning of a second bloodless revolution in Egypt. It may be no less momentous than the overthrow of the monarchy a decade earlier.

Cairo is no longer a quaint mixture of poverty and riches, the city where "the Orient begins". With its ten-storey skyscrapers and broad avenues, it now belongs indubitably to the rising middle class which has displaced the Levantines from the fashionable pavements and driven the former Pashas to the golf-and-whisky routine in the clubs that are not exclusive any more

Throngs of healthy, cheerful working people, who crowd the bazaars, are evidently enjoying their shopping spree with the thrill of new experience. New hotels are springing up by the score. Restaurants and cinemas are always packed. Even the city's night-life, tarnished for a time when two palatial casinos were razed to the ground to make room for public parks, has regained its glitter.

RAPID PROGRESS

A vigorous industrialisation and development programme has added 600,000 persons to the urban labour force of 2.5 million persons within two years. The reduction of the eight-hour working day to seven hours has opened up job opportunities for 100,000 new hands; underemployed rural workers are migrating to savour the excitements of town life. A sizable housing programme takes care of the problem of over-crowding; Cairo and Alexandria are among the few big cities in the world where rent controls have yet to father a serious "key money" racket. About 100,000 wage-earners have already received profit-sharing bonuses ranging from £E. 5 to £E. 50 apiece; a like number of civil servants have been given ten or fifteen days' salary in lieu of bonus. Some 200,000 young women, having taken jobs in offices, television factories or textile mills, are adding to family incomes for the first time. Wages in the inhospitable desert oases of the New Valley and the complex of key projects at Aswan, including the High Dam, have been doubled by generous allowances.

The biggest boost to the wage-earners' morale has come from the election of two of them as company directors in every board of seven. Four hundred and forty labourers and an equal number of white-collar employees have been elevated under this compulsory scheme for labour participation in management. The Government's Institute of Management, typically financed by Ford Foundation, has instituted courses to teach the worker-directors elements of managerial skills, beginning with a short course on how to read balance-sheets.

RISE IN INCOMES

How is the Government able to afford these expensive experiments? who pays the bill? Has nationalisation reduced productivity? Does the State get the requisite personnel to man the vast public sector that embraces one hundred per cent. of foreign trade, ninety per cent. of organised industry, and more than half of transport, banking, insurance and other services? How much of economic growth, if any, is neutralised by the staggering 2.5 per cent. annual rise in population? Is U.A.R. running fast merely to stand still?

The answer to these questions is

in 1952 to 27.6 million today. They are the more remarkable because the scope for agricultural expansion, both lateral and vertical, is limited until the High Dam can be built. And that, as yet, is a long way away.

Even in the pre-Nasser era, Egypt's closely cropped acres produced some of the highest yields in the world. Better farm practices could—and did—increase the cropped area by about ten per cent. over a decade to 10 million acres while the cultivated area rose by no more than two per cent. during this period to about 6 million acres. Greater use of fertilisers, extensive adoption of hybrid seeds and, surprisingly, a lowering of water supply has resulted in a marginal increase of major crops like maize, wheat and cotton though the output of rice has nearly doubled.

BETTER LIVING

Since a good bit of the rice output is exported to earn foreign exchange, the higher standards of local diet are supported by a huge dose of aid under American Public Law 480. Imports of wheat, flour and maize under this programme account for nearly 40 per cent. of the country's total grain supply. The tidy increase in the contribution of agriculture to the Gross National Product from £E. 252 million in 1952-53 to £E. 450 million in 1962-63 is accounted for mainly by the spurt in animal output and production of clover fodder, vegetables and fruits. An average Egyptian is thus not merely eating more; he is eating a better balanced meal as well. Meanwhile Egypt has become the most industrialised nation on the African continent, barring the Union of South Africa. Beginning from nothing more sophisticated than baked bread, a wide range of quality goods is being turned out by the Egyptian factories: cosmetics and rail cars, textiles and T.V. sets, electric pylons and jet planes, batteries and bicycles. The industrial revolution has made a welcome mark on Egypt's foreign trade pattern: exports of manufactures and minerals last year sufficed to pay for non-food imports of consumer goods into the country valued at £.E. 50 million. The Government hopes that in 1963-64 industrial exports would fetch a quarter of the nation's foreign exchange earnings placed at a record figure of £.E. 360 million. If this estimate proves optimistic, insatiable domestic demand rather than the rate of industrial growth will be to blame. Exports of cement, tyres and cotton piecegoods, for example, are falling presently due to higher consumption at home. Egypt's virile textile industry however makes up with yarn shipments what it bites of the export quota for raw cotton.

In the middle of such balancing acts, the Egyptian planners have laid the foundations of three key industries that are vital to the economy: petroleum, steel and fertilisers. Crude oil output has jumped within a decade from 2.6 million cubic metres to over 7 million cubic metres. The proven recoverable oil reserves have doubled to nearly 100 million cubic metres. And refining capacity has more than doubled to nearly five million tons. Egyptian crude is rather poor in middle distillates and presents problems of marketing; the local refineries have to depend for almost half of their needs on imports. Nevertheless, next year Egypt may turn the corner to become a nett exporter of petroleum products. The importance of this development is highlighted by the fact that oil provides the fuel to power four-fifths of all industrial enterprise in Egypt.

STEEL INDUSTRY

INSIDE EGYPT

Continued from col. 4

the management was getting ready to install a third blast furnace imported from the Soviet Union which would raise its annual capacity from 220,000 tons to half a million tons by 1967. Owing to dependence on imports and incomplete training of personnel, Helwan steel costs twenty per cent. more than the world price, but it does help meet nearly half of the domestic demand.

Financially, the ultra-modern £.E. 28 million Kima Fertiliser Factory at Aswan seems to be doing better. It made a profit of £.E. 2 million last year. This is good going considering that the construction of the factory began only three years ago and a tidy sum was spent on labour amenities. These include the erection of 660 air-conditioned flats for a third of the labour force, a mosque, a sporting club, a theatre, a co-operative super-market and a swimming pool.

Kima produces 400,000 tons of ammonium nitrate fertiliser per annum with 20.5 per cent. nitrogen content. It uses cheap electricity from the brand new hydel station at Aswan and sells the products to the Government's agricultural bank for distribution to the farmer. By 1967, Kima's output would be doubled and together with other factories owned by the State-run General Organisation of Chemical Industries it would help reach the total target of 2 million tons to attain national self-sufficiency in fertilisers. As it is, Kima, combining profits with social welfare, is a model enterprise—big, flexible and a link in the burgeoning complex of Government undertakings. It is through such factories that President Nasser hopes to transform industry from an icing on top of the agricultural base into a composite part of the larger economic cake.

(To be concluded)

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seized over a period of five years ending in 1957. This included 180,000 acres belonging to the ousted royal family. The ceiling of 200 acres for the landlord and 100 acres for all his dependent children, originally fixed, was liberal by Indian standards and must be considered extremely generous since an average acre in Egypt yields a net income of Rs. 25 per month. Mr. Nasser declared in July 1962 that a substantial number of the affected landlords got round the law by making national transfers of excess land and continuing to farm it on an "agency" basis. The abuse led the Government to halve the maximum permissible holdings but the new measure has failed to yield more than 245,000 acres.

The next lot of victims was the foreign companies that held a stranglehold on the country's banking and insurance system, cotton trade, oil industry, and the Suez Canal. Being mostly subsidiaries of giant cartels in England or France, these firms were hurt but not crippled by the loss of their business in Egypt. All of them were compensated on the basis of the ruling market value of their shares and most of them continued to do business in the countries of their origin, prospering in the post-war economic recovery of Europe. The classical case is that of the Suez Canal Company the nationalisation of which in 1956 plunged West Asia into a disastrous war. The company lost the canal but changed its spots to become a vast holding and investment enterprise in Europe. Today, its shares command greater premia than ever before.

SOCIALIST SQUEEZE

Another group of people who were affected by the socialist "squeeze" is the expatriates—Greek, Syrian, Lebanese, Italian, Armenian, British, French, and Jewish—nearly a million in all. Most of these people held privilege positions in the nation's economic life and provided services—as traders or technicians—that the country could do without. About a quarter of them have chosen to remain in the country, despite everything and, by large, are doing well.

Egypt's *nouveau riche*, the industrial barons and the neo-millionaires were touched for the first time two years ago. Some 40 persons were put in jail for no other fault than the possession of fat bank balances; about 200 Army officers were placed under preventive detention on

which neither side
sake. It was about th
Egypt's non-alignment be
accepted in the West; fro
beginnings American aid ha
ed today to a total of over
million.

In May 1962 the U.S.A. signed a three-year PL 480 aid agreement with Cairo. Shortly afterwards, the UAR applied to join GATT and accepted the Work Bank's stabilisation programme tying itself unbreakably to the Western camp. This development has opened the way for an increasing flow of loans and export credits from West Germany, England, France and Japan, so much so that a third of Egypt's development expenditure is now financed from foreign sources. It may be ironic that the West is footing the bill for ensuring the success of Arab socialism. Egypt's heavy obligations to the Soviet camp, however, will not only enable President Nasser to get over the "hump" during a critical phase of nationalisation but will also give him ample room for political manoeuvre at a time when he needs it most.

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INSIDE EGYPT

II—Towards Socialism

By K. C. KHANNA

"The Times of India" News Service

CAIRO:

THREE years ago, it was fashionable to define President Nasser's philosophy as "Islam plus Tito." Actually, Arab socialism lacked content till the summer of 1961 when the chief executive and his principal aide, Mr. Ali Sabry, retired to the privacy of a beach near Alexandria and thought up the complicated nationalisation laws which were to change the political face of Egypt.

The Yugoslavs, who used to feel flattered earlier at being described as Mr. Nasser's ideological pathfinders, were among the first to be appalled at the speed and the sweep of the Egyptian measures. During his visit to Cairo towards the end of 1961, President Tito is understood to have warned President Nasser against biting more than what his bureaucracy and manpower could chew. A production crisis, coupled with the crushing financial burden of compensation that the State had committed itself to pay for the nationalised property, the Yugoslavs feared, could spell disaster. It turned out, however, that President Nasser had a shrewder idea of the budgetary problem and the capacity of his administrative machine than his friends across the Mediterranean.

STATE ACTIVITY

The scope of State activity, thanks to the demands of development and nationalisation, has tripled but the size of the bureaucracy has not increased to more than 1.2 million persons, that is by a bare third. This is a remarkable achievement since administrative reorganisation has yet to be attempted and there is no significant change in the deep-rooted inertia of the old-time officialdom. There are still 168 steps to getting a telephone connection in Cairo. Some of the 25 Ministries of the Government are even now distributed over as many as 15 far-flung buildings in the Capital. Nearly 500 nationalised firms are being run by 39 separate companies of the Government. The Government's Institute of Personnel Management is usually unaware of what the Government's Institute of National Planning is doing. But somewhere along the line, the erstwhile sinecures have been whipped into action and the new generation of foreign-trained executives, some 10,000 in all, is pulling its weight in the top jobs.

It would be unrealistic to expect that the nationalisation of 400 companies at one blow, workers' participation in management, and the dismissal of many managers on grounds of political unreliability, would not generate frightful managerial problems. The new laws require that no post carrying a salary of more than 1,500 Egyptian pounds a year can be held in any nationalised company without the personal sanction of the President. The shortage of personnel has meant that a general manager and his deputies often have to sit with co-equal powers in the managerial boards, a situation that has played havoc with the chain of command. It is not in all cases that leadership position and patriotic motives can make up for the loss of monetary incentives. But the fact remains that in the first year of nationalisation production has gone up.

SLOW INDUCTION

As a result of the slow induction into socialism, social barriers have crumbled rather gently. The first blow fell on the men who could bear it most: the landlords. Even so only about 420,000 acres of [illegible] of a total of transferred to obscure jobs because they happened to be blood relations of people on whom the axe fell; and the property of 1,000 others was "frozen." Since nearly a year, however, these men are back in circulation minus varying chunks of their wealth but nevertheless with enough cash to afford a style of living that does not differ in essentials from the comfortable standards they knew.

CASE OF AMIN BROTHERS

The case of Amin Brothers is typical. Starting from scratch about 20 years ago, the twin brothers had built up a vast publishing empire worth nearly a million pounds. When it was nationalised in the summer of 1961, the dashing entrepreneur—journalists lost their jobs and, like other publishers, have yet to receive full compensation. But soon their technical ability was requisitioned by the Government; one now heads a giant publishing enterprise called Dar el Hilal, and the other is the managing editor of the newspaper chain which he once owned. The two brothers get an annual salary of £(E)5,000, pay £(E)1,600 in taxes and net about £(E)300 a month. This is by no means a princely sum but it is more than the salary of the Ministers in President Nasser's Cabinet.

This kind of pragmatism has enabled the Nasser regime not only to reduce discontent but also to husband the available manpower in a manner that the advocates of private enterprise find it difficult to criticise. In most of the Government-owned undertakings production targets and social service ideals have begun to take precedence over the profit motive. There still is scope for conventional riches in Egypt: urban property—lands and buildings—forms the basis of many a private fortune. Besides, the new technocrats, often seconded from the Army, have instructions to let experienced hands in the newly nationalised firms to do their part until "something goes wrong". The device has worked well in obviating dislocation during the crucial period of transition. Meanwhile the training programmes are being reoriented to meet critical shortages that have developed in certain sectors despite breakneck expansion of the educational system. Against the current demand of 4,000 qualified engineers, for example, the universities are not likely to turn out more than 900 this year.

FOUR KEY SECTORS

It is remarkable, however, that the Government, over the years, has concentrated only on the development of four key sectors: defence, industry, education and health; expenditure under other budgetary heads has risen but marginally. Taxes, amounting to £(E)421 million in 1962-63, bear almost the same proportion to the gross national product as they did a decade earlier—that is about 25 per cent.

The rest of the budgetary expenditure is met by the income from nationalised companies (£(E)68 million), the Suez Canal (£(E)50 million), the insurance and pension funds (£(E)40 million), market loans (£(E)80 million), small savings (£(E)40 million), and foreign loans. In the arftermath of the Suez crisis, the Soviet bloc gave Egypt loans and aid worth nearly $700 million; in return, President Nasser pledged an undisclosed portion of the country's cotton crop for soft currencies of the East. By 1959, Egypt's commitment to the Soviet bloc became irreversible; the high dam, the arms deal and other [illegible] formed [illegible]

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The Story of Ancient Egypt

EGYPT TO THE END OF THE OLD KINGDOM: By Cyril Aldred; Edited by S. Piggott; Thames and Hudson, 30, Bloomsbury St., London. 30s.

The considerable art objects of Ancient Egypt, significant both in quality and for quantity—as every year witnesses additions to Egypt's store—stress emphatically that Egyptian Art from its very early stage of development was as much concerned with the visual presentation of events, facts and scenes, as it was representational. The dry climate of the Nile valley and the dictates of ancient Egypt's religion have largely aided Egypt's material culture to survive in abundance. Indeed her religion called upon the faithful to provide amply the dead in the other world with possessions and requisites suitable to and befitting his social status this side of the grave. The story of Ancient Egypt reveals contact between Mesopotamia and Egypt by before 3000 B.C., and a writing—not withstanding its individuality and originality—owing its origin as a concept, particularly in the signs for sounds, to the scribes of the Euphrates and Tigris. Unlike Mesopotamia, Egypt presents from the very beginning that essentially African figure—the prehistoric chieftain, a medicine-man and rain maker, with magic power over the elements, keeping his people in health and plenty, slowly becoming, with the advent of the first historical dynasties, the omnipotent, rain-making god-king, "the Pharaoh", in command over the Nile, sustainer and protector of the nation.

The author, Mr. Cyril Aldred, Keeper of Art and Archaeology, Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh, limits himself in the work under review to a survey of the civilisation that developed in Egypt from prehistory to C. 2000 B.C. and which blossomed during the period of the Old Kingdom covered by Dynasties III (C. 2700—2615 B.C.) to VI (C. 2350—2180 B.C.).

Apart from a study of the Pyramid Texts constituting the chief literary legacy of the Old Kingdom, and a few literary remains that have survived, by an intelligent arraying and essaying of artistic modes and concepts obtained by a study of Ancient Egypt's significant sculpture and architecture, the author has succeeded in proving how we can get a deeper insight into a pre-scientific culture such as that of Old Kingdom Egypt than by an intellectual analysis of its philosophical beliefs.

It was Manetho, a Graeco-Egyptian priest, that started the system of grouping as early as C. 220 B.C. the reigns of Egypt's kings into 31 dynasties. This system has much in its favour and is still in vogue among Egyptologists who have however further arranged the dynasties into longer periods, such as Old, Middle and New Kingdoms, their intervals marked by political confusion. The prehistoric ages are also grouped into broad periods named after important sites in Egypt where distinct cultures have been noted, identified and dated. The dating of such sequences by archaeological evidence, we are happy to note, has since been controlled by C-14 analyses. The book is of immense value for reference. Its neat get-up and excellent plates bring credit to its publishers. Under the able editorship of Prof. Stuart Piggott of international repute as archaeologist, it has acquired the status of a model worthy of emulation.

T. N. Ramachandran.

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THE DILEMMA THAT FACES MALAYSIA

RECONCILING A POLITICAL IMAGE WITH PRACTICAL REALITIES

From S. NIHAL SINGH

AT Kuala Lumpur airport recently, the Defence Minister of Malaysia wept as an aircraft brought the bodies of eight Malaysian soldiers killed in an ambush in Borneo. The spectacle of Tun Abdul Razak, a stolid matter-of-fact man, sobbing was a symbol of the country's sense of shock over a unique tragedy.

The incident took place almost on New Year's eve at a timber outpost at Kalabakan in Sabah. Malaysian soldiers were bivouacked in two houses not far from a settlement of Indonesian workers who traditionally provide the labour force for Sabah's booming timber trade. Hand-grenades aimed at the houses found eight soldiers dead and 19 wounded. The intruders left after an engagement with the remaining troops and were swallowed up by the surrounding jungle.

Tension along what is now the Malaysian-Indonesian border in Borneo has already claimed over a hundred lives. But never had the wages of Indonesian "confrontation" tasted so bitter. To the poignancy of those killed being their own flesh and blood was added the circumstances of their death. Tengku Abdul Rahman said it was "treachery". The conclusion was, indeed, inescapable that although most terrorists—as the guerrillas in Borneo are officially described—operated from Indonesian bases across the border, there must have been collusion in this case. Kalabakan is 30 miles inside Malaysian territory.

HAPPY DAYS

Malaya, the dominant partner of the new Federation of Malaysia, became independent in 1957. There was the war, the Japanese occupation and those 12 dogged years of the Emergency, but the first two events took place before freedom and the guerrilla war against the Communists was largely won under the British. Recent history has been rather kind to Malaya and its genial Prime Minister has always placed stress on happiness as the main objective for his nation.

Then came the concept of Malaysia—the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak —and almost overnight Malaya was swept into the whirlpool of regional politics. Indonesian "confrontation" towards Malaysia has alternated with peace talks. Bitter words of abuse have often yielded place to great protestations of friendship. In the public consciousness of Malaya, there has always been a Micawber-like quality of good fortune (and peace) round the corner.

Kalabakan has changed this to an extent. It is now being recognized in Kuala Lumpur that Indonesian confrontation represents the first real test for free Malaya (and other units of Malaysia). Kalabakan is part of the growing-up process which is necessary but awkward.

Malaysia's basic problem begins with the composition of its population. The Chinese form the biggest single block (over 40%) although Malays, taken together with the other "indigenous" peoples, have a numerical edge over the Chinese. Indians represent nearly one-tenth of the population. The Malaysian Constitution, like the previous Malayan Constitution, gives political weightage to Malays and other "indigenous" peoples.

ALIEN TIES

An estimated 60% of the Malays of Malaysia are of Indonesian stock and, together with the deep feelings of a common religion and race, share kinship with Indonesians. The presence of two immigrant races in large numbers—the Chinese and the Indian—makes the Malays' attachment of Indonesia the greater.

Indonesian hostility, therefore, strikes at the root of Malay consciousness. There is an unreal quality about the loud demonstrations of protest against Indonesia although political expediency had made Kuala Lumpur sponsor them. Malaysians say that the present crisis has helped knit the country's heterogenous peoples into one nation because the immigrant races' suspicions of Malays' attachment to Indonesia have now been reduced. How lasting this phenomenon will be remains to be seen.

Continuing Indonesian taunts about the British "running" Malaysia have made Kuala Lumpur more conscious of the important rôle the British are continuing to play in Government, industry and defence. Malaysians now freely admit that the British are a "political liability" in Borneo but they immediately add that, but for them, the Indonesian would have a field day. And there is an ironical twist in present Malaysian suspicions that, with British troops already overcommitted, London might have second thougths over fighting an unending guerrilla war in the jungles of Borneo. An interesting exemplification of these suspicions was a red herring floated in Kuala Lumpur recently about the virtues of Malaysia joining SEATO

One can still hear the stock arguments in Kuala Lumpur. How can 10 million Malaysians want to fight 100 million Indonesians? How can Indonesia, with its strong armed forces, fear encirclement? But more thought is being given to more important issues.

SUBVERSION

There are so many imponderables in the situation that long-term planning has to be based on assumptions. One assumption is that, apart from the ideological pull Indonesia will continue to exercise over a section of the people in Malaysian Borneo, subversion from across the border will go on. Increasing attention is therefore being paid to counter-propaganda and a newly-expanded external service of Radio Malaysia is trying to reach the high standards in vitriolic prose set by official and other Indonesian radio stations. Malaysian research workers are also digging into history to find incriminating evidence against Indonesia.

From the military point of view, Malaysians will have to continue to rely upon outside help because their own armed forces are too small to be able to defend the country. The 30-year British defence treaty with Malaya, now extended to Malaysia, is the fleet anchor, but many Malaysians wish that their dependence on one single European power (Britain) were less complete. They would, therefore, have welcomed Australian and New Zealand support in Borneo and are, for the same reason, bitter over what they describe as the USA's ambivalent attitude towards Indonesia.

Events culminating in Kalabakan have helped to build up a tempo in Malaya and the biggest problem before the leaders in Kuala Lumpur today is to retain this tempo against the changing tactics of Indonesia. Government leaders feel that they cannot afford to play ducks and drakes with the population, with elections coming in April or May this year. Opposition parties will pounce upon the ruling Alliance Government, given half a chance.

How to reconcile this requirement of practical politics with the equally important problem of Malaysia's image abroad is worrying Kuala Lumpur. In so far as the Malaysian crisis is being internationalized, to that extent will Kuala Lumpur need international support and sympathy. Malaysia, therefore, cannot afford to create the impression abroad of refusing to negotiate a settlement.

There are more questions in Kuala Lumpur than there are answers, and some of the contradictions that exist in Malaysia are part of the process of growing up.

Ra'ayat were Indonesian-oriented; dedicated Communists in the

nance. British interests in

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MALAYSIA'S DIFFERENCES WITH INDONESIA—I

DJAKARTA PUTS REVOLUTION BEFORE EVOLUTION

From S. NIHAL SINGH

AN inkling of the genesis of the Malaysia-Indonesia crisis can be had from a document published by Kuala Lumpur. It is an English translation of the proceedings of two plenary meetings held in 1945 of the "Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence".

The committee resolved that "the territory of Free Indonesia will include the former Dutch East Indies with the addition of Malaya, North Borneo, Papua, Timor and the adjacent islands". Dr Soekarno was an enthusiastic supporter of this resolution. Dr Hatta's voice of reason, warning against the dangers of new imperialism, was drowned.

Being pragmatists, Indonesian leaders have redefined their national boundaries over the years to limit them to the former Dutch East Indies. The long campaign over West Irian made the commitment to their new concept more complete because they were at pains to allay suspicions that they had further territorial ambitions.

The concept of Malaysia was first broached when Indonesia was submerged in her propaganda and military campaign over West Irian. Indonesians believe in fighting one major issue at a time, and Malaysia was therefore given a secondary place in their scheme of things; Dr Subandrio went to the extent of giving it faint praise at the United Nations.

"PAN-INDONESIA"

Once the campaign over West Irian was successfully concluded, Indonesians were free to take issue with Malaysia. Indonesian leaders had given up the idea of incorporating Malaya as they had earlier of taking in the Philippines; both countries were originally included in Dr Soekarno's concept of a "Pan-Indonesia". The British Borneo territories, however, were another matter. Indonesian leaders had apparently hoped that, with ideological warfare, these territories would gradually come within Indonesia's sphere of influence, finally to form a part of the Indonesian State.

Britain, however, was quick to anticipate Indonesia's future moves. By broaching the concept of Malaysia, the British plan was to change a predictable sequence of events; Britain's inspiration for Malaysia's formation is not in doubt, although it was Tengku Abdul Rahman who made the proposal in May 1961. London's primary interest in it was to rescue the British Borneo territories from Indonesia, while for Malaya the concept's main attraction was that it solved the problem of Singapore's integration presented by its Chinese population and its radical politics. In commending Malaysia to the people of the Borneo territories, British officials made no secret of the fact that they were delivering them out of the "lion's jaws". Britain's rôle, as far as her traditional representation as the lion is concerned, was here reversed.

Indonesian leaders in consequence felt cheated, and their particular animosity against Britain dates from this period. While Indonesians were exercising their minds in private over the question of "avenging British calumny", events in the tiny Sultanate of Brunei offered the ideal opportunity. The motivations of the Brunei revolt of December 1962 were primarily internal but they tied up excellently with Indonesia's objectives. Azahari and his Party Ra'ayat were Indonesian-oriented; dedicated Communists in the other Borneo territories were utilized to spread the revolt over all the three territories.

NOT FORGOTTEN

Azahari is now disliked in Djakarta because Indonesia can never forgive him for having failed in pulling off the revolt. Had it succeeded, Indonesia could have given recognition to his "Government", thus puncturing the Malaysia concept. Because the revolt failed, the next best thing for Indonesia was to utilize it for propaganda purposes. A clandestine radio station was set up and an official status given to Azahari's representative in Djakarta. The failure of the revolt also won for Indonesia a valuable ally in the Philippines. Manila gave a propaganda platform to Azahari to work off its own resentments over a supercilious British attitude to the Philippines' claim to Sabah as also to align itself with the Asian issue.

The die was thus cast for much that was to follow, until President Macapagal, in an act of true statesmanship, propounded the Maphilindo scheme—a loose confederation of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia working towards the ideal of the unity of Malay peoples. Indonesia's dominant rôle in Maphilindo was assured and explicitly stated by the Philippines. This was accepted by Indonesia at the first three-nation summit in Manila last year; the fact that President Soekarno threw away this tailor-made plan to spread and consolidate his influence in the area for the dangerous and uncertain fruits of confrontation will rank as his biggest failure in a chequered political career.

A host of other factors greatly complicate the dispute over Malaysia. There are basic causes of conflict between Malaya (now Malaysia) and Indonesia. Indonesian political development has been such that it places a premium on revolution as against evolution. President Soekarno has sedulously cultivated the cult of Indonesian superiority, making it flow from the country having won its freedom through an armed struggle. And in solving Indonesia's problem of integration, he used the cement of extreme nationalism, which is indistinguishable from chauvinism.

The West Irian episode provided Indonesia with substantial hardware from the Soviet Union. Indonesia is far from being a first-rate military Power, but in terms of the capacities her neighbours possessed (and possess today) the new acquisition of strength encouraged President Soekarno to flex his muscles and give some substance to the Indonesian desire to dominate South-East Asia.

Malaya's political development, on the other hand, has been very subdued. Malaya's independence was not so much an achievement of the Malayan leaders as an act of statesmanship on Britain's part. The structure of the feudal Sultans was retained in free Malaya; although their political powers were taken away, they were made the central arch in the edifice of Malaya' political dominance. British interests in

INTER-RACIAL FACTOR

In spite of the great disparity between the two countries, Indonesian leaders were prepared to put up with Malaya as long as she acknowledged them as their mentors and treated them with due deference. This was not such an unwelcome prospect as it would seem. The Malays' political horizon was seriously limited by the inter-racial character of their country. The Chinese, comprising nearly 40% of the population, were the biggest non-European entrepreneurs; the Malays were, by and large, poor and had to be helped to meet the Chinese challenge.

Indonesia, with her population of nearly 100 million Malays, was a source of much comfort to the Malays of Malaya and a widespread feeling among them was to seek very close ties, formalized if possible with Indonesia. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the only Opposition party to control any State Government in Malaya, is an exemplification of these feelings.


The Malaysia concept came as a rude shock to Indonesians because their "pupils"—as they considered the Malayan leaders—were not merely backing a British "plot" to deprive them of pieces of valuable territory but were also planning to benefit at their expense. This was seen as a piece of effrontery and went to create the bitter fruits of confrontation.

Malaysia touched another very sensitive Indonesian spot. Against the background of island revolts that have continued to plague Djakarta, the new concept was seen as a diabolical plot to perpetuate British military presence around Indonesia. The Sumatra rebellion of 1957-58 and the encouragement it received from some of the Western Powers are strongly imprinted on the minds of Indonesian leaders. And a continuing British presence in the vicinity, it was felt in Djakarta, would provide Western Powers with an ideal opportunity to encourage revolts at a time of their choosing.

The Indonesians have used all the arguments they could muster to try to stop Malaysia. Apart from the theory of 'imperialistic encirclement' of Indonesia, they developed the intriguing thesis that Malaysia's formation would only provide a stepping stone to Communism to invade the island nations of South-East Asia—a Chinese Singapore spreading out its claws. They have also suggested to a West trying to stem Chinese influence in the area that Malaysia's formation would only encourage the local Chinese, whose basic sympathies for the mainland Government of China are not in doubt, to consolidate their hold over the new Federation.

When these arguments did not convince the better part of the world (the Communist nations excepted), Indonesia launched guerrilla warfare, her gamble to have Malaysia undone through a United Nations investigation failed last year and she preferred to intensify her confrontation policy rather than accept Malaysia.

It is true that the people of



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MALAYSIA'S DIFFERENCES WITH INDONESIA—II

NEED FOR REVIVAL OF THE MAPHILINDO IDEA

From S. NIHAL SINGH

THE Malaysia-Indonesia crisis is, essentially, a conflict between an extreme form of nationalism and the efforts of a semi-feudal heterogeneous nation to find its place in the tempestuous world of South-East Asia. Around this central fact are enmeshed many interesting national and international factors.

With the astuteness the highest echelons of Indonesian leadership is capable of, Djakarta has calculated to a fine point its own importance in the East-West struggle in the area. With a population of over 100 million and a string of potentially rich islands stretching over a vast and vital strategic area, Indonesia has occupied a central position in the USA's Pacific area plans.

U.S. tolerance and understanding of the frequent aberrations of Indonesian nationalism have stemmed from this basic American concern with Indonesia's strategic importance. Americans have also been impressed by the vitality of the people and the many attractive features Indonesian nationalism includes. Their hearty endorsement of the Maphilindo concept underlined this desire to encourage the great emotional base for Malay unity which only can help in stemming Chinese influence.

In spite of the hardware provided by the Soviet Union, the Russian presence in Indonesia has never had a dramatic impact. As long as the Soviet Union was the undisputed Communist Power, Djakarta paid her due deference. With the Sino-Soviet conflict exploding on the world stage, Indonesians were quick to seize the opportunity to reorient their thinking and favours. (According to a story related in Djakarta's diplomatic world with relish, the U.S. Ambassador is reported to have told his Soviet counterpart after a snub administered by President Soekarno to a high visiting Russian dignitary: "Mr Ambassador, not only are they playing the East against the West but the East against the East").

BASIC PREJUDICE

Indonesians have a basic prejudice against the Chinese, flowing from the long dominance of Chinese traders in the rural areas and their opulence in the cities. The anti-Chinese riots of last year were an example of this prejudice, as also the earlier period of bedevilled relations between Djakarta and Peking over the question of Chinese traders.

Peking, however, chose to turn a blind eye to the anti-Chinese riots in order to continue its wooing of Indonesia. China's strongest base is the growing Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which is dominated by the pro-Peking wing. And in the existing circumstances of Indonesia, all the vague but catchy jingoist slogans popularized by the apparatus of the Indonesian State are readily susceptible to Communist (particularly Chinese) exploitation.

Malaysia impinges on Indonesia's relations with these three Powers. The USA has been increasingly disillusioned by the pattern of recent events; in view of her present preoccupation with the Indo-China States and the polarization taking place there between the pro and anti-Communist forces, American patience with Indonesia is beginning to be exhausted. U.S. aid has almost been stopped and earlier plans to provide substantial funds for Indonesian development have been put away.

Both China and the Soviet Union have formally supported Indonesia on the Malaysia dispute. China's support has been lacking in warmth perhaps because there is substantial Chinese population in Malaysia. But the Chinese policy is to continue to exploit the favourable circumstances of Indonesia while keeping her presence there as unobtrusive as possible.

Although the Soviet Union's present interests would seem to lie more in the direction of Maphilindo in terms of keeping Chinese influence at bay, she can hardly do less than reiterate her support of Indonesia. Russia's new endorsement of Djakarta's position will do its bit to bolster the Soviet image in Indonesia. A period of increased Indonesian cordiality towards Russia is indicated, also because the Malaysia issue can figure in the United Nations, where Djakarta will have to rely heavily on Soviet support.

Indonesian leaders seem convinced that the main hindrance to their Big Power ambitions is Britain's military power in South-East Asia. Djakarta has left severely alone the fact of America's greater power in the area because it benefits from the counterbalancing effects of the American presence on the Chinese. During the entire period of confrontation, Djakarta has concentrated her propaganda on seeking to remove the British military presence from the area. It is, therefore, all the more ironical that Indonesia should have given short shrift to the Maphilindo project, which foreshadowed a gradual replacement of the European Powers through regional defence arrangements.

Although Indonesian leaders are strikingly clear about their long-term objectives of being *the* Power in South-East Asia, their short-term policies are full of contradictions. Largely, these flow from the basic instability of the Indonesian State. President Soekarno's great contribution has been the integration of his fantastically-varied country, and in giving the ordinary Indonesian a sense of dignity. But he has failed to give his country a stable political structure, relying rather on his own charismatic appeal and the balancing of the PKI with the anti-Communist Armed Forces.

TRADE BOYCOTT

The problems presented by the disappearance of the balancing factor are so immense that they can only form the subject of speculation. It is also a universally-recognized axiom that President Soekarno has no patience with economic planning. He has consistently made economic policies subservient to political objectives. The two most dramatic instances of this have been his launching of a trade boycott against Malaysia without any form of adequate preparation, and his willingness to sacrifice prospects of substantial foreign aid, a solely-needed commodity, for the dubious glories of confronting Malaysia. Economic instability has in consequence been exacerbated.

The Indonesian nation, on the other hand, is being continually fed on jingoism, and there have been times during the long period of confrontation when the hands of the Indonesian leaders have been forced by public feeling whipped up by official propaganda. The PKI naturally throws its full weight against any move for accommodation with Malaysia. Also, the Indonesian leaders susceptibility to their own propaganda increasingly tends to limit their horizons.

The time has, however, arrived when Indonesia's actions are in danger of crowding out her long-term objective of playing a dominant independent role in the area. The only sensible alternative to continuing military confrontation is to adapt the concept to a purely ideological campaign and to revive the Maphilindo project. The three-nation Tokyo summit proved that President Soekarno was either unable or unwilling to give a chance to the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission to start work. If he continues to maintain this position, he will not only risk losing Filipino friendship but will also consign his country and South-East Asia to a new and dangerous phase of instability.

Malaysia is the receiving end of much that happens today in relation to the dispute. While Indonesian confrontation has given the new Federation greater unity, it remains a jigsaw puzzle. Confrontation has not resolved the basic distrust between Malays and Chinese; Indians play a secondary role in the inter-racial suspicions. Indonesians are well aware of this, as wel as of the fact that over 60% of Malays are of Indonesian stock. They are utilizing the suspicions Malays have of Chinese by continual propaganda blasts at Mr Lee Kuan Yew's Chinese-dominated State Government and the alleged hardships Malays suffer at its hands. It is also an indication of the strength of Malays' suspicions that, in spite of all the bitter fruits of confrontation, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party retained its hold over the State of Kelantan in the recent Malayan elections

NEW BURDENS

Malaysia's defensive posture in relation to Indonesia does not flow entirely from its smallness and lack of military resources and consequent dependence on a European Power. Its inter-racial character has a very strong bearing on the dispute. Although Malaysian leaders are becoming increasingly resigned to a long period of strife with Indonesia, they have still fully to grasp all the hardships it will entail for their country.

Malaysia is an affluent country, but its affluence comes largely from the export of two primary products—rubber and tin—which are proverbially susceptible to changing (usually falling) world prices. Malaysia's formation means that the Federal Government will have to make increasing development outlays in the Borneo territories while intensifying rural development in Malaya. Recent spectacular jumps in the Malaysian defence budget are the inevitable result of Indonesia's continuing confrontation. They are a new burden on the national exchequer. Singapore, however, has largely weathered the storm created by Indonesia's trade boycott.

Peace therefore is a very welcome prospect for Malaysia, although there are hotheads who seek to emulate the Indonesian brand of nationalism by proposing various measures, including the encouraging of dissident tendencies in Sumatra, an island traditionally at odds with the Javanese-dominated Central Government and more conservative in its political outlook. Confrontation has, besides, given the Malaysian Chinese the opportunity to oppose Maphilindo vigorously.

Is there any prospect of an early peace? The answer to this question largely depends upon Indonesia; President Soekarno does not have much time in which to give the answer.

(Concluded)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS/MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

INDIA AND CHINA TODAY

By G. N. DAS

The famous historian, H. A. L. Fisher, in his preface to the original edition of his monumental "A History of Europe," said he could discern in history no plot or a predetermined pattern, that one emergency follows another as one wave follows upon another. The one safe rule for a historian was that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.

That, indeed, is the only way to approach the present dispute between India and China for which history offers no precedent. For China, till Mao's rise to power, had never been an expansionist power. The writer contrasts the old cultural ties between the two with the sudden worsening of relations in our day.

DIA, said Prime Minister Nehru at the Asian Re- ons Conference in New Delhi 1947, "is the natural centre l focal point of the many es at work in Asia. Geography compelling factor, and geo- phically she is so situated as to the meeting point of western northern and eastern and th-east Asia. Because of this, history of India is a long his- y of her relations with the other ntries of Asia." And of these ntries an important place uld be assigned to China—one he oldest of civilizations, though ong the youngest of nations in Western sense, and now a wing force in international irs.

n about 1,000 B.C. small groups Neolithic peasants crossed over o eastern India from Burma rying stone tools, some of which comparable to ones reported m north China. However, regu- contact between India and ina belongs to a considerably er age, although it is difficult to e a precise date to its begin- gs. Commercial relations be- een the two countries both by nd and sea appear to have exist- from the second century B.C. uring the early part of the Chris- n era Chinese silk was imported India on a large scale. Prior to is, in about 2 B.C., certain texts Buddhism were presented to the hinese emperor by the Yueh-chi lers of Central Asia. The result the introduction of this religion to China and the neighbouring ountries was tremendous, similar the effect on Europe of the pread of Christianity.

The first Buddhist scholars from ur country to visit China were asyapa Matanga and Dharma- atna, both belonging to central ndia. It is stated that in A.D. 65 mperor Ming of the eastern Han ynasty saw a golden image in his ream. When he was told that it epresented the Buddha, he sent missaries to India to secure some Buddhist texts and teachers. The esult was the arrival in China of he two priests with numerous elics and texts carried on a white orse. They lived in a monastery alled Po-ma-sse ("White Horse Monastery"), which the emperor uilt for them, and wrote five ooks on Buddhism. One of them, ntitled "Sutra of the Forty-two ections," contained the essential rinciples of the religion and was he first Buddhist work in Chinese. rom this time Buddhism began to ain ground in China as a popular eligion. There is no doubt that its ntense spirituality, the nature of ts rituals and worship and its tress on salvation through moral xertion ma e a deep impression n the Chin e mind.

A gre dian scholar named Kumar , whose home was in Kashmi , ed at the Chinese apital in A.D. 401 and worked here till his death in A.D. 413. He had a good command of the Chi- ese and Sanskrit languages and ranslated more than a hundred acred works with the help of about 800 assisatnts. He also pre- pared a biography in Chinese of Nagarjuna, the eminent Buddhist thinker of south India of the second century A.D., about whom we know so little from indigenous sources. It was because of his efforts that the school of Buddhism called Hinayana or the Little Vehicle was superseded by that of Mahayana or the Great Vehicle in China.

No less reputed than the above was teacher Bodhidharma of Kan- chipuram, who is even now res- pected in China as the founder of Ch'an or, as it was later called, Zen Buddhism. He reached Canton in A.D. 520 and, according to one account, spent nine years in medi- tation at the Shao Lin monastery, near Loyang, in Honan Province. "The truly valuable things," he said, "are attained only by that inner purification and enlighten- ment which comes through quiet reflection and mediation."

Paramartha of Ujjain was an- other distinguished Indian teacher who translated about 70 Buddhist texts in China during the years 546 and 569. His labours have ensured the preservation of some of the writings of Vasubandhu, Asanga, Nagarjuna, Asvaghosa, Vasumitra and Gunamati—all leading figures in Buddhist thought, about whom our knowledge is mainly based on Chinese works. He also translated Isvarakrishna's Sankhyakarika, which significantly is not a Bud- dhist but a Hindu text.

Vajrabodhi, a scholar from Kerala, arrived in China in A.D. 719 with a disciple named Amog- havajra and was responsible for the introduction of the Mantra sect of Buddhism, which assured and assures salvation to people having faith in its formulas and cere- monies. Amoghavajra collected many tantric texts from India and translated them into Chinese. Thus Indian scholars popularized both Buddhism and Hindu philosophical ideas. It is surprising all the more that these great sons of our coun- try are known primarily through Chinese sources and are seldom mentioned in Indian records.

Indian culture also penetrated into China through Tibet. The great teacher Padmasambhava of north-east India first established Lamaism or Tantric Buddhism with its magic and miracles in the eighth century A.D. At that time Tibet held sway over western China and Mongolia also, and so the diffusion of Tantric Buddhism in these areas was greatly facili- tated. Along with it certain Hindu, particularly Saivite, cults were in- troduced into China.

TRAVELLERS

From the third century A.D. Chi- nese pilgrims began coming to India in a steady stream. They came not only on pilgrimage but also to study Buddhism and collect relics as well as religious texts. Among those who arrived between the fifth and the seventh centuries were Fa-hsien (A.D. 399-414), Yuan Chwang (A.D. 629-645) and I-tsing (A.D. 671-695). According to the latter, twenty Chinese Buddh- ist priests journeyed to India via Burma about 500 years before his visit and were well received by the Indian ruler Srigupta, who built a temple for them in Bengal and en- dowed the land and revenues of nearly twenty villages in their favour.

A large number of these priests came to India between the tenth and the eleventh centuries. During the same period the largest num- ber of Indian monks was in resi- dence in the Chinese court. The last Chinese scholar departed from India in about A.D. 1033 and the last Indian teacher visited China in A.D. 1053, and it was at about this time that the cultural inter- course beween the two countries declined.

Conact with China was not con- fined to north India. The early Cholas of the South sent envoys to the Han emperor in about the first century A.D. In return for Chinese silk and gold, south India exported pearls, gems and other products. Moreover, from the third century A.D. the Indian kingdom of Cambodia (Kambuja) establish- ed diplomatic relationships with China.

Indian influence in China was far from being confined to the sphere of religion. It also spread to such varied fields of human en- deavour as sculpture, painting, music, astronomy, mathematics, architecture, drama and the like. But from about the tenth century A.D. a process of assimilation of the borrowed elements set in, and, if we compare, for instance, the faces of the deities in a present- day Buddhist temple in China with those of the earliest Indian origi- nals, this can easily be noticed.

TAOISM

Cultural relations between India and China did not represent a one- way traffic. The two countries were both borrowers and lenders, but the extent of Chinese influence on our life and culture has not been adequately investigated. Neverthe- less, certain facts stand out more or less clearly. So far as Indian religious life is concerned, there seem to be some traits which may be traced to Taoist thought. The Kamakhya cult of Assam and the form of tantricism called China- chara also betray the influences of China. More: the introduction of a few fruits, like lichis (nephelium litchi), pears and peaches; of ver- milion; of bamboo; of fishing in backwaters, as practised in south India; of the porcelain industry of Kerala; and, above all, of the widespread use of silk—all these may well be attributed to stimulus from that country. But in the realm of art and architecture only slight influences can be seen.

The earliest routes between India and China were via Assam, Burma and Yunnan, and, secondly, along the coast to Arakan and then to Pagan and Yunnan. They lay, however, through mountainous and inhospitable country and, there- fore, in about the second century B.C. fresh routes were started across Central Asia, which was then coming under the influence of Hindu-Buddhist culture and was transformed into a sort of Greater India in the fourth century A.D. They continued to function till the later part of the eighth century A.D., when the Arabs spread to the area and, with the added strength of Tibetan militarism, succeeded in driving the Chinese into what is called China Proper. Nevertheless at about this period there sprang up a new, though not equally effective, overland route across Tibet. In addition, the sea afforded another line of communication, particularly for south India, for several centuries more.

The cultural exchange between India and China for about 1500 years was an event of first-rate im- portance in this part of the world and substantially moulded the course of history in other distant countries like Korea, Japan, Mon- golia, Tonkin, etc. It is difficult to over-estimate its dominant role in shaping the mind of east Asia and creating a common civilization—a civilization which is (or was) cha- racterized by a "faith in an unseen reality of which all life is a mani- festation, the primacy of spiritual experience, a rigid adherence to intellectual norms, and an anxiety for harmonizing apparent oppo- sites."

In the light of the peaceful inter- course between India and China in the olden days, which has been called "one of the most remarkable things in the world's history," the current border dispute is not only unfortunate but also unprecedent- ed to a great extent. It is all the more unfortunate that despite the recent meeting between the Indian and the Chinese Prime Ministers, the differences between the two countries are not nearer solution and the Sino-Indian boundary, ex- tending over 3,520 kilometres along the Himalayas, continues to be a source of danger, if not actual con- flict at the moment.

STATUS QUO

The age-old status quo in this border was rudely shaken when the Chinese Communists constructed a 100-mile road across Indian territory in Aksai Chin, Ladakh, in 1957, estab- lished a camp at Spanggur in the same area in 1959, entered the Lohit Frontier Division of N.E.F.A. in 1957 and, last but not least, des- patched armed personnel to Bara Hoti in Uttar Pradesh in 1958. In July, 1958 an official Chinese maga- zine even published a map showing portions of Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and N.E.F.A. as the territory of China. However, events took a se- rious turn only in August, 1959 with the Chinese seizure of the Indian frontier outpost of Longju, south of the McMohon Line in the north-eastern sector, followed by other acts of aggression.

On September 26, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the Chi- nese Prime Minister saying that these actions and the attempt to justify them had greatly shocked the people of this country. "India," he went on, "was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two coun- tries signed the 1954 agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problems which his- tory had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all in- sistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have dis- cussed in recent years and, I thought, settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her south-western border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope and this promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should essentially be a border dis- pute, claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been and are an integral part of the territory of India." Should the Chinese leaders co-operate whole- heartedly in finding a just and peaceful solution of this problem, they will have derived profit from a lesson in history.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

THE LONG MARCH AND AFTER

The story of the Chinese revolution is carried a stage further from the Long March—truce with Chiang and war with Japan which threatened to turn China into a colony. K. M. Panikkar enlivens the narrative with many asides.

THE long march ended when Mao Tse-tung led the tattered remnants of his army into the town of Po-An in North Shensi. Here he waited, negotiating with the authorities of an independent "Soviet" area which had been in existence there for over ten years under a group of local revolutionaries of whom the most important was Kao Kang.

Mao's prestige had grown so much during these years that with his trained army he found no difficulty in being invited to take over the leadership of the area. Yenan, which thus became the new capital of Chinese Communism, was a place ideally suited for defence against the kind of danger which the Kiangsi Soviet faced.

Though the Communists were safe in Yenan, their situation could not have appeared hopeful. What gave them the opportunity they sought was action by Japan. The Japanese militarists were determined to bring China under control by taking advantage of the crisis in Europe.

Decision to Resist

In 1935 Peking and North China had been virtually detached from the authority of the Chiang Kai-shek Government and placed under the protection of Japan. Feeling in China—especially among the intellectuals and the middle classes—was inflamed by this surrender. The Communists even while in Kiangsi had issued a proclamation affirming their intention of marching north and resisting the Japanese. Though this seemed no more than a futile gesture, as the little territory they controlled was far away from the scene of Japanese action, it had a political effect in rallying patriotic opinion to the Communist side.

From North Shensi they were in a better position to act, and they did not lose any time in launching appeals for national unity to fight the invaders, and thus they began to establish their claim to be the champions of Chinese nationalism.

Chiang Kai-shek had a difficult choice to make. He had failed to annihilate the Communists, who had found a new and more impregnable base. He had also failed to stem the advance of the Japanese and had yielded to their control important areas of North China. He could not fight both the Communists and the Japanese.

Arrest of Chiang

His own desire was to annihilate the Communists first, thus ridding himself of the poison which weakened his body politic, and then to turn his full strength on the Japanese. Events however forced his hands. The Manchurian Army under the command of Chang Hsueh-liang—son of the redoubtable Manchurian war lord Marshal Chang Tso-lin—was concentrated at Sian. To these forces, Chiang Kai-shek desired to entrust the fresh "Communist-annihilation campaign" he had planned.

But Chang Hsueh-liang thought otherwise. To him and his command the primary duty of the Chinese was to drive the Japanese out from Manchuria itself. So when Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian on December 12, 1936, to plan the new annihilating campaign against the Communists in Yenan, General Chang Hsueh-liang had him and his officers arrested.

From this humiliating position, where his life itself was in danger, Chiang was saved by the intervention of the Communists themselves. Mao Tse-tung sent Chou En-lai to Sian to intervene in the dispute.

Though this was one of the most spectacular events in recent Chinese history, many facts regarding this strange adventure by which Chiang, a prisoner threatened with summary execution, emerged as the ally of the Communists and the acknowledged leader of China in the anti-Japanese war, still remain obscure.

United Front

Under the terms of the agreement negotiated by Chou En-lai, the Communists gave up their claim to independence, and were content to be considered an autonomous Border Area Administration. The Chinese Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army of the national forces under the strategic direction of Chiang himself. A united front against Japan was created, and Chiang undertook to concentrate his efforts against the invaders.

Why, when they held Chiang at their mercy, did the Communists agree to these terms which not only recognized the legitimacy and authority of the Kuomintang but placed the Red Army under the nominal command of the Generalissimo? I once aked Chou En-lai this question and his reply was frank. Chiang's leadership was still needed for preserving the unity of China. He still had a national role to play, and his elimination at that stage would have been disastrous. Also, the Communists needed breathing time to build up their strength. The long march, it is true, had toughened the troops and saved the revolution, but in Yenan, Mao and his colleagues had not yet had time to build up their strength.

Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai had calculated that by standing forth as champions of national resistance to the Japanese, even at the cost of sacrificing many things which they held dear, the Communists would gain the sympathy of the intellectual classes of China. Before the Communists took over in 1949 opinion in China was to a very great extent dominated by the *literati*—the new class of intellectuals, poets, professors and lawyers and the vast student population. The activities of the Communists till then had made no direct appeal to them. They were intensely nationalist in their attitude, not concerned so much with internal reforms, which could wait, as with the organization of national resistance to the Japanese.

The Communists, by appearing to make heavy sacrifices even when they held Chiang prisoner, showed themselves to the intelligentsia not only as patriots but as the champions of national liberation. The alliance thus made between the Communists and the middle-class intellectuals was one of the many sources of Communist strength in the years to come.

Though in appearance Chiang had emerged with his authority in a way more consolidated than before, he has himself never ceased to consider this agreement as the greatest mistake in his life. He is convinced that if instead of agreeing with Chou to establish a joint front against the Japanese, he had persisted in his original idea of liquidating the Communists, as he could have easily done in 1936, and then turned on the Japanese, he could have driven out the Japanese and at the same time prevented the country from coming under Communist control.

During the truce which followed this incident at Sian, the Communists tried out their economic and social programme and gained experience in the art of government. The most significant aspect of the Yenan period is that it provided the intelligentsia all over China with an alternative centre of attraction at a time when the Kuomintang was becoming increasingly reactionary.

Repressive Policy

Until 1936 the Kuomintang had maintained a dual aspect—first a Government under military tutelage, second a liberal nationalism as the inheritor of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. But now the Kuomintang entered on a frankly reactionary stage. Its theoretical doctrines are enshrined in Chiang Kai-shek's own book, *China's Destiny*.

The new officials tended once again to become a mandariniate. Confucianism became again the philosophy in power, and the Holy Sage whose deposition had been one of the persistent demands of the May 4 movement became again the patron saint of the pseudo-intelligentsia. The Kuomintang began a programme of re-

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pression, especially of professors and literary men, whose influence in the universities it dreaded.

Nothing could have given the new centre at Yenan a better opportunity. It became the centre of allegiance of the disaffected intelligentsia, who began to see in it the prospect of a New China.

During the ten years that Yenan remained the seat of the Communist Government, it was much more than the headquarters of a party. It was converted into a laboratory for the political, economic and cultural revolution of a people. It had a university, a school of art, a training centre for cadres, a military academy. Also a sense of complete certainty in their victory dominated the Communists' thinking. From 1937 there was a regular pilgrimage of young men with progressive ideas to the new Mecca in the north-west.

Full-scale war against Japan began in July, 1937, and as it progressed the Communists in Yenan were able to extend their area of influence. The Eighth Route Army operated mainly behind the Japanese lines, with the support of the poor peasants, working up their feelings against both the Japanese and their own landlords. Liberation was thus coming to have an extended meaning; not only the recovery of China's independence but also the liberation of the common people from the oppression of the landlords, bureaucratic capitalists and others vaguely denounced as imperialist exploiters

The Decline of Kuomintang

Mao's Thesis

Gradually, a doctrine was also being evolved to enable a national front to be created under the leadership of the Communists. At the seventh Congress of the party on April 24, 1945, Mao presented his thesis on "coalition government," which was an invitation to all progressive parties to work under the leadership of the Communists to create a new China.

Mao's doctrine was simple. The time had not come for a one-party government in China, and consequently what suited China in the present stage of development was a coalition of classes from which only the land-owners, the bureaucratic capitalists and the collaborationists were excluded. Even the small land-owners and "national capitalists" were to be found a place in the broad national front. Mao, in his famous speech on a coalition government, declared that, while the leadership was to remain with the Communists, they would be content with a minority representation in the national coaliton, emphasizing that the government of the country would be through agreement. To allay the fears of the middle class about a dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao Tse-tung declared that what the Chinese Communists stood for was not the rule of the proletariat but the rule of the people. To this distinction, the Communists owed much of their success in securing the co-operation of the numerous middle-class parties.

By the end of the war it was clear that the Kuomintang had lost the support of the vast body of intellectuals. Dean Acheson, in transmitting the White Paper entitled "United States' Relations With China" to President Truman, stated in his covering letter that some American observers had realized as early as 1943 that the Kuomintang had forfeited the confidence of large sections of the Chinese people and that "they were concerned with the effect which this deterioration of the Kuomintang must have on its eventual struggle, whether political or military, with the Chinese Communists. These observers were already fearful in 1943-44 that the National Government might be so isolating itself from the people that in the post-war competition for power it would prove itself impotent to maintain its authority."

The isolation of the Kuomintang from the people was the real source of Chiang Kai-shek's weakness. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues had broadened the sources of their power, and provided the formula of a national coalition and a people's government to enable the disillusioned middle-classes to rally to the Communist banner.—*Observer*.

(To be concluded)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

LAST STEPS TO POWER

In this concluding article of a series of four, K. M. Panikkar describes the last days of the Kuomintang on the mainland and the strategy pursued by the Communists after the seizure of power.

JAPAN surrendered on August 14, 1945. The situation in China was strange. The international position of Chiang Kai-shek's Government never seemed stronger. Officially recognized as one of the Big Five, with a permanent seat on the Security Council, China to the casual observer seemed to have stepped into the vacant seat of imperial Japan.

In 1945, the Soviets signed a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek under which the Kuomintang Government, officially recognized as the central government of China, was promised help in case of future Japanese aggression. The signatories also agreed "not to take part in any coalition whatever directed against the other."

Though internationally the Nationalist Government's position seemed unassailable, internally the situation was totally different. During the ten years of Japanese War the area controlled by Yenan had grown. Its political and military organization had attained a strength much beyond what the Communists could have hoped in 1936. It controlled a well-trained army of over a million and a half soldiers and its authority was accepted by over 90 million people. Besides, in North and Central China, in areas which were under effective Japanese or puppet government occupation, the Communist armies had established guerrilla centres. They had organized the people and established the framework of an underground government.

ACUTE DANGER

At the time of Japan's surrender the Kuomintang Government was frightened that Communist army units might take over the government in areas where they faced the Japanese. The most acute danger was in Manchuria. The Russian Army had moved in there, and there was genuine fear that the Soviet commanders might associate themselves with the Communist guerrillas who were fighting on that front.

In the race for positions it was the Kuomintang that was successful. The American authorities in the Far East realized what was at stake and effectively airlifted Kuomintang commandos to different centres in North China and Manchuria to enable them to take over from the Japanese. This sudden move, known as "Operation Dove," upset all Red calculations and the Communists had to be satisfied with the areas over which they had direct control.

But America recognized that the position was an unreal one. That while formally and legalistically all China was under one central government there was in fact another government which challenged that authority and was effective over large areas. Uncertain about the outcome of a continuing civil war, the American Government under the leadership of General Marshall embarked on a policy of mediation between the rival parties in the hope of creating a united dynamic China which would collaborate with the West.

REAL ISSUE

This mediation had little chance of success. The party which America desired to see in power was the party which was not sympathetic towards mediation. In May, 1945, three months before the Japanese surrender, the Kuomintang had officially proclaimed that there could be no compromise in this struggle against the Chinese Communist Party. The Communists were the active supporters of the American proposals, no doubt fully realizing that the Kuomintang would prevent any possibility of agreement. [illegible] was one issue on which [illegible] Party could never [illegible] merging of [illegible]

[illegible]ard

to the Communists governing directly an area larger than most European States, claiming the allegiance of guerrilla groups all over the country, and maintaining an army of over a million and a half soldiers under their own officers. Mao Tse-tung on the other hand could not yield the effective control of his armies to the Kuomintang or accept the position of a war lord under the general suzerainty of Nanking.

Chiang, it need hardly be said, looked upon the reopening of the civil war as a continuation of his annihilating campaigns, interrupted as a result of the Sian agreement, but now taken up again on a vaster scale. In the first few months of the new campaign the Kuomintang armies were on the offensive. In numbers and resources the Kuomintang had an overwhelming advantage. A large portion of its troops had been armed and trained by the Americans. The railway lines were under Government control. It had also a powerful air force with experience of actual warfare. Besides, it had also the support of the United States in the supply of material.

The new annihilation campaign into which Chiang had thrown 1,600,000 troops, about 80 per cent of his regular forces, met with immediate success. The Communists were driven out of Yenan and much of the area which they had held lightly in the central plains was recovered. But the Communists in yielding up areas had maintained their armies intact. They broke through the attempted encirclement and moved towards the north-west.

The Kuomintang appeared at the end of 1947 to be at the height of its power, having not only reoccupied effectively most of central and northern China and Manchuria but also reduced the Communists in appearance to a rebellious and dissident group occupying some of the outer and inaccessible areas of the State. The stage was then set for a political transformation. A National Assembly was summoned to meet in Nanking to elect a regular president and inaugurate a democratic system of government.

In his speech to the National Assembly which elected him President of China in May, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek declared that he hoped to annihilate the Communists in a period of three months, but before the echoes of the speech died away this pleasant dream had begun to turn into a nightmare. Even while the National Assembly was in session the Communists struck a spectacular blow in the very [illegible] China. They attacked [illegible] tured Kaifeng, a major [illegible] central China. The tide [illegible] had begun to turn.

By the end of the [illegible] Kuomintang armies in [illegible] ria had surrendered to [illegible] munists. Marching [illegible]

Continued on back

The Seizure of Power

Continued from page 1

Mukden and joining with the armies of Liu Po Chi and Chen Yi, veterans of the great march, the Communist armies won in central China one of the most decisive battles of Chinese history, the battle of Hsuchow, where the flower of the Kuomintang army was defeated and destroyed in an engagement lasting over three weeks. The victory of Hsuchow brought the Communists to the Yangtse and it was clear that the strength of Kuomintang resistance was broken and the occupation of the rest of China was only a matter of time.

Hsuchow exposed the political no less than the military weakness of Kuomintang China. The political structure of the vast area over which Chiang Kai-shek claimed authority stood exposed more as a confederation of war lords than as a national government.

WISE MANOEUVRING

The Communists did not fail to exploit their victory politically to the fullest extent. Their emphasis was less on the surrender of the Kuomintang than on the restoration of peace. "Let not brother fight brother" was their slogan. "The civil war is being continued in the interests of foreign imperialists. The Communists desire only peace and unity."

This propaganda fell on fertile soil. In the new "Parliament" which had been constituted after Chiang's election in 1948 the majority took up these cries and they found a leader in the Vice-President, Li Tsung-jen, who had been elected against the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek and had the support of a section of the Kuomintang. The Communists wisely shifted their pressure to the political front in the months following Hsuchow, and the victory on the political front was no less spectacular than the military victory.

As a result of combined political, military and diplomatic pressure Chiang Kai-shek temporarily retired from the Presidency, making way for Vice-President Li Tsung-jen. Li, without either the prestige or the political experience of Chiang and weakened by the refusal of large sections of the army to [illegible] neither to [illegible] carry on [illegible] nists kept up their political pressure, which was a demand for the convocation of a political consultative conference, in effect a constituent assembly of all parties, excepting those associated with Chiang's regime, who were roundly denounced as war criminals.

Li Tsung-jen hoped that the Communists would be prepared for a coalition on terms of equality or at least for a modification of the terms enabling the Kuomintang to maintain authority in some form over the southern provinces. At this time he argued to me that the Kuomintang was still in effective possession of much larger areas than it had occupied at the height of Japanese aggression and controlled a better equipped army of no fewer than two million under experienced leaders. It had, too, the support of powerful allies. They could fight back effectively from Canton or Chungking. Therefore it was worth while to the Communists to recognize these facts and gain control by peaceful methods.

Secondly, Li Tsung-jen argued that the acquisition of legitimacy would itself be a major gain for the Communists, and they could have this only by reaching an agreement with him, since the Kuomintang Government was still regarded as the legitimate authority in China. He believed that the Communists would be prepared to make serious concessions.

These arguments proved illusory. The Communists could plainly see that the organization of government had disintegrated and that the Kuomintang army had no will to fight. They were not interested in Kuomintang legitimacy. They rejected the doubtful honour of being the inheritors of the Kuomintang. They refused to take over the obligations and the commitments of Chiang's regime.

NEW REPUBLIC

Consequently, the negotiations which Li Tsung-jen initiated broke down. The leading personalities whom he had sent to Peking to negotiate on behalf of the Government stayed in Peking. The Communists crossed the Yangtse and by the end of the year the Kuomintang regime had evacuated the mainland and taken refuge in Formosa. Simultaneously Communist leadership had worked out [illegible] representatives of different parties, a united political front and a temporary constitution on the basis of which they [illegible]

On October 1, 1949, the new People's Republic was proclaimed from Tien An Mun or the Gate of Heavenly Peace. The system of government which was introduced was what Mao had called the New Democracy, that is, the dictatorship of the people. Also Mao Tse-tung himself made it clear that so far as the rest of the world was concerned not only was the forty-year-old dependence on America broken, but the new regime allied itself with the Communist world and stood squarely in the Socialist camp.

With the departure of the remnant forces of the Kuomintang to Taiwan, a central government had come into existence for the first time for a hundred years effectively exercising authority over the entire area of China. Its writ ran from Harbin to Canton and from the Pacific to the Himalayas. A united army, a trained political cadre and a party which functioned at all levels, from the village to the Forbidden City in Peking, converted what even in the most glorious eras of the past was only a loose confederation under a Son of Heaven into a modern State with centralized power and resources. This was the true Chinese revolution which was proclaimed at the Gate of Heavenly Peace on October 1, 1949.—*Observer.*

(Concluded)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

bying at the U.N. to the lists of guests at the various Indian embassy functions. At Belgrade beamed ... propaganda machine to certain Latin American countries where she is believed to man, who ... negotiations, will eventu... put decisive pressure on the other.

GUINEA CRITICIZES TOGO REGIME

STATES URGED TO DENY RECOGNITION

CONAKRY, Jan 24.—President Sekou Tour of Guinea said in a broadcast here last night that his Government was asking all African States to refuse the request by Mr Nicholas Grunitzky for recognition of his provisional Togolese Government, says AFP.

Guinea was also asking all international organizations not to consider the Togolese situation—following the coup d'état there and the assassination of President Olympio—as an "internal political problem".

Mr Toure said the people of Guinea "condemned without reserve" the "criminal authors" of the murder of Mr Olympio and disapproved of the Togo provisional Government's decision to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives and repeal the Constitution.

Meanwhile, according to a report from Lome, the Togolese provisional Cabinet has adopted a decree granting a general amnesty, and another reviving political parties.

The Cabinet also adopted a decree reducing the working week to 40 hours.

BEINGS NOT MONOPOLY

' HAVE THEM TOO

cattered through the Milky n planets bearing intelligent of Columbia University, an eports.

systems like the solar system with similar physical and chemical properties, hence life must have existed in many of these planetary systems, since biochemists have demonstrated that the complex organic molecules necessary to maintain life are synthesized if the physical and chemical conditions are suitable".

Prof Motz also said that if a star has been burning long enough and, if the temperature is agreeable on a planet, highly intelligent life is bound to evolve. About a billion years ago, the temperature on earth apparently became warm enough to support primitive life, and then its evolution to higher forms and that life of some sort seems to be "the rule rather than the exception in our galaxy"

The only certain way to find intelligence in other worlds was by searching for signals which intelligent beings somewhere in the solar system might be broadcasting. Mr Su-shu Huang and Mr R. H. Wilson, of the national aeronautics and space administration, said. They added that a search had been started by Dr Frank D. Drake.

'CHINA WANTS TO PUSH THE WORLD INTO WAR'

PEKING IGNORANT OF MARXISM, SAYS TITO

BELGRADE, Jan 24.—President Tito said yesterday that the Chinese leaders were following the policy of Genghis Khan in wishing to push the world into war.

The Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, said he told the congress of the Yugoslav People's Youth Organization here that the Chinese leaders would not care if millions of people were killed, reports Reuter.

He said it did not trouble the Chinese leaders that workers and peasants in America, Europe and Communist countries would also perish in a world war.

Millions of Chinese would die in such a war, he said and asked: "Is that not a heartless attitude towards their own people also? But they call the prospect of such a cataclysm a Marxist-Leninist policy. No wise person could agree with such a policy.

"It is not a case of only some temporary deviation, but of complete ignorance of the theoretical theses of Marx, Engels and Lenin about strategy and the tactics of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, and about the question of war and peace."

Fortunately the forces of peace were growing greatly, President Tito added. The Soviet Union and other Communist countries, all uncommitted and other peace-loving countries and the progressive forces of capitalist countries represented a policy of peaceful co-existence and solving international problems by negotiations.

He told the congress that Yugoslavia would do all she could to promote good relations with the West.

President ... followed Mr Khrushchev's recent attack on abstract art with a call for action against "trashy" modern painting, sculpture, films and literature which were "deforming young human souls".

Regretting that "never in our country has so much trashy literature been translated and painted as today", he told the congress it was necessary to take ideological action in the sphere of culture just as it had proved necessary last year to deal with weaknesses in the economy.

MR. GAITSKELL CREMATED

LONDON, Jan 24.—Family, political and personal friends attended a simple funeral service for Mr Hugh Gaitskell here yesterday near the Labour Party leader's North London home, says Reuter.

Over 100 sheaves of flowers—many from international organizations—linked the pathways of the churchyard, and these flowers were later distributed to a dozen hospitals in the neighbourhood.

After a short service Mr Gaitskell was cremated.

TITO'S MESSAGE TO NASSER ON MOSCOW TALKS

CAIRO, Jan 24.—President Tito has sent President Nasser a message on his discussions with Mr Khrushchev on Germany and Berlin and other international problems, including Yugoslav-Chinese relations, it was authoritatively learnt here.

The message was delivered to President Nasser two days ago by the Yugoslav Embassy, says PTI.

President Tito, who recently visited Moscow for talks with Mr Khrushchev, is understood to have sent similar messages to other leaders of non-aligned States, including Mr Nehru.

President Tito is reported to have told President Nasser that the Soviet Union wants to prevent any armed clash.

75 YEARS AGO

FROM THE STATESMAN OF JANUARY 25, 1888

(News Items)

NATIVE MARRIAGE.—On Monday evening last a large number of European and native gentlemen, including several European ladies, were present at Nebotollah upon the invitation of Baboo Kapoor Chand on the occasion of his son's marriage.

DR STEIN

Dr Aurel Stein, a native of Hungary, who is a distinguished Sanskrit, Persian and Pehlvi scholar, and has been spoken highly of by Dr Rost, and Professor Rath—has been appointed Principal of the Oriental College.

His Excellency the Viceroy has formally acknowledged the offer of his Highness the Maharaja of Bhurtpore to contribute nine lakhs of rupees towards the defence of the Empire.

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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

CHINA CONTINUES DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

INDO-PAKISTANI TALKS: TEMPO CAUTIOUS IN DELHI

By KRISHAN BHATIA

THE Chinese Government's action in waiving all customary rules of protocol while welcoming and feting Ghana's Justice Minister, Mr Ofori-Atta, last week should have many a bureaucratic head in Delhi shaking in stern disapproval.

When Mr Ofori-Atta arrived in Canton, the southernmost end of the country, Marshal Chen Yi was present to receive him and act as his personal escort during his journey to Hangchow, over 500 miles away, where no less a person than Mr Chou En-lai turned up at the airport to greet him.

After a visit to Delhi where rules of protocol are applied firmly and impersonally (a fact which reportedly caused the Ghanaian delegation some irritation) his reception in China must have warmed Mr Ofori-Atta's non-aligned heart. Little wonder that he has found China's latest response to the Colombo proposals reasonable. Courtesy has a mellowing effect, the value of which is often inadequately appreciated in Delhi.

His personal feelings apart, the red-carpet treatment accorded to the visitor from Ghana was obviously a part of China's massive diplomatic offensive against India—a battle that this country has to fight without foreign assistance. From the way two missions had to be despatched hurriedly to some Afro-Asian countries recently, it is evident that on this front, too, the Chinese found India in a deplorable state of unpreparedness.

It may be a harsh thing to say and may evoke indignant protests from the Foreign Office but the fact is that during the past decade or so India has run through a large fund of international—to be more precise Afro-Asian—goodwill with amazing political prodigality. Ten years ago, many newly-independent nations drew their inspiration from India and looked to her for guidance. A few week's ago, however, when a concerted effort was made to explain India's case against China, her representatives encountered at several places a distressing lack of friendliness and some avoidable misunderstandings.

The beginning of the decline in India's popularity among the African and Asian nations coincided virtually with her emergence as a leading nation of this region because having achieved that enviable position, India moved steadily, and perhaps unconsciously, closer to the world Powers and away from her Afro-Asian friends. This growing distance between her and others in the region has been reflected in recent years in almost everything, from Mr Krishna Menon's sphere of lobbying at the United Nations to her own diplomatic activities. Even at the earlier Preparatory Conference at Cairo, therefore, she found, much to her surprise, that many Asian and African nations were speaking a language she did not understand.

It would be wrong to trace the origin of all her diplomatic difficulties to the fact of her having been engrossed in the big Power controversies. The choice of her representatives abroad has also not been particularly wise sometimes and has contributed to her difficulties. Many an Indian traveller has returned home with distressing reports of supercilious—often arrogant—behaviour on the part of the country's missions abroad.

India's diplomatic service suffers from the fact that most of the senior posts are filled by people drawn from the civil services. Some civil servants have admittedly made a great success of their assignments but by and large, it must be realized, attitudes and mental habits acquired as district magistrates in pre-independence India are not the ideal equipment for diplomacy.

In the past, a diplomat was primarily a channel of communication between two Governments. He still has to perform this function but in this era of the U.N. he also has some other, and relatively more important, duties to perform. These days, when votes have to be assiduously wooed at the U.N., it has become necessary to extend the art of public relations to diplomacy and a diplomat must acquire not only the P. R. man's affability of manner but also some of his gimmicks.

*

A LEADER from a non-aligned country who recently visited Peking was surprised at the intensity of the campaign there against India and Mr Nehru. This organized effort on Peking's part to defame India and her Prime Minister is not confined to China but covers many countries.

China is known to have been active in the South Asian countries for a long time, but now she is extending her propaganda tentacles to nations beyond Asia. In an African country recently, a visiting Indian Minister was asked questions which clearly indicated Chinese prompting. Reports suggest the existence of a fairly active and influential China lobby even in Britain. Lately, China has been building herself in the image of a self-respecting country heroically grappling with massive economic problems but constantly harassed by an arrogant neighbour.

China varies her technique from country to country. Burma and Nepal have been cajoled into friendship through border treaties and economic assistance. In Pakistan, she exploited anti-Indian sentiments. Ceylon has been offered a rubber-rice barter agreement which virtually keeps its economy afloat. The way to British hearts, Peking feels, lies through Hongkong and its trade.

The need for India to win friends and influence people was never greater than now.

*

THE second round of the Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir here last week was from all accounts a remarkable example of how a long-standing dispute involving for both sides many harsh realities can be discussed without the use of unpalatable language.

Sardar Swaran Singh and Mr Z. A. Bhutto covered much the same ground over which Mr Krishna Menon and Chaudhuri Mohammad Zafrullah Khan have fought many wordy battles, but unlike their predecessors they walked over it gingerly, quickly changing direction when a pitfall appeared across their path. They discussed the Dixon and McNaughton proposals but the way they tackled them it looked as if fresh avenues were being explored. Often they relied rather heavily on political euphemisms. Partition, for instance, was referred to as "extension of the international boundary through Kashmir".

Their gentle language and careful avoidance of unpleasant realities has kept the talks going for two rounds but it is doubtful if they can continue in the same manner when they resume them next month at Karachi. At their next meeting they will have to face issues squarely and talk in blunt terms. The dispute over the future of the Valley cannot be put off much longer.

On the question of the Valley some veiled hints have already been thrown out for the two parties to ruminate on during the three week intermission. Broadly speaking they reflect the Indian preference for a settlement on the basis of a rationalized cease-fire line and the Pakistani view that should the State be partitioned the dividing line should lie much to the South-East of the cease-fire line and bring the Valley under its control.

If these are going to be the starting points of the negotiations at Karachi, it should be obvious that there has been no tangible progress towards a settlement. Even if they do not say so openly, both sides are no doubt aware of it. What keeps the talks going is the two parties' reluctance to be held responsible for their break-down and the fond hope entertained by each side that Mr Duncan Sandys and Mr Averell Harri-

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



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Chinese Depredations in Ceylon

Even five hundred years ago the Chinese were up to their tricks. They abducted a Ceylonese King and had him replaced by their candidate.

By William Willetts

WHAT was it all about? It so happens that Ho's missions are extremely well documented on the Chinese side. Earliest in date of these documents is the stone memorial inscription of March 1431 which clearly sets forth the seven voyages in their proper chronological sequence, and was the means of correcting the confused time-table given in the official histories. Next we have the reports of two men who actually went with Ho. Fei Hsin, who wrote his *Hsing ch'a sheng lan* (Triumphant Visions of the Starry Raft) in 1436, made four voyages in all, two under Ho, and was definitely on the crucial third voyage of 1409-11; he was attached in a military capacity. Ma Huan, a Muslim like Ho, went as an interpreter on the 4th and 7th voyages, but is otherwise unknown. His account called *Ying yai sheng lan* ('A Description of the Shores of the Ocean') is dated 1451. A third report was made by one Kung Chen, a staff secretary on the last voyage. Unfortunately this work, entitled *Hsi yang fan kuo chih* or 'A Description of Foreign Countries of the West', has disappeared as an integral text and survives only in the form of fragments quoted by other authors.

As well as these we have a work called *Hsi yang chao kung tien lu*, 'A Record of Tributary Nations of the West', written in 1520 by one Huang Cheng-ts'-eng and leaning heavily on earlier reports. Then there are the histories—the *Ming shih lu*, or 'Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty'; the *Wu hsueh pien* by Ching Hsiao and the official *Ming shih*, 'History of the Ming Dynasty,' by Chang Ting-yueh (1739). Minor references are also found in *Hsi yu chi fu chu*, 'A Description of Western Countries', written in 1450, and in a late commentary on the *Hsi yu chi*, 'Records of the Western World,' by the 7th-century Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsuan-tsang.

On the Ceylonese side we have fairly circumstantial account in traditional *Rajavaliya*, a historical narrative of Ceylonese which is not a definitive and exists in several recen- and another account in Diogo to's history of Ceylon down A.D. the source for which ly a lost version of the ory. There is also a brief in a Buddhist text call- *Saddharmaratnakara*, written by a *mahathera* named Vimalakirti not long after the events now to to be described.

Needless to say, Chinese and Ceylonese versions differ substantially as to the circumstances of the abduction. Here is *Rajavaliya*: 'During the reign of King Alagakkonara, Dosraja, King of Ceylon, landed in Lanka with an immense army; and, under pretext of bringing presents and curiosities, craftily carried away King Alagakkonara, who fell into his hands, foolishly thinking that he also brought presents as other foreign princes had done in the time of King Parakramabahu. His (Alagakkonara's) four younger brothers were killed. Taking many captives, Dosraja returned to Great China.' To fill out the plaintiff's case let us now take do Couto's testimony: '.....on the day that they (the Chinese) intended to embark they captured the king, and sacked his city; and carrying off from it great treasures they departed for China, and presented the captive king to theirs. The latter was very angry with the treachery that his vassals had practised on a king who had received them into his country: and he forthwith commended them under pain of death to take him back again to his kingdom, for which purpose he ordered an armada to be got ready, in which he embarked him with every honour.' *A propos*, the captives were undoubtedly sent back to Ceylon with the fourth expedition of 1412-5, but I am afraid the writer betrays a naive insularity when he supposes that the ships were specially chartered to carry them.

The third Ceylonese text, the *Saddharma-ratnakara*, has this to say: 'He (Alagakkonara) went away being caught in the Chinese stratagem through his *karma* in a previous existence'—words implying, perhaps, that Alagakkonara was not an entirely unblemished personality. After mentioning the adverse opinion held about him by the Chinese, Dr. Paranavitana comments that this was probably a just estimate, for not even in Sinhalese writings is anything good said about him. His brother Virabahu, with whom he fought a life-and-death struggle for power, had been a great patron of Buddhism; and this, Paranavitana suggests, probably explains Alagakkonara's bitter hostility to the religion. Cheng Ho earnestly admonished him to turn over a new leaf. But, as Paranavitana caustically observes: 'success in this direction is not to be expected of a Chinese eunuch where Sinhalese *mahatheras* had failed.'

What do the Chinese records say of the matter? A stone (1431) tes-



This is believed to be Cheng Ho's passport issued in 1407, and at present in a Government of India collection in Shillong.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



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
Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

follows: 'Its king Ya-lieh-
rh (Alagakkonara) was
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ar (1411) on our return h
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subsequently he receiv
mperial favour of return
is own country.' Anothe
eats these identical words
the stones we pass to Fe
d his 'Triumphant Vision
Starry Raft' (1436). H
by recording the Imperia
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Shan (Ceylon), and the
up of a memorial tablet
he Galle Stone). He goes
eir King, A-lieh-k'u-nai
agakkonara) showed him
rateful and formed a plo
(the mission). The admi-
eunuch Cheng Ho, secretly
s preparations, and having
ly issued orders, his mes-
advanced rapidly and
(lit. 'gag in mouth'). In the
f the night the guns were
ey dashed in and captured
alive. In the ninth year
lo (1411) the king came to
nd made his submission,
ght the Imperial favour,
forgiven, and the kingdom
ored to what it had been
y. From that time the bar-
of the four quarters have
filled with fear and have
bsolutely to cherishing

fuller version of these
events reported by Fei
us now turn to the *Pien*
ction of the official Ming
ing shih, where we read
s: 'The present king is
Ya-lieh-k'u-nai-erh (Ala-
a); he is a So-li (Chola);
heretic and does not res-
Law of Buddha. He is a
d violent tyrant, who has
assion for his people and
eats the Sacred (Tooth)
th disrespect.'
e third year of Yung-lo
the Emperor sent the
Cheng Ho with perfumes
ers in order to make of

ntinued on page III)

NTRI SAHEB
By Jomson



d of the VIPs we
expecting, a village
er force has arri-
ved, Sir...."

CHINESE IN CEYLON

(Continued from page I)

them pious offerings in foreign countries. Cheng Ho admonished King Alagakkonara to respect the teachings of Buddha and reject heresies. The King got impatient and wanted to do him mischief. Cheng Ho knew this and went away. Then, later, Cheng Ho was again sent to go with gifts to foreign countries, and at the same time to take presents to the king of the Island of Ceylon. The king, more arrogant than ever, showed no respect and even tried to harm Cheng Ho. On his orders 50,000 armed men put up a *cheveu de frise* to block Cheng's path; a second force was detailed to go and pillage the ships. But it happened that some subordinates betrayed the king's intentions; as soon as he got to hear about it, Cheng Ho with his party made all speed back to their ships. But the road was already cut. Taking 3,000 men, Cheng Ho made a detour during the night, attacked the capital, forced an entry, and made himself master of it. The squads who had been detached to raid the ships, as well as some up-country barbarian troops, rallied on all sides, joined forces, formed themselves into a cordon several men deep surrounding the town, and did battle for six days. Cheng Ho and his men, keeping the king prisoner, sailed out (of the city one morning) at dawn, cleared away the barricade, and fought their way for over 20 *li* (about seven miles). By evening they were near the ships, but before going on board they solemnly worshipped before the Sacred Tooth; only then did they embark.'

'And at that moment a remarkable thing happened. The metallic lustre on the temple, of which we have spoken, brightened; and a mighty flash of lightning lit the surrounding countryside. The Chinese made their escape undetected, and then sailed ten thousand *li* across the seas without let or hindrance from wind or wave, but as though they were sailing over a lawn. Fierce dragons, and fishes malevolent by nature, swam helter-skelter ahead, but showed no disposition to attack the fleet; and the company in the ships, feeling themselves safe, were filled with joy. They came to the capital on the 9th day of July, in the 9th year of Yung-lo (1411)'.

Now we have heard from do Couto that the king of Ceylon, Alagakkonara, was honourably repatriated by order of the Emperor of China, a special fleet being fitted out for this purpose. This is partly corroborated by two stones which say: 'subsequently he (King Alagakkonara) received the Imperial favour of returning to his own country, and Fei Hsin also says that the king was forgiven 'and the kingdom was restored to what it had been originally'.

The actual circumstances appear to have been rather different. Here is the testimony of Hsi yang kung tien lu, which we say was written by Huang Sheng-ts'eng in 1520. 'In the ninth year of Yung-lo (1411) the King (of Ceylon) A-lieh-k'u-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) who had previously broken off relations with the Chinese and had had his capital taken by assault by the mission (of Cheng Ho) when on his return (from the West), and who had then been made prisoner, was set at liberty by the order of the Emperor. He chose his most worthy subject to be made king (of Ceylon) and in the tenth year (1412) an Imperial Edict appointed Pu-la-ka-ma-ssu-la-cha (Parakramabahu Raja, or Parakramabahu VI)'. The *Ming shih* says that this 'most worthy subject' was then known as Yeh-pa-nai-na, and Wu hsueh pien (1522) brings the two names together, saying that Yeh-pa-nai-na later became Pu-la-ka-ma-pa-ssu-la-cha, i.e., Parakramabahu Raja. Paranavitana takes Yeh-pa-nai-na to be apana, a title applicable to any prince of the royal blood.

One wonders what murky depths of intrigue lie beneath these few cryptic words about the new succession. For about sixty years the *de facto* rulers of Ceylon had been the Alagakkonaras, whose capital was Rayigama or Kotte, it is not certain which; both places lie somewhat to the south of Colombo. The *de jure* sovereigns ruled at Gampala in the Kandy district, and were in the lineage of the Parakramabahus and Bhuvanaikabahus. If now this prince who received the title of Parakramabahu VI while in China was a member of the Gampala royal house, what can he possibly have been doing in the entourage of Alagakkonara, his hereditary enemy? The ingenious answer supplied by Dr. Paranavitana is that he was *not* of Alagakkonara's entourage, but took a separate passage, perhaps incognito, but certainly with the knowledge and complicity of Cheng Ho himself. The Chinese undoubtedly intended to eradicate the fractious Alagakkonara and his line, and Cheng Ho was now able to put forward as his nominee a man who was at the same time Alagakkonara's mortal enemy, a royal prince, and a legitimate heir to the Gampala Throne. Such a man the Chinese Emperor must have welcomed with open arms. Why did Alagakkonara consent to his nomination? He had no option in the matter. He has already been softened up by a suggestion from one of the Emperor's Ministers that he and his party should be executed forthwith. In any case *Ming shih-lu* tells us that it was not Alagakkonara who was called upon to make the choice, but that the matter lay in the competent hands of the Board of Rites.

If these inferences are correctly drawn, we have a measure of Cheng Ho's resourcefulness and diplomatic prowess, in that he brought the lawful contender to the Ceylonese Throne to China, together with the ruling monarch, and later carried him back in triumph as the new king, under the benign authority of the Son of Heaven in Peking. Parakramabahu VI arrived back in Ceylon about July, 1414, but then had to evict a temporary ruler called Parakramabahu-apa, and this task was not completed until 1415.

There, then, is the evidence regarding the rape of the King of Ceylon. It may be that in removing Alagakkonara from the Throne, Cheng Ho was acting as a chosen instrument, righting a wrong done to the legitimate rulers of Gampala, just as he had with equal dexterity dealt with the Chinese pirate at Palembang and the Siamese usurper of the Throne of Pasai. Or you may feel, all said and done, right was on the side of Alagakkonara, and that if he wanted to be a heretic (he was not of course a Chola), this was no possible concern of the Chinese.

(This is the second of three articles. The first appeared last week).

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STALEMATE IN CHINA

REVOLUTION MOVING NEITHER FORWARD NOR BACKWARD

NEUROSIS RESULTS IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE

By RICHARD HARRIS

Early in June an order was published in Peking telling transport workers that they must preserve order. Railway workers had been leaving their posts, the "revolutionary masses" had been seizing transport by force or had been stopping trains by laying themselves down on the rails; "little generals of the revolution" were blamed for "irresponsible conduct".

A few days earlier wall posters had had another story to tell. Three hundred revolutionaries had burst into the foreign affairs office of the State council in Peking, seizing documents and burning them. During the raid they had beaten up and severely injured 43 soldiers who tried to stop them.

How should one interpret this picture of indiscipline in China? One cannot tell how widespread it is. In the past few weeks attempts have been made to quieten the violence that burst out again in April and early May in the still continuing cultural revolution. Far from coming to a stop because of its success, or being called off for its failure, allowing China to get back to a normal momentum of daily work, one's impression of the cultural revolution is of a whirlpool, never issuing forth, a whirlpool kept going by the indomitable revolutionary will of Chairman Mao.

FAULTY CONCEPT

Is the end in sight? Not in the least. To stimulate flagging ardour the Chinese have been told by their leader that "the present cultural revolution is only the first one. There will be more later. The danger exists that at any time capitalist restoration will become possible. Do not think that with one or two, or even three or four great cultural revolutions there would be peace and everything would be settled". "This", adds the People's Daily not very convincingly, "is a great strategic concept".

From the beginning of this year China's cultural revolution might be outlined somewhat as follows: early in January the mass tactics of the Maoist irregulars seemed to be winning the day against those labelled revisionist. At least Mao's personal appeal was enlisting the tacit support of the silent crowds who watch the endless demonstrations that must chop millions of man-hours every day off China's gross national product. Except in those provinces where a solidly anti-Maoist leadership was adamant, Mao was closing in for victory of a kind.

Hence the "January revolution" was ordered so that take-overs could supplant a corrupted leadership with the "three-way alliance"—the army, the emergent Maoist rebels, and those in office who could be considered reliably Maoist. At this point the whole revolution ran into new difficulties. The army was reluctant at being ordered into the fray and only rarely did it come out wholly on the Maoist side. Worse, the Red rebels, these supposed purists of the Maoist faith, were organized in such an ad hoc way that there was no unified leadership; as soon as power was at hand they fell to squabbling.

SOME RESISTANCE

Faced by this prospect of confusion and breakdown Chou En-lai intervened to order people back to work. The needs of spring cultivation were stressed; Red Guards were sent home or back to school. It seemed that the cultural revolution might at least go into recess. But these hopes of a respite have long since vanished. What was intended as a climax of brilliant illumination sputtered out. By now, six months after the January revelution, the Maoist forces have no more power than they had then; only six provinces have been taken over by three-way alliances; in 23 others confusion of some kind survives.

This spring has been a time of renewed violence, not least in those very cities and provinces where Maoist takeovers were most triumphantly proclaimed. There was a pitched battle at a Shanghai newspaper office, a city where the "question of political power" is still at stake, thanks to the Maoist forces being hampered by a corrosive "trend towards ultra-democracy". Accounts of many other "bloody incidents" come from all over the country and there is proof enough of them in the new orders that went out in May urging an end to violence.

A spreading indiscipline often wears a mantle of revolutionary ardour, though many of the incidents in Peking suggest Red Guard groups kept in being to serve the personal aims of rival leaders in the top Maoist group —not least Chiang Ching, Mao's active wife. There have been continuous attacks, probably from such sources, against Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister. He is attacked for having said that not all those who opposed Mao Tse-tung could be classed as reactionaries, nor all those who supported him as revolutionaries. He stays in office thanks to the defence of Chou En-lai who is reported to have been incensed by the raid on the Foreign Affairs office.

CHOU UNDER FIRE

Another report says he told Red Guards that he would not tolerate any more "jet plane" mass criticism meetings (at which culprits are made to stand with heads bowed and arms held stiffly behind them). With the extremism that now abounds it is not surprising that recent wall posters carry veiled attacks on Chou En-lai himself.

The situation in the outer provinces—Sinkiang, Chinghai, inner Mongolia, Szechuan and Tibet—is still far from clear; it seems unlikely that the Maoists have made much headway against the local anti-Maoist leaders. But an even more alarming sign of disorder is the report of armed resistance in Hangchow by guerrillas who retreated back into the hills after an engagement. If this were to spread China might really lapse into war lordism. A wall poster that quotes Lin Piao as saying that there had always been damage in revolutions but that the cultural revolution had thus far caused less damage than the civil war is, if a true report, an appalling confession of the meaningless turmoil that is still being whipped up in China.

There is evidence for this turmoil of a much less dramatic kind. A Japanese correspondent in Shanghai reports that many schools have not reopened because of the deterioration of the teachers' authority. He quotes the letter columns of a newspaper complaining about pickpockets and many minor crimes committed in the name of the revolution. In Peking Red Guards, ready with their stock Mao quote "rebellion is justified", have been hounding teachers who refused to conform and the result is a decline throughout the educational system as pupils are encouraged to harass their teachers—an unheard of cutting of Confucian arteries.

Besides the social malaise there is the damage to the economy. In Shantung—one of the provinces supposedly taken over—the use of force in the continuing struggle for [illegible] "undermining industrial and agricultural production". There have been several reports of railways being cut, and many more of workers being "hoodwinked" by anti-Maoists and stopping work for one reason or another. By now exasperation and confusion must be affecting millions of Chinese whose task of running the country has been so fouled up.

No wonder the official news agency came out recently with a supposed answer to a reader's query explaining what the cultural revolution was all about. "People sometimes ask why it is necessary for the proletarian revolutionaries to seize power. After all the Chinese working class had been in power for more than 17 years. It used to be thought that once the working class takes power and the exploiting classes are deprived of control over the means of production the main task then becomes economic construction and the promotion of the people's wellbeing." But Chairman Mao, readers were assured, had changed all that by his discovery that class struggle continues to exist: China must be committed to endless struggle.

STRUGGLE

Signs of neurosis in these conditions are obvious. An hysterical xenophobia is set loose either by raising the thunder over Hongkong or in the nasty trespass of all international diplomatic standards in attacks lately on British officials and last week on two junior members of the Indian embassy. This last incident has been followed by an angry statement from the Foreign Ministry charging the diplomatic missions and the correspondents of imperialist, revisionist and reactionary countries in China (which must cover all but a tiny handful) with unscrupulous stealing of intelligence, "snooping around with ulterior motives, surreptitiously photographing, copying and stealing big character posters—resorting to all kinds of sinister methods to collect papers, journals, pamphlets and leaflets put out by revolutionary organizations—probing for in-

[illegible] the C.A.B. does. That it [illegible] been allowed to do so for [illegible] successful

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formation from our masses by posing as personnel from friendly countries"...

Wondering how long it can last means considering how Mao Tse-tung can claim a victory. One way would have been the successful take-over from below by a new generation of dedicated Maoists. That has failed: even when they have taken over they are not dedicated but prove to be as scarred by human failing as any of those being castigated for corruption. Even then, "no matter how important the contradictions or differences among the revolutionary mass organizations are, in comparison with the struggle against the handful of party people in authority taking the capitalist road they are still secondary".

MAO HAMSTRUNG

In that case, what of this struggle? Why is the handful still there? The answer, in the case of Ilpu Shao-chi, now labelled as China's arch revisionist, is that Mao Tse-tung cannot vote him out of power. As head of State Mr Liu has been prevented from acting. New ambassadors presenting credentials have been received lately either by Soong Ching-ling (Sun Yat-sen's widow) or the aging Tung Pi-wu. An invitation to Mr Kaunda to visit China was signed by Chou En-lai. But to remove Liu Pao-chi from his party office means a decision by the party congress. Mao Tse-tung plainly dislikes party congresses, having held only one in 1956 which held its second session in 1958: since when a congress is long overdue. Alternatively, in emergency cases according to the constitution, a vote of at least two-thirds of the Central Committee will serve to expel one of its members. Such a vote is obviously beyond Mao's grasp.

Apparently moving neither forward nor backward the cultural revolution grinds on. The Press churns out the same old articles endlessly quoting the same passages from Mao. While his determination lasts it is impossible to see how it will end. This month one of the rebel newspapers quoted a speech made by Chou En-lai to the National Scientific and Technological Commission. The three-way alliance he is reported to have confessed, had gone wrong. What China needed he thought, was a new three-way alliance of the old, the young, and the middle-aged.—Copyright. *From The Times, London.*

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WHY CHINA IGNORES THE RULE OF DIPLOMACY.

XENOPHOBIA HAS HISTORICAL CONTINUITY

By RICHARD HARRIS

ANYONE who has lived in China under Communist rule, will have met the full force of Chinese self-righteousness. It shone out from time to time under Chiang Kai-shek's rule too. By now it must be apparent to those who have come no nearer to China than Portland Place. How can it be explained, and why is it so intense?

The analogy to start with might be those charts showing the history of mankind—the amoebas, the primates, ending with homo sapiens, a tiny stretch of blue to mark the years of this last set against the long stretch of yellow showing the millions upon millions of years before man had made his mark. An exaggeration of course. But think of China conscious of its own unity in 200 B.C. let us say; conscious of a cultural superiority and a territorial base immensely greater than any other people with which it came into contact. This was the world of which she became the centre and remained in her own unchallenged view the arbiter until—until when?

There could be several answers to that. The first might be 1860, when defeat in the second Anglo-Chinese war forced upon China the presence of foreign missions in Peking. The Chinese in turn had to set up the Tsungli Yamen, a new department of government to deal with these powerful and hated intruders; had they not had to sign a treaty in which one clause forbade them to refer to them in documents as "barbarians"? But they did, of course, and the sense of superiority did not die away merely because China had had to make this terrible concession of allowing envoys to their court—in itself an admission that the international authority of the Emperor had had to be abandoned.

UNEQUAL TREATY

But what was admitted in an "unequal treaty" did not become part of China's consciousness. Here is a scholarly Chinese official, Feng Kueifen (1809-74):

> The most unparalleled anger which has ever existed since the creation of Heaven and Earth is exciting all who are conscious in their minds and have spirit in their blood; their hats are raised by their hair standing on end. The largest country in the globe today is yet controlled by small barbarians.

Only a few intellectuals in China had really begun to understand the Western world by the end of the nineteenth century; only in the first two decades of this century did the implications of the world they were now forced to live in gradually make themselves felt in China. And it was at this time, from 1911 when the imperial system was finally toppled until 1923 or therabouts, that China was in a state of intellectual self-abasement, the young furiously rejecting the whole Confunclanist past and thirsting for Western learning, eagerly seizing on every political doctrine in sight that might solve China's ills. Books were even written urging total surrender to the culture and ideas of the West.

This was momentary. Alongside the self-abasement was a burning rage at the insults China had suffered in the century since the Opium War, a rage that would one day burst out in cries of anger but which had to be suppressed while China's decay and disunity was so manifest. And underneath that, like a stream that has gone underground for a time, was the old sense of superiority and the unchallenged sense of self-righteousness that had gone with it. Mr Mao Tse-tung, it might be said, belonged to a generation that was enraged with the world: with its old world that had deserted it and with the new world that had invaded it. Some of that rage seems still at work.

Traces of the self-righteousness run right through. Mr Lin Tse-hsu, the Canton viceroy, naturally worded his remonstrance to Queen Victoria with an almost paternal kindliness. If only she would behave and not ruin China with this drug of course the Emperor would look upon her kindly. The idea that Chinese Culture—Chinese thoughts one might say—might be displaced by Western thoughts occurred to very few Chinese in high position until this century.

And then when China did get a government nominally in control of the country (though this was far from true) it was not a government that really came to terms with the outside world. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek was too weak. His first task was to give expression to Chinese nationalism by regaining from the foreign intruders all those privileges by which they had destroyed Chinese sovereignty—the treaty ports, the Peking legation quarter, the trading rights up rivers, the privileges for missionaries, and the extra-territoral jurisdiction of foreign consuls.

CHIANG'S REGIME

Chiang had not the power to regain Chinese authority over Tibet even (though he tried it by manoeuvre). So for his staff dealing with foreigners the first objective was to restore the integrity of China. Many of those the foreigners met were in any case so Westernized as to be deracine and half expatriate, quite unrepresentative of their country and its ambitions. Furthermore Chiang's Government had no doctrinal base from which to function as a Government of China. With "returned students" in the cities —from America and Europe— China was still intellectually beholden to the West. Thus the sense of superiority only occasionally made itself felt: the potent self-righteousness had nothing on which to fasten itself. But they were both there, and building up.

The world was not at all ready for what it got in 1949. The idea that it has got a government that has had no foreign relations as we understand them for two thousand years—this is an idea that is slow to sink in to the Western mind. What are embassies for? The briefest examination of any Chinese Embassy anywhere since 1949—in the Communist world, the Afro-Asian, or the West—will soon show that none of them function as we would expect an embassy to function. They are not truly learning about these countries because it does not occur to them that any of them have anything to offer (save for technology). Most Chinese Embassies are collectors of admiration for the new China and collectors of revolutionary followers of the methods of Chairman Mao.

For a time, under Mr Chou En-lai's urging, China pursued peaceful coexistence. In 1956 *People's Daily* noted with a patronizing air "some pleasant signs that Britain is taking a realistc path of peaceful coexistence". But in recent years the emotions of Chairman Mao have been less and less restrained. By now half the departments in China's Foreign Office may be suffering the intervention of Red Guard power groups.

CHINESE HISTORY

This is the China the world is up against. Since 1949 the unity and sense of purpose that had been lacking for half a century filled the tank and under Mao, China was off. Add to this the injection of faith so incessantly instilled in recent years as to create a mass hysteria and the baseball bat wielders come into focus. How to treat the patient? Obviously containment is an absurd policy so long as the people contained feel they have genuine grievances unsatisfied—and the Chinese most genuinely have.

Even a satisfied China may take half a century to adjust her relations with a world in which she has never before lived, a world of equal relations between nation States. Things will get easier when an old-style xenophobe like Mao Tse-tung makes way for a younger generation, but it will still be a younger generation raised in its sense of superiority and self-righteousness. The world will have to be patient. But a little knowledge of Chinese history will help, too.

—*From The Times, London.*

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RELATIONS WITH CHINA

A VERY miscellaneous collection of 70 Members of Parliament has drawn up a manifesto demanding rupture of diplomatic relations with China. They seem to come from virtually all parties except the Communists—Congress, Swatantra, Jana Sangh, both sorts of Socialists, Akalis, Independents—though it seems highly doubtful whether they represent a cross-section of opinion in all these parties. But that is no reason for failing to examine their thesis, which is in many respects logical and appealing. It was lent fresh strength at the end of last week, when Chinese misbehaviour was doubly repeated in Delhi. First, four members of the embassy deliberately attempted to evade the travel restrictions, which would not have been imposed at all except for those on our own diplomatists in Peking, which are indeed severer. Secondly, when the Chinese Chargé d' Affairs lodged a protest with the External Affairs Ministry over the cancellation of their air tickets, he had the breathtaking impudence to object to the presence of Mr Raghunath, earlier expelled from China and beaten up by the Red Guards, and to call him a spy.

Diplomatic relations with a foreign State are maintained for four principal reasons: protection of one's own interests and nationals in that State; trade; information; and collaboration in matters of common or general interest. For none of these purposes is diplomatic representation in Peking of much use to anybody, nowadays, let alone India. As has repeatedly been demonstrated, it protects nobody from the outrages of the Red Guards. When they burnt down the British Legation last month, a rupture between the two nations was widely advocated; it seems mainly to have been avoided because of Hongkong, and on the theory that, while steam was being worked off at the expense of Mr Hopson and his colleagues, or later the London police, direct pressure on that colony might be slightly less likely. India has no such hostage to fortune except her Himalayan border; neither diplomacy nor the Bandung spirit saved that from invasion in 1962 and threat in 1965. India's trade with China is negligible. Information is almost impossible to collect at first hand; anybody who tries, or even knows Chinese, sooner or later gets the Raghunath treatment. Analysis of broadcasts, wall newspapers, refugee tales, is more safely and cheaper done at a distance—much of it available almost for nothing in the Press. As to collaboration, the Chinese are in no mood for it; on the contrary, their radio has been inciting disruption to the embarrassment even of the CPI (M).

The further conclusions that the signatories drew, though also not without some logical validity, are still more controversial. They are that India should cease to support China's membership of the United Nations and should recognize the Government of Taiwan (Formosa). Despite repeatedly sad experiences at China's hands, the Union Government has so far, perhaps oddly, continued to treat this claim to U.N. membership as a matter of principle. Possibly New Delhi still also believes that accession to the international comity would help to calm Peking down. That was always doubtful. When, a good many years back, Mr Chou En-lai visited Lake Success, he made it amply clear that the question was not whether China should be admitted but whether it would agree to join; the minimum terms included a permanent seat on the Security Council, with veto, and expulsion of Taiwan not merely from its present position but from the U.N. altogether. Since then, to put it mildly, evidence of sanity and restraint in Peking has not shown any notable increase. On the contrary, the "cultural revolution" has been proclaimed to be entering its "bloodbath" stage, with much evidence that this claim is perfectly correct.

However, to ask Mrs Indira Gandhi to abandon the stand which India has adopted for so many years might be rather too much of a reflection on her late father's foreign policy, whatever may have happened since Bandung. Still more would this be so were recognition of Taiwan concerned, apart from the risk of involving India too deeply in the interests of the Americans. Nor is either matter one of any great urgency. But it would be salutary if these, and other questions, were henceforth considered less in the light of now rather battered "principles" than in that of international interests. The matter of diplomatic relations seems a case in point. It might be argued that, if India intended a breach, she has missed her moment: it should have happened when Indian diplomatists were beaten up. Yet the fact surely remains that the Chinese Embassy in Delhi is nowadays little more than a nuisance, and the Indian Embassy in Peking little more than an expensive irrelevance. This, the financial, aspect of the matter is also a consideration. And, since it concerns neither prohibition nor Hindi, it might deserve not unsympathetic consideration on his return from Mr Morarji Desai.

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LESSON IN SELF-HELP FROM WEST ASIA WAR

INDIA'S INTERESTS ALONE MUST SHAPE FOREIGN POLICY

By INDER MALHOTRA

WHY is it that our policy on the current crisis in West Asia has aroused so much dissent and discontent in the country in spite of the fact that a policy of warm-hearted friendliness with the Arabs, especially with the UAR led by President Nasser, is basically sound and in India's national interest?

This is a question which the makers of foreign policy must seriously ponder over. And it simply will not do to pretend—as some morons have done—that criticism of the West Asia policy is an outcome merely of the "machinations" of the "Israeli-U.S. lobby", presumably financed by the CIA! Its sheer absurdity apart, such a belief can do enormous harm; a Government which misjudges the underlying causes of public opinion can be in no position to take appropriate corrective action.

Dissatisfaction with the West Asia policy is as widespread as it is strong. It is by no means confined to the ranks of the Opposition; the discussions by the Congress Parliamentary Party's Executive have shown that, and much more might yet be said by the party's General Body. Even within the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Committee, serious doubts were expressed by some of the most senior Ministers before they agreed to the policy statement eventually made by Mrs Gandhi in Parliament.

Obviously, this state of affairs has not developed overnight. It has gradually grown over the years. The outburst against the Government's handling of the current crisis has an elaborate background to it. This background needs to be considered in order to comprehend the present criticism.

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MANY even among those who fully subscribe to a policy of friendship with the UAR and other Arab countries have felt for a long time that the Government has been executing this policy in a ham-handed manner. Only those who are either incorrigible ideologues or have a vested interest in the matter would seem to disagree with the proposition that in our dealings with the Arabs we have generally appeared to be abject. Whether it is the question of the Jordan waters or of a seat in the Security Council we seem to have given unthinking, unqualified and unreserved support to the Arabs, and have in turn put up with even brusque rebuffs. Even after Mr Chagla's sweeping support to the UAR, President Nasser said not a word about India at a Press conference where he profusely praised, of all things, President de Gaulle's neutrality. Those who want to draw any comfort from the subsequent visit to this country of a junior UAR diplomat as President Nasser's "special envoy" are welcome to do so.

The other side of the coin is much worse. The Government of India always seems to be acting on the basis of the perverse and pathetic belief that the more we wish to placate the Arabs the more offensive we must be to Israel.

The vexed question of normal diplomatic relations with a country we recognize may be left out of the present discussion. But what is one to say about the high-handed cancellation at the eleventh hour of the Israeli Consul's party, the rampage on which the Arab students in this country are allowed to go with impunity every time any Indian has the temerity to express friendly sentiments for Israel, and the gross discourtesy the Government showed to the President of Israel during his transit through India? These are some of the examples of official behaviour which have created a revulsion among many Indians. And this revulsion—an entirely understandable and instinctive reaction—is fed not a little by the feeling that, in spite of the Indian Government bending over backwards to support the Arabs, we received neither support nor sympathy when we were attacked by China and Pakistan.

It is altogether possible that the Israeli Consulate, with or without American help, has tried to capitalize on this feeling, with or without success. There can also be no gainsaying the fact that some political elements in the country are opposed to the West Asia policy because they extend to West Asia their communal outlook at home. But it would be absurd for anyone to deny that disappointment and disillusionment with our Arab friends, and the disgust with the Government's behaviour towards Israel have inflamed public opinion. The angularities, excesses and distortions of the West Asia policy have apparently become the enemy of its pith and substance.

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HAVING said all this, one must hasten to make one or two points of overwhelming importance. In the first place, an instinctive or emotional feeling, whether of revulsion or elation, cannot be a sound basis for making foreign policy which must always be based on a cold calculation of national interests.

From this point of view, a powerful case exists for a policy of friendship and support to the nationalistic, modern-minded and progressive sections of the Arab world, led by the UAR. Unless the qualities symbolized by President Nasser prevail in the Arab world and vanquish the forces of feudalism and religious bigotry, backed by Western military might, India's interests can be seriously jeopardized in a region of supreme importance to her. And there is no reason why a pro-Nasser policy cannot be shorn of its exuberance, excesses and irritating features.

Secondly, while it would be futile to expect that we can win Arab support over Kashmir against Pakistan, it is not strictly true that the UAR failed us in the dark November of 1962 or in September, 1965, when Pakistan attacked us.

True, on both occasions, the UAR refrained from naming the aggressor. But on both occasions, its attitude was far from unhelpful and there can be many occasions in international diplomacy when a nation welcomes another's neutrality at a crucial juncture. At the time of the Chinese aggression, the UAR played an important part in the evolution of the Colombo proposals, acceptable to India, which were rejected by China. In 1965, President Nasser was responsible for toning down a resolution criticizing India, which Jordan and Saudi Arabia sponsored at the Casablanca summit. At an OAU meeting soon thereafter, the UAR joined Ethiopia in successfully excluding a discussion on Indo-Pakistan relations. All this needs to be judged in the context that except for Malaysia, no other country in the world took India's side during the Pakistani aggression. It must also be recorded that, contrary to the general impression, on neither occasion did Israel support India, which is, however, wholly understandable.


The crowning failure of the Union Government is that neither the public at large nor Parliament nor, for that matter, senior members of the Government sent. What about the future? A great deal of thinking needs to be initiated right away, because a situation which was complicated enough has been made infinitely more complex by the current war.

Whether a military status quo ante is restored in West Asia after an eventual cease-fire or not, a political status quo ante in the region is practically unthinkable. Far-reaching changes are unavoidable and there is no knowing what kind of political equilibrium will emerge from the disastrous war. A profoundly significant development already has been the sudden convergence of American and Russian interests in West Asia, just as the interests of the two super-Powers converged earlier on the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. In the resulting situation, the Government as well as the leaders of public opinion will have to display much greater finesse and sophistication than they have so far.

A word of caution may be uttered in this connexion. If it is wrong to develop a blind, irrational and unthinking attachment to the Arabs, it would be equally wrong to develop a similarly emotional attitude towards Israel. Every country and every issue must be judged by the touchstone of Indian interests. Mrs Gandhi has a point therefore when she complains that the critics of her policy are prepared to turn a blind eye to the wanton and brutal killing by the Israelis of Indian soldiers of peace in Gaza.

By far the biggest lesson of the conflagration in West Asia, however, is that the country must always be prepared—at whatever cost—to defend its freedom and frontiers, and that this is a task which a country must perform on its own strength. The manner in which the Soviet Union washed its hands of the UAR should be an eye-opener to those Indians who hanker after a military umbrella, nuclear or otherwise.

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DELHI, JANUARY 8, 1963

SPEAKING TO PEKING

If war be the continuation of diplomacy by other means, for China at any rate diplomacy seems a continuation of war by other means. Doubtless for its own selfish reasons, Peking proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire towards the end of November; and there have been considerable selective withdrawals since—a process unimpeded by India. But the other war, that of repetitive notes and unscrupulous manoeuvres in non-aligned capitals, goes merrily on; and on the final day of 1962 New Delhi received yet another Note containing the most transparently false charges against India which country, the victim of naked Chinese aggression, is cynically accused of first attacking Chinese "frontier guards". It is also said that India remains unresponsive to China's invitation to "peaceful" negotiations. India's reply went on New Year's Day.

Peking ought to know that the Government of India's suggestion, which the Chinese choose to call an unacceptable "pre-condition", that the Chinese forces return to their positions of September 8 before useful talks can begin has its critics in India. They rightly point out that even this withdrawal will leave China still in possession of thousands of square miles of Indian territory. What Peking means by "the actual line of control of November 1959" still seems clear only to the Chinese. That India is agreeable to negotiations in spite of unexpected military reverses has been made repeatedly and abundantly clear by the Prime Minister, as at Allahabad on Sunday. This country is perhaps more disturbed by the absence of any earnest of Chinese goodwill than by a particular line or date. It is still open to the Chinese to furnish some evidence of the good intentions they so loudly claim.

What China has no right to expect is a repetition of India's state of military unpreparedness; and if Peking now affects to be perturbed over India's determination to defend her territory against any attack it has only itself to thank for it. As the latest Indian Note points out, Chinese aggression began as early as 1957, when the Chinese were conducting interminable talks which later proved to be only cover for the military preparations culminating in the massive invasion of October 20 last. India is to be forgiven if she is not as trustful of Chinese intentions as she used to be. As is evident from India's desire to continue with her economic development, in spite of the emergency, New Delhi will be only too glad to speak to Peking. It is for the latter to provide an honourable basis for talks.

DELHI, FEBRUARY 10, 1963

COUP IN IRAQ

Though much is still obscure about the military coup in Iraq, one thing certain is that General Kassem had made enough enemies to explain it several times over. No doubt in part inevitably. From the Royalists he could only expect implacable hostility, perhaps aggravated by Jordanian agents; the pro-Egyptian element he felt, rightly or wrongly, would only be satisfied with virtual or actual loss of Iraq's identity; previous Governments have had trouble with the Kurds, though strafing their villages with napalm is a more modern development. But simultaneously General Kassem was vigorously anti-Western, both in general policy and in particular to press his claim against Britain for annexation of Kuwait. With the Communists, on the contrary, he seems to have followed an in-and-out policy: first of local severity, aggravated after they proclaimed solidarity with the Kurds; later of alleged conciliation, particularly after a sudden purge of nationalist officers. No wonder, perhaps, that he had been reported—especially after the attempt on his life late in 1959—to live under conditions of "security" which placed those of the late Nuri-es-Said in the shade.

At least in part, the leadership of the coup seems ascribed to the Ba'ath Socialist Party, a pan-Arab movement of the non-Communist left with its main strength, and a good deal of its geopolitical inspiration, in Syria. On the other hand the immediate cause, as a short while back in Togo, may just as well have been jobs as ideology: 58 officers were purged at the end of last month, with perhaps prospect or seeming prospect of further changes later. And the occasion, as in 1958, may merely have been that certain military units happened to be in particular places; then General Kassem toppled Nuri with one suspect battalion, imprudently allowed to pass through Baghdad on a movement order, though the scale of the fighting, if 600 men were indeed killed at his headquarters, suggests more extensive complicity on this occasion. However all that may be, the new junta seems rather oddly to have been simultaneously welcomed in Cairo and Kuwait; the Kurds, too, have declared for it, though with what prospect of gaining from it the autonomy they seek remains very much to be seen and the Americans seem consoled in belief that it is anti-Communist. The junta itself merely issues the usual declarations of anti-imperialism and neutralism; what in detail it proposes—apart from keeping the oil flowing—remains, if it lasts, to be seen.

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A PRO's Report Ancient Egypt

THIS technocratic age of ours is also the age of salesmanship and public relations. The P.R.O. is thus as much a symbol of our age as the priest is of a theocratic age like that of ancient Egypt. Today, a talented P.R.O. from Yankee-land can sell refrigerators to Esquimaux. But before we start patting ourselves on the back and grinning from ear to ear, let us check up the record again.

Here is a surprise for us. From Egypt of 1100 B.C. we leave the story of Wenamun who was a priest but handled a superb public relations job. He was the greatest of all P.R.Os, for he worked under the immense handicap of having no expense account.

THEBES TEMPLE

In the temple of Thebes, they periodically required cedar-wood for repairing the state-barge on which the image of the god, Amon, was taken in river processions during festivals. So long as Egypt was a great Power there was no difficulty for the Prince of Pyblos, who ruled cedared Lebanon, parted with the costly timber and pretended to like doing it, against protocol trinkets from Egypt which cost nothing, like—I shouldn't be surprised—an autographed photograph of the Pharaoh addressing the F.A.O. World Timber Conference or some such thing.

But by about 1100 B.C. the days of Egypt's greatness were over and if she started throwing her weight about, it would only raise guffaws. At Thebes, the Ramessid dynasty still nominally reigned, though actually Egypt was divided up among various petty rulers. As Thebes was too broke to afford even the protocol junk for the Prince of Byblos, the king and the priests thought out a stratagem.

A priest of the temple was sent with an image of Amon, in the hope that devotion to the god or fear of him would induce the prince to offer the cedar-wood and waive the trinkets with a cheerfulness that hurt like the dence. Wenamun was the priest chosen for this purpose and he was a superb P.R.O. His assignment was a very tricky one but he managed it somehow and submitted to the king a report which should be in the syllabus for all training courses for P.R.Os.

BOAT TICKET

Not only did Wenamun have no money to pay for the cedar-wood the Home Office could not even scrape together the money for buying him his boat ticket. After leaving Thebes, he has to halt at Tanis, a kingdom which had been set up at the mouth of the Nile by Smendes, a king of a rival dynasty, for getting safe conduct. He gets a ship to Byblos which, however, has to make a halt at several places on the way.

At Dhar, one of the sailors in the ship steals the little money that Wenamun had with him and disappears. He calls on the Governor of Dhar and demands that he should make good the loss: "I swear to you that the money belongs to Amon-Ra, the king of the Gods." The Governor replies: "Be angry or [illegible] that the money belonged to the god, the governor has not the courage to dismiss him and asks Wenamun to stay for a few days so that he can make enquiries in the meanwhile. But the thief cannot be traced and after some time Wenamun gets another ship which halts at Tyre.

Tyre belonged to the same state as Dhar and Wenamun pesters its Governor also for making good his loss. The Governor refuses to do so, but he has a bag of money with him while this interview is taking place. Wenamun promptly seizes it and declares that he intends to keep it till his own money is returned. The Governor can do nothing with a priest of Amon bent on satyagraha.

At last he reaches Byblos and meets the Governor, who does not want to have anything more to do with him, as he has no money to pay for the cedar-wood. "I passed nineteen days in the port of Byblos and the Governor passed his days in sending messages to me each day, saying 'Get thee gone out of my harbour'."

Then surprising developments take place. An oracle gets possessed and asks the Prince of Byblos to seize the image of Amon and chase Wenamun away. Wenamun seems to have suspected the possibility of some such developments, for he had already taken the image from the ship and burried it in a cave on the shore.

Meanwhile, the Governor, on the orders of the Prince, now sends a message asking Wenamun to stay. Wenamun replies: "You are the man who sent me messages daily saying, 'Get thee gone out of my harbour!' You now ask me to stay. But I have found a ship bound for Egypt. It is ready to depart and I am going in it. If I miss it today, tomorrow you will come again and say, 'Get out of here!'

THE PRINCE

The Governor at last persuades the difficult fellow to stay and arranges an interview with the Prince "I found the Prince seated in the upper chambers of his palace. He was reclining with his back towards an opening in the wall and the waves of the Syrian Sea were rolling in and breaking on the shore behind him."

The negotiations that follow need all the cunning possessed by the wily Wenamun. He wants to claim that the Prince of Byblos used to supply the cedar in the past as tribute to the King of Egypt and now against payment. The Prince produces records to show that one thousand coins of silver were always paid whenever the wood was supplied. The Prince says: "If [illegible] sent silver and gold to pay father and my father's father. for me, I am assuredly not the ant, nor the servant of him sent thee."

OSES TEMPER

hen Wenamun continues to e, the Prince loses his temper reminds him that the envoys King of Egypt had sent earlier ng for tribute had been impri- d by him at Byblos and had in prison after ten or fifteen s. He asks Wenamun whether would like to visit their tombs.

Wenamun alters his tactics and w claims that he has nothing to with the King of Egypt and that is the priest of Amon. He kes a long speech on the great- s of the god and tells the Prince posterity will remember him the generous prince who gave gift of cedar for the boat to used in the god's river proces- n. The Prince is won over.

The cedar trees are cut in the ests in the hills and brought to sea-shore to dry in the sun and come seasoned timber. Then other difficulty arises. Wenamun s no money for the transport of timber back to Egypt. The overnor, who probably nurses a levance against him because he tained from the Prince the timber ter he, the Governor, had already refused it, asks him to leave yblos: "If you persist in contem- ating with fear the sea voyage u must also contemplate with at the things I will do to you. m stay on here."

Wenamun is held up here for [illegible] ing him. He replies: "See the cranes that fly to Egypt again and again in their seasonal migrations. See how they flock to the cool water brooks to take a brief rest before resuming their flight to the fields of Egypt. For how many seasons am I going to be held up here?" The Governor takes pity and arranges for his departure.

But the troubles are not over. As his ships is about to leave, a vast crowd of traders assembles on the shore. Their ships which had taken merchandise to Egypt had been seized by pirates in the Nile mouth. The powerless king of Egypt had not been able to prevent the increasing growth of such lawlessness, but he is still answerable to a foreign country. The traders therefore want to seize the timber and kill Wenamun.

ANGRY TRADERS

The Governor is in difficulties. He tells the angry traders: "I cannot take prisoner the envoy of Amon in my own land. But let me despatch him and once he has left the harbour you can pursue him and do what you like with him."

With the ships of the traders in hot pursuit, Wenamun sets sail and take refuge in Alashiya, a small kingdom in the extreme north of Syria. He meets the queen and praises her so extravagantly that she is puzzled and asks what he wants. He pleads for protection. The rest of his adventures has been lost to us but since he made his report to his king, we know that his clever brain enabled him to reach home at last.

[illegible] affairs in a manner in [illegible] C.A.B. does. That it has been allowed to do so for [illegible] disgraceful

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Why Helicopters Are Used In Vietnam

By Our Aeronautical Correspondent

AT a symposium to discuss aircraft separation standards on North Atlantic Airways about two years ago, a pilot remarked that although we can now fly higher, faster and much more noisily than the birds, "we just can't fly as smart!" It was an apt reference to the relatively enormous air space required by each aircraft flying an airway. Does it not apply however with equal force to the miles of concrete that modern aircraft require for take-off and landing?

It is becoming increasingly apparent that not only runway lengths but the whole question of these vast areas of concrete constitute an aspect of aviation that has lagged far behind technological progress in other fields. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that on the up-dating of this particular aspect will depend much of the future utility of both military and civil aircraft.

From the military point of view —as has recently been so convincingly demonstrated—the conventional airfield is an extremely vulnerable target. If located close to an area where ground forces are engaged, it is, in fact, prohibitively vulnerable. If located on the other hand, far to the rear the effect is to reduce the time that aircraft can spend on operational duty in forward areas —and this, of course, applies with greatest force to aircraft operating in support of ground forces.

USE OF A COPTER

The obvious remedy is to design aircraft that are capable of vertical or very short take-off and landing. This will eliminate the need for conventional airfields for tactical aircraft. The employment of helicopters in massive numbers by the Americans in Vietnam is a step which *faute de mieux*, has had to be taken towards that end.

"For want of something better" —because of course, the simple helicopter has serious limitations. To meet urgent military demands in the light of battle experience, many helicopters have been progressively improved, particularly in the matter of shaft-turbine engines. A good example is the Bell AH-IG Hueycobra. This has been developed from the Bell UH-IB and is the first helicopter with a fully integrated built-in weapons system. Despite material progress, however, the helicopter lacks and, presumably will always lack, one essential military requirement—that is speed

Intensive research, consequently, has been and is being conducted in the field of what is known as "composite aircraft" or "compound helicopters". While the experts profess to find distinctions between these two classes of aircraft, both, generally speaking, cover a vehicle which has the hovering capability of the helicopter but derives a major proportion of its high speed lift from a fixed wing and either a shaft-turbine or a jet engine.

A FIXED WING

Present developments include helicopters in which the rotors can be stopped and trailed behind a fixed wing and in which the whole rotor assembly can be retracted into the top of the fuselage. The latter concept is being pursued by Lockheed-California. Alternatively, there is the tilt-rotor concept now under development by Bell. In this design, the whole rotor assembly can be tilted through an arc of 90 degrees. When tilted from the vertical—its normal position for take-off, hover and landing—to the horizontal, the rotors serve as large propellers for forward flight.

Yet another and, perhaps, more promising design is that of the tilt-wing. Here the whole wing with, of course, its embedded engines, swivels at the wing-root through 90 degrees. It is swivelled to the vertical position for take-off, hover and landing and returns to its normal position for forward flight. The most successful of several experimental tilt-wing aircraft seems to be the Ling-Temco-Vought AH-142 transport. This was demonstrated at the last Paris Air Show.

At the present state of the art, both the composite aircraft and the compound helicopter have weight and other penalties which limit their military utility. Speed and climb, for instance, are two important limiting factors. It is computed that the top speed likely to be achieved by either the trailing or the housed rotor helicopter is about 320 knots. The tilt-wing aircraft comes out much better in this respect with a top speed of about 420 knots.

While by no means negligible, performance of this kind would not, of course serve the purposes now fulfilled by conventional fighter aircraft—interception is one example of such a purpose. For roles of this nature, other means of providing VTOL capability have to be found. Of various systems tried the swivelling jet nozzle has been found to date to be the most practical. The Hawker Siddeley P.1127 "Harrier" —now entering service with the Royal Air Force—is an obvious example.

There will be rapid development no doubt of all forms of Vtol and V/STOL aircraft for military purposes. In due course these will cover the whole spectrum of tactical military operations—air superiority interception, strike-reconnaissance, and transport. But while the case for VTOL capability in military aircraft is obvious—and just as obviously will command the necessary resources for development—that of commercial air transport is less apparent and, of course, less urgent. It will be developed only when circumstances force the pace.

Such circumstances will probably be created by two principal conditions: first, the growing competitive abilities of new forms of surface transport: and secondly, the increasing difficulty of finding —and growing public opposition to the appropriation of—land for new sites for more and more airports of enormous dimensions in the vicinity of major cities. There may be other factors, as yet unforeseen, which could hasten the process, but even so one would not expect to see commercial VTOL operations on a large scale before the middle of the next decade.

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LEGITIMACY AND THE LAW

THE West Bengal Labour Minister has at least one thing to commend him: the novelty of his views regarding the conduct of public affairs. The only difficulty about them is that they are not consistent with his responsibilities as a Minister. Undaunted by the disregard of the law by some workers, and far from being self-conscious about his inability or unwillingness to do much about it, he came up with the view a few weeks ago that his duty, as he conceived it, was to let labour and employers contend however they may in the arena of unrest to prove which side was stronger; he and those who are supposed to be the custodians of law and order should simply stand aside. Last week he tried to give this position a moral veneer; the Government, he is reported to have said, should support "whatever is just and humane, ethical and legitimate, even if the existing law goes against it."

This can be a fascinating thesis for debate, but as a guide to public behaviour it can be the negation of any form of government, as the Labour Minister's colleagues are beginning to discover: so much of their time is spent in rushing around to extinguish quite unnecessary fires (to the lighting of which their own utterances sometimes contribute) that they are unable to find the time and attention required by measures which would be of lasting benefit to the people. The more ardent ideologues among them say they are hampered by the political diversity in the United Front. They are probably more seriously hampered by the fact that even programmes on which they are agreed cannot be carried out because the administrative machinery is hamstrung, and with disorders threatening to become endemic few people are able to turn their thoughts, much less actions, into constructive channels. Whoever wishes to, takes the law into his own hands, and not all those who do so are inspired by noble causes or by the anguish of the people; in any crowd which is seen disrupting communications or mobbing public offices and utilities there are many faces of irresponsible hooliganism. Some local revolutionary zeal may thus find an outlet; even some local grievance may succeed in attracting attention. But every disruption in the normal life of the community means misery for millions of people and especially for those in whose name these outbursts are staged.

Of most Ministers of the UF Government it can be said that when trouble breaks out they are prompt, admittedly in their own rather unorthodox way, to pacify people and damp the fires. But the more primary function of the Ministry is to curb the spreading proclivity towards irresponsible behaviour, and an obvious way of doing it is to spread respect for the law instead of encouraging its violation as the rationalizations of the Labour Minister do. Not all laws may be satisfactory and it may not be possible for the West Bengal Government to change some of them. But when the Labour Minister speaks of what is "just" and "legitimate", he should not forget the overriding test of legitimacy in a democratic system, that laws ordained by the majority are sanctified by the people's will; their limits may not be transgressed and no one without due authority may assume unto himself the right to determine what the limits are. Some Ministers may find it irksome that they do not yet have the majority exclusively on their side and cannot fashion laws as they wish. But this does not justify their encouraging disobedience of the law. By refusing to recognize this elementary limitation of the democratic system, some Ministers have assisted in bringing about a situation in which no decision or regulation of the Government is proof against being openly flouted by large numbers of people who may be motivated only by self-interest but, in the prevailing atmosphere, can masquerade as the flag bearers of a revolution. Most of their actions are neither legal nor, in the light of public interest, "just and humane, ethical and legitimate".

DIGGING FOR CAMELOT

THE old war-slogan of "digging for victory" seems to have taken on a new significance in Britain in the last few years. Archaeology, once the province of the rich or the eccentric, has now opened its gates to the common man. In 1873, that strange German archaeologist Schliemann staggered generations of schoolboys who had battled through the Odyssey and the Iliad by digging up Troy and showing that the hitherto legendary city really existed. But the public image of the archaeologist remained that of the tweed-suited amateur pottering round the Greek islands or revealing long-forgotten Mesopotamian relics. At last, mass media—which is generally a synonym for the omnipotent TV—are about to bring archaeology to the people. Britain will soon have her own Homeric legend verified in the process.

The legend of King Arthur has long been an integral part of British folklore. As early as 600 A.D., he appeared in Welsh poetry as the hero-figure. From this point he sailed on through Medieval Romance, Tudor histories, Victorian narrative verse and finally, preserved in a television series, he crossed the Atlantic to enjoy the dubious pleasure of being syndicated throughout the States. Now the myth is about to be vindicated. A new generation of professional archaeologists is beginning to work on the Iron Age ramparts at Cadbury Hill which looks down over the Somerset countryside. The chivalrous figures of Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table await the diggers' trowels—heartened no doubt by the fact that they owe their "reincarnation", in part at least, to the funds of the descendants of the Connecticut Yankee.

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Lord Northbrook

History Of The Dismal Science

The Worldly Philosophers. By Robert L. Heilbroner. (Washington Square Press, 20c.)

TO many people the names of the great economists mean little more than a collection of confusing theories and statistics. Yet, as Dr Heilbroner rightly asserts, their influence was often greater than that of generals who shuttled armies back and forth across frontiers or the statesmen who frequently claim the lion's share in history text books. In tracing the history of economic theory from Adam Smith to Keynes, the author seeks to present not only the ideas but also the men behind them. A stranger group of men it would be difficult to imagine. They include a philosopher and a madman, a parson and a stockbroker, a revolutionary and a nobleman, an aesthete, a sceptic and a tramp.

Dr Heilbroner begins with the world of Adam Smith, which replaced that of Colbert and the seventeenth century Mercantilists. Naturally, Smith's "Wealth of Nations" reflects the actual world of the late eighteenth century, his are the dynamics of a static community; it grows but never matures. In this respect his theories were overcome by new social and economic forces. Yet the great panorama of "the market" remains a major achievement.

As England engaged in the long years of war against Revolutionary France and later against Napoleon, the optimism of Smith was replaced by the gloomy presentiments of Malthus and Ricardo. Certainly Malthus's "Essay on Population" makes prophetic reading when we consider present world problems. Yet economics was soon to emerge into the rather startling world of the Utopian Socialists. The experiments of Robert Owen at New Lanark. Saint-Simon's "brotherhood in blue" who ranked each other as "fathers and sons". Fourier's mildly insane visions of social bliss, all these seem bizarre and even ridiculous. They were sincere but lacked the stamp of respectability; they needed someone who appreciated their sentiments but had his feet more firmly on the ground. Such a man was John Stuart Mill. His "Principles of Political Economy" brought economic debate back into the world of ethics and morality.

But, by a curious quirk of fate, a far smaller book was published in the same year, "The Communist Manifesto" In a few pages it undid, in bitter words, all the calm and reasonableness with which Mill had endowed the world. Probably "Das Kapital" is one of the most discussed and least read of economic texts. Dr Heilbroner gives a lucid and fascinating account of both Marx and his writings. There could have been few stranger fellow revolutionaries than this slow, meticulous Jewish perfectionist and the dashing, elegant Engels, who liked to ride to hounds and who had once swum the Weser River four times without a break. Historians have too often been preoccupied with Marx the revolutionary, to the extent that they have lost sight of the laborious scholar who sought to prove that with the spread of education among women, the latter no longer feel they have got to marry early or stay on the shelf. They want to pick and choose their mate and meanwhile earn their keep.

As for a modern young man, he expects a lot from a girl. He wants her to be not only educated and goodlooking, but also efficient in every way. Domestic accomplishments no longer matter so much. Social graces, poise and self-assurance are more important.

Fiction: Curious Goings-On

The Clinic. By James Kerr. (Michael Joseph, 35s.)
Where Is Evie Alton? By Hester Bourne. (Hurst & Blackett, 22s 6d.)
The Forgotten Heir. By D. A. Ponsonby. (Hurst & Blackett, 22s 6d.)
Virginia. By Kathleen Lindsay (Hurst and Blackett, 18s.)
Babyhip. By Patricia Well. (Michael Joseph, 30s.)
The Alien. By L. P. Davies. (Herbert Jenkins, 20s.)

IN "The Clinic", James Kerr has written a saga of medical malpractice on the part of one Dr Matthew Hatch. Rich and successful, owning his own expensive clinic in California, Dr Hatch inspires confidence in all his patients, who think him marvellous, both as a man and a surgeon, though the doctors working with him know him to be a megalomaniac, who imagines he is god once he has the scalpel in his hand. Despite knowing this, they continue to work for him, for his is a lucrative practice, and they have a share in it. Dr Hatch then employs a new resident doctor, Peter de Haan, a young idealist, fresh from medical school. Peter is appalled by what he discovers, H realizes that Matthew Hatch is just a crude and hasty butcher, who advises surgery for almost all his patients, many of whom develop alarming post-operative complications, which often end fatally. Peter finds himself in a quandary. He knows that he should do something, but he also knows that Dr Hatch could be a powerful enemy if crossed, especially to an up-and-coming medical practitioner. It is only when Dr Hatch performs an unnecessary hysterectomy on his fiancee that he decides to act. How he manages to get Matthew Hatch involved in a suit, filed against him by a woman whose husband has recently died through negligence on the doctor's part, makes for thrilling reading; the court case itself is gripping, and winds up to a tense and thrilling climax.

ignoring the fact that she is now another man's legal wife. Heron challenges him to a duel, in which Dangerville gets killed. The Governor of the place advises Heron to make good his escape while still he can, and he decides to sail to Virginia, where he has a plantation and a house. How Charles and Virginia make a new life for themselves, in a new world, among new people, makes for satisfying reading. The novel is well written, light and humorous, historically plausible, though with a pleasing lack of tedious detail.

*

"Babyhip" is a novel straight out from Crazyville. It is a revolting mess of phychologically unstable middle-aged, spinster teachers, sixteen-year-old schoolgirls with amazing four letter word vocabularies, and painfully conventional parents, who haven't a clue. There is Sarah Green, a schoolgirl and an egocentric at sixteen. She loses her virginity somewhere in the beginning of the book, and from then on tends to think that "making piggies", to use her language, is fun. She has a liking for pot, cigars and purple hats. There are, of course, her parents, fanatically Jewish, who think their daughter is a monster of ingratitude. They make fools of themselves generally. Then there is pathetic Miss Crenshaw, fortyish or thereabouts, a teacher who sports an expensive ivory cigarette-holder and a figure gone to seed. She discovers, a little late in life, her lesbian tendencies, especially towards her assets. The girl's looks, social, educational and domestic qualifications also enter into the picture.

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
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Funding: Indira Heritage and the MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



DELHI SUNDAY JUNE 15 1969

Marriage no longer a bargain

—says INDIRA PARTHASARATHY

WE Indians are inordinately proud of our spiritual heritage, our tradition, culture and civilisation.

Whenever there is a general discussion, the names of our great spiritual ancestors, philosophers, our epics and Vedas start rolling glibly off our tongues.

Frequently, we hear smug statements on the number of happy marriages in our country, as compared with broken homes elsewhere.

For all our self-complacency, it is an incontestable fact that, nowadays, the arranging of marriages, as well as the adjustments after the marriage have grown more complicated. It is also true that there is generally an increase in the rate of divorces in our country.

Social taboo

Many of us will not utter the word 'divorce' aloud. There is a derogatory ring about the word.

Formerly couples used to stay married to better or worse because there was no other alternative. They dared not think in terms of separation or divorce.

Socially and religiously, it was taboo. A divorced person, male or female was shunned. Even now, it is fear of ostracism that keeps many couples from divorce.

Why has marriage become more a problem than it used to be in the days of our parents and grandparents? I will confine myself only to the middle class as I happen to belong to it.

Indian marriages are akin to bargains in the market place. For all our talk of the sanctity of marriage, finance plays a major share in it. The expenses of the weddings are almost wholly borne by the girl's father.

Usually, the youth's parents expect a dowry from the girl's father commensurate with the young man's academic qualifications, his expectations of success in his chosen career, his property and similar assets. The girl's looks, social, educational and domestic qualifications also enter into the picture.

benefit." This is the kind of specious reasoning that the dowry-raving groom today offers!

Our parents were much younger when they got married. They led sheltered lives and hardly saw much of the outside world. There were fewer distractions and recreational pastimes and their daily routine was simpler and quieter.

Today's young people are older at the time of marriage and mentally more mature. While the previous generation quietly and meekly accepted the fact they had to marry whoever the parents chose, the present generation has begun to think, and wants to make his own decision. They want to choose their mates and lead their own lives.

This has complicated matters. Now the parents neither leave the choice of a partner to their offspring, nor do they autocratically say 'yes' or 'no'. The result is a lot of discussion, misunderstandings and confusion. Any failure or unhappiness after the marriage often creates bitterness between the two generations.

Times have changed

Times have changed and the sooner parents realise it, the better. The growth of literacy, the complexity of modern life, the variety of distractions and pleasurable pastimes - all these have tended to increase the spirit of restlessness in modern youth.

Most grownups freely allow their children to see films and read books of their choice. The cinemas and romantic novels play a part in making the young folk sexually and emotionally aware of the opposite sex. Generally, there is a lowering of inhibitions.

With the spread of education among women, the latter no longer feel they have got to marry early or stay on the shelf. They want to pick and choose their mate and meanwhile earn their keep.

As for a modern young man, he expects a lot from a girl. He wants her to be not only educated and goodlooking, but also efficient in every way. Domestic accomplishments no longer matter so much. Social graces, poise and self-assurance are more important.

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the financial infra-structure of Governmental lending institutions, risk capital has to come from individual investors. Without this risk capital, which forms the essential nucleus for any investment, new industrial development will be hard to come about. Some studies that have been recently made have clearly shown that private savings, if properly invested, are much more conducive to economic growth than

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

The survival of the Congress by itself will not serve the cause of democracy. It is necessary to have a strong alternative national party.

CATCHY SLOGANS FAIL TO ENTHUSE

It is time for political opportunism to be countered by the entry into politics of men with progressive ideas and a reputation for integrity and ability.



Mrs. Indira

THE drubbing the Congress took at the last general election revealed the weakness that had developed in our political system. No longer does faith in a particular ideology and programme inspire the parties—it is lust for power, patronage and financial gain that motivates them; this explains political opportunism and frequent shifts in alignments. Doubts deepen whether we have learnt to live with a parliamentary democracy.

A parliamentary democracy functions best under a two party system. But we have chosen a multi-party system. Parties proliferate without any ideological basis, centred around individuals who hold out promises of gaining political or bargaining power. Groupism and bossism become more assertive, particularly at election time. Coalitions are hastily contrived of parties with incompatible ideologies and of individuals without any principles, solely to gain power. Not unnaturally, they soon disintegrate under the stress of their inherent contradictions. This phenomenon accounts for the apate of mid-term elections to replace President's Rule which had perforce to be imposed.

There would have been hope of polarisation of political thought and its coalescene into two major parties of the Right and the Left had the counsel of Gandhiji to disband the Congress as a political party been heeded. The great national movement which had gathered under its banner all political parties in the national cause of independence could not possibly survive as a political entity when its purpose had been gained.

It was inevitable that the Congress, as it was, would lose some of its components. The process was hastened by the expulsion of the Communists from the party in 1945 for violating its policy. By 1951, the socialists had splintered off and the Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha, deriving inspiration from India's past religious and political traditions, had taken distinctive shape. Even then there were portents that regional and communal pulls would cause a further disintegration and state parties would spring up to further parochial interests, not necessarily in harmony with national objectives and priorities.

Disenchantment with the Con-

[illegible] followers left the party.

But this is not the end of the sad story. The coalitions fared no better. In West Bengal, the ULF with

authority and compromise even on the choice of candidates have only weakened and not strengthened the party. This policy might bring a few short-term electoral gains, but should the Congress sacrifice the future for the present? Would it not be better for it to weed out the undesirables, even if it results in a setback for a time, to re-establish the image of the party for an impressive future come-back?

In the confused political situation, would the Congress regain its lost power in the four states where mid-term elections are now being held? It is generally believed that in Bihar, U.P. and the Punjab, the Congress prospects of obtaining a majority are slender nor are the prospects of any other party or coalition any brighter. In West Bengal, the outcome is anybody's guess; there is just a possibility of the Congress obtaining a marginal majority. But even if victory comes it will be a negative one. It will not be because the electorate is enamoured of the party, its leadership or performance but because it will be a choice of despair—an escape from instability and insecurity which the return of the UF to power would inevitably bring.

An offshoot of the present political instability and of so many parties contending for power is the growth of the cult of violence to gain political ends. The "senas" have now become politically activated. A new addition is the "Red Guards" with a wider base and violence as their creed. With sympathisers in the official echelons they are able to flout established authority; and law and order is fast becoming a casualty. Mob violence and student unrest are no longer anomic, they have become basic tools of organised political groups. Yet this turn of events has not caused a ripple in political and official complacency.

The survival of the Congress or even its resuscitation will not by itself serve the cause of democracy. It is necessary to have a strong alternative national party with a defined policy and a declared purpose. But is this in sight? There have been parleys between the Swatantra and Jana Sangh but they do not hold out hopes of an Anschluss. Identification of the platform of political parties in Opposition is not difficult to achieve. In final analysis, differences in their approach to national problems are original. It is on the issue of leadership that moves for unification lapsed with [illegible] C. Ghosh [illegible]s. In Bihar, [illegible] founder. [illegible]pplied by the [illegible]nce but the [illegible] for three [illegible] governments [illegible]ere equally

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there no answer to all this, no way out? Would it not be best if intellectuals were to get actively involved? It was they who had spearheaded the freedom movement and gave shape and form to national demands. But their influence receded in a mass movement, nor were they conditioned for the rough and tumble of changing political life. After independence the rabble-rousers have come to the fore, playing upon the emotional involvement of people in race, language and religion for political power, trampling democratic values. For India's progress, politics has to be liberated from the meshes of caste, community and parochialism.

It is time for political opportunism to be countered by the entry into politics of men with progressive ideas and a reputation for integrity and ability, be they in industry and commerce, education or the learned professions. The disenchanted electorate is no longer swayed by party slogans and empty promises; it has developed a discriminatory and a selective sense. It would welcome people whose profession and livelihood is not politics. Their stature and influence might conceivably induce like-minded parties in the Opposition to merge and also revitalise the Congress, restoring to the electorate its lost faith in democracy and elected governments.

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Men, Matters and Memories

SIR Francis Chichester's one-man voyage round the world in his 53-ft. ketch, Gipsy Moth IV, has confounded more than one prophet.

If he is alive, the doctor who wanted to operate Chichester for lung cancer nearly ten years ago must feel slightly abashed and embarrassed. Since then Chichester has faced icebergs, squally seas and storms. In 1960 he won the Observer's first solo Transatlantic race in **Gipsy Moth III** and during a gale got into his bunk to read Shakespeare's **Tempest**.

He has a wry sense of humour. In his report to **The Times** after his latest voyage Chichester records that as he sighted the shores of England he was reading another of Shakespeare's plays. It was **Much Ado About Nothing**. Plymouth, and indeed all England, gave him a hero's welcome.



Chichester

Chichester has a more lively tale to tell than Svetlana. But he will make much less out of it. Svetlana stands to gain around Rs 60 lakhs by defecting to the West. Chichester reportedly should net a little over Rs 20 lakhs from his latest exploit by way of writing, broadcasting, TV and advertisements.

He writes racily, judging from his radio despatches to **The Times** as he girdled the globe: "I filleted through the Doldrums as if I had had a passage reserved for me by Father Neptune." And as he sighted Plymouth: "I don't want to let down generations of British mariners by toasting my first sight of Plymouth Hoe with a nice glass of cold water, and the only other drink I have left on board are various odds and ends I don't fancy. Gipsy Moth IV a dry ship! Sir Francis Drake would turn over in his hammock!"

Millionaire

IT was said of the first Lord Leverhulme, a notoriously thrifty spender, that a cabbie, on being tipped three pence, remonstrated with him.

"But your son who isn't half as rich as you gives me a shilling," said the cabbie.

"That," replied Leverhulme, "is why he isn't half as rich."

Ariel has no way of knowing how much Mr G. D. Birla tips cabmen, if indeed he ever rides in cabs. But Mr Birla is lavish in his public expenditure and benefactions which however



The Government employees, however, would press for an early announcement by the Government for grant of an increased DA.

meeting.

voked statements in yesterday's practice restrain in their easily provstairs to task and advised them to bers of the Dal took such attitude in the Cabinet. Some senior members of certain wrongmen" of irritation wrought by the frustrated and belligerent as a result of DA and who, at times had become had been splitting for an increased 95,000 Government employees who and a great relief to nearly drew. Rs 5 lakhs while 47 drew above Rs 1 lakh but below Rs 2 lakhs. Some 56 rulers got less than Rs 1 lakh but above Rs 50,000. Nearly 400 Princes had privy purses of below



P. N. Haksar

Secretary

REPLACING L. K. Jha as Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister is P. N. Haksar who comes to New Delhi from London where his last assignment was as Deputy High Commissioner.

London is among his favourite diplomatic beats. He has spent several years of his official career there. As one associated formerly with the world of public relations, Haksar is most at home in the company of newspapermen, and his departure from London brought him some unusual encomiums from Fleet Street.

Public relations are largely a matter of private relations, of individual contacts. Haksar, a good mixer, is also a shrewd observer, and generally sound in his assessment of men and matters. The Principal Secretary is the principal eyes and ears of the Prime Minister, and Haksar's talents are peculiarly suited to the job.

Memoirs

ACCORDING to **Newsweek**, Khrushchev has been permitted to write some selective fragments of his political memoirs for publication abroad but not at home. Reportedly these will be released in the United States to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution.

Mr K will not be allowed to tell much, which will dampen the impact of his memoirs on the threatened revelations of Svetlana. Khrushchev could tell a great deal if he chose to. But obviously he could only do so if, like Stalin's daughter, he was out of the USSR. Mr K is very much inside it.

The most interesting part of his uncensored memoirs would have been the infighting which preceded his capture of power in 1957 and the second bout of infighting which ended with his expulsion in 1963. The British ambassador at the time of the first round was Sir William Hayter, now a don at Oxford, whose own memoirs ("The Kremlin and the Embassy") reveal that he and most of his diplomatic colleagues knew very little of what was going on around them.



Khrushchev

Hayter at one stage predicted to his Government that Malenkov and Khrushchev would agree to a division of tasks. When Malenkov was deposed as Prime Minister, Sir William admitted it took "everyone" by surprise, "myself not least." He can be forgiven, for in his memoirs he recalls an earlier stay in Moscow in the 1930s as a round of endless dinner parties and 'a continual exchange, in bad French, of inaccurate political information, mostly picked up from servants."

Perhaps things were much the same in the 1950s.

Banking

WITHOUT Rothschild, Disraeli could not have bought the Suez canal. The fate of empires sometimes hangs on the whims of financiers.

It would be Ruritanian to read such influence and power into the individual who controls the Reserve Bank of India. But in some respects its Governor is the financial guardian of the nation, in certain ways even more so than the Finance Minister. In the early 1930s Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, was more responsible for Britain going off the gold standard than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden.



L. K. JHA

It would be interesting to know who really advised the devaluation of the rupee last year.

Was it the present Governor of the Reserve Bank, Mr P. C. Bhattacharya? Or was it the Governor-designate, Mr L. K. Jha? If so, one should remember that even Homer nodded. Jha is one of the most brilliant of our civil servants, now a thinning tribe. His promotions have been rapid, and deservedly so. Though versatile and capable of putting his hands to most jobs, he moves most easily in the complex world of commerce and finance.

L.K. has a clear, tough, incisive mind. He sees deeper into a problem than most men. He likes to get into the heart of a matter, to unravel and dissect it tissue by tissue until the essentials are laid bare. He is also a lively conversationalist, with often something original to contribute.

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Men, Matters and Memories

IS Moise Tshombe, once overlord of secessionist Katanga, fated to meet the violent death he has so often in the past casually and cynically meted out to others?

Even for a Congolese leader, his is a pretty bloodstained record. That he had Lumumba executed after inflicting on him the most degrading indignities is undeniable. The irony is that Lumumba was handed over to Tshombe by Mobutu who is now thirsting for Tshombe's blood, and will have him hanged, probably in public, if the Algerian authorities decide to surrender him. Tshombe was sentenced to death by the Congolese Government in his absence in Madrid. The charge was high treason.



Tshombe

For a brief period from June 1965 he was the Congo's fourth Prime Minister. But was ousted by Mobutu who now holds the reins of power. Tshombe is known as the Congo's "rubber man." So far he has shown an infinite capacity to bounce in and out of power. He has also a most mobile face. The Belgians christened him "our black Fernandel" after the French actor with the India rubber face.

Tshombe is clever and can turn on the charm. He is also vain. "People simply can't resist you", said a UN official in transparent flattery. Tshombe turned on him his bland round face. "I know," he murmured.

Princes

INDIA'S Princes are momentarily in the news with the light-headed brigade of the Congress Beatles charging them like the famous British Light Brigade charged the Russian guns at Balaclava.

The British charge spelt gallantry but not good sense. The Congress charge spells neither. In India's budget of Rs 2,700 crores the Princes' privy purses cost the exchequer today around Rs 4 crores. After Independence the Indian Princes numbered 554 and their privy purses, according to the White Paper laid before Parliament, amounted collectively to Rs 580 lakhs. A general ceiling of Rs 10 lakhs per year was imposed except in the case of eleven princes whose privy purses were fixed on an ad hoc scale. The other privy purses were graded according to a defined rule of thumb.



Prince

Of the 543 Princes whose privy purses at their highest could not exceed Rs 10 lakhs a year only thirteen drew between Rs 5 lakhs and Rs 10 lakhs a year. Thirtyone drew above Rs 2 lakhs but below Rs 5 lakhs while 47 drew above Rs 1 lakh but below Rs 2 lakhs. Some 56 rulers got less than Rs 1 lakh but above Rs 50,000. Nearly 400 Princes had privy purses of below

ment of India is committed to paying only such amounts as it might decide, not exceeding in any case Rs 10 lakhs annually.

Adroit

AT the best of times the Union Home Ministry hangs like a millstone around the neck of whoever is fated to carry it.

With Peking's monomania bubbling outside and inside our frontiers, with explosive Naxalbari and gheraos galore, Mr Chavan has his neck weighted down and his hands full. Yet resilient as he normally is, he has never shown more bounce than today. He came out with flying colours at the end of the Lok Sabha debate on the Home Ministry's demand for grants.

It is not that he has the instincts of a lathi wielder. Having for many years as a Congressman been at the wrong end of a lathi, Chavan is not prone to wield it lightly or to encourage others to do so. His strong point is his calculated reserve and restraint. No Congress politician at his level is less garrulous. He has rarely been known to commit himself. His 'yes' might more often mean 'no'.



Chavan

Chavan's major handicap is his too close identification in the public mind with Maharashtra. This has detracted from his status as an all-India leader. Behind his back he is often referred to as Shivaji. The Shivaji cult has been overplayed in Maharashtra to the detriment of both. It has given Maharashtra an image of excessive parochialism. Ironically it has led the rest of India to regard Shivaji as a Maharashtrian figure and not, as he really should be, a national all-India legend.

His Holiness

LAST week the Dalai Lama celebrated his thirty-third birthday. There have been many politicians in exile without a visa but His Holiness is the first Dalai Lama to be without a country. No Dalai Lama has functioned before him outside Tibet.

The veneration in which His Holiness continues to be held by millions of his followers not only in Tibet but in other parts of the world is a tribute both to his religious status as to his unusually attractive personality. When way back in February, 1940, he was, as a four-and-a-half-year-old child, installed as the Dalai Lama on the golden throne in the Potala Sir Basil Gould, who headed the British delegation at the ceremony, remarked on the child's composure, poise and gravity during the long hours of blessings and prayers.



In Tibet the Dalai Lama is known as Gyalpo Rimpoche meaning Great Gem of Majesty. Dalai Lama means Ocean of Wisdom or Ocean Wide. When a Dalai Lama dies his successor is chosen only after a protracted search since each Dalai

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THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS OF PRESIDENT NIXON

From LOUIS HEREN In Washington

THERE are few American political myths so widespread as the First Hundred Days, during which the new President is supposed to launch programmes designed to change the country and much of the world.

The expectation of instant presidency goes back to 1933 when President Roosevelt knew that urgent action was vital, but the dangers have long been obvious. Only President Kennedy followed his example, with not altogether happy results. This helps to explain Mr Nixon's slow beginning. He warned reporters during the election campaign not to expect precipitate action.

There was the surprise visit to Europe, and the ABM decision but his Administration has otherwise generated little excitement. The pace has been deliberate, the mien judicious. He has emerged as a benign chairman of the board presiding, between week-ends at the beach, over corporate reorganization before announcing next year's line of new models.

The stated reasons are that the nation's problems are too complex for quick resolution, and that the American people long desperately for a period of calm. Both are persuasive. For instance, the shooting down of the reconnaissance plane by the North Koreans did not bring about the usual chorus of demands for vengeance. Congressmen also returned from their districts after the Easter recess to report that their people were more than willing to give Mr Nixon time to extricate the country from Vietnam.

Above all, the new presidential assistants say, confidence in government must be restored, and this requires the settling of modest goals which can and must be achieved. Mr Nixon's priorities are peace, especially in Vietnam, and the control of inflation and crime. Other domestic problems have not been ignored, but most of them will have to await presidential attention—and funds.

SHROUD OF SECRECY

To be fair, Mr Nixon has not been idle. Some of the decisions are not overpopular, but at least they were made. They include presidential action leading to the ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the European visit, the ABM decision, and four-Power talks on the Middle East. In Vietnam, he reduced the scale of the B52 bombings and refused to respond to the Tet offensive. The search for a peaceful solution continues under a shroud of secrecy. Nobody outside the immediate presidential circle knows of what is going on, but clearly Vietnam demands much of Mr Nixon's attention. He also refused to react violently to the shooting down of the flying Pueblo off North Korea.

At home, the list includes the budget proposals, action on the tax surcharge and tax reform, initial aid for riot-damaged cities, a start of the reorganization of government (necessary after eight years of Democratic rule), electoral college and postal reforms, and approval of wiretapping and bugging in criminal investigations. There were also the nominations for the Cabinet and other high government appointments. These have gone slowly, in spite of that computer, but this would probably have been enough if it were not for Congressional preoccupation with Vietnam and the plight of the cities—and lingering suspicion of Mr Nixon.

He was never widely admired or trusted. The campaign talk about the new Nixon suggested that even Republicans recognized that he was unloved in his former incarnation. Indeed, few other serious presidential candidates aroused so much dislike, even contempt. The tradition of the honeymoon period, which all Presidents can expect to enjoy whether or not they accept the challenge of the first hundred days, has only just managed to keep criticism within reasonable bounds.

Even so, Democratic ornaments of the American establishment have accused him of plunging into a whole galaxy of unnecessary and expensive weapons systems rejected by the last Administration. In fact, every system listed was approved by the Democrats. Whatever may be said about the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, it makes more sense than the Sentinel ABM announced by Mr Robert McNamara in 1967 and costs a great deal less.

Yet Mr Nixon has shown extraordinary self-confidence. It may not be well-founded (a horrifying thought), but its emergence is the most important development of his first months. The virtuoso performances at most of his Press conferences are only one aspect. He has behaved like a man who had been in training for the job most of his adult life, as I suppose he was. There were the eight years as Vice-President, and if his succession was delayed he acts as if the further eight years in the wilderness were well spent.

He has already set the style of the White House for the next four or eight years. If it strikes some as stuffy, some of his Californians have a more natural gaiety than most of the Kennedy men, and are a good deal younger. Formality, nevertheless, is the keynote, in the offices and the State reception rooms.

PROS AND CONS

The National Security Council staffs, which Mr Kennedy dismantled, have been revived and expanded. The Council is once again the central policy-making body for defence and foreign affairs, or so say the Nixon men. An Urban Affairs Council has been added, and the status of the Cabinet enhanced. Papers are called for well in advance of their consideration by one of the many bodies within the Executive Office. He likes to know the issues, the pros and cons, and the options. Prior consensus is not sought.

At meetings, he listens and questions, then puts the briefing papers into that attaché case which figured so prominently in his campaign posters, and goes away to decide alone. There are said to be no competing power groups. The departments are informed and heard. The image of Mr Nixon which emerges after talking to those around him is not of a board chairman, but of a president sitting above the battle knowing where he wants to go and how to get there.

Reality has not quite squared with this. Perhaps after eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Washington may have got too accustomed to brave rhetoric and shooting from the hip. There has also been the secrecy over the Vietnam talks, and the new Cabinet men are very new. The assumption is that they are well-meaning men who must first learn that cutting through government red tape is not the only solution to the nation's problems, but this and more have suggested a reluctance to act reminiscent of the early Eisenhower years.

Mr Nixon is the first to admit that he was strongly influenced by the old general. This is evident in his national security organization, which resembles an army commander's staff in many ways. There is the assumption, yet to be proved, that the States could tackle many domestic problems better than Washington if given a cut of federal revenues. He also believes that voluntary agencies and businesses could be encouraged to take on some of the problems.

This would indicate that the President has what can perhaps best be described as a conventional Republican mind, but some of the old beliefs, such as the essentially benign workings of the market place, are under strict control. Mr Nixon knows that something must be done for Negroes (he prefers to lump them with Mexican-Americans and Red Indians), and is keenly aware that he stands small chance of re-election if domestic tranquillity and progress are not somehow combined.

Yet we have seen that the blacks and others will more or less have to wait until peace is restored, especially in Vietnam, and inflation and crime controlled. There is a good deal of politics in this, but also courage. Little more than a year ago Washington, Chicago, and other cities were in flames, and there is small reason to suppose that there will not be another hot summer this year. The only reason I can think of is that the Republicans are in charge, and that Mr John Mitchell, the Attorney-General, is determined to maintain order. They owe nothing to the blacks, nine out of 10 of whom voted Democratic, and the militants might think twice before throwing the first fire bomb.

TREMENDOUS RISKS

The reasoning is callous, but the country cannot stand many more hot summers. Violence and crime must be reduced if only to placate his supporters, the white middle class. The risks are tremendous, but the fact remains that little can be done until the defence budget is reduced and inflation controlled. This has long been understood and indeed partly explains the demand to get out of Vietnam quickly and the opposition to the ABM programme, but Mr Nixon refuses to be rushed.

He believes that he must try to negotiate a settlement in Paris, but if Hanoi remains implacable troops will be withdrawn as the South Vietnamese are seen fit to replace them. He has given himself about a year. He is also determined to reach a series of agreements with the Russians that could lead to the limitation of strategic arms, and to the relaxation of tension in the Middle East and elsewhere, but argues that a quick withdrawal from Vietnam could persuade the Soviet Union that the United States has lost the will to resist Communist aggression. He is also not prepared to forgo the development of anti-ballistic missiles, which the Soviet Union is still pursuing.

One can see in this the quality referred to earlier. Mr Nixon's confidence in himself and his staff, or blind Republican reaction to blacks and peaceniks. He can only be given the benefit of the doubt at this stage, and surely a less confident man would have compromised rather than taken on much of the Democratic leadership, the peace lobby, and the black militants. President Nixon confidently believes that he can weather the approaching storm, and certainly the opinion polls show that a majority in the country is prepared to give him more time. He might pull it off, but God help this republic if that confidence is not well founded.—*From The Times, London.*

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THE PACK RESHUFFLED

THE Cabinet reshuffle announced by Mrs Gandhi at least has one virtue; it will stop further speculation. Whether it has more only time can show. It certainly gives Home a better Minister than Mr Nanda, a more stable personality, more tempered by experience of politics and administration. Mr Chavan's stand on some local controversies was partisan, but he need suffer little embarrassment from that now. Apart from the desire with which he is credited, that Mrs Gandhi should take a more direct hand on such issues as the future of Goa and Maharashtra's boundary dispute with Mysore, the decisions already taken about Nagaland put both issues beyond his Ministry's discretion. However, in many ways his new charge is more tough than Defence; it will test his mettle in new and tricky ways. The confidence reposed in him by Mrs Gandhi does him credit. The country, acutely anxious these days because of unstable conditions, will wait for results with sympathetic interest.

Defence has gained little, nor has it lost. Mr Swaran Singh is as good a change as any available within the Cabinet and he will have the whole-time assistance of the able Mr Hathi. His tenure in the new post may not turn out to be brilliantly different from Mr Chavan's, but there is little reason to fear that it will not be as satisfactory. He has an enormous range of experience of Government, gained in travelling from one Ministry to another. In each he has served with sufficient competence to give no one any moments of anxiety upon his elevation to the next. In External Affairs he showed qualities he was not suspected of earlier; relations with Pakistan he handled with some finesse. Whether his successor will do as well in this important if unrewarding area is one of the doubts raised by the reshuffle. On occasions, Mr Chagla has expressed his views with less restraint than is expected of a person of his eminence, maturity and judicial background. His presentation of India's policies could certainly profit from his distinguished bearing and sophistication. One can only hope that it will also show equal improvement in other and more essential respects. Misgivings take the place of mere doubts with Mr Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed's transfer to Education. Even his enemies credit him with a shrewd appreciation of politics, but what he knows about Education is not clear to many. The current wave of student unrest should have convinced Mrs Gandhi, even if the mess in which education is did not, that this important Ministry is still as sadly neglected as it has been for years. It deserved better in the reshuffle.

The sum total of the changes cannot make anyone very enthusiastic about them. Obviously, Mrs Gandhi could not have done a great deal better once it was decided that she should not go outside her present team. But what the country most needs it has not yet got; a team of such stature that it inspires confidence. In terms of the merits of its individual decisions, Mrs Gandhi's Cabinet has done better than some others in the past; if some of its decisions have not yet yielded the fruit expected of them the reason is such God-made causes as the second successive year of serious drought. But leadership is something more than the aggregate virtue of individual decisions; that undefinable something the present team does not have. At any time this can be a disadvantage for the Government; in times like these and with elections impending, the disadvantage can be serious. The least these circumstances should bring home to the Government is that it cannot afford any more mistakes or any signs of vacillation or lack of a firm grip of affairs.

UNHAPPY ENDING

BENGAL'S famous, if a shad long, festive season was comin to an end; then something mos deplorable had to happen o Monday morning in Metiabru and adjoining areas to mar th occasion. Trouble broke ou over a religious procession; an the West Bengal police had t open fire, killing two peopl and injuring five other As disturbances spread, th Calcutta police were obliged t come on the scene and open fire too; 13 are reported to have been injured. Not the least unfortunate part of the affair is that, during the rioting of January, 1964, Metiabruz and neighbouring areas were remarkably free from tension, although the character of the residents there was at least as mixed as anywhere else. Whether or not it is too early to congratulate the police on the despatch and expedition with which they went into action against the mischief makers, it is certainly time to assert again that those who dare to disturb the secular harmony of the India Republic deserve nothing but the harshest treatment, irrespective of what faith they affect to belong to. Arson was a feature of Monday's disturbances; its targets were apparently carefully selected. Preventive arrests and curfew helped contain a potentially dangerous situation; but other questions remain.

The violent nature of the campaign against cow slaughter has already tarnished the nation's capital. It is difficult to say whether the disorders then witnessed represented a national pre-election trend. It needs to be ensured, by every available means, however tough, that the warning of Metiabruz is not lost on either the people or the authorities. Suggestions have been heard that during the recent pujas certain politicians quietly asked the police to go easy on the organizers of community pujas, for the latter are useful election campaigners. In past years immersion of images had to be completed on one prescribed day. Now, it is gathered, deferred immersion only means additional payments which, it seems clear, do not mean additional adequate police precaution against unruly processions. Quinquennial general elections are undoubtedly an advertisement for democracy; periodical disturbances with religious overtones are not.

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A GOOD START

THE first general principles laid down by the new Union Home Minister for the conduct of his Ministry's affairs seem entirely admirable. He is reported to have told the Congress Parliamentary Party that, in a crisis of law and order, action should be prompt but that offenders should be dealt with under the law of the land, and not under emergency regulations. With both these propositions we are in entire agreement; indeed they supplement each other.

One of the main faults of Mr Nanda was that he was a sheep in wolf's clothing. When a real crisis occurred on his own doorstep, like the anti-cow-slaughter agitation in Delhi, he fumbled it; contrast Mr Chavan's firm and resolute performance in the Lok Sabha on Wednesday. But let his intelligence people tell Mr Nanda that some hideous plot was impending, and he would promptly set about scotching it by all kinds of methods Whether the Left Communists would have attempted a rising had the Chinese actually invaded last year is a matter of conjecture; had they done so, the Emergency and the Defence of India Rules could, and should, have been used to the full to foil them. In fact they had attempted nothing like the rural guerrilla activity which Mr Nanda much earlier told us that they were contemplating, and did not do so even during the three weeks' war with Pakistan; which makes his famous "white paper" even more fatuous reading in retrospect than at the time. By contrast, his policy of putting large numbers of people "inside" under the DIR did nothing whatever to foil the policy in fact adopted: creeping paralysis or disruption of the country by "bandhs", "gheraos" and similar agitation.

It is a known characteristic of policemen, particularly security policemen, to demand additional powers to bring unforeseen situations under control. This repeatedly happened, for instance, in pre-independence Malaya; and repeatedly the civil authorities patiently explained that the powers, or something very like them, were available already, if only the security people would read the statute book. This is no less true here. The Indian Penal Code, for instance contains clauses against "restraint" and "confinement" ample to deal with any "gherao"; under the Criminal Procedure Code both offences are cognizable, and they carry quite severe penalties. They are simply not used. The same goes for most other forms of disorder. In the last resort there is the Preventive Detention Act. We like this no more than we like any other form of penal action without proper trial; but at least it now incorporates safeguards, including access to the courts under Article 19, denied by the Defence of India Act.

One thing more Mr Chavan might have nonetheless added. Neither prompt nor correct action will suffice to deal with rowdies unless punishment is equally prompt, correct—and exemplary. Today, far too often, offenders come before a lenient bench, which imposes a negligible penalty or lets them out on bail to thumb their noses at the police. Not unoften the Government itself drops prosecutions, as a pathetic but frequently silly gesture to political peace. It may buy peace for a moment; but only till the next time.

THE COLOMBO PLAN

IN asking South East Asian countries "to give priority to development of agriculture rather than industry and to reduce their population to practical limits" the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation has only been emphasizing the obvious. Mr George D. Woods, President of the World Bank, has said that "in the underdeveloped world as a whole the yearly addition of some 50 million people to the population may eat up half the gain in production in a single year". The FAO in its latest annual report speaks of "per person food production in developing countries" having "dropped back to 1957-58 level" and adds that "invaluable as food aid may be in the long run greater production in the developing countries themselves is essential for any lasting improvement in their food situation" Yet the appeal of the Colombo Plan Council is significant principally in two ways since the Council has from its inception stressed technical training for industry, it suggests a welcome flexibility of approach; and it is perhaps the first step towards strengthening training facilities for agricultural extension, animal husbandry, fisheries and family planning.

Although the gradual blurring of the early distinction between donor and recipient countries—India, which is the major recipient of aid from outside the region, is now also the chief donor in the region—is gratifying, organization at the receiving end is in many cases inadequate. Progress towards self-reliant growth, establishment in each country of permanent institutions to make use of local resources for training all the necessary categories of skilled personnel, is yet much too slow. Nor is there in most countries of the region any central agency to co-ordinate the activities of the various donor countries and international agencies. The work of the American Peace Corps, for instance, could be closely co-ordinated with similar activities by other countries, the FAO and the ILO. Integration is obviously not easy. But guidelines do exist, especially in the OEEC, within which it ought to be possible at least to achieve closer co-ordination.

GOOSE-STEP

THE Romans regarded Juno's geese as sacred, especially after the famous cacklers gave away the presence of nocturnal marauders, and so saved the Capitol. This did not prevent them, strange and sacrilegious as it may seem to some, from fattening and eating their holy birds. Last week, more than 23 centuries after the Latin geese foiled the Gauls, a curious experiment took place near Wantage in Britain, where eight geese walked west, at an estimated speed of just under a mile an hour for more than four hours, while an RSPCA inspector trudged alongside to see that they were not exploited or suffering from sore feet. The object of this march was to test a theory held by a Cambridge professor of archaeology. The Romans are known to have feasted on a certain kind of goose bred only around Calais, but there has always been some mystery about their transport. Dr Glyn Daniel maintains that they went to Rome on foot. Bad light put a stop to the Berkshire experiment, though the inspector was able first to affirm that the geese were not at all footsore and could certainly manage to march five miles a day.

If the professor is right those poor web-footed burghers of Calais, marching 1,000 miles to ancient retribution, had as tough a time as Hannibal's elephants. If the suggestion is raised that they would also make tough eating by the time they reached the *mensae* of the imperialist decadents of the capital, the answer is *foie gras*. The goose that laid the golden liver was what Roman gourmets wanted, just as present day gourmets go for Strasbourg, Toulouse and Alsace *foie gras*. The marching theory hangs on the fact that geese hate being cooped up in carts, preferring to leg it every time.

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FEAR OF NEWS

SPEAKING on the rôle of newspapers in a democracy in her luncheon address to the I.P.I. Assembly, Mrs Gandhi observed that freedom of the Press created "problems and difficulties" and proceeded to add that the war on poverty in India was analogous to the second World War, which in Britain had necessitated restrictions on publication of news detrimental to the national interest. The context in which she recalled this experience was the students' agitation. "Now I am sure", said Mrs Gandhi, "that had this agitation not got wide publicity, there would not have been another agitation in another place. Because there was wide publicity, students in other places felt they were lagging behind." The question which Mrs Gandhi posed, after this astonishing thesis, was how much liberty the Press should have in the present circumstances of India. To a question from a member of an otherwise dumbfounded audience, she clarified that her statement did not imply any suggestion for suppression of news; nor did she suggest that newspapers generally or any section of them had distorted or falsified the news of the agitation. Presumably in her view news on such occasions should be what Authority would like newspapers to put out, perhaps in the manner which it may prescribe by rule or, still worse, by oral advice.

That such a view of the rôle of the Press is held at the highest level of the Government is bound to cause a profound shock. The war-time analogy based on a metaphorical verbal similarity, the assumption that publication of news of the agitation was "wide publicity" to the cause, and the utmost certainty about publication having directly aggravated the agitation in other areas, are all too naive to do credit to the Prime Minister's or her Government's assessment of this apparently deep-seated malady. The case for the publication of truthful news has always been that in the absence of it rumour gains credence and causes even more mischief than truth conceivably can in similar situations. Assuming that newspapers had done what the Prime Minister would have liked, could Mrs Gandhi's Government also prevent student agitators or their instigators from writing letters to their counterparts in other areas or travelling around giving their own versions of what had happened or is proposed to be done?

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to the electorate at home. The Press has no duty to recognize any such obligation to subserve the limited ends of those in power when it feels that the national interest is at stake and calls for a different and mature approach to a developing crisis. That such an approach was lacking is proved not only by Mrs Gandhi's superficial analysis of the nature of the present discontents but also by

CHATTERATION

SURVEY sickness is a new global disease diagnosed by delegates to a recent psychological convention in New York. It is described as an occupational hazard driving researchers to scurry about the world scattering questionnaires which demand hard-to-get data. For example, 70 Americans called during one year on a professor in Argentina; an official at the U.S. embassy in London said that British scholars would have little time for their own work if they consented to see all the inquisitive firemen; a delegate admitted that he was sending 5,600 questionnaires needing 10,000 hours of work to Chilean schools. The East is a happy hunting ground for these probing time-wasters.

The latest survey device, called "chatterbox", is meant to discover how many hours people spend talking every day. The guinea-pigs, students at Edinburgh University, are to wear miniature mikes taped to their throats with wires to meters in their pockets, the first experiments to be on a talkative woman and a taciturn man. The professor in charge curiously assumes that when people talk it is because they have something to say. But are not most conversations either monologues interrupted by people who don't listen and insist on butting in, or duets where two people talk simultaneously?

Only a very few talk the talk the sirens talked. Hazlitt said of Coleridge that "he talked on for ever; and you wished him to talk for ever and ever". Dr Johnson (whose Lexicon defines "chatteration" as "inclination to, or habit of, talking incessantly") was a boon to Boswell. But for the most part that buzz to be heard wherever two or three are gathered together is pure Gilbertese:

The meaning doesn't matter
if it's only idle chatter
Of a transcendental kind.

75 YEARS AGO

FROM THE STATESMAN OF NOVEMBER 18, 1891

(Editorials)

Clearly there is something very rotten in the state of the Protected Malay States: and the sooner the Colonial Office interferes, the better will it be for the English reputation for integrity and justice.

There are, we observe, premonitory symptoms of hostility among the working classes in the United States to the projected immigration of the expatriated Jews, that seem likely to culminate in as violent an opposition as the crusade against the Chinese in the States on the Pacific seaboard.

(News Item)

VAMBERY ON THE PAMIR QUESTION

The *Times* contains a letter from Professor Vambery on the Pamir question. He shows two things; first, that the western portion of the Pamirs, to which, through Bokhara, Russia lays a claim, has been almost continuously under the authority of the rulers of Afghanistan since Timur, and the second that on the northeastern portion of the roof of the world, the authority of China has for a hundred and thirty odd years been acknowledged.

the conclusion to which she jumped, that the liberty of the Press was the villain of the piece.

ISLAM IN CHINA

APART from removal of all religious images and a ban on all religious practices in Tibet, a systematic campaign is reported to be afoot in China proper, aimed at annihilation of Islam In a recent declaration the Red Guards speak of "destroying the superstition of Islam in China by wiping out all its practices and even its theoretical foundations". There have been attacks on mosques and mullahs. As all this apparently is part of the cultural revolution, the Chinese Government is unconcerned, if not positively jubilant. So far there has been neither appeal for greater awareness of social responsibilities nor condemnation of atrocities.

While all this must be deeply distressing to many countries, especially those with a large Muslim population such as India, Pakistan's predicament is indeed pathetic. Member countries of the Islamic group which King Feisal is desperately trying to build are unlikely to view the antics of Pakistan's ally as only temporary aberrations Inside Pakistan, whose "creation was based on the ideology of Islam", resentment must be much greater than the military régime cares to admit. Early last month there were wild, apparently officially sponsored, demonstrations in Karachi and Rawalpindi in protest against the death penalty on some members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAR who tried to assassinate President Nasser.

Although over 50 million Muslims have been living in India since Independence with full religious freedom, any minor clash between Hindus and Muslims anywhere has been enough for Pakistan to tell the world that Islam is in danger. Yet she is silent about China's resolute bid to destroy Islam. It is not easy to guess President Ayub's reactions but it seems that, as with Hamlet, his pale cast of thought is impairing the native hue of resolution. Or, is it that the friendship to which the two countries have pledged themselves is truly "eternal and unbreakable". Islam notwithstanding?

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FOOD AND POLITICS

THE form is changing, but the substance is not. This is how the cynic may regard the decisions taken at the Chief Ministers' conference on Wednesday to set up a National Food Council, complete with a Standing Committee, to draw up a national food budget. Since the council is only another name for Chief Ministers in conclave, and the food budget may amount to no more than the exercises attempted in the past three years to fix quotas for transfer of grains from surplus to deficit States, the cynicism is not unjustified. Even so, a specific commitment to draw up a budget at the all-India level represents an advance over the present situation, where the States keep making arbitrary, and even fantastic, assessments of their surpluses or shortages. If public opinion keeps up pressure, it is possible that machinery may gradually be built up to put budgeting on the "scientific and realistic" basis envisaged by the Foodgrains Policy Committee in its report submitted in September. Information about crop prospects will still have to come from the States themselves, but it should not be difficult to devise some kind of audit to test their trustworthiness. Looking ahead, it is clear that the need for independent audit to put crop estimates above politics will be the greater after 1967 if the Congress is replaced by the Opposition in some States. Otherwise, the country might find itself exposed to Centre-State quarrels which could seriously jeopardize India's unity.

However quickly the budgeting machinery is set up, it will still be too late to deal with the crisis ahead. Rice and other kharif crops have already started to arrive in the market, making it necessary to take immediate decisions about levels and methods of procurement. The Chief Ministers have, according to Mr Subramaniam's Press briefing, agreed to compulsory levies on producers, but this means little in the absence of a consensus on the targets to be kept in view. Backsliding under electoral pressure is plain for all to see: West Bengal has decided to exempt irrigated holdings of seven acres or less from levy; Gujarat has reduced the paddy levy from 75% to 60%; Mysore gave up levies altogether early this year. There are of course honourable exceptions, among them Madras where the Chief Minister turned down on November 9 an Opposition plea to leave out farms below five acres from procurement programmes. But the exceptions are few, and the possibility very real of more States giving in to clamour against levies as elections draw near. An unfortunate aspect is that Opposition parties which stridently protest against India's inordinate dependence upon U.S. largesse have shown little willingness to back procurement efforts. They take shelter behind the plea that the levy as now administered bears too heavily upon the small farmers. There may well be a case for lightening the burden upon them, but none for wholesale exemptions if procurement targets are to be met. As Mr Bhaktavatsalam pointed out in Madras, 76% of the State's holdings are below five acres.

The issues involved in effective procurement being essentially political, the plea Mrs Gandhi made in her person-to-person broadcast on Wednesday to put food above politics is almost meaningless. Political parties could certainly agree, as dock workers and others have done before, that they would do nothing which impedes movement of food, but to ask for a moratorium on political debate on the principle and methods of food management is not only unreal but perhaps also undemocratic. It is the right, and even the duty, of political parties to keep the Governments' handling of the crisis in review, not merely in the genteel atmosphere of consultative committees but also in public forums such as Parliament and even election rallies.

CARELESS TALK

FACED with Jordan's complaint against Israel's very telling attack on the former's territory on November 13, the Security Council reacted sharply; it proved to be one of those rare occasions when the East and the West took more or less the same view of a particular question. The U.S. delegate, Mr Goldberg, said that Israel had violated its solemn obligations to the United Nations; and the USA is a friend of Israel's. It was only to be expected that the Soviet representative, Mr Fedorenko, would use stronger language; this comes easily to Russian spokesmen; and there is the fact that the Soviet Union has in recent years supplied considerable quantities of arms to the Arab countries, specially to the UAR and Syria; the latter's attitude to Israel is, if anything, a little more militant than the Egyptians'. The British delegate, Lord Caradon, saw no justification whatsoever in Israel's calculated attack on a country which, in comparison with its neighbours, had given Israel perhaps the least trouble. It was left to the French representative, M Seydoux, to qualify the condemnation; his delegation could not overlook the incidents which had incited the Israeli attack.

New Delhi also felt sympathy for stricken Jordan. Whether it was necessary for the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs to go out of his way to say that Israel's retaliatory action deserved to be "severely condemned" may however be doubted. It cannot be unknown to the Government of India that Israel's complaints of infiltrators from its openly hostile Arab neighbours are by no means imaginary. Reticence on contentious West Asian issues is made the more advisable by India's own unhappy experience with Pakistani infiltrators in Kashmir and elsewhere, notably in Assam in recent months. Unfriendly neighbours can subvert stability without actually violating a border; and Israel's sources of water are on very unfriendly territory. Only last year India had to administer to Pakistan a sharp retort against attempts at subversion and Jordan's attitude to that affair was hardly helpful to India.

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EMERGENCY POWERS

THE current fierce debate in West Germany on the new Emergency Bill, drafted by the Grand Coalition, has relevance for India. Indeed, the Bill itself, as also the attacks on it, show a degree of concern for parliamentary control over the executive which is rather unusual for a country which has little of democratic traditions. Unlike India, which gives its President carte blanche to declare a state of emergency, on being satisfied that a war or internal disturbance threatens the security of the country (though in practice this means the satisfaction of the Union Cabinet), and unlike Britain which empowers its Prime Minister to declare one provided that he calls a session of Parliament within five days of such declaration, the West German Bill does not allow any such power to the executive, even for a day.

The Bill provides for an Emergency Parliament, consisting of 22 deputies from the Bundestag and one representative each from the 11 Lander (States). In case of emergency, it is this Emergency Parliament that takes over the functions of Parliament. If the Bundestag is able to meet, it alone can decide, by a two-thirds majority, whether "a state of external danger" exists and delegate all or any of its powers to the Emergency Parliament. But it is given the right to veto, by a simple majority, any action of the Emergency Parliament and also to decide whether war or threat of war has receded. If the Bundestag cannot meet, the Emergency Parliament can decide, again by a two-thirds majority, the question of external aggression or issue emergency decrees. The executive must act only through Parliament or the Emergency Parliament, as the case may be. The Emergency Bill thus underlines Parliament's distrust of the executive, and also its lack of full trust even in the Emergency Parliament, which, some fear, being a small body is liable to be won over by the executive.

Contrast the situation in India. No actual state of war or of internal disturbance is necessary for the declaration or continuance of the emergency. Nor is continuance of either contingency necessary for continuance of the emergency. Even five years after the Chinese war and two years after the Pakistani invasion, we are still living in one. The Union Cabinet has gone back on its promise to lift the emergency, because it does not have the necessary majority in Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to apply the emergency powers to selected areas. The West German Bill is a welcome contrast in another respect. Even in emergency, it guarantees freedom of speech, of the Press and of association. The right of the Supreme Constitutional Court to hear individual grievances and give relief is guaranteed. The land of Hitler has thus drafted, and will in all probability adopt, what may turn out to be the most enlightened emergency legislation in the world.

The Statesman

75 YEARS AGO

SEPTEMBER 11, 1892

(Editorial)

A hostile or an uncharitable critic might, with great show of reason, see in its (Government of India's) persistent persecution of the Ameer—for we can call it nothing else—a deliberate purpose of a much more sinister kind, nothing more or less, in fact, than a determination to provoke the Ameer to some act of overt hostility which would give it an excuse for repudiating its engagements with him, and asserting for itself a free hand in its future dealings with Afghanistan.

(News Items)

A UNIONIST BANQUET

In recognition of the gallant fight he made in the cause of Union when contesting the county against Mr Gladstone, Colonel Wanchope was entertained at a banquet on Saturday evening by the Unionist electors of Mid-Lothian.

AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN

(From Our Correspondent)

Allahabad, Sep. 10.

It is believed that Hashim Ali is playing a waiting game at Balo. If he intends to surrender it will probably not be until the last moment.

DE GAULLE ARRIVES IN KRAKOW

KRAKOW, Sept 9.—Applauding crowds shouting "Long may he live" greeted President de Gaulle as he arrived in this mediaeval former royal capital yesterday at the start of a week-end tour of Poland's provinces reports Reuter.

Large banners facing him as he stepped from a Soviet-built Ilyushin-18 aircraft carried slogans saying "Long live France" "Long live Peace" and "The Oder-Neisse line is a frontier of peace".

After inspecting a guard of honour the general saluted and shouted in Polish to the troops "greetings, soldiers" in Polish military tradition. The guardsmen roared back in unison "Greetings Mr President".

General de Gaulle, who flew here yesterday from Warsaw with the Polish Head of State, Mr Edward Ochab, was an instructor to Polish officers when he served as a captain with the French military mission in Warsaw from 1919 to 1921.

After a formal welcoming ceremony at Krakow airport the two statesmen drove together in an open car through crowded city streets to the Wawel Castle, perched atop a rocky hill overlooking the Vistula.

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HOPES SOAR AFTER THE CHANGE IN INDONESIA

STUDENTS CONSULTED BY ARMY ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES

From S. NIHAL SINGH

IN Indonesia today students represent not merely a new generation but a new era. It is the era of greater freedom of thought and action. In academic circles in Djakarta, the atmosphere is reminiscent of the beginning of the de-Stalinization phase in Europe. There is exaggerated hope for the future, a thrill in having survived the confining years of the past.

Who are these students who have been instrumental in giving a new orientation to Indonesia's thinking and policies? In a country known for its ingenuity in coining acronyms, they call them the 66 Generation—as opposed to the Generation of 1945 with their now soiled past. Student leaders disclaim responsibility for the title with a trace of exaggerated modesty. They say they are there to do the people's will, not to win glory for themselves.

The Kami Students' Action Front has set up its headquarters in the former Chinese Consulate-General in Djakarta, ransacked by students last month. Visitors must sign a register before entering. A student leader is addressing a large group inside, his speech punctuated by much clapping. Around the courtyard, where soldiers take a benign interest in the goings on, other students sit in rooms, some containing only bare door-frames, to discuss their affairs.

Mr Cosmas Batubara, Kami's General Chairman, divides his time between the Consulate-General and the headquarters of his own Catholic Students' Movement, the PMKRI. A glamourized painting of General Suharto, the present Defence Minister and effective ruler, is hung beneath President Soekarno's portrait in the hall.

MODEST YOUTH

Mr Batubara is a youthful, modest looking man reading for a master's degree in journalism, but he wants to be a full-time politician.

Groups of students sit chatting in the hall of the PKMRI, bursts of laughter punctuating their chatter—Indonesians are basically a happy people. Others, some in their Kami tunics, just sit and stare into blank space, as if waiting for something to happen. Mr Batubara leads me to a corner, asking an interpreter to join us. He understands English but is not a fluent English speaker.

The questions come from me in a steady stream. What are Kami's main objectives at present? Do you want to return to the Constitution of 1945, largely negated by President Soekarno through decrees and political manoeuvres? Do you want general elections? How do you view the postponement of the provisional Congress—a post-

of PKI elements re-emerging. Elections are not the main objective of his organization.

"Soekarno", Mr Batubara said, "is still our President. His powers should be based on law . . . as long as General Suharto bases his leadership on our three demands (reshuffle of the old Cabinet, banning of the PKI and the bringing down of prices), we support him. He has done a good job until now . . . so far General Nasution has joined our demands to fight for us. He is one of the victims of the PKI coup".

About Dr Hatta, Mr Batubara was more guarded, less enthusiastic. "As long as anybody is struggling with us, we accept him. But we don't idolize anybody".

Mr Batubara, in common with most Indonesians I have talked to, viewed Indonesia's future in rosy hues. His concept of the future is an era in which the 1945 Constitution would be restored, the PKI entirely eliminated and Kami's three demands fulfilled. "Kami members", he pointed out, "are the young generation. They have political consciousness. They are rational and critical. They are not yes men". The last remark was a swipe at President Soekarno's previous chief advisers.

It was hardly surprising that Mr Batubara could not fully explain the motivations of the students' upsurge. "It is the tradition of students everywhere in the world to fight for justice," he said. He averred that even before the abortive coup of October last year his Catholic Students' Movement was fighting the Communists, although this was not publicized. "We use the September 30 affair as a pretext to beat the PKI. People support us."

PARENTS' SUPPORT

Other students, who had by this time joined our dialogue, gave me the benefit of their views. "We were ourselves surprised by our ability to do things," said one trying to explain the origins of Kami and its phenomenal success. "Our parents were, of course, surprised in the beginning. They saw the danger we were in—that we might get shot. But they supported us and helped us with food and materials."

Mr Batubara, himself a Roman

in this

population who followed their neighbours to pay their tributes.

The winds of change blowing through Indonesia following the abortive coup and the Army's clever strategy in making use of it thus produced the spark that ignited the students' rebellion. Liberal professors in the University in Djakarta welcomed the change with open arms; some of them indeed acted as the students' advisers whose ranks also include Roman Catholic priests of Dutch descent but Indonesian nationality.

RULE OF LAW

The students' revolt has already produced a dramatic change in the climate of opinion. There is a new impatience with flamboyance and histrionics. It is the fashion now to decry prestige projects and wasteful expenditure. "Yes men," has become a dirty phrase. And the Government has seen it fit to encourage a week-long seminar at the University in Djakarta whose upshot was a sharp cry for a return to the rule of law.

On the obverse side, it is somewhat frightening for an observer of the Indonesian scene returning to the country to find new ideas already being used as catch phrases and slogans. To a nation fed on clichés for years, acronyms and slogans come naturally. Gestapu, the acronym to describe and condemn the abortive coup, was a brilliant piece of political propaganda. But now there is the 66 Generation, Ampera, denoting the suffering of the people, and even the call for a return to the 1945 Constitution has become something of a slogan.

What of the future? There are complaints that students are being used by interested parties for their personal ends. In universities, professors are being sacked for their alleged pro-Communist tendencies although some might have had no connexion with the coup. The students, having once tasted power, will be loath to let it go and many students will find the life of bending events to their desires more interesting than the somewhat mundane business of attending classes. Student attendance in universities is still very poor.

Largely by circumstances but also through courage, students have thus become a political factor of consequence. Kami delegations regularly meet the generals and no major political decision is taken without the students being consulted and their acquiescence, if not enthusiasm, secured. President Soekarno's recent action in revamping his Supreme Advisory Council brought forth a storm of protest and its indefinite postponement.

Although Kami and the other student groups have proved to be of invaluable help to the Army in consolidating its power, the future might see a parting of the ways. General Suharto's strategy is to evoke a consensus in the country in dealing with President Soekarno. The pace is necessarily slow, while students are traditionally impetuous. Besides the intolerable economic plight of most city dwellers—an essential ingredient in the students' revolt—might prove too much of a task for the Army and its supporters. New crises in the economic or political field might see new fireworks.

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Funding: Tariff Reform Research

WEST GERMAN STOCKTAKING OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FEAR COMPLEX IN THE WEST: TRADE DEMANDS FROM THE EAST

From E. I. BROOK

VIENNA.—West Germany recently passed through what must have been an uncomfortable week-end.

For weeks past capitals in eastern Europe have been celebrating the 20th anniversary of the expulsion of the German army and the Soviet Union specially set back its traditional May Day parade in Moscow's Red Square to stage a triumph on May 8. Throughout much of the world, among West Germany's present friends, associates and its political opponents, there was commemoration of the collapse of the biggest organized concentration of German armed might that has ever been known.

For nearly half a century Germans have been accustomed to unpleasant anniversaries and to varying degrees of international unpopularity. Today the West Germans may, in some areas, be admired for their virile recovery, their competence and drive but Bonn knows well that nowhere is the German loved. Fortunately for him, the average German does not expect affection abroad. Since their earliest days in central Europe the Germanic peoples have been aggressive to their Slav, Danish and other neighbours and have sought out the best lands in the river valleys of eastern and south-eastern Europe either as conquerors or as settlers. None of their immediate neighbours, treaties of friendship and trade notwithstanding, have any illusion that the nature of their great neighbour has altered.

GERMAN REUNION

There is today much lip service to the concept of German reunion. The fact that the dividing line between the contemporary West Germans and East Germans is not only as artificial as are these names but of Communist conception and control makes it easier for foreign capitals to give some semblance of sincerity to their denunciations of division. The democratic idea of free elections—an idea historically very new to most of Germany—gives the necessary tinge of liberalism.

No one, however, has the slightest illusion as to what would be the savage nature of the solution of reunion and probable aggression farther eastward to recover "lost lands" if reunion were left to the Germans alone.

However co-operative friendly neighbouring Western Governments may be, the Germans are aware of the hatred towards them that persists in Belgium and northern France, of the antipathy of most of the Scandinavians, of the coldness of the British, of the suspicious watchfulness of the Austrian socialists and, above all, of the solid political hostility of eastern Europe. If the United States is more sincere than most over protestations in favour of German reunion, Bonn is conscious that here too the sentiment arises more directly from Washington's anxiety to balance Moscow than from a wish to satisfy German aspirations.

The week-end celebrations may be regarded as the third "moment of truth" for the West Germans.

The first was the utter chaos and destruction of their defeat 20 years ago; the second came 18 years later when two elderly gentlemen knelt side by side in Rheims Cathedral to signify the obliteration of Franco-German enmities and to pledge their co-operation and friendship.

But it is clear to the Germans today during their third moment of truth that those two old gentlemen had quite different ideas at the back of their minds in that historic moment. The treaty of friendship, despite the gesture of President de Gaulle's kisses, was far more the product of the urgency of Dr Adenauer, in his late eighties and on the brink of retirement than of the General's initiative. Dr Adenauer pressed for the treaty as the coping stone to his life's work, Franco-German friendship based on Rhineland-Frankish co-operation, West European and Catholic in concept. To Gen de Gaulle, who sincerely welcomed the idea of a co-operative Germany so long as that remained possible and as long as co-operation followed direction from Paris, the treaty was a convenience and a fortification in days when his Western neighbour, Britain, was estranged.

Times and requirements have changed. France, intent on leading a Europe, and probably not merely a Western Europe, as free as possible from American political influence, knows that Bonn without Dr Adenauer turns with more reassurance to Washington than to Paris. Economically the West German Government has had to pay a price to its farmers in order to save the Common Market after Gen De Gaulle pushed through his own terms for agricultural union. There is every indication that he will be equally unyielding over West European political union.

GALLIC DALLIANCE

Whatever spark of historical sentiment may have inspired Gen de Gaulle at the signing of the Franco-German treaty of friendship there is none in the practical skilful minds of his Premier, M Pompidou, or of his Foreign Minister, M Couve de Murville. Systematically the French team trims the Common Market to their requirements, halts the Kennedy Round to uncertain progress and turns a bland but indifferent face to overtures from the European Free Trade Association. Their smiles now reach beyond Bonn to Moscow and Peking while the French abruptly torpedo Italian ideas for pursuing European unity and keep Bonn on tenterhooks of anxiety and annoyance as to what [illegible] and to pay [illegible] cent. East Europe seeks increasingly to trade with West Germany and to buy its industrial equipment. More significant, possibly, American objections on the political plane to economic urgings for more U.S. and German trade with East Europe are beginning to give way.

TURNING EAST

A meeting has just concluded of the Association for South-East Europe a German organization which attracted to Bonn many representatives from Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania to take an active part in the discussions. Had there not also been a liberal sprinkling of Russian observers at the sessions it seems likely that the East European part would have been more active still.

While objecting to the far-reaching discriminatory character of West European economic integration against third parties, especially against the socialist countries who are held guilty of dumping, all three East European countries sought more German co-operation in production, technical progress and export of capital goods. Some East European delegates, including the Bulgarian, sought the commercial aid of West European countries, and notably Germany, in their gradual emancipation from Soviet tutelage. Rumania considers it is now in a position considerably to increase its exports to West Germany and asked better terms in prices for purchases from Germany.

In the last 14 years West German trade with Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania has increased fivefold but there remains the imbalance of German exports of capital goods against imports of mainly farm products from these areas. It is this imbalance that both sides are now anxious to set right. The recent decision by Bonn to extend credit guarantees to East European countries from five to eight years may be the first step in this direction. The setting up of German trade delegations in Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Sofia will certainly help.

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The Statesman

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DELHI, APRIL 27, 1965

A TEST OF NERVE

GRAVE happenings have been reported from India's border in Kutch; the concern they have spread throughout the country would be justified even if the parallel with Ladakh were less suggestive. But excitement must not decide what only judgment should. India's defence forces are in far better shape now than then and they must be left free to act without the impediment of too much clamour. It would be as wrong to hustle the Armed Forces as it would be to deny them the support they might need. They alone have a total view of what is needed and can be done, they are best able to judge how far they can commit themselves in one place without too dangerously exposing another.

Distraction of the popular, and more particularly the political, mind is sometimes the main objective of an enemy; Pakistan might be testing our nerve more than our military strength. If political controversy is allowed to cloud the cool judgment of the Defence Minister or the forces, Pakistan would win one victory immediately no matter what happened later to Kanjarkot; the Indian Army would be drawn into a wasting commitment in the marshes while serious threats develop elsewhere on the borders. The least that public opinion can do is not to offer the comfort of this possibility to Pakistan.

Intrusions across the border are easy to stage but very difficult to prevent. As often as not they are in the nature of pin-pricks: irritating but not dangerous. So long as they remain so it is best to let the local forces take care of them. If they add up to more serious intentions, the defending army is better able to judge than public opinion where and how big the real threat might be. This judgment must be left free to function. The Army can be counted upon to pass any test of its strength with credit; politicians must give strength to the people in the war of nerves. Meanwhile world opinion will have yet another opportunity of seeing how hostile a neighbour Pakistan is.

DIEGO GARCIA

THE plan for an Anglo-U.S. radio communications centre in the Indian Ocean is not new; nor should it cause any surprise that there may be more centres in the future or that such a system could conceivably provide technical support for an effective deterrent to possible nuclear aggression by China. Immediately after the publication of first reports at the end of last August, it was explained in London that the immediate purpose of the proposed centre was to facilitate high-speed communications, but that it could also be useful as a forward staging post for troops. It was also known that Diego Garcia, a coral atoll about 1,000 miles from the southern tip of the Indian peninsula, was one of the possible sites; its choice now seems fairly certain, although some hard bargaining with the Mauritius authorities is not ruled out.

There is nothing in the immediate plan to which India could take legitimate objection. The island is a dependency of Mauritius, which is a British colony; its use in Anglo-U.S. defence arrangements is hardly a matter on which India could officially pronounce. Even its geographical position is hardly relevant; the Maldivian island of Gan, which is already being used as a British staging post is very much closer to Indian shores. Greater sensitiveness to an American presence in the Indian Ocean would be meaningless in the context of recent and present realities. Nevertheless, concern over the possibility of a nuclear presence is more than likely. Even if India's enthusiasm for a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean has been less pronounced than that of some of her neighbours, she is officially committed to supporting the idea; last September, New Delhi took pains to let it be known that, according to its information, the USA and Britain were not planning to set up missile bases in the Indian Ocean.

That was understandable, especially in the context of prevailing Afro-Asian, including some Indian, opinion. More important, however, was the sense of realism New Delhi showed in refraining from vociferous agitation against a possible Western nuclear presence in the area. Still more significant, perhaps, was the successful Indian effort to make their commercial possibilities. Indeed there is no end to this process of adaptation as industrially advanced countries are finding out, for each phase of development calls for fresh adjustments to be made.

not unifying ... if applied more systematically and completely, could enhance the value of each separate line of advance and yield cumulative benefits.

All is not gloom by a long way. The process of re-adaptation from traditional industries is bound to be painful; but rural artisans, as surveys have shown, are not slow to adopt better techniques of produc... once they are con... Kashmir leader in ... there is likely to be

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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A NEW SHOP IN BRITAIN TO SELL CHINESE PROPAGANDA

By PRASANTA SARKAR

IN their propaganda drive in the West, the Chinese have scored a significant gain in the United Kingdom, which is bound to have an impact on the English-speaking world in general and India in particular. There is evidence of subtle Chinese moves in East Pakistan, similar to those in the U.K., which concern India.

The formation of a new Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU) has been announced in Britain and unlike the usual friendship societies it has been able to hook into its fold a large gathering of respectable names whose reputation in academic, social, cultural, political and economic spheres extends far beyond the United Kingdom.

Among active SACU members are Sir Eric Ashby, Master of Clare College, Cambridge; Sir Maurice Bowra, Warden of Wadham College, Oxford; Mr Christopher Hill, Master-elect of Balliol; Sir Gordon Sutherland, Master of Emmanuel, Cambridge; Sir John Fulton, Vice-Chancellor of Sussex University; Dame Janet Vaughan, Principal of Somerville, Oxford, and Professor Owen Lattimore, the American in charge of Chinese Studies at Leeds University.

Among personalities represented from the theatre and the arts are Beryl Grey, Joan Littlewood, Dame Marie Rambert, Vanessa Redgrave, Hariet Cohen, J. B. Priestley and the composer, Benjamin Britten. Political and other personalities included in the membership are two Labour and one Liberal MPs; the boilermakers' leader, Mr Ted Hill along with Lord Boyd Orr, the cricketer, Sir Learie Constantine, Lord Brain of Eynsham, Alderman Lewis Cohen, chairman of the Alliance Building Society, and the sculptress Barbara Hepworth.

CHINA v. U.S.S.R.

No less significant than the membership list is SACU's genesis which represents a victory of Chinese diplomacy over the Soviet Union. The new society is a breakaway from the Britain-China Friendship Association which has always been tied to the Moscow-aligned British Communist Party. SACU, besides including Left-wingers as members, has been able to associate a whole list of famous personalities hitherto unconnected with causes of this kind.

The man behind the revolt against the British Communist Party-controlled BCFA is Dr Joseph Needham, the Cambridge biochemist, who alleged that the Americans used germ warfare in the Korean war. Dr Needham resigned as president of the BCFA on the grounds of its "unduly close connexion with the British Communist Party".

The Broadsheet, The Study Group is SACU's precursor.

PEOPLE'S PARTY

An example from the Broadsheet (June, 1964 — No. 5): "The Chinese are also being criticized in Soviet and other Communist statements for being preoccupied with the anti-imperialist struggle and disregarding the class struggle. It is ironical that such arguments should be used by people who are doing their utmost to strengthen the capitalist Governments of India, the UAR and other newly independent countries. In reality the Chinese maintain that the leadership of national liberation movements must not be surrendered to the national bourgeoisie but must be led by the proletariat under a proletariat party."

When SACU's counterpart comes into being in East Pakistan, for which the spadework has already been done, all such interpretations of the Chinese positions will be translated into Bengali and Urdu for circulation not only in Pakistan but also for transmission to India.

That SACU will engage itself in publicizing Chinese views and achievements is evident from the history of the split in the British-China Friendship Association which was set up shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Differences in the BCFA, according to The Broadsheet, started growing since 1960 when it exercised a form of censorship over Chinese publications by virtually suppressing the booklet Long Live Leninism.

The Broadsheet says: "As differences of opinion within the international Communist movement grew deeper and more open, and extended to differences between States, they were naturally reflected within the ranks of the Association. Despite the growing concern of many members that slanderous attacks against China were being left unanswered, a policy of silence on issues deemed controversial was pursued, and the circulation of published replies to attacks by other Communist Parties on the Chinese Communist Party was discouraged."

The need for a split was occasioned when the BCFA National Committee meeting in October, 1963, ruled against publication of any Chinese material on the ground that "it would be disastrous for our Association to become involved in inter-Party Communist controversy. It would not only cause serious divisions in the ranks of the Association, but weaken the work of the Association in the realization of its aims".

The then BCFA president, Dr Needham, who was not present at the national committee meeting, said later that if he had been present and voting at the meeting he would have voted against the policy statement. He said: "If today some of our members, for whatever reasons, feel that they cannot even associate themselves with the mere objective statement of the political beliefs of our Chinese friends, if they feel them to be so 'heretical' that they should not even be described, then surely these members might indeed consider whether they can honestly remain within a British-China Friendship Association."

FINAL SPLIT

The final split came after the BCFA annual meeting on May 9, 1964, where moves to alter the BCFA policy were defeated by 174 votes to 108. A resolution defeated at the meeting demanded that the BCFA discuss such "important issues" as (1) Is the foreign policy fact."

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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THE STATESMAN
Incorporating and directly descended from
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PUBLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY
FROM DELHI AND CALCUTTA

Vol. No. CXXVI 2317

DELHI. OCTOBER 9, 1967

SENAS GALORE

SOMEWHAT arbitrarily, the British declared large sections of the Indian people non-military and restricted recruitment of the armed forces to a few selected areas. This served the imperial purpose well, except when wars supervened, but never quite extinguished the military aspirations of those excluded. Mahatma Gandhi led the Congress into non-violence; yet various organizations of volunteers even within the party adopted uniforms and held drills and marches on the lines of what the army was believed to do. Terrorism in Bengal and Punjab had unmistakable military overtones. The statue of Netaji Subhas Bose in military uniform on the Maidan in Calcutta is more reminiscent of his appearance as the GOC of the Congress volunteers in the twenties than of his days with the Indian National Army. The Bengal Volunteers of East Bengal fancied themselves as an army of sorts. Neither the Razakars nor the Razakars were wedded to non-violence. But discipline was what held the formations together. Only the Khudai Khidmatgars of the NWFP, raised by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, maintained discipline without going the way of violence. Mrs Indira Gandhi herself once led the Vanara Sena in the United Provinces; the Sena, however, was not a paramilitary organization.

There are signs, disturbing though not being alarming yet, that the struggle for freedom, which many means seemed impossible, has lately been replaced by a striving for regional exclusiveness. The inspiration is probably as political as economic. Linguistic chauvinism on the part of some has undoubtedly provoked organized resistance in others, for language is very much an instrument of politics in India today. Growing unemployment throughout the country has given rise to demands for priority for "sons of the soil". The professed aim of the Shiv Sena is apparently to protect the rights of Maharashtrians; some of its activities suggest that these cannot be safeguarded without injuring the legitimate rights of others as Indian citizens. Whether teaching of or in Hindi will bring about what it has long been claimed it will, at most influential sections including articulate supporters of Hindi, send their children to English-medium schools many of which are run by foreign missionaries who have made India their home. According to one correspondent in New Delhi, not one Minister at the Centre was sending his progeny to schools that taught in an Indian language. It may well be that more is heard about the poor quality of Indian English today because more Indians are speaking some sort of English. Madras has already made known its preference for English as a link language. Nagaland has adopted English as its only official language. The glory of the English language and its literature is doubtless great; the increasing Indian love for English may be attributable to sheer recognition of realities. There is no other viable or acceptable language; not even another "library language", whatever that coinage means.

It seems by and large agreed that, in spite of the maladroit efforts of the Union Education Ministry, abetted by offers of largesse from the impecunious Union Finance Ministry, the jettisoning of English in haste may be a more gradual process than Mr Morarji Desai may appreciate. "Gradualness is all" is not a very good slogan in every matter. But considering the impatient militancy of some, it seems the most sensible way of preventing an immediate collapse of the system of education in India and not the system of education alone. Some of the arguments advanced for indefinite continuation of English are perhaps specious and in some cases motivated by class and other interests. The inadequacies of Hindi are sometimes exaggerated for similar reasons. The fact yet remains that the chancellors of the universities of Allahabad and Annamalai can today converse only in English; and nobody in his senses has suggested that the logues of this kind should cease forthwith. No country is an island entire unto itself. The immediate effect of forcibly moving English can only be the conversion of every State into an island of ignorance and unknowing; and the universities of the country should be the last agencies to support such disastrous scheme. Even educational institutions in Rajasthan may be wiser to consider whether English teaching should not begin earlier than the first year of the three-year degree course. Young folk pick up languages much quicker than the elders think.

The Statesman 75 YEARS AGO

Organized as the American Emergency Committee on the Panama Canal, they hope to overthrow three proposed new treaties governing operations and control of the Atlantic-Pacific link.

"In accordance with the law on military service, soldiers and seamen who have completed their term of military service are being demoilized into the reserve".

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No. CXXVI 2287

SEPTEMBER 4, 1967

...MA IN VIETNAM

...in the USA, not many have been inclined to ...e South Vietnamese ...ntial elections as seri... ...s the Johnson Admin... ...n would have liked them ...reated; in much of the ... outside the elections ...een regarded as an irre..., if not a farce, the ...phrase having been used ...ne eminent Americans ... The electoral outcome therefore cause little ...nent, let alone influenc... ...iews on the rights and ...s of the Vietnam war. ...ason is not that the elec... ...rocesses have not been ...lously fair; even Mr ...n and other official ...man said that people ... not expect too much ...elections held in South ...m's present conditions, ... standards of Western ...racy should not be ... to a politically back... Asian country. What ...ailed to recognize, or at ...o point out, is that in ...g circumstances the ...ns, even if conducted ...ut undue interference by ...f the contestants, could ...y reflect South Viet... ...se opinion on the issues ...ved in the war. Doubts about the representative character of the Saigon Government would persist even it were formed after "fair" elections in which a large number of the people of South Vietnam did not or could not take part.

The USA, therefore, has no reason honestly to believe that endorsement of its war policy by whoever rules in Saigon after the elections will provide stronger moral sanction to its presence and performance in Vietnam. It will have to decide and act on the strength of its own logic and assessment, neither of which seems to have impressed upon it the need for a fundamentally new approach to the Vietnam problem. It has steadily stepped up the war against the North; during the past few weeks, in particular, the air offensive has been extended to cover major new targets, including Hanoi itself. Yet the outcome seems increasingly uncertain and potentially more and more dangerous. "The major part of the U.S. military task", said Mr McNamara in October, 1963, "can be completed by the end of 1965". Four months later, he again said that the USA still hoped to withdraw most of its troops from South Vietnam before the end of ... that the Sheikh is expected to have learnt the lessons of September 1965 as well as anybody else, forms the basis of the belief that in any dialogue with the Kashmir leader in ... future there is likely to be

could convince the part... cerned that it really d... want to interfere in ano... country's affairs against t... wishes of its people. The task is not easy, nor the outcome certain; but there seems no other course which would be both feasible and just.

MINISTER OF ARTS

MOTIVES for seeking a university degree are varied. To a young man a good one may mean a qualification for a career; to a young woman either a job, a husband or both. To some, irrespective of age, higher education is a determined response to a challenge, a will to make up for earlier lost opportunities. Even grandmothers have been known to take university examinations a long after sons and grandsons are settled in life and usually have little to do with books any more. There have been instances of mother and son taking the same examination in the same year. But a Patna daily reports the still more curious case of a State Cabinet Minister going in for the B.A. examination. What impelled him to do so would be very much worth knowing. It cannot possibly have anything to do with his career as a Minister. It is not as yet a constitutional requirement that a Minister must hold a university degree, or indeed be an able person by any objective standard. Such demands are made only on lesser persons, such as civil servants.

Resolutions alone, however, may by themselves achieve little. The Patna report goes on to allege that the Bihar Minister was detected using unfair means at the examination. His disclosure that he was a Minister allegedly brought the retort from the invigilator that he should have carried a suitable label if he wanted to be treated differently to others. The invigilator was also allegedly unimpressed by the Minister's plea for mercy, on the ground that a political career would otherwise be ruined. Moreover the Patna report, published on August 25, does not seem to have been contradicted as yet. If it is correct, the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal Government, which only recently announced its decision to use its powers under the DIR against indisciplined students, might have to decide what to do with a colleague no less allegedly lacking in discipline.

The Statesman 75 YEARS AGO

SEPTEMBER 4, 1892

(Editorial)

The *Pioneer* of yesterday contains a further statement, or rather series of statements, regarding the proportion of the despatch of a force to the Gomul Pass, which, if they correctly represent the intention of the Government of India, leave no room for doubt that it has been determined to have recourse to force... the very ... of ... imposed. As the report shows, the Indian Football Association does not conduct its affairs in the perfunctory manner in which the C.A.B. does. That it has been allowed to do so for ... disgraceful

Fundi... Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

...The first victims of ... and worse were ... That the ... react was ... expected. There ... protests from ... Tamilnad Mr ... leader of the small ... Kazhagham, has ... formation of a ... to counteract the ... In Assam there ... similar attempts ... turn as much ... Bengalis as against the ... Only too easily ... dangerous efforts ... and unless these ... semi-armies are ... firmly and early ... consequences on the ... the nation will be ... the future of the ... why the results may ... short of disastrous.

...nomenon has differ... in different lands. ...hey are called Red ... is unknown what ...garding. In Ghana ... to be called the ...Brigade; It was diffi... over just what they ...building. In Hitler's ... there were the ...rts; it is now only ...own what they were ...esence all these or... are the same and ...s carry in them the ...scism. There is no ...m of coercion; and ...of political or ideo...ration will conceal ...truth. What makes ...for Indian unity ...n it need be is the ... that some of these ...oodlums obviously ...emance from high ...eir supporters may ...now what they are ...th. Proliferation of ...pons in the world ...y not threaten this ...liferation of senas, ...r name they may ...suredly does.

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OCTOBER 9, 1899

(Editorial)

The Bill for the establishment of unpaid village tribunals in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, which lately obtained the approval of the Supreme and Local Governments, and has now been referred to a select committee, aims at the provision of an inexpensive machinery for the disposal of petty litigation. The importance of this scheme to the millions of the rural population who will be affected by it, can hardly be over-estimated.

(News Items)

The word "kiss" is Anglo-Saxon, and may indeed be taken as an instance of how pleasant Anglo-Saxon can be. The philologist assures us that it is allied to the Gothic "kustus," a proof or test, and to the Latin "gustus" a taste, which suggests the old saying that 'the proof of the pudding lies in eating." That same Gothic "kustus" comes from the verb "kiusau," to choose, from which one would imagine that among the Goths kissing went by favour.

GENERAL LOCKHART AND THE BLACK MOUNTAIN EXPEDITION

(From Our Correspondent)

Allahabad, Oct. 8.

General Sir William Lockhart, accompanied by Lieutenant Roberts, King's Royal Rifles, leaves the Black Mountain shortly for Simla, presumably to give the Government of India the benefit of his advice in determining the course now to be adopted in that region.

LORD TENNYSON'S LAST RESTING PLACE

London, Oct. 8.

Lord Tennyson's remains will be interred at Poets' Corner, Westminster Abbey, on Wednesday, next to the grave of the poet Browning.

CHEWING-GUM COMES TO RUSSIA

From Our London Office

OCT 7.—Advertising space in the Soviet Press has always been reserved for practical items, such as machines or locomotives or to exhort the people to remember to ring for the fire brigade when a neighbour's house is on fire. But this week a whole page of advertisement in the Ministry of Trade journal makes a new departure, writes The Times' Moscow correspondent.

The product being marketed is neither practical, nor spiritually uplifting. It is none other than chewing-gum—that symbol of transatlantic decadence, for many years held to be a method of criminally wasting the proletariat's muscular energy.

The journal prints a picture of a happy youth on a scooter proudly stretching that familiar elastic from his smiling mouth. The product is being exported to Russia by the German Democratic Republic.

SOVEREIGNTY OVER PANAMA CANAL

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1.—Congressmen and prominent Americans have launched a national campaign "to protect the sovereignty of the Panama Canal" claiming that surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the strategic waterway could lead to world war, reports Reuter.

Organized as the American Emergency Committee on the Panama Canal, they hope to overthrow three proposed new treaties governing operations and control of the Atlantic-Pacific link.

military service ... men who have ... term of military service ... ing demoilized into the reserve".

The announcement did not el...

here are now 30 times ... y American troops in ... n as there were when ... reezy forecasts were ... nd yet nobody now ... when the Americans ... able to complete their ... task. In fact, Mr ... ara himself has at last ... zed that nothing "short ... ained and systematic ... g of the population ... will deprive the ... Vietnamese of their will ... nue the war and, more ... nt, that the leaders in ... cannot be "bombed to ... otiating table". Not un... ly, a Senator comment... if Mr McNamara was ... the only course for the ... as to withdraw immediately from Vietnam.

ght be reckoned a small ... that Mr McNamara did ... e with those who would ... see an end to whatever ... t is still being observ... the bombing strategy; ... y at least, the USA is ... ommitted to selective ... g. Yet, on the Defence ... ary's own admission, ... ve attacks will not end ... r. Even some less select... kes are unlikely to have ... effect on North Viet... e morale; an Associated ... report from Hanoi says ... e bombing of the capi... s further strengthened ... ople's will to fight, and ... cNamara himself said ... bombing the ports and ... the harbours would not ... effective means of stop... e infiltration of supplies ... South Vietnam". The ... of course, has the military ... s of causing such destruc... s might totally incapacit... orth Vietnam, but—quite ... from the unthinkable in... nity of it all—such a ... e, as the Defence Secre... oted, would involve risks ... at present are "too high ... the dubious prospect of ... ssful results".

... ce negotiations would not ... ssarily follow; what might ... w is a direct confrontation ... China with incalculable ... lications and consequen... China's internal troubles ... not a sufficient guarantee ... st such a development. ... then can the USA do in ... dilemma? It could con... the military campaign ... resent lines; but with little ... how for it in North Viet... and very much less in the ... th where the Vietcong ... again been successfully ... ve. A saner, possibly also ... re profitable, course would ... to stop the bombing of the ... rth; this would not necessari... bring Hanoi to the confer... e table, but at least it might ... the long run if Washington, ... h much greater patience ... d tact than shown hitherto,

to compel the ... Mahomed from Wana, unless he should withdraw within such time as it may have fixed, or may hereafter fix, for the purpose.

(News Items)

DWARKANATH MITTER

We have read the life of the late Justice Dwarkanath Mitter, in Bengali, with intense interest. From beginning to end, the book does not contain a single dull page. Dwarkanath Mitter, who rose to the highest eminence possible for a native of this country to attain, was born to humble parentage.

LADY DUELLISTS

In times gone by, French ladies as well as gentlemen went out *sur le terrain* to defend their honour or their love. Probably the most celebrated of these female encounters was that which took place between the Marquise de Nesle and the Comtesse de Polignac. Both fell in love with the Marachal de Richelieu, and disputed his favours—at least, so the old chroniclers tell us.

"NON-SMOKERS LIVE LONGER"

NEW YORK, Sept 2.—After a great display of will power, a man finally quits cigarettes. Theoretically, according to the U.S. Government research, he will be healthier and will live longer, reports AP.

Should he get a reduction in his life insurance premium rate? Insurance companies are considering the possibility.

However, since the Government made its disclosures on the relationship between smoking and certain diseases, there appears to be no great rush in the insurance industry to reward the non-smoker with cheaper premiums.

One medium-size company has been offering an unrestricted allowance to non-smokers on life insurance policies since 1963. At least two giant insurance firms offer discounts to non-smokers, but with limitations.

An industry spokesman said they were growing more concerned about the cigarette-smoking applicant for life insurance.

WORLD RICE PRICE UNLIKELY TO FALL

LONDON, Sept 1.—The Commonwealth Secretariat warned yesterday that no downward trend can be expected in the near future in the international price of rice, reports UPI.

It said there should be some easing when supplies of crops in Thailand and the USA become available but that "no major change in the relationship between world exportable supplies and world demand, which reflects the growing world population is foreseen for the coming season".

The prospects for the 1967-68 crops so far were very much brighter than they were a year earlier, it said, though much still depended largely on the weather over the next few months.

Conditions in Asia, where nine-tenths of the world's rice is grown, have been much more favourable this year than last with a good monsoon reported in progress over most areas of India and good reports from other areas.

This, coupled with the fact that the Sheikh is expected to have learnt the lessons of September 1965 as well as anybody else, forms the basis of the belief that in any dialogue with the Kashmir leader in future there is likely to be

veteran cricketers. This seems the very least that should be imposed. As the report shows, the Indian Football Association does not conduct its affairs in the perfunctory manner in which the C.A.B. does. That it has been allowed to do so for

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PTEMBER 6, 1967

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By A Staff Reporter

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is now on the point of a total breakdown in respect of rice. What is remarkable is that a State Minister has to rush to Delhi even to explain that promises are meaningless unless they are honoured in time—after several other Ministers have already been to Delhi to explain the State's food position in detail. The Centre claims that it has already despatched West Bengal's quota for August, but the fact remains that by August 31 the State had received only about 60% of the monthly allocation of rice. This does little credit to the Central supply machinery. The West Bengal Government should also ponder over the contribution which the 24-hour bandh towards the end of the month made to the disastrous delay in the movement of foodgrains to the State.

The State Government's attitude towards its own procurement tasks has been hardly more helpful. At a recent conference in Calcutta one district magistrate reported that farmers were holding back stocks; in another district the authorities, on their own admission, know the particular houses in which paddy has been hoarded but are desisting from forcible seizure of the stocks for fear of local resistance. The police failed even to carry out a search, for no other reason than opposition by a group of village women. On the one hand, the Government swears by the name of popular movements against hoarding and blackmarketing; on the other, it acquiesces in sectional resistance to dehoarding and procurement. Perhaps it wishes to be popular no less with jotedars, smugglers and dishonest traders than with those who shout against these people. But such popularity cannot but be short-lived; those who are suffering most from scarcity and crippling prices have already begun to wonder what good the new Government has really been able to do so far. The United Front, at its current session in Calcutta, must devise a fool-proof policy for internal procurement and the Government must carry out that policy even if it hurts certain sections whom it now seems unwilling to annoy; without strict controls at the levels of growers, rice millers and traders procurement will fall far short of demand even after a good aman crop.

USSR ORDERS TROOPS' DEMOBILIZATION

MOSCOW, Sept 4.—In an apparent routine move, the Soviet Union ordered today demobilization of troops completing military service and a new call-up of 1948-born citizens for military duty, says AP.

An official announcement said: "The Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, today ordered a regular demobilization of servicemen from the USSR armed forces and new call-up for military service.

"In accordance with the law on military service, soldiers and seamen who have completed their term of military service are being demobilized into the reserve".

The announcement did not el-

DELHI, SEPTEMBER 16, 1967

IN SLOW MOTION

ACCORDING to apparently authoritative reports, restrictions on the freedom of Sheikh Abdullah are to be relaxed gradually, with a view to releasing him eventually in the middle of winter when the Kashmir Valley will be safely snow-bound. In view of past experience—the tourist season in 1964 was disrupted by the unsettling effect of the Sheikh's previous release and this is International Tourist Year—no serious objection can be taken to the proposed procedure and timing. What matters is that the Government seems to have realized, albeit belatedly, that indefinite imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah is neither desirable nor practicable. More than 250 MPs have already demanded the Sheikh's immediate release, and only the politically deaf can fail to hear the rumblings of a major storm in Jammu and Kashmir, should the question of the Sheikh's release be brushed aside once again. It follows, therefore, that the Sheikh must either be conciliated or contained; before either course can be adopted, however, the Sheikh must be set free. To do so unconditionally, and in one go, would be more gracious, but it might be prudent to complete the process in slow, but not too slow, stages.

Sheikh Abdullah's first release in 1958 was perhaps as much a farce as his subsequent trial in the Kashmir conspiracy case. But his second release in 1964 was intended to be different. If, however, the results that flowed from it were both unexpected and unhappy, the manner of the release was at least partly responsible. Of course, Mr Nehru's death was a big blow. But there can be no gainsaying the fact that Sheikh Abdullah's own temperament and erratic behaviour contributed a great deal to the sorry mess: after his dramatic meeting with Mr Chou En-lai in Algiers, the drama of the Sheikh's early morning arrest at Palam on May 8, 1965, became unavoidable. A case can be made out that the Sheikh's waywardness was partly the result of the interaction of his abrupt and precipitate release on the one hand and the tumultuous impact it had on the masses of Jammu and Kashmir on the other. Gradualness is expected to lead to less tumult and more sober thinking.

This, coupled with the fact that the Sheikh is expected to have learnt the lessons of September 1965 as well as anybody else, forms the basis of the belief that in any dialogue with the Kashmir leader in future there is likely to be

some of the details. That it was the Home Guards rather than the police who beat up Mr Sitesh Roy, and that senior police officers merely showed lack of alertness in this matter, will doubtless be a great comfort to Mr Roy. Equally comforting to those who were lathi-charged will be that "it was an act of indiscretion"; that the weight of evidence shows that hurling of missiles occurred after the lathi-charge and not before it; and that in England and Australia it is common practice to allow spectators to sit on the grass right up to the boundary lines. About the teargassing Mr Justice K. C. Sen is equally painstaking and accurate: it was due to "the grace of God that stampede and deaths" did not follow, particularly among the women and children. But did the police really "make a choice of evils"? To fire teargas shells in any circumstances on a crowd that has no means of escape seems the action of a dangerous lunatic.

But in one respect the details were and are essential. Though every informed person has known for years that the arrangements for ticket at important Test matches have been flagrantly manipulated, it was risky to say so because of the perils of the law of defamation. Now Mr Justice Sen has said it for us. "The overcrowding, the seed of the trouble, was occasioned by the issue and printing of tickets without due regard to the actual accommodation; the reckless issue of 'volunteers' badges, which on January 1 were not totally withdrawn in accordance with an earlier decision; and the issue of an inordinately large number of passes and authority slips to various organizations". Even had the number of tickets been suited to the space available, the space allotted per person was quite insufficient; as things were, it was insufferable. The arrangements for printing the tickets were hurried, unsatisfactory and not in accordance with the rules. Those for distributing them were equally deplorable, with favouritism and "pull" exercised in all directions, some of it probably political, and a roaring black market.

Having seen the jockeying which goes on, both for complimentary and for ordinary tickets, we are not in the least surprised. But it needed the tragedy last January to bring the matter publicly to light. What should happen now is for the State Government to decide. The commission has made recommendations for the management both of the Ranji Stadium, which it thinks should be reconstructed or extended, and of future Test matches. The latter, Mr Justice Sen thinks, might be left to the C.A.B. under stringent conditions: that all matters should be handled by a four sub-committee containing, apart from C.A.B. officials, at least six representatives of the State Government, including veteran cricketers. This seems the very least that should be imposed. As the report shows, the Indian Football Association does not conduct its affairs in the perfunctory manner in which the C.A.B. does. That it has been allowed to do so for [illegible] disgraceful

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DELHI, OCTOBER 7, 1967

IN NAME ONLY

To nobody's surprise except perhaps their own, the numerous, all-embracing non-Congress coalitions are showing signs of cracking up, even if none of them has yet collapsed. Apart from the somewhat special affairs of West Bengal and Kerala which are in a class by themselves, the experience of U.P., Bihar and Haryana is enough to confirm that in spite of the shared desire of their constituents to keep the Congress out of power, most United Front Governments are united only in name. They have shown themselves incapable of learning even the elementary lesson that combinations of admittedly heterogeneous parties can hope to survive only if no constituent tries to impose its will upon the rest, as the SSP is trying to do in U.P. and other constituents of other Fronts elsewhere; the Akali-Jana Sangh partnership in Punjab is a rare exception.

In particularly bad shape is the State of Haryana; unlike the intra-United Front dissensions in other States, those in Haryana do not have even the thinnest veneer of principle, ideology or policy. Rao Birendra Singh, the ebullient Chief Minister, flatters the Congress—which he deserted in order to head the UF Ministry—by imitating its lust for power; to remain in office, by hook or by crook, is his sole concern, and since his opponents, both within the UF and without are equally obsessed with the sole idea of throwing him out, the unsavouriness acquired by Haryana's politics is more than considerable. In the circumstances, the Chief Minister's regard for the responsibilities of his office is declining very steeply. He has backed up his earlier suggestion for the dismemberment of Himachal Pradesh by making a whopping territorial claim on Punjab, refusing at the same time to countenance any idea of arbitration over his disputes with neighbouring States. The logic behind this behaviour may be obscure, but there is nothing mysterious about the Rao's resolute refusal to convene an early session of the State legislature.

In U.P., the Swatantra Party, whose nominee in the UF Government resigned some weeks ago but has not yet been replaced, has decided to withdraw from the Front. But the major source of Mr Charan Singh's worry is the SSP threat to quit the Government unless the Chief Minister unconditionally and immediately ary politics, it will only succeed in digging its own grave apart from democracy's.

ANY OLD IRON

FREE fish served with free champagne, to woo cautious Parisians back to sea food after the oil contamination caused by the wrecked tanker Torrey Canyon, lately had 40,000 of them rioting to get it at Les Halles. The tables were laden with salmon, trout and oysters, but no lobsters joined the dance because they are in short supply. The lobster figure for 1965 was 16,000 tons as opposed to ten times that weight of oysters and mussels. Now the Professor of Geography at Montpellier University, together with Merchant Navy authorities responsible for French fisheries, has launched an experiment to acclimatize an exotic species of the lobster. Ancient automobiles are being sunk to an approximate depth of nine fathoms in a stretch of the Mediterranean off Palavas-les-Flots, where it is hoped that the lobsters will nest and breed in the back-axles of Peugeots, writhe among the gears of Renaults and perform quadrilles in the chassis of Simcas, with as much enthusiasm as they undoubtedly would among a wrecked flotilla.

An anticipated bonus is that this lively marine cemetery will attract skin-divers and help to popularize seaside resorts. In England, however, Cornish fishermen have just scuppered a team of skin-divers who were trying to tag crayfish in a research project authorized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fish and Food. They accused the divers of raiding their pots, and declared total war, "buzzing" them from fishing vessels and threatening them with shotguns. If phlegmatic Englishmen carry on in this fashion the excitable French are likely to march to the barnacled barricades of the breakwaters and guillotine their divers before they even get their flappers on.

One real side-benefit, if the lobsters catch on in a big way, will be some small lightening of the car scrapyards' load. In Australia Leon Samson, a professional strong man, is demonstrating yet another method by eating a whole car in four years to win Rs 1 lakh. He uses oxyacetylene equipment and consumes two pounds of car per day. American dental research promises to make everyone into a self-contained strong man, able to crunch up razor blades and old bedsteads without outside assistance, by establishing that metal can be welded firmly to dental enamel by ultrasonic vibration; the method has planted plastic teeth of such amazing durability in the jaw bones of baboons that they are as good as new after two years of constant gnawing at cage bars. Metal-tipped unbreakable teeth would provide humans with a mouthful of machine tools so versatile that everyone could gobble up his defunct car, provided only that further medical research fitted him with an internal combustion engine capable of digesting scrap metal.

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U.S.A. NAMES FIVE TO CHOOSE SITE OF NEW PANAMA CANAL

PRESIDENT Johnson has announced the selection of five men to study the feasibility of building a new canal across the Central American isthmus and to choose a suitable site. From his Texas ranch the President announced that Mr Robert Anderson, a former Secretary of the Treasury, and a man for whom Mr Johnson is known to have a great admiration, would be chairman of the group, writes The Times Washington correspondent.

Dr Milton Eisenhower, the former President's brother, who is president of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Mr Kenneth E. Fields an industrial consultant, Mr Raymond A. Hill, chairman of the consulting engineers, Leeds Hill and Jewett, Inc., and Mr Robert G Storey, president of the South-Western Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas, are the other members.

Their task will be to choose between sites in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia which have been identified as suitable for the construction of a sea-level canal to replace the present Panama Canal.

Considerable study has already been given to the project, which was announced by the President when he offered to renegotiate with Panama the terms of the treaty governing the present canal. It has been suggested that nuclear explosives might be used to excavate the new one.


The United States has proposed four possible routes, as shown on the map, for a sea-level canal linking the Atlantic and the Pacific to replace the existing Panama Canal. The canal was built 50 years ago and is fast becoming inadequate. The possibilities are

(1) Panama: Sasardi-Morti route; about 60 miles long, passing through the Darien jungle across land rising at points to 1,000 ft above sea level.

(2) Panama San Blas route; 40 miles long near the present canal, running through well-populated territory.

(3) Colombia: Atrato-Truando route; 100 miles long, running through jungle, crossing a 932-ft ridge of the Andes.

(4) Nicaragua-Costa Rica: Salinas Bay route; 150 miles, passing through parts of both countries over land rising to 750 ft.



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PRELUDE TO ALGIERS

TIME and place have imparted meaning to certain happenings in Accra over the week-end. On the face of it, these were minor battles, won and lost in campaigns of little consequence. But they should help to break the spell that China casts on many minds. Some people in India, many more elsewhere in the Afro-Asian countries, ascribe to China a diplomatic invincibility which she does not possess. The result is defeatism: they allow China to get away with tension-making postures which in their hearts they know they do not like though they prefer not to say so. The victim of the silence is quite often India but sometimes also a major country like Russia.

With the Algiers conference only a few weeks hence, a related gathering at Accra has given proof in preview that no one needs to cower down, and many do not, when China launches her familiar tirades. The influence of Peking's way of thinking is often believed to be even stronger at solidarity meetings, which are mainly gatherings of Leftist organizations, than at a full-fledged conference of the Afro-Asian countries, such as is to be held at Algiers in June, where meet accredited representatives of Governments of which many are bitterly anti-Communist at home. Yet even at the solidarity conference in Accra last week-end Peking was given some resounding smacks. Its defeat was heavy in some voting bouts in which its respective opponents were the Soviet Union, Ceylon and India. This could be a precedent for events at Algiers if only some kind of a Chinese magic is not thought up where none exists. As a Power of growing size and influence, China's importance is undeniable. But, as many countries in Africa are beginning to see, this does not give Peking unlimited rights beyond the frontiers of China.

UNREST IN BURMA

NEWS from Burma in the last few days has been distressing. The hope of "all nationalities resolving to live in unity through weal and woe" to which General Ne Win gave expression on Union Day in February last year seems nowhere near fulfilment. There is recrudescence of rebel activity. Although the troubled scene does not lend itself readily to analysis, the raids on towns and villages in the Irrawaddy Delta and the Kachin State suggest the strength of centrifugal forces. Most of this militarism has very little to do with politics, although Burma has been for many years a mosaic of elements out of harmony with one another. It is at times a case of wreaking vengeance on some helpless village headman for co-operating with the Government.

The Burma Revolutionary Council's talks with the rebels early last year was across a gulf not merely of ideas about the future but about the hard facts of national life. The rift is now as wide as it has ever been; and peace "from Tavoy to Myitkyina" is inconceivable without (and problematic even with) rebel support. Yet, evidently encouraged by the surrender of over 2,400 rebels in the last five months, General Ne Win has come to feel that bringing a country to order by lobbing shells into the unheeding jungle is wasteful and that elimination of insurrections will require long-term steps, political and psychological; there have been seminars for peasants and workers. So far the rebels, silenced for a time, are now active again.

There has been trouble, too, from a section of monks who resent the Government's efforts "to purify the Sangha". Many phongyis have been arrested in Mandalay and Pakokku; some of these are said to have strong political (anti-Government) affiliations. The Burmese Revolutionary Council's forward march is, as Mr Kadar of Hungary said of his party, "accompanied by horseflies stinging from both the right and the left". There is no pre-packaged answer to a good many of Burma's predicaments. It is not only a question of preventing bloody skirmishes but laying the foundations for trustful co-operation.

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...e of course ...irdles still to ...operation be... ...ficiary coun... ...heckmated by unresolved border disputes. There is also the graver danger that U.S. aid may seem suspect to other major Powers with rather different aims in this region. Mr Johnson has been wise therefore to invite participation from others, with the Soviet Union and North Vietnam specifically mentioned in this context. The French and the West Germans are already involved, the former in a project in Cambodia and the latter in Thailand. There is some basis thus for the hope of mounting a really large co-operative endeavour with even less affluent countries like India joining in to provide technical manpower, not equipment. China remains the odd man out; it may have to be brought in later, but now, because its stakes ...

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MR Bloodworth, been Far Easte pondent of the Ob more than 10 years, his book not for th pert, who "will find it that he does n know or reject", bu dinary reader, "who have been east of the purpose is not ready and neatly a formation, but rath plain what makes tick". The explanat from clear. Part of is inherent in the the character of the their vast and com of over 3,000 yea Bloodworth has m more difficult by th his presentation, w nalistic without th coherence of good writing. He would much better to rough portrait of th stead of blurring a pretentious jum history, philosoph and various other tradition. Not that useful in expla makes the Chines even that Mr knowledge appea but he has not h standing by rando to ancient and obs explaining the m the Chinese chara

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WHAT MAKES CHINA TICK?

Chinese Looking Glass. By Dennis Bloodworth. (Secker & Warburg, 36s.)

China : Emerging World Power. By Victor P. Petrov. (Van Nostrand, $1.75.)

China : Ageless Land and Countless People. By Chiao-min Hsieh. (Van Nostrand, $1.75.)

MR Bloodworth, who has been Far Eastern Correspondent of the Observer for more than 10 years, has written his book not for the China expert, who "will find nothing in it that he does not already know or reject", but for the ordinary reader, "who may never have been east of Suez". Yet the purpose is not to provide ready and neatly arranged information, but rather "to explain what makes the Chinese tick". The explanation is far from clear. Part of the difficulty is inherent in the subject, in the character of the Chinese and their vast and complex history of over 3,000 years. But Mr Bloodworth has made his task more difficult by the manner of his presentation, which is journalistic without the clarity and coherence of good journalistic writing. He would have done much better to attempt a rough portrait of the Chinese instead of blurring its outline by a pretentious jumble of their history, philosophy, literature and various other aspects of tradition. Not that these are not useful in explaining "what makes the Chinese tick"; not even that Mr Bloodworth's knowledge appears deficient; but he has not helped understanding by random references to ancient and obscure detail in explaining the major traits of the Chinese character.

This is a pity, for Mr Bloodworth has obviously taken special pains over his home work. On the one hand, he is anxious to tell the reader how much there is to be learnt before coming to conclusions about the Chinese; on the other, he can never resist the temptation of offering the neatest and cleverest of conclusions. Troubled by the load of his learning, he finds it difficult to keep such conclusions always consistent. He notes, for example, that the Chinese "are instinctively drawn to counsels of moderation and the Golden Mean", but in another context he does not hesitate to mention overconfidence as "the besetting sin of the Chinese". He is not quite unaware of such contradictions and tries to resolve them with such puzzles as the following: "The Chinese are...born extremists whose extremes simply interact. And when Confucius, recognizing this so sharply 2,500 years ago, preached the Golden Mean, he inadvertently accentuated the whole process by creating a new form of extremism: moderation".

Yet Mr Bloodworth is not an unperceptive student of China and its people; if his book had followed a less confusing plan, it could have made a useful contribution to an understanding of the Chinese psychology and hence of China's policies. He does not fail to point out [illegible] isms between [illegible] were the Formosa Nationalists. There is also an excellent analysis of the contemporary Chinese attitudes to the Russians and the Americans, showing in particular that China's present animosity towards Russia has reasons in past history which have nothing to do with the so-called ideological dispute.

Mr Bloodworth also shows why the theory of peaceful co-existence is irreconcilable not only with Maoist doctrine but also with the traditional Chinese view of China's place in the world; nor do the Chinese have a tradition of alliances, "for none could be the equal ally of the Middle Kingdom". As for the future, he has no doubt that the bourgeois instinct, like thrombosis, cannot but remain a threat to the middle-aged. "China found her own road to Communism; she will doubtless find her own road to revisionism too". In the meantime, there are two hazards; first the Cultural Revolution may be manipulated by leaders who lack Mr Mao Tse-tung's "characteristic understanding", and, secondly, "arthritic age may also have impaired Mao's own mental flexibility".

The two other books on China are of the kind Mr Bloodworth did not wish to write: brief, straightforward, and usefully informative. Professor Petrov concentrates mostly on agricultural and natural resources and industrial development; Professor Hsieh deals mainly with geographical features, population and certain cultural issues. Politics is not altogether excluded

OCCIDENTAL STAR

Queen Elizabeth I. By J. E. Neale. (Cape. 16s.)

It is significant that Professor Neale's work, though first published in 1934, has to this day remained a best seller. The reissue of a work of balanced scholarship and of ready wit by an acknowledged authority on the Tudor period who has followed in the footsteps of A.F. Pollard is to be welcomed.

Professor Neale avoided the twin pitfalls which usually confront the writers of historical biographies: unconvincing psychoanalysis on the one hand, and dry lifeless research on the other. Elizabeth is seen as a person and, above all, as a woman in a man's century. The vicissitudes of her early life, the escapade with Seymour, her relationship with her sister Mary, are presented sympathetically and with great vigour. The enigmatic quality of the Queen is vividly conveyed. If the legend is revised in the light of considered judgment, one can only say that the facts are eminently more fascinating than the myth.

The Elizabethan age did not go out in a blaze of glory. The already gathered

ON STRIKE

Strikes in India. By V. B. Karnik. (Manaktalas, Rs 42.)

Indian Labour Problems. By S. C. Pant. (Chaitanya, Rs 12.)

WITH unmistakable sympathy for the working class Mr Karnik, an ex-trade unionist himself, writes lucidly on the phenomenon of strikes the motivation of the workers the attitude of the employers and the Government, and on the results of strikes. As in western Europe, so in India, strikes became a feature along with the development of large-scale industries which inevitably led to the concentration of workers in industrial areas. Mr Karnik throws a good deal of light on the early strike struggles and their forgotten leaders: John Miller, K. N. Mitra, Miss Probhavati Das Gupta who led the first jute workers' general strike. Evidently trade-unionism came from outside, and the workers, mostly illiterate, did not throw up an army of cadres and could be swayed by politicians.

During the hundred years from 1850 to 1950 strikes swept the country. The workers had genuine economic grievances; the resistance of employers, both Indian and European, was stubborn, and the laissez-faire spirit of factory legislation was to their advantage. But strikes in India developed also as part of the national movement of the Gandhi era. It is, however, revealing that the Congress did not undertake any pro-working class legislation when it assumed power. In fact industrial disputes tended to increase in this period.

The book is not exactly a balance sheet of strikes, but Mr Karnik makes some illuminating formulations that are relevant to an understanding of industrial relations. Indian workers came to learn almost spontaneously to use the weapon of strikes, and there developed remarkable solidarity among workers who were divided into different castes and communities and sometimes spoke different languages. Depression hit the workers, who "succeeded in days of economic prosperity and failed in days of economic depression". Although workers lost heavily in the matter of wages during protracted strikes, some substantial gains were made; there was radicalization, and the workers learnt to develop their organization. In fact strikes after 1947 were "more peaceful and orderly". Legal prohibition of strikes "is never effective"; much more useful is informed public opinion.

Mr Pant's book is mainly a descriptive account of industrial relations in the post-independence period, but some of his conclusions seem to be vague and unreal. When he avers that western-oriented collective bargaining has no place in India he seems to be particularly afraid of a wage structure which the economy cannot bear. It is not clear how collective bargaining "is inconsistent with the method of planning". Mr

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MAO TSE-TUNG REALIZES HE DARED TOO MUCH

By RICHARD HARRIS

Though it is too early to attempt a balance-sheet of the Chinese cultural revolution—for the revolution continues—it is evident that the Wuhan incident made Mr Mao and his men realize that they had attempted too much. Immediately followed the restoration of some of the powers and prestige of the Army and the clear orders to it to put down the disorder of the Red Guards.

An open admission by Lin Piao on October 1 that the losses of the cultural revolution had been much less than the gains really means that the ratio is about fifty-fifty. Mao's latest appeals have the anguish of a man who has realized his error.

CHINA'S national day on October 1 confirmed that a turning-point had been reached in the cultural revolution. It had no victory trumpet, not even a prospect of the promised land; it was a turning-point precisely because its character was modest, unassertive and much less vituperative than usual. The emphasis was entirely on unity. Mr Lin Piao's speech even bravely claimed that the losses of the cultural revolution had been much less than the gains, a statement which could be amended to fifty-fifty in losses and gains by the normal statistical rectification one applies to such statements to China. Fifty-fifty, that is to say, in the unspoken personal conclusions of a leader like Mr Lin Piao who is Mr Mao Tse-tung's designated successor.

There has been much more in the spate of articles from *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* during the past two weeks to show that the Maoist camp is busily correcting its errors, making concessions and discouraging any rivalries that survive. "Various problems have presented themselves in the course of the cultural revolution"—put that admission alongside those that were being made about the great leap forward six years ago and one can deduce to what damage the Maoist side now privately admits. Indeed, last week Mr Chou En-lai confessed that the cultural revolution had "exacted a price in production", though "we took this into account in advance".

CRUCIAL MOMENT

Looking back over the past three months in China cause and effect might run thus. The Wuhan incident was crucial. Outside the rumours of coups against Mr Mao, such as those alleged against Mr Peng Chen and his supporters in the spring of 1966 or against Mr Ho Lung and others in the autumn, Wuhan was the first case of an army commander and a political leader actually detaining men from the headquarters group of the cultural revolution. Had Mr Chou En-lai fallen into the bag—as it seems was intended—a sudden swing might easily have turned the army's power against Mao himself. At least this was one of the fears, judging by the constant references to "state power" being at stake.

In any case, if Mr Wuhan's example had been followed, and other commanders of military regions who had been standing aside or were plainly neutral in the cultural revolution had openly turned against Mr Mao, his control in the country might very quickly have vanished. Canton was one centre where troubles rose to a peak after Wuhan and where the circumstances were very similar. The immediate response at that time to growing attacks on Red Guards and their like was to arm them—the old slogan "fight with words not weapons" was amended to "attack with words, defend with weapons".

Some time during August, one suspects, both Maoists and anti-Maoists saw with horror what could happen to China. The chaos was multiplying, minor violence was drawing in [illegible] corrected. But what, it [illegible] ister for his disloyalty in 1959. Every army commander could decide for himself whether his name was on the list of suspects.

At the same time, and more constructively, the status and authority of the army were restored. The foolish order, for which Mr Mao himself had been responsible last January, in which the army was called in to use force on the side of Maoist revolutionaries, was not rescinded in so many words. But that has been the effect of the changes made. There has been a renewed attempt to improve the army's image with the masses as a guardian of their interests. More significantly the army has been told to put down disorder with no fear that in suppressing Red Guards it will be in the wrong. Moreover a new order went out cancelling the issue of arms to Red Guards and giving the army authority to confiscate all weapons in the hands of any person outside its ranks. The status of the army as the arbiter of order was further established by some plain down-grading of Red Guards and Maoist rebel groups. Red Guards were to "take a correct attitude to themselves", they must learn from workers, peasants, and soldiers. The official encouragement that launched the young into a rampage of "smashing the old" a year ago has now stopped; the ascendancy of the young may be ending.

September also saw Mr Mao Tse-tung's tour of provinces in central and east China, the first such tour reported since the cultural revolution began. No doubt he thought concessions could patch up new revolutionary alliances that would save his face while winning the support of senior party officials and army commanders who were unconvinced by the arguments of the cultural revolution. There have been signs elsewhere that in building up new provincial authorities there is to be no sweeping discharge of the old staff; the handful of those charged with revisionism gets smaller and smaller.

CORRUPTIVE POWER

Anyone reading Mr Lin Piao's remark about the losses and the gains of the cultural revolution might think it a step forward that the losses are now being acknowledged and the

and to the collective that it is beyond the capacity of normal man to give, save in exceptional circumstances.

It is too much to expect a man like Mr Mao to conclude therefore that the goals of the cultural revolution are no more attainable than were the goals of total collectivity that pushed China into the great leap forward. Needless to say the cultural revolution goes on; the revisionists are still to be repudiated; "China's Khrushchev"—the alias for Mr Liu Shao-chi—is still the man who has worked alongside Mr Mao supposedly sabotaging his efforts ever since about 1926.

If one combs the national day speeches to see what stands to the credit of the cultural revolution what then is there? *People's Daily* offers this answer: "the immense spiritual force, generated by the great proletarian cultural revolution has been transformed into a gigantic material force that is propelling forward the development of socialist construction"—a repetition of Mr Mao's belief in spirit conquering matter. But it is the example of this phenomenon that makes one gasp: China's nuclear progress, claims *People's Daily*, has made its leap forward thanks to the great spiritual force generated by the cultural revolution. No evidence is offered in support of this statement. Most students of Chinese affairs have assumed that the speed of China's progress in this field has been partly because the scientists working have not had their time wasted by demonstrations, or their work interfered with by Red Guards, or their techniques revised in the light of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts, but have been left alone to get on with the job.

LITTLE CHANGE

In any case it is too early to attempt a balance-sheet of the cultural revolution. That it has changed a lot of faces at the top is certainly true, though one wonders with what degree of permanence. That it has changed many internal policies there is so far little evidence. The commune system as revised after the errors of the great leap forward remains as it was in the days when "China's Khrushchev" was in control. Nor is there any other part of China's daily working life that has yet been changed by the decrees of the new men in power. One suspects that even when the new revolutionary alliances are stable they will not behave very differently from their predecessors.

With a man like Mr Chou En-lai obviously back into prominence we may take this new turn in events in China as not merely temporary. As Mr Chou defined it this week the phases of the cultural revolution are struggle-criticism-transformation and the last phase has yet to begin. Alternatively Mr Mao's dialectic of unity-criticism-unity might still apply so that the present phase of unity would be followed by more criticism. Maybe. When one looks back over the course of the cultural revolution and guesses at what real awareness of failure and error can be read behind the partial admissions it seems unlikely that the tensions of the past six months will

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Funding: Tattva Foundation

Tragedy of a social reformer

A MAN of many parts, Behramji Merwanji Malabari (1853-1912) is today remembered mainly as a radical social reformer.

Yet his life presents a micrograph of India in the second half of the 19th century, a period of all-round ferment when Indian society was struggling to discover and shape a new image.

Malabari appears as a tragic figure carrying about him haunting recollections of his childhood and, in a bid to get rid of the resultant melancholy and tribulations, dedicating himself to the creation of a better reformed society.

After years of earnest labour in journalism, politics and social reform he all but completely failed: and what added poignancy to his tragedy was the realisation that he had failed. Misunderstood and maligned he finally withdrew from public life and sought peace in intellectual and spiritual pursuits.

Parentage

Behramji was born at Baroda to Dhanjibhai and Bhikabai Mehta. Irreconcilable differences soon compelled Bhikabai to leave the house of her husband and settle at Surat. Dhanjibhai did not live long thereafter and Bhikabai married Merwanji Malabari.

Although the new relationship fared no better than the first, Bhikabai put up with it for the sake of her young son. But the sensitive boy 'gained little and lost much by this undesirable contact. However, the step-father vanished on the failure of his business.

Pinning all her hopes on Behramji, Bhikabai took small jobs to bring him up decently. But he had become a vagrant whom neither the penury of his mother nor her pathetic pleadings could reclaim. And then came the transformation.

Bhikabai was struck down with cholera. Her irresponsible son stood by the deathbed looking on mournfully but helplessly as she moved inexorably towards death.

"Next morning," says Malabari, "I became an old man. All my past associations were discarded." This was in 1864.

For the rest of his life this confrontation with death and the realisation of what his mother had suffered and expected of him remained vivid in Malabari's mind.

Sad memory

Malabari's ardent advocacy of social reform and solicitude for the poor were born of this realisation of the poverty and sufferings of his mother. As if to make up for what he could not do for her, he strove to alleviate human suffering.

Carrying his 'mother about in the spirit', he admitted: 'In every good woman I see my mother; I pity every bad or ill-used woman for my mother's sake."

It was natural for such a man to burn compromise on the question of social reform. His disillusionment with the Indian National Congress is largely explained by its disavowal of social reform to the extent of forbidding the use of its pandal by the Indian Social Conference.

Malabari's concern for the poor was also the outcome of his experiences as an orphan. In an attempt to fulfil the dreams of his deceased mother he devoted more than a decade (1864-1876) to self-education. Of necessity the best

by Sudhir Chandra

part of morning and evening had to be given to tuitions.

Fortunately, he got in Mr and Mrs Dixon, Irish Presbyterian missionaries at Surat, two kind patrons who guided and influenced him. examination in the fourth attempt brought his formal education to an end.

First-hand experience of penury made Malabari view every question,



Behramji Merwanji Malabari

political social or economic from the point of its bearing on the masses. Several other contemporary leaders also cared for the masses; but their over-riding concern was consciously or unconsciously for their own class.

Unlike most of them, Malabari supported legislation for the relief of juvenile factory workers, and the introduction of income tax because its alternative was the salt tax which fell on the poor.

When the Reverend E. S. Hume was struggling to continue his support to a large number of famine-affected children, Malabari handed him a small sum and said: "Please accept this small sum; I only wish it were larger. Yet you can understand the spirit which led to its gift, when I say that my own children will have somewhat less to eat because of this gift."

This willingness to part with something which he and his family needed distinguishes Malabari from his contemporaries.

Malabari entered public life in order to co-operate with like-minded people and educate public opinion. The Press offered itself as a ready means for the latter and in course of time he made his **Indian Spectator** the most sober and responsible newspaper in India.

Moderation and poise characterised Malabari's journalism. During the Ilbert Bill agitation, racialism touched a new high since the holocaust of 1857-8. The determined opposition of the Europeans in India compelled the government to dilute the original bill beyond recognition.

This volte face shocked educated India. Despite his own disappointment, Malabari advised the fellow leaders and countrymen to accept the compromise solution. He wrote to Mehta that Ripon had been disheartened by the feebleness of his own Councillors and pressurised the Secretary of State for India. It lay in the interest of Indians to support the Viceroy lest they should play into the hands of their adversaries by obliging him to resign.

Malabari wrote likewise in the **Indian Spectator.**

Slowly the Indian Press veered round to this view the only significant instance of Malabari's success in influencing public opinion without being misunderstood.

Malabari also edited the short-lived **Voice of India.** It rendered useful service towards reflecting and promoting unity of interest and sentiment at a time when there

by Sudhir Chandra

selfish in human nature. For this generation of leaders politics was, **inter alia,** a means to promote their own interests.

While every notable contemporary of Malabari accepted titles or other honours from the government, he declined the offer of the shrivelty of Bombay thrice, the Kaisar-i-Hind and KCSI ship.

Malabari also moved away from the Congress because of his unwillingness to submit to the sham of 'its resolutions made to order, and its unanimous votes.' Yet he remained 'always ready to be used by it for the good of the country'.

Till he was 32 or 33 Malabari's was a rapid rise to fame as a public man. He felt confident enough to launch his most important campaign. In 1884 he wrote two powerful notes on Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood which soon became the **vade mecum** of social reformers.

Child marriage

The disappointing response elicited by six years of work in India led Malabari to go to England where he urged the Press, women and statesmen to press for social legislation in India. Finally, a committee of prominent persons was organised in England to demand legislative action in India.

After considerable hesitation and uncertainty, the Government of India introduced the Age of Consent Bill in 1891. This was the signal for a furious controversy to storm the country.

Malabari came in for vitriolic attacks by the Hindu leaders and Press. Some even denied him a **locus standi** in the matter because he was a Parsi. Malabari silently suffered the pain of being censored and disowned by the very community he was seeking to reform.

The Bill was passed in 1892. It raised from 10 to 12 years the age for the consummation of marriage. The measure was not likely to act as a deterrent, and nothing more could be expected of it. True. Malabari could console himself with the thought of having forced the government to introduce at least token legislation.

He could also be satisfied with having forced the Hindu orthodoxy to discuss the problem. For, even while contracting Malabari's assertions regarding the medical scriptural aspects of child marriage, orthodox leaders like Tilak were obliged to recognise the necessity of social reform through education and persuasion.

No gains

Yet, these were not the gains for which Malabari had fought his battles in India and England. The 'monstrosities' of a wife at 10 a widow at 12 (the age limits standing lower in many cases) and a mother at 13, in the face of which he thought it madness to hope for 'a consistent, progressive public life', had remained untouched by the Age of Consent Act.

Women in India would still be wife at 10, widow at 12 and mother at 13. And after the tremendous excitement of 1891-92 it was impossible to expect further legislation. Only once in a lifetime could a man force a decision on such a matter.

Malabari had pressed for action and obtained nothing but the lame recognition of a principle.

Slowly and sadly the 'old' man of forty started picking up, fondly hoping that some day somebody would bring about a society in which no woman would suffer as his mother had done. In a Gujaratt verse he had described duty as 'our final rest in heaven'. For him the thought of having done his duty became his best comfort for the remaining twenty years of his life.

Works of the Tyabji Art Gallery

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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
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By EDWARD NEILAN

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
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Indian plains below, is probably the most strategic slice of real estate in the Himalayas today. It is also the most backward. Its disinclination to greet outsiders long ago won it the nickname "hermit kingdom."

The king rules with an iron hand. He listens to the royal council but pays little attention to the 126-member National Assembly which meets twice a year, to talk about the weather, the Chinese and the Indians.

The king is considered a benevolent monarch. Among his accomplishments during the last ten years has been the freeing of 5,000 slaves, giving them a choice between continuing to work for their master; for pay or accepting land from the Government to work as farmers. He also ended the traditional Bhutanese custom of prostration in the king's presence and in that of senior officers.

Buddhism is the State religion and a large chunk of the budget goes towards the support of some 4,000 lamas who are attached to eight monasteries.

Illiterate

In the past, China has offered to extend diplomatic recognition to Bhutan, recognise Bhutan's sovereignty and extend technical aid. Bhutan declines, politely, each time.

As a means of pressure, Chinese radio broadcasts frequently refer to Bhutan as one of China's "lost territories," taken by the imperialists. Peking never hides the fact that some day Bhutan is to be "liberated."

Road-building on the Chinese side of the border is another subtle pressure. So is the outflanking action in the hills of northern Bengal, around Siliguri and Naxalbari. Here the communists are waging an insurgency operation right on Bhutan's doorstep, at the point where Sikkim, India and Bhutan meet.


The world's philatelists have come to know Bhutan as a result of 40-year-old King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk's desire to gain some prestige for his country abroad. India agreed to let Bhutan join the International Postal Union, and helped Bhutan get Colombo Plan assistance (20 trucks from Australia). India also may sponsor Bhutan for membership in the United Nations if a study commissioned by the king shows such a move to be financially practical.

Bhutan earns more than Rs 3,75,000 a year by selling its very colourful postage stamps. A recent new issue brought requests from stamp collectors all over the world.

Bhutan, with 700,000 mostly illiterate people living in the moun-



Red Chinese soldiers on border facing tiny Bhutan.



Road building in Bhutan gets top priority these ays, but and the equipment not so modern. Winter snws will s for several months.

constructed in response to similar Chinese activity on the other side of the border. You frequently see Bhutanese army jeeps, their drivers wearing green berets and crisp khaki uniforms, on the road near Siliguri and Darjeeling in India. Now an airfield is being built with Indian aid.

Thus the travel time from the Indian foothills into Bhutan is being cut within five years from four days on mule-back, to six hours by jeep and to 30 minutes by plane. Helicopters presently make the journey in just under one hour.

Refugees

The airfield is 4,000 feet long with an asphalt surface. It is being built by 700 labourers brought in from Nepal. Indian military officers claim the airfield is being built to help Bhutan's poor transport network, but it is obvious the field would have military value in case of war. The Indians are also building helicopter pads at strategic points in Bhutan. The locations of these have very little to do with trade or tourism.

The people of Bhutan are called Bhutias. they are of Tibetan origin. It is on these racial ties that the Chinese are playing to win political

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works at the Triveni Art Gallery

Fundjng: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Kannada National Research Institute, Melukote Collection

Funding Kathy Cowles Image art

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-Araneta

purpose of her visit is to have holiday, Gemma says, but she is also collecting "copy" for the Mini-Graphic.

For her, journalism was part of growing up. Her mother was a regular columnist for a daily paper, and Gemma lost no time in following her lead. At nine, she already had her own column, in the children's page of a women's periodical. A frequent free-lancer in following years, she returned to the profession in 1965, once again with her own weekly column, when she joined the Manila Times. She still finds time for this, while running the Mini-Graphic, and caring for Fatima, her one-year-old daughter.

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The Deputy Mayor, advised the members not to be provoked d declared the resolution in der as it concerned the function- of the civic body.

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Youth held for theft of rail cushions worth 30,000

By Our Staff Reporter

NEW DELHI, Nov 3—The Delhi Police have arrested a teenager allegedly for the theft of railway cushions worth over Rs 30,000.

The young man was found loitering with four railway cushions in Seelampur when he was spotted by a police official. During interrogation he insisted that the cushions belonged to his father, an employee of the Northern Railway.

The police found that his father was a vendor at the Old Delhi Railway station.

The police later recovered 98 cushions at his instance which he had sold to a transporter of Naya Bazar. The transporter told them that the boy had been charging Rs 35 to Rs 40 per cushion from him.

The teenager has allegedly been working in collusion with another teenager.

According to the police the boys enter a first class compartment and finding a suitable opportunity remove the cushions from the seats and throw them out of the compartment. Later, they get down at the next railway station, and after walking the distance collect their booty.

Dance well executed

By Our Dance Critic

The highlight of the opening day's fare in the Kannada Rajyotsava at AIFACS Hall on Friday evening was a brilliant Bharatanatyam recital by Kumaris Asha and Revathi, with Pandanallur Muthiah Pillai, the grand old man of the Pandanallur school in charge of the cymbals. The numbers acquired stature because of sound schooling in the purest of Bharatanatyam traditions.

Both dancers have pleasing personality. Their adavus are chiselled and perfect and there are no jerky movements. The twists and turns are graceful and above all their abhinaya is attractive and neatly joined.

All these qualities made their jawali and padam fascinating pieces judged by the highest standards of this difficult art. In Krishna Nee Begane, so much and so often danced to, Asha displayed a new approach with quick-changing abhinaya, now as Krishna the naughty child, now as the angry but unpunishing mother and now as the Lord himself. Revathi's jawali was equally interpretative, helped no doubt by very expressive eyes which were fully exploited.

The Karaga dance was done with verve but was a bit prolonged. Balappa Hukkeri's ballads suffered from tonal faults.

ART

Maiden bid with promise

By Our Art Critic

Manab Kumar Banerjee and B. P. Paliwal are two young painters having a joint show of their works at the Trivedi Art Gallery



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ers, 46 are women, and the comparative figure for education and culture is 62. In the field of public health out of 100 workers, 86 are women. Soviet women have made great inroads in a field generally regarded as masculine—engineering. One out of every three Soviet engineers is a woman. In France one out of 50 engineers is a woman; in the USA one out of 100.

In the Supreme Soviet of the USSR there are 390 women Deputies. It may surprise many to learn that among specialists in higher secondary education women comprise nearly 60 per cent. Valentina Tereshkova, the world's first woman cosmonaut, has demonstrated that there are worlds left for Soviet women to conquer!

The main achievement of the Russians is that every Soviet citizen is free from the threat of hunger and from unemployment.

The Western world is apt to make much of the fact that the people of Russia do not possess that freedom which democratic countries hold so precious—the freedom to criticise the Government and to voice their opinions freely. But to a man who is illiterate or lives on the borders of starvation such freedom is mythical and must necessarily lose much of its meaning.

Aid to India

All visitors to Russia are inclined to agree on the point that there is now far more freedom for the average man to express his view than in the Stalinist era.

It is a measure of the strength and growth of the Soviet Union that it is now in a position to render aid to developing Afro-Asian nations—both economic and technical aid. Soviet credits granted to developing countries amounted to 4,400 million roubles (Rs 3,665 crores) at the beginning of 1966. About 600 Soviet-aided projects are being carried out in different countries and of these about 220 have already been completed.

The total amount of economic assistance given by the Soviet Union to India in the 12 years of economic cooperation between the two countries now exceeds Rs 100 crores. The USSR is now assisting India in the construction of 68 major industries, agricultural, scientific and educational projects, out of which 24 were already completed by February this year.

This apart, earlier this year we received two million tonnes of wheat, and the expenses connected with the delivery of the wheat, estimated at about Rs 2 crores were met by the Soviet Union.

The march of the Soviet Union towards its goal remains as thrilling as the exploits of its cosmonauts.

Fundi... Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

From poverty to power

Fifty years of Soviet achievements

FIFTY years is not long in the life of a nation but it is long enough to assess the triumphs and failures of a new political system which has been in operation for half a century.

The birth and emergence of Soviet communism represented a turning point in the world's history for it was the first time that a new and unique type of State came into being—a State which controlled the means of production. It was revolutionary in its impact, and though few expected it to succeed, it did so triumphantly. Today Russia is one of the two most powerful States.

The achievements of the Soviet Union can be seen in their proper perspective when one remembers the conditions which existed when Lenin and the Bolsheviks came to power. It has been graphically described by Nehru in "Glimpses of World History."

"The German war was still on, although the Russian army had gone to pieces and there was no chance of its fighting; there was disorder all over the country and roving bands of soldiers and brigands did much as they liked; the economic structure had broken down; food was scarce and people were hungry; all round him (Lenin) were representatives of the old order ready to crush the Revolution; the organisation of the State was capitalist and most of the old Government servants refused to co-operate with the new Government; bankers would not give money; even the telegraph office would not send telegrams. A difficult enough situation to frighten the bravest."

Venus probe

Soviet communism has matured and changed with the passage of years. Its achievements, particularly in technological and scientific spheres are there for all to see. Its spectacular achievements in the sphere of space flights have captured the imagination of men the world over and made the dreams of Jules Verne a reality.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary, the landing of Venus-4, the Soviet Union's automatic research station, which made a soft landing on Venus, was one of the most remarkable feats of the space age. It extended the boundaries of man's knowledge to outer worlds by giving him accurate information about the cloud-shrouded myst... planet.

Spectacular as the Venus p... is, it is in keeping with Rus... past achievements in space; it on April 12, 1961 that cosmo... Yuri Gagarin became the firs... to travel in outer space and re... there for 108 minutes. Many m... were the triumphs which follo...

The changes which have t... place in the Soviet Union a... those in its relations with o... countries are equally dramatic testify to the changing mood... the Soviet leaders. Who... instance, could have predicted... the early years of Soviet c... munism that a day would c... when the Soviet Union would... it easier to work with the USA... in space-exploration and b... loggerheads with another c... munist nation—militant Red C... China's leaders are today... implacable foes of the Russia...

None could have foretold... Lenin's predictions at the e... World War I that there wou... uprising in Europe which w... give Bolshevism opportunit... seize power, would come to n... Khrushchev believed that... newly-independent countries o... and America would provide... ground for communism. Thi... not happen either.

What did happen was... cracks began to appear in... Communist monolith — first... Yugoslavia's expulsion from... Cominform in 1948 and then...



Peasants received by Lenin . . . a painting by Russian artist V. A. Serov

Fifty years of Soviet achievements

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The rapid industria... country helped to pr... and heavy machine... about the mechanisat... culture. The Russians... 1958 nearly all agric...

Funding: Tattva Nidhi, Chennai

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Valentina Tereshkova, the world's first woman cosmonaut, has shown there are few worlds left for Soviet women to conquer.

the persons questioned stated that they spent more than two hours a day on shopping and household work. There is now a five-day working week in the USSR.

How is it that the Soviet Union which only 50 years ago was a backward economy should have become one of the world's industrial giants in that short span of time? After the USA, the Soviet Union is the world's most industrialised nation. It produces one-fifth of the total goods produced in the world.

Far more important, it has neither illiterate nor unemployed people Special attention was paid by the Soviet Union to improve the technical standard of the worker and the peasant. About 50 years ago, Russia held one of the lowest positions in Europe in the level of education of its people.

In pre-revolutionary Russia about 75 per cent of the population between the age of nine and 45 were illiterate. Few workers and peasants had education above the primary level. To India today the manner in which the Soviets tackled the herculean problem of illiteracy is of special interest. The Soviet Constitution gave the right to all its citizens to use their native language as the basic language in all local, public and State organisations.

In schools the teaching was conducted in the mother tongue. In 1923 with the formation of a "Down with Illiteracy" Society, millions of people were drawn into this campaign and schools, clubs, Government offices were transformed after working hours into classes for adult literacy. Writers and artist participated in this campaign. Even Maxim Gorky organised readings for illiterate people and this helped to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses. Collective and State farms have their own schools since education is the bedrock of progress.

Agriculture

Statistics can often be misleading but, on the other hand, they can also help to show the progress achieved in perspective. Whereas the achievements of Soviet agriculture are not as spectacular as those in the realm of industry, the peasant is no longer the oppressed and ill-starved being of the Czarist days. The poverty of the Russian peasant in these days can be judged from one or two facts: 34 per cent of the peasants possessed no farm implements and 30 per cent could not afford a horse.

The Soviets not only nationalised all the land and freed the peasants from all taxes and debts but they laid the groundwork nor turning small peasant holding into large State enterprises.

The rapid industrialisation of the country helped to produce tractors and heavy machinery to bring about the mechanisation of agriculture. The Russians claim that by 1958 nearly all agricultural operations were machanised. The electrification of agriculture received high priority. Before the October Revolution there were only 80 rural power stations with a total capacity of 2,000 kw which supplied electricity to a small number of landed estates. Rural electricity grew at an amazing rate and by 1965 the total capacity of rural power stations was 52.8 million kw.

A cultural revolution appears to have taken place in the life of the farmers in the span of five decades. Wilereas before the Revolution, the vast majority of farmers were illiterate, now many of them have higher or secondary education. There were 90,000 village libraries in 1965. Radio sets, newspapers and magazines can be found in village homes. Clubs, theatres and houses of culture are to be found in the Soviet countryside.

Automation

There is a lesson in all this for India—that if we wish to improve the life of those who live in rural areas, we must provide them with the necessary amenities housing being the first necessity. The Russians claim that house construction is being carried on in a big way in the Soviet villages.

That the Soviet Union has become one of the world's two main industrial giants, next only to the USA is known to all. While in 1913 Russia accounted for four per cent of the world's industrial output, today it produces 20 per cent of the world's industrial output.

It must be remembered that Russia withstood not only the difficult years following the Revolution but also the Nazi hordes in World War II for only then can the significance of the achievement be understood. In 1913 Russia had no key heavy industries and no developed machine-building industry but, whereas in 1913 Russia accounted for 6.5 per cent of the world's steel output by 1966 it rose to 20 per cent—100 million tons a year.

One of the main reasons for the rapid economic development has been the close link between Soviet science, technology and economic development. The Russians point out with pride that the biggest hydro-electric stations in the world as well as thermal and atomic stations have been built by Soviet scientists and engineers. In the engineering industry automation has become widespread and it has gone over from producing individual automation machines to complete automation of shops and factories.

There has been a radical transformation in the position of women. In the Soviet Union there are over 100 million women, 20 million more than men. It is estimated that in industry out of every 100 workers, 46 are women, and the comparative figure for education and culture is 62. In the field of public health out of 100 workers, 86 are women. Soviet women have made great inroads in a field generally regarded as masculine-engineering. One out of every three Soviet engineers is a woman. In France one out of 50 engineers is a woman; in the USA one out of 100.

In the Supreme Soviet of the USSR there are 390 women Deputies. It may surprise many to learn that among specialists in higher secondary education women comprise nearly 60 per cent. Valentina Tereshkova, the world's first woman cosmonaut, has demonstrated that there are worlds left for Soviet women to conquer!

The main achievement of the Russians is that every Soviet citizen is free from the threat of hunger and from unemployment.

The Western world is apt to make much of the fact that the people of Russia do not possess that freedom which democratic countries hold so precious—the freedom to criticise the Government and to voice their opinions freely. But to a man who is illiterate or lives on the borders of starvation such freedom is mythical and must necessarily lose much of its meaning.

Aid to India

All visitors to Russia are inclined to agree on the point that there is now far more freedom for the average man to express his view than in the Stalinist era.

It is a measure of the strength and growth of the Soviet Union that it is now in a position to render aid to developing Afro-Asian nations—both economic and technical aid. Soviet credits granted to developing countries amounted to 4,400 million roubles (Rs 3,665 crores) at the beginning of 1966. About 600 Soviet-aided projects are being carried out in different countries and of these about 220 have already been completed.

The total amount of economic assistance given by the Soviet Union to India in the 12 years of economic cooperation between the two countries now exceeds Rs 100 crores. The USSR is now assisting India in the construction of 63 major industries, agricultural, scientific and educational projects, out of which 24 were already completed by February this year.

This apart, earlier this year we received two million tonnes of wheat, and the expenses connected with the delivery of the wheat, estimated at about Rs 2 crores were met by the Soviet Union.

The march of the Soviet Union towards its goal remains as thrilling as the exploits of its cosmonauts.

Fundi... Heritage and IKS, MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA
CONDUCTOR

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The resolution was brought to

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

...ch Institute, Melukote Collection

Funding: Tattva Vidya

DILEMMA IN VIETNAM

SIR,—In your leading article "Dilemma in Vietnam" (September 3-4)' you have so correctly stated that "in much of the world outside, the elections have been regarded as an irrelevance, if not a farce...." The elections were a farce in conception and in execution. It is admitted that more than 30% —some say it is almost as high as 50%—of the country is under the National Liberation Front. The people there were not represented in these elections. It is stated that 83% of the registered voters cast their votes. But what percentage of the total population, including the areas under the Vietcong, do these registered voters represent?

Only those in the USA or elsewhere who like to delude themselves could have ever dreamt that these elections would be fair and that the contestants would have equal opportunities for electioneering. The dice were loaded in favour of the ruling party from the very beginning. On one side were the leaders of the Vietnamese military junta—General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky—with all the glamour and prestige and power that go with a military dictatorship and with aeroplanes, helicopters, jeeps and cars at their disposal for electioneering. On the other side were the civilians with none of these facilities available to them. The provincial chiefs in South Vietnam are military officers under the direct control and influence of the military junta. Many of the minor candidates were put up by the Government itself to split the civilian vote and confuse the campaign; candidates and voters could not have forgotten Air Marshal Ky's recent statement that he would respond "militarily" if a civilian he disliked won the Presidency.

The basic question is: What are the Americans doing in Vietnam? That the Americans are in Vietnam to stop world Communism from spreading is just nonsense. There might have been some justification for the fear of world Communism in the Stalin era but where is this monolithic structure of world Communism today? The two major Communist Powers are at each other's throats; and one of them is torn by internal rivalries and strife. Where is this "revolution of the proletariat" in evidence anywhere?

In Vietnam particularly there was no danger of world Communism; an independent Vietnam under President Ho Chi Minh would not have allowed the Chinese to take over the country. But for American interference, Dr Ho Chi Minh would have been an Asian Tito and Vietnam an Asian Yugoslavia. What would have been wrong with that? Have we forgotten that the first blow given to Stalin's world Communism was by Marshal Tito, a Communist? Real belief in democracy means that you give freedom to others to think the way they do. Here in India we are 500 million people. Do we need to send over 50 million Marines to save us from going Communist?

Communism or any other ideology cannot be stopped by bullets. It has to be stopped by superior ideas. The ism I am opposed to is the one that believes in proselytization by force across national boundaries, whatever that ism might be.

The display of this naked, brute American power in Vietnam has begun to create doubts whether American professions in democracy are sincere. By their acts and behaviour in Vietnam, the Americans have let loose a spirit of violence and immorality all over the world. I think the vehemence and extremism that is being evidenced today in the racial riots in America is partially due to Vietnam.

We, in India, have also been affected. A member of Parliament recently asked: "If Americans can napalm-bomb thousands and thousands of Vietnamese, why can't we do the same to the Nagas?"

The only redeeming feature in this otherwise dark picture is that in America itself powerful voices are being raised against America's rôle in Vietnam. And let it be said to the credit of America that dissenters are given full freedom.

I have lived in America for 33 years. I have loved the country and, more so, its people. Therefore, it is not easy for me to come out with this indictment against a country which became my second home. But I feel that, as a true friend of America, I must speak out the truth.—Yours, etc., J. J. SINGH

New Delhi, Sept 8.

Sir,—The golden piece, "Dilemma in Vietnam" (September 3-4), almost speaks in the vein of Othello:

Good signior, you shall more command with years than with your weapons.

Washington should command the problem-child of Vietnam with its information and belief in democracy rather than with loathsome military tactics. Let the child speak in his own language in his own way and test what he has got from the world by now.—Yours, etc., HARADHAN BHATTACHARYYA.

Burdwan, Sept 4.

Sir,—Your leading article "Dilemma in Vietnam" (September 3-4)' seems to me one of the best articles on a current issue engaging the attention of the whole world today. Your appeal to the USA "A saner, possibly also more profitable course would be to stop the bombing of the North . . ." is consistent with the desire of peace-loving nations. If your request is heeded by the USA, not only will further escalation of the war in Vietnam be halted but the possible chance of China's involvement in the war may recede for the present at least.

If there is further escalation of the war on U.S. initiative the idea—which is gaining momentum—that under the cover of generous help extended to economically handicapped countries the USA has some intentions other than those she expresses will begin to hold validity in many minds.—Yours, etc., KAMALENDU BHATTACHARYA.

Calcutta, Sept 5.

Funding: Arts and Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Russian artist V. A. Serov

Research Institute, Mehrauli Collection

Funding: Tata Trusts. Digitized by eGangotri

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PERMANENT REVOLUTION

THE disappearance of Peking's wall posters has deprived the Chinese public and, indirectly, the world outside of some extremely diverting reading matter. But attacks on "the handful of party persons taking the capitalist road" continue through other media and at other forums. An article in the People's Daily, quoted by the New China News Agency, described Mr Liu Shao-chi as the "number one scab betraying the interests of the working class"; at the National Day rally also, Mr Lin Piao did not miss the opportunity of denouncing "China's Khrushchev," again. Whether this kind of campaign is more humane than Stalin's methods of dealing with political rivals is not altogether certain; the prolonged psychological torture inflicted upon Mr Liu by ceaseless vilification and public humiliation must be almost unbearable. And his sin might have been no more than doubting the wisdom of some of Mr Mao's policies which brought the Chinese economy very close to ruin. That recovery was achieved by reversing those policies, thus confirming the doubts of men like Mr Liu, will not be acknowledged so long as Mr Mao lives and rules China: a Cultural Revolution seems to have little use for historical facts, for Mr Liu and some others are also being charged with having made concessions and compromises for which none but Mr Mao himself was responsible.

The persistence of personal attacks indicates that personal factors may have played a large part in Mr Mao's calculations behind the upheaval he has engineered. The rest can be explained only by a combination of recklessness, fanatical disregard of others' views and reactions, and a desperate desire to save China from the kind of development that has taken place in Russia. Mr Mao has often moved between reckless leaps and tactical compromises, the latter having been more pronounced during the Communists' struggle for power and the former after the successful completion of the struggle. The fanatical intolerance may be a sign of age, particularly in a man who has had very little contact with the outside world and been accustomed for long to imposing his will on people around him. The almost pathological hatred for what is regarded as Russian revisionism has complex origins; much of it can be explained by Russ-

when Hitler was on his way to power—Dr Lohia was among the founders of the Congress Socialist Party and was to the end of his days actively associated with one or the other of its successors. His post-independence disenchantment with Nehru, which frequently found extreme expression, stemmed from his passionate love of socialism; this ideology, he thought, received insufficient support from his former leader.

It was wholly unnecessary to share Dr Lohia's ideology to admire his idealism and personal courage. To many his enthusiasm for Hindi as a national language seemed excessive. The inspiration, again, was socialism. He thought, not entirely without reason, that present inequalities could not be eliminated without a readjustment of the status and power of the small English-speaking elite. In some matters Dr Lohia gave the appearance of being an eccentric, a crank, an anarchist almost. He was also an antidote to pervasive conformism in the cities and ineradicable conservatism in the rural areas. The heat of his public controversies and the warmth of his personal relationships apart, a certain breath of uncompromising radicalism has gone out of the air. It is not true that unpleasant truths need no more be spoken loud and clear in our democratic society.

SUMMING UP

AFTER a test involving 8,000 school children, an Australian University Professor found that the average child, once he had mastered the basic elements, quickly became proficient in reading. Mathematics on the other hand was quite another matter. Not only did fear and anxiety frequently hold back progress, but in mathematics "mastery achieved at one level merely led to the next". Which of course is only the depressing truth. One-column totting up and taking away followed by excursions into the territory of hundreds, thousands and millions. After which there are still the awesome heights of higher mathematics to be scaled, with the topmost peak apparently receding at every turn.

All too clearly, as the Professor stressed, there is no comparison between reading and arithmetic as a subject for study. Books are not only a source of knowledge but can and do provide limitless pleasure. By contrast only the dedicated few "do sums" in their spare time just for the love of it. For one thing, experience proves that there is nothing in mathematical lore, however advanced, which can act as a transforming factor. A small coin is still that and nothing more, however much its owner may understand of mathematical coplexities. And it may still not be enough to cover the cost of the book he would so much like to buy, if he could afford it.

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Russian artist V. A. Serov
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Funding: Tattva Heritage and

FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR FORECAST

Refugee Problem Main Irritant, Say Experts

LONDON, Oct 10.—Two British historians have cast a fourth Arab-Israeli war—which they said Israel not win—unless the Palestine refugee question is se reports AP.

The fate of one million Arabs displaced when Israel was formed 19 years ago was identified as the focus of the grim new tussle within the Muslim world by Mr Michael Howard and Mr Robert Hunter.

Mr Howard, Professor of War Studies at London University, and Mr Hunter, Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics expressed their views in a special report published yesterday by the Institute of Strategic Studies on the origins of the six-day war between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

Research took the two men to Washington, New York and several West Asian capitals.

They also said Israel's victories "may have created as many new problems as they solved".

They said: "Two and a half million Jews now control territory containing nearly 1,500,000 Arbs . . . who are likely in future to make up nearly a quarter of Israel's population".

"Israel will be confronted with all the problems of a multi-racial society in which the minority group is potentially hostile and sustained by powerful supporters beyond the frontier".

LOSING BATTLE

Among these supporters are Jordan's King Hussein and the Algerian President Col Houari Boumedienne representing the moderate and revolutionary wings of the Arab world and the two are struggling for the ascendancy of their approaches. So long as the fundamental Arab grievance over the refugees remains unsettled, the report said, Israel will be fighting a losing battle.

"And if Col Boumedienne wins there will be a fourth Arab-Israeli war." Mr Howard and Mr Hunter wrote.

The war they envisaged would be neither the classical conflict of the past nor a Vietnam-type guerrilla struggle but "inter-communal friction—the sniper at the upper window and the grenade lofted into the coffee house".

Mr Howard and Mr Hunter warned that Israel's victories may yet yield bitter fruit unless her military talents are matched by statesmanship calling for abandonment of "many Zionist ideas" and a reversion to the concept of "a Palestine shared peacefully between Arabs and Jews".

Funding: Indira Gandhi National Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

Nehru Memorial Research Institute. Mekuote Collection

Funding: Tattva Vichara and

DE GAULLE'S TACTICS & FRENCH MOOD ENSURED BIG MAJORITY

From PRAN CHOPRA

THE first ballot in the French elections had left the commentators and critics a little baffled and breathless; after the second they are simply lying flat on their backs. They had already used up "stunning", "sweeping", "striking" and any other word they could think of to describe their explosion of surprise; now they have nothing left to use at all. Hence the inadequacy of their latest accounts of the greatest fact about French politics today, that despite the battering he got in May and June at the hands of students and workers, President de Gaulle has won the biggest electoral victory known in France.

It had been expected (or hoped or feared, according to taste) that the second ballot would reduce the lead taken by the Gaullists in the ballot of June 23. In fact it was not only out of modesty or decency that M Pompidou declined to claim victory on the night of June 23 although his followers were already parading the tricolour down the Champs Elysee. Caution and a certain apprehension were also responsible and he was the first to explain why he was still anxious; in 1967 as he recalled the second ballot very nearly upset the result of the first. And this time there were a few additional causes of worry. Or so it was thought.

FIRST BALLOT

The first ballot in France, is rather like an opinion poll, only it is truer and more thorough. As seats are won only by absolute majority the results reflect the dominant mood of the country or the constituency very clearly. The second ballot is more like a mid-term election in India, a complicated manoeuvre by all parties concerned to form new combinations in the light of the first ballot. By a complex and typically French piece of reasoning it was thought that the combinations would go against the Gaullists, and now that they have not done so, the forecasters are finding it difficult to explain away their forecasts.

The fact however is that it is the surprise which is surprising. The size of President de Gaulle's victory may have been unexpected but the fact that he won is not. It could have been doubted only by those interested in wishful thinking. President de Gaulle's tactics and the French mood today made the victory all but inevitable. The tactics were frankly cynical and may even be described as dishonest: the mood is one of panic in which falsehoods and allegations stick even faster than the truth.

The second ballot in the French elections has neither brought about the swing, which M Pompidou feared, nor the abstentions which the long holidays might have started. Those who had forecast a swing against the Gaullists in the second ballot are now hard put to explaining away their forecasts. But it is apparent that the size of President de Gaulle's victory may have been unexpected; the fact that he won is not. It could have been doubted only by those interested in wishful thinking.

they spoke of the events of May and speculated about what could have followed. But many more were sick with apprehension and emphatic in saying that only the ruination of France or perhaps even its disintegration could have followed.

DE GAULLE'S ROLE

President de Gaulle played upon this mood with consummate skill. He did lose nerve in the last week of May when he plunged the country into a state of power vacuum at the top. His apologists are now saying that his dramatic threat to go away if he was not wanted was only a clever piece of shock treatment which prepared the electorate for the forensic trick he played in his television broadcast on May 30. But it is suspected that there was more than that to his sudden disappearance from Paris at a critical hour. When such large numbers of workers rejected the wage agreements made by their leaders with the Government and refused to vacate the factories which they had been occupying for a fortnight or more, the Government really did not know where to go to, and even President de Gaulle had only his house in the country to go to.

FACT AND HALF-FACT

But when he strode his way back to the Elysee Palace with all the drama which he best knows how to impart to such a moment he had the whole country sighing with relief. Then he proceeded to mesmerize it by showing it many shapes of the enemy, real or imaginary, and he did so without too much regard either for the facts or for the limits which misrepresentation should not transgress even in elections. The broadcast had all the power of his oratory to communicate his passion for France and himself to others. But it also had a devilishly clever mixture of fact and half-fact.

He chose the Communists as enemy No. 1. But he would not say whether they were so only because they were Communists; that would have been a perfectly fair battle of ideology to offer. He accused them also of designs of which many people believe them to have been innocent. Thus he reaped the wages of the fear he planted in the minds of the people, the fear of what would happen if his party were defeated or he went away, fear of Communism and foreign conspiracy for capturing power.

The Communists say he abuses them wrongly, and many people not caught in the heat of the battle agree that they are right. They constantly urged restraint upon students and settlement upon workers, and they did not make a bid for power even when President de Gaulle seemed on the point of abdication, (that ambition they left to M Mitterrrand and his Socialist Federation). However such was the spell jointly cast by events and by their image as built up by President de Gaulle that, as Le Monde wrote, "the Communist Party paid for the barricades which it had never raised and for the strike pickets which it had never ordered." Since France is not a nation of revolutionaries but largely of conservatives who love revolution but only so long as it does not affect them, Persident de Gaulle converted them into what he himself described as "the party of panic". Even those, whether activists or intellectuals, whose convictions as Communists probably go deeper were repelled by the chaos and disorder they had not hoped to see in the universities and colleges.

Because of this it was not a very realistic expectation that the second ballot would contain the march started by President de Gaulle with the first. In normal circumstances it might have. Having put the Communists and, in fact, the whole spectrum on the Left safely out of the reach of the mischief of power in the first ballot, the French voter may have been expected to express his disapproval of the regime of President de Gaulle—and the disapproval is widespread—by not giving him too large a majority. But in this case probably the stakes were considered to be too high to be risked and the froth of emotion too deep for calculation and discrimination. If the Communists were mad and bad boys on June 23 they must be reminded of this on June 30 also. Therefore, the voters stayed at the job of voting and stayed with the party for which they had voted one week earlier. Neither the swing which M Pompidou feared nor the abstentions which the start of the long holidays might have caused materialized in fact.

(To be concluded)

Funding: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Peking terrorizes Middle East smugglers

by Leo Heiman

CHAIRMAN Mao Tse-tung's secret weapon requires no costly investments in machinery or materials.

It grows in profusion in the lush sheltered valleys of Yunnan, provides the gold and dollars for Red China's nuclear development projects, and pays for Peking's espionage and subversion abroad.

This ultimate weapon is opium and its more potent derivatives, whose sales through Peking's illicit marketing channels went up from an estimated Rs. 2.5 crores in 1964 to more than Rs. 12 crores in 1967, according to officials of the Interpol (International Police) Narcotics Commission.

Chief Inspector Ronald D. Morrison, a veteran British investigator who watches Peking's narcotics pushing activities with growing concern, says the Red Chinese are smuggling opium to the Soviet Union as well.

They probably intend to weaken Russia's moral, social, economic and public health foundations in the same way they try to hurt the West.

But the fact remains that Western Europe and North America, especially the United States, are the top targets of Mao's opium war, Chief Inspector Morrison stressed.

Although many marketing routes are utilised by Peking's narcotics pushers, the traditional Middle East smuggling channels are being taken over by Red Chinese gangs or their local stooges, who fight a ruthless campaign against local gangs for control of the networks.

No holds are barred and no punches pulled in this undeclared opium war. Guns, bombs, knives and poison are used together with bribes, blackmail and pressure to secure the most profitable outlets.

Hard way

Twelve people, three of them Chinese, died in unexplained "accidents" in Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus in 1967; and officials believe all were the victims of Mao's opium war. There must be twice as many casualties not reported to the police.

Some battles are erroneously ascribed to political vendettas, like the recent gunfight in Beirut, when rival mobs fought with machine guns from racing cars in the best tradition of old gangster movies.

Lebanese authorities said the running battle on Beirut's waterfront, in which two persons were killed and seven injured, had been caused by strife between pro and anti-Nasser elements in the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

But authoritative sources in Cyprus believe the machine-gun battle was another deadly eruption of Mao's opium war, brought about by a clash between "progressives" and "traditionalists."

"Using Marxist terminology, progressive narcotics pushes are those who co-operate with Chairman Mao's networks for their own profit, and for success of world revolution. Traditionalists are those who prefer to stick to their old suppliers and resent Peking's muscling in," Morrison said.

In theory, smuggling drugs to the Middle East is very much like selling snow in Siberia. But the Red Chinese are not interested in the Middle East as a market, despite the presence of 12 million confirmed addicts (4.5 million in Egypt alone, according to official statistics).

They learned the hard way that without controlling Mid-east narcotics outlets, no major smuggling activities are possible, Interpol sources stated.

Before the arrival of Chairman Mao's hard-sell crowd, 90 per cent of the Middle East's hashish and opium originated in the mountain valleys of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Part of the annual harvest was smuggled to Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Algeria across the Sinai peninsula. Sinai's occupation by Israeli forces in June, 1967, put an end to this traffic. The gangs must now use the longer route across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea coast, then by boat to Egypt and by jeep or camel to the old channels.

As much as half of the total hashish and opium crop used to be carried to clandestine warehouses in Beirut, Alexandria, Mersin, Izmir and Istanbul. Sicilian and Corsican parties took over from there, smuggling the drugs for processing in underworld laboratories in Italy and France.

The finished products, like morphine and heroin, were not only less bulky and more difficult to detect than raw hashish and opium, but also spelled fabulous profits to the Mafia gang and their Union Corse colleagues.

Before Chairman Mao's opium offensive, one ton of raw hashish sold for Rs. 11,25,000 in the Middle East. By the time it arrived in a secret warehouse on the waterfront, it was worth Rs. 33,75,000. But after being processed in laboratories and cut down with cheap chemicals or milk powder, its value skyrocketed to Rs. 3 crores on the American side of the Atlantic.

Dead-end alley

In the beginning, the Red Chinese did not intend to gate-crash the existing organisations in the Middle East. Reports from top Interpol sources stress that in the years 1964-1965, Peking's narcotics pushers regarded Albania as their main outlet in the Mediterranean region.

Red China's truculent little satellite in Europe was ideally located across the narrow Adriatic Sea from Italy and its professional gangs.

Red Chinese freighters could unload as many tons of raw opium as they wanted in sheltered Albanian harbours, for trans-shipment to West European ports. But it soon became apparent that Albania was a dead-end alley, as far narcotics smuggling was concerned.

Mao's gangs were left with no choice but to take over the traditional Middle East outlets. They first tried commercial competition, by offering their wares at discount to waterfront smugglers.

But so many interests were involved, from the landlord who plants opium poppies on his estate to the customs official who looks the other way when drums of "olive oil" or casks of "date wine" are being loaded on a rusty little freighter, that Mao's pushers could not get to first base.

Ruthless methods

What happened next is the old story of better organised, more ruthless and dynamic gangs muscling in with guns, money and dynamite. Many local outfits accepted the Red Chinese proposition to operate as before, with local drugs on local markets, but use their connections to peddle China's narcotics to overseas pushers.

Other gangs had to be intimidated with knives or machine guns, or eliminated entirely, for the operation to succeed. This means a 50 per cent loss to Middle Eastern producers, who naturally resent China's competition.

On the other hand, Mafia and Union Corse resist Peking's pressure for marketing finished products processed in Red Chinese laboratories.

"The big mobs (gangs) are willing to buy only raw opium," Morrison said. 'They are determined to control the processing themselves because that's where the big profit is. If and when Red China secures control of the clandestine labs as well, Chairman Mao will win his opium war."

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PLANNING COMMISSION'S ADVISORY ROLE: ITS IMPLICATIONS

By R. J. VENKATESWARAN

THE reconstituted Planning Commission can function effectively only if its relationship with the Union Cabinet is clearly defined. Mrs Indira Gandhi has announced that the Planning Commission will work as an advisory body.

Even when the Commission was first set up in March, 1950, the Government of India had clearly emphasized its advisory rôle in its Resolution which said: "The Planning Commission will make recommendations to the Cabinet. In framing its recommendations, the Planning Commission will act in close understanding and consultation with the Ministries of the Central Government and the Governments of the States. The responsibility for taking and implementing decision will rest with the Central and State Governments".

But, in course of time, the Planning Commission was not content to be a purely advisory body and began to take on executive functions. In fact, it even became, as its critics have described, "a super-Cabinet". One important factor which helped the growth of this trend was, of course the close association of the Prime Minister and other Ministers with the Commission. This naturally enhanced its prestige and enabled it, over the years, to assume powers and functions which it did not have in the beginning. As Dr D. R. Gadgil has observed in his book, Planning & Economic Policy in India, "it is the power complex of the Planning Commission or its members and their natural desire to exercise power and patronage like Ministers that are chiefly responsible for the neglect by the Commission of its main functions and for a needless extension of its activities over many irrelevant fields. The misdirection has been helped largely by membership of the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister of the Planning Commission which appears to have vested the Planning Commission with an unnatural kind of prestige and importance".

A.R.C. RECOMMENDATION

If the Government of India were really keen that the Commission should function only as an advisory body, it should have agreed to the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission to exclude Ministers, including the Prime Minister, from its membership. Since, however this has not been done, it is necessary to take measures to ensure that the Commission is strictly confined to its advisory rôle. For instance the Commission should be asked to convey its advice to the Cabinet confidentially; and the Commission should also not be permitted to engage itself in public controversies.

These suggestions are not new. In fact these were the intentions of the Government of India when they set up the Commission. This is clear from the views of the late Mr V. T. Krishnamachari who was connected with the Commission for over a decade since its inception. In his book, Fundamentals of Planning in India, he explains how there is "continuous touch between the Planning Commission on the one hand and the Ministries and the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees on the other". As a consequence, the Commission, he says, has two obligations: it has to maintain secrecy in regard to differences of views between the Commission and the Union and State Ministries; and it cannot engage in controversies in public about the Plan or reply directly to criticisms. Mr Krishnamachari's view was that it was for the Governments concerned to decide what information they would like to place before the public on various aspects of planning.

So long as Mr Krishnamachari was the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission (from February 1953 to January 1960) this commendable dignity and restraint was in evidence. As an administrator of vast experience, he concentrated his attention on the problems of implementation and co-ordination of the different schemes planning. Mr Asoka Mehta's rôle as the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission was somewhat different. From the very beginning, Mr Mehta was freely expressing his views on practically all subjects; often they were at variance with those of the Cabinet. For example, in his convocation address to Saugor University, Mr Mehta advocated nationalization of commercial banks which created considerable controversy and embarrassed the Cabinet. Subsequently, Mr Mehta was appointed Cabinet Minister in charge of Planning but this did not help to bring about a harmonious relationship between the Commission and the Cabinet.

UNPOPULAR CONCEPT

Dr Gadgil has joined the Planning Commission as Deputy Chairman at a time when the very concept of planning has become rather unpopular because of the continued stagnation in the economy for the past few years. Since practically all sections of public opinion are now agreed on the need for some kind of planning for the country, it is essential that the Planning Commission should improve its image as an expert body which does not allow itself to be influenced unduly by ideologies. The Prime Minister as its chairman should therefore ensure that the principle of joint responsibility is enforced not only on the Cabinet but on the Commission as well. The Commission's members should not express views contrary to the accepted policies of the Cabinet. Since the Commission will only be an advisory body, the Cabinet, is free to accept or reject its advice. But if the Commission's advice is not accepted by the Cabinet on important matters, the former's prestige and influence will suffer if the differences are publicized.

There has been an increasing tendency on the part of the Union Cabinet to announce major decisions without carefully considering their implications. The decision to devalue the rupee was literally and figuratively a leap in the dark (it was announced on the midnight of June 5, 1966); and its impact on the economy, it is now generally admitted, has been adverse. It is true that a delicate decision like the devaluation of the rupee had to be taken in secret. But secrecy was necessary only in regard to the timing and extent of the devaluation. Although Mr Asoka Mehta had a big say in influencing the decision, the Planning Commission as such was not in the picture nor did the Cabinet as a whole seem to have discussed this vital decision. Had the Commission made an expert study on all the implications of devaluation, perhaps many of its complications could have been foreseen.

OTHER PROPOSALS

Other important proposals announced in haste relate to the introduction of 14 languages as media for the Union Public Service Commission examinations, nationalization of general insurance, progressive take-over of foreign trade, social control over banks, and adoption of regional languages for University education. It is true that on some of these matters a final decision is yet to be announced. But have these subjects been referred, or are likely to be referred, to the Planning Commission which should have a say in such vital matters?

It is also important to ensure close and cordial relationship between the Planning Commission and the State Cabinets. It was for this purpose that the Government of India set up the National Development Council in 1962, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Chief Ministers of all States, and Members of the Planning Commission. Although the Council also is only an advisory body, according to Mr V. T. Krishnamachari, its recommendations "carry much weight with the Union as well as State Governments". The Council's usefulness perhaps can be increased if it meets more frequently. But in the present political situation, a serious impediment to the States' effective participation in the planning process is the instability of most Ministries.

After the death of Mr Nehru, the Chief Ministers succeeded in strengthening their powers considerably by influencing the choice of the Prime Minister. But after the last General Election, the Chief Ministers in many States have been unable to assert themselves because of the constant threat to their stability. In such a situation, it will be difficult for the Planning Commission to secure the effective co-operation of the State Governments. If the States are unable to influence the planning process either through the National Development Council or through other means, it will be not so much because of the concentration of too much power at the Centre but because of their own incapacity to speak from positions of strength.

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Funding: Cultural Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



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
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ARAB SUMMIT INITIATES A NEW STYLE

From G. H. JANSEN

BEIRUT.—After the numerous preparatory conferences and the agitated diplomatic activity that preceded it, did the Arab Summit conference at Khartoum achieve worthwhile results, adequate for the grave problems facing the Arabs? The answer is a very qualified affirmative.

Before the conference Egypt's best known editor said the conference should be satisfied if it achieved a minimum programme: in the event it achieved something more than the bare minimum.

There are at least three measures immediately effective and very popular which it recoiled from. It did not approve any sort of oil selective cut-off; nor did it recommend a commercial boycott of Israel's Western friends or a withdrawal of Arab deposits from their banks. The altogether less dramatic achievements of the conference may be divided into the general and the particular. In broad terms, first it produced a realistic, pragmatic approach, quite new for Arab conferences. The "summit" asked the Governments to do only what it was sure they were prepared to do. Its communiqué is strictly within the limits of practical possibilities. But getting unanimous agreement that was also sincere inevitably meant that it had to aim at the lowest common denominator

PRETENCE ABANDONED

Secondly, the conference initiated a new style in inter-Arab relations. Now a great Arab pretence nas been abandoned with the frank acceptance that 13 very different countries do not and cannot always see eye to eye. Because of this pretence the communiqués of earlier Arab meetings were just so much paper over the cracks in the façade of Arab unity. This time those Governments that did not wish to co-operate did not do so; those who did not accept the basis of the conference stayed away (like Syria) or attended in polite silence (like Algeria) and they were not criticized as renegades or traitors. Even the Palestine delegation which withdrew at the last session did so without recrimination, while Syria promised to implement the positive recommendations. On the other hand, by producing a programme on which progressive Arab countries (the UAR and Iraq) are to collaborate with the conservatives (Saudi Arabia and Jordan) the conference has gone some way towards blurring the distinctions. By frankly admitting the possibility of differences, the differences have been diminished.

ARAB STANCE

As far as particular details are concerned, the conference maintained a firm Arab stance towards Israel by stating that there would be no peace with the Jewish State and no recognition of or negotiations with her. This eliminates the possibility that Jordan would reach a separate accommodation with Israel—the so-called King Hussain plan. It also rules out an Arab declaration of non-belligerency This does not mean that third parties cannot find some form of words that would result in the withdrawal of Israeli troops but the verbal quid pro quo for Israel will have to be so attenuated that it will probably be unacceptable to Israel; anything on the lines of President Tito's plan becomes more difficult of realization. While the rebuilding of the Arab armies was decided on for an eventual next round against Israel it is clear that this is not to materialize in the immediate or near future. Facing the choice between a military or political solution the summit conference recommended a bit of both alternatives.

While firm towards Israel, the Arab leaders showed some flexibility towards its Western friends: by not being unreasonable or totally antagonistic towards the Anglo-Americans. The Arabs probably hope to draw them away from their protege.

The recommendations do not so much punish them as make them pay, in hard cash for their unfriendliness towards the Arabs. Hence the Suez Canal remains closed which means higher oil price for the whole of Europe, except France importing Algerian oil. The financial assistance to the UAR and Jordan enables them to hang on to it and to resist economic pressures till an Israeli withdrawal permits the Canal to be opened and the West Bank to be returned to Jordan. The continuation of the Canal closure does of course, bring little comfort to India and other South and South-East Asian countries. The "summit" spirit, if not the "summit" itself produced the Feisal-Nasser agreement on Yemen. This may be inoperative in Yemen itself but it does much to reduce tension between the leaders of the two ideological camps in the Arab world.

Arab Leftists are condemning this conference as a "self-out" of the Arab revolution but when questioned they cannot suggest what more the conference could have done. That being possible the Arabs have, for the first time, decided to cut their coat according to their cloth.

RASHTRAPATI NILAYAM CIRCULAR

RASHTRAPATI NILAYAM

BOLARUM, Sunday.—In the evening the President gave an "At Home" to the delegates to the All-India Newspapers Editors' Conference at Rashtrapati Nilayam.

SATURDAY.—In the morning the President received: Shri P. S. Rau, Shri Sayyed Ahmadullah Quadri and party, Nawab Hasan Ali Mirza of Masulipatam and family, Prince and Princess Hashim Jah, Shri O. Pulla Reddi, Shri Mujtaba Siddiqui.

The President attended a Luncheon Party given in his honour by H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad.

In the evening the President attended a Staff Tea Party at Rashtrapati Nilayam.

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Were The Arabs Double-Crossed By Lawrence?

By PETER HOPKIRK

AFTER remaining secret for half a century evidence is shortly to be published suggesting that Lawrence of Arabia far from championing Arab freedom was instead working powerfully behind the scenes trying to establish British control of the Middle East with the help of Jewish finance

Months of work on public record office files in London and official Zionist papers in Israel by a team of investigators has yielded evidence that Lawrence was working secretly to establish Britain's first "brown Dominion" in the former Ottoman territories.

The results to be published in September in a new assessment of Lawrence by Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson are likely to come as a shock to both Arab and Israeli historians.

Already proof copies of the book —The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia—are reported to be changing hands on the literary black market for several times the publisher's price.

After thorough study of the evidence in their possession the authors conclude that Lawrence double-crossed the Arabs he fought alongside

Lawrence they say "knew all the time that British policy which he had a hand in formulating, was directly opposed to the sort of freedom the Arabs wanted, to the type of postwar State they believed they had been promised and were fighting for"

The authors argue that Lawrence's influence on the cynical manoeuvring that went on over possession of the former enemy territories is now shown to be considerably greater than has been thought hitherto His strategy for British victory over French and even Arab aspirations the authors declare "involved what can only be described as a calculating use of Zionist aspirations"

Among much other previously unpublished material they quote a confidential letter—described by Lawrence as "explosive"—which he wrote to one of his closest collaborators in the Arab revolt

It outlines a plan for easing the French whom he loathed out of Syria which they had been promised under the Sykes-Picot agreement

Instead it would become a "brown Dominion" within the British Empire (this was before Australia and Canada had Dominion status) supported in exchange for concessions from Faisal, by international Jewish money

"Zionists" Lawrence writes, "are not a Government and not British and their action does not infringe the Sykes-Picot agreement. They are also Semites and Palestinian and the Arab Government is not afraid of them (can cut all their throats or better pull all their teeth out when it wishes).

"They will finance the whole East I hope Syria and Mesopotamia alike" Lawrence goes on "High Jews are unwilling to put much cash into Palestine only since that country offers nothing but a sentimental return. They want six per cent".

The author's comment: "This is what Lawrence was working for and is the explanation of his readiness to help a union between the Zionists and the Arabs It was a bold if cynical plan: the Arabs would provide the land, "international Jewry the money at six per cent"

"It is interesting" they add "to speculate on the shape of the Middle East today had such a scheme succeeded" The ejection of Faisal leader of the Arab revolt from Damascus by French force of arms was Knightley and Simpson say "for Lawrence a humiliating defeat and one from which he was never really to recover"

The book contains material extracted from many new and previously closed sources that is likely to upset national sensibilities in the Middle East and in France

For instance in a report by Lawrence in 1916 while still nominally a second lieutenant in Intelligence in Cairo he outlines his views on an Arab revolt with what the authors describe as "neat if chilling precision"

The action of Husain in raising the revolt Lawrence writes "seems beneficial to us because it marches with our immediate aims the break-up of the Islamic 'bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire and because the States he would set up to succeed the Turks would be as harmless to ourselves as Turkey was before she became a tool in German hands"

One man who has spent a lifetime studying Lawrence in relation to Zionism is Mr Sidney Sugarman, a writer for the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review. After hearing about the new material to be published by Knightley and Simpson he told me

"We have been waiting for years for this material to be made available by the Public Record Office. Without examining it in detail I cannot say whether or not I agree with the authors' conclusions, but it will clearly have the effect of a bombshell among Jews who imagined that Lawrence's Zionism was of a different order, and among Arabs who may have thought he was their friend pure and simple."

Lawrence's dream for the Middle East, the authors suggest, sprang from the influence of a group of prominent men, including Lionel Curtis and D. G. Hogarth—later to head the Arab Intelligence Bureau in Cairo—who belonged to the Round Table Movement.—*From The Times, London.*

WHAT NOT TO DO

Reader's Report. By Christopher Derrick. (Gollancz, 35s).

A NOVELIST may write for many and varied reasons. He may aim solely to please himself or he may have the critics or the general public in mind. But, even if his vision extends to posterity, he must first please the publisher's reader. If he fails in this task, posterity will never benefit from his genius. Mr Derrick has been a publisher's reader for fifteen years, rejecting and, unfortunately less often, accepting manuscripts. He does not claim that it is possible to provide a blue-print for success which, if followed, will produce a literary masterpiece. Nevertheless he is eminently qualified to point out the pitfalls to the aspiring novelist.

One of the most common difficulties is that of starting. Countless people must have sat down with a typewriter and a blank sheet of paper, only to come to a permanent halt. Mr Derrick offers practical help here and suggests that writing, like most professions, requires discipline. This is a point of view held by many successful writers, including Somerset Maugham, who always covered the required amount of foolscap, regardless of apparent inspiration. The important thing is to write; revision is always possible at a later date. When it comes to choosing a story line, the author has definite views on what to avoid. His summary of the thirty-one plots which should be avoided is rather amusing but at the same time, it is a sad comment on the numerous worthless novels which eventually find their way into print.

Inevitably a book which seeks to teach what is basically unteachable has a somewhat unrealistic tone. Mr Derrick can only tell the would-be novelist what to avoid; he cannot often proffer positive advice. The chapters on methods of developing character, the art of writing, and successful conclusions, are therefore largely a list of "don'ts". However, when he turns to the question of publication, the advice is often useful and practical. Perhaps one would not contemplate forwarding hand-written copy to a publisher, yet thousands do every year.

Funding: Arcadia Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Russian Institute of V. A. Serov
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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

Indonesian Question Marks

JAKARTA.

By
DENIS WARNER

NO ONE should ever look too far into the future in Indonesia, but it no longer seems incautious to suggest that the era of Governmental insanity and Communist collaboration that began seven years ago with President Soekarno's assumption of full powers, and endangered all South-East Asia, is approaching its end.

Nasakom, the irreconcilable alliance of nationalist, religious and Communist groups which was the foundation of Dr. Soekarno's political structure, remains, but primarily as a principle that cannot be liquidated without irreparable damage to the prestige of its architect. Jakarta-Peking relations may not collapse, but the much vaunted axis is as dead as the dodo, and while Dr. Soekarno himself has survived as a symbol of Indonesian unity he has become more of a constitutional monarch than a President with dictatorial powers.

This does not mean that Indonesia has suddenly become pro-West—it is unlikely ever to be that. It does not mean that the struggle for power is not continuing, or that there are not bitter times ahead. President Soekarno will not lightly accept the position of a figurehead, and no one should underestimate his powers of persuasion or even, in his own curious way, his powers of leadership.

"I am not optimistic," said an Indonesian leader of moderate political inclinations. "The Communists have certainly had a major setback. It will take them a long time to recover, but I fear we have only delayed things by three or four years."

This represents a gloomier view. Others, many others, are much more cheerful. They point with satisfaction and hope to Communist slogans ripped from hoardings and walls and to the "Hang Aidit" injunctions that have taken their place, to the smoke from burning Communist and Communist front buildings still rising above almost every Indonesian town. These, they say, represent the passing of the point of no return.

Outrage at Murders

The Indonesians are not cruel people, and the initial sense of outrage at the murders on Oct. 1 has been kept alive by the discovery of lists of people earmarked for liquidation, and medieval instruments of torture in the possession of the "Gestapu," as the Sept. 30 coup planners are known.

More significantly, even the voice of Dr. Soekarno, raised now in defence of the Communists (or, as he euphemistically puts it now that his friends are endangered, in the defence of law and order), has gone unheeded. When he complained that actions against the Communists had been misrepresented, and that Aidit's home, contrary to Press reports, had not been wrecked, the Moslem mob, under Army supervision, quickly set the record straight.

Yet the very fact that Dr. Soekarno is back in office at this time, making speeches, however guarded they may be, and flanked by his closest ally and architect of the Peking-Jakarta axis, Dr. Subandrio, is just one insight into the difficulties of self-preservation and control that now confront the two principal survivors of the plot—Gen. Suharto (who was spending the night at a hospital with his sick daughter when the assassins called) and Gen. Nasution.

pened before the coup is never likely to be known. But it is possible to piece together some fragments of the Presidential picture during the hours of crisis, and to draw some obvious conclusions.

According to the President's own version, the palace guard became concerned about the unexplained presence of troops around the palace in the small hours of Oct. 1. At 6 a.m., under escort, he left the palace for Halim Air Force base, a curious destination at any time, but even more curious on this occasion because it was headquarters for the coup d'état in progress, a coup about which the President, by inference, knew nothing. Yet, knowing nothing, he thought the base would be a good place to go in case he needed to fly to a place of safety.

Halim air base is only 15 miles from Jakarta. In the early morning the roads are relatively free of traffic, but even at peak periods the President and his escort would be able to make the journey in less than an hour. On this day it took an unexplained three and a half hours.

Generals Kidnapped

He arrived at the base at 9.30 a.m., the precise moment at which his friend and Air Force Commander, Omar Dani, chose to issue an order of the day explaining that a movement had been conducted through the night to protect the President from American "CIA subversion."

Converging on Halim air base from other parts of Jakarta, along with the Presidential convoy, were the trucks containing other elements of the palace guard, members of the Communist youth and women's organisations, armed and trained by the Air Force, and the kidnapped generals. Two were probably dead. The rest were almost certainly alive, although in poor shape.

From the neighbours of one general I had an eye-witness account of his capture. Representing themselves to be members of the palace guard—which, in some cases, they were—the assassins persuaded the general to open his door. He appeared in his pyjamas and was quickly grabbed by the legs and dragged off, his head bumping on the ground, to a truck waiting 50 yards away. Later, the general was killed at Halim after suffering the vilest tortures and indignities.

Another eye-witness account has Dr. Soekarno at Halim at 10 a.m., sitting in the shade of a tree with his hat and shoes off and in the best of humour. During the day the President's aides visited him from the palace with reports of what had happened in the city. He was also visited at some period during the day by Dr. Leimena, Second Deputy Prime Minister and a Christian, whose quick intuition led him to escape over the garden wall when the assassins called at his home early in the morning.

Safer Base

During the day Dr. Soekarno issued a statement which was published the following morning only in the news agency bulletin, Antara, now purged of its Communist controllers, and the Communist daily, *Harian Rakjat*, which has been banned by the Army. Dr. Soekarno announced that he had taken command of the Army in his own hands and named Gen. Pranoto, an inept personnel officer, sometimes, but inaccurately, labelled a Communist, as "caretaker."

he had no reason to believe he had been murdered, and, if he knew him to be dead, how he acquired this information.

There were certainly doubts in Dr. Soekarno's mind, however, about the wisdom of the course he should now pursue. His friends, Omar Dani, in whose sphere of command the Communist assassins had been armed and trained in secret at Halim, and the Communist leader, D. N. Aidit, who had long campaigned for the creation of just such a "people's army," took off for another and more secure air base at Madiun in central Java.

They wanted Dr. Soekarno to go with them. Instead, he chose to go to his palace at Bogor, a hill station south of Jakarta, thereby establishing his "neutrality." Gen. Suharto ignored the appointment of Pranoto and secured Jakarta. He then drove to Bogor for a five-hour conference with President Soekarno. Out of this meeting came Dr. Soekarno's first brief taped broadcast message. It perplexed the outside world and puzzled many in Indonesia. But it accounts very largely for the continuing Army-Soekarno relationship.

The situation in central Java was tense and explosive. Jogjakarta had fallen to rebel groups and the Diponegoro division, which controls this densely-populated and Communist-impregnated region, was in a state of disunity and ready to throw in its lot entirely with the Sept. 30 movement. Gen. Mokoginta in Sumatra, possibly influenced by Dr. Subandrio, who was in his territory for reasons which have never been adequately explained, appeared convinced that Col. Untung had broken some sort of plot.

Whether delivered freely or under duress (and only the degree is really questionable), it may be argued that Dr. Soekarno's broadcast saved the day from what still could have been civil war or, worse, a bloody and brutal Communist take-over. It has also left Dr. Soekarno with highly dangerous negotiating powers.

Army's Power

Effective control is in the hands of the Army, and one of Suharto's first orders after his official appointment as Chief of Staff and Army Minister was to give his regional commanders wide authority to close down Communist party organisations if there were indications (not evidence) that the local leadership had been involved in, or supported, the Sept. 30 movement.

But the lack of reaction on the part of the Communist party does not mean that it has been broken. For the moment it is lying very low, hoping, no doubt, that Dr. Soekarno's "political settlement" will provide the umbrella under which it may function normally again. If it does not, there is still much that the three million party members and their eleven million followers in "front" organisations can do to frustrate the Army.

At this point, the Malaysian confrontation is the least of the Army's worries. But crushing Malaysia is still an article of faith and it was one policy the Army shared with the Communists. If it is unlikely to be pursued with any great spirit, it is also unlikely to be dropped, at least in the foreseeable future.

If the Army succeeds in its efforts to separate Dr. Subandrio from President Soekarno—and there are leaflets around Jakarta accusing him of having organised the September coup—future relations with China are likely to pursue a very different course. They are, of course, severely

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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By PRAN CHO

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Russian artist V. A. Serov
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Funding: Tattva Herit

IA'S PLAN FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

EFUL MIRROR FOR THE IEWS OF THE WORLD

By PRAN CHOPRA

ve multiplied in the past few days that Presi- Radhakrishnan took a timely and worthwhile hen on April 25 he made his proposals for a tlement in Vietnam. On the one hand interest has spread. On the other, reasons have grown l why India should press such an initiative as also become clearer that it would be wiser is initiative than merely to swell the chorus condemnation. This view is not invalidated mption of the air raids on North Vietnam.

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sals of course are ine at present; no been filled in by nt or others. But there is enough in them as a basis of discussion: cessation of hostilities in both parts of Vietnam, policing of the borders by an Afro-Asian force and maintenance of the present boundaries as long as the people desire it. In fact it would have been premature for the President to speak in greater detail; that might have hindered exploration instead of helping diverse attitudes to unfold themselves. But there should be no hesitation or delay in diplomatic efforts to discover the possible extent of agreement on details.

The area of agreement would be the widest in the USA. Reactions there, though still meagre, have been constructive: the Washington Post has given guarded welcome, and the State Department has officially said it has "taken note of the proposals with interest", and is giving them "very careful consideration". In the same statement the Department said the USA "is prepared to stop bombing North Vietnam whenever there is a clear indication that Hanoi is ceasing its aggression". This places the recent suspension of the raids, despite their subsequent resumption, in a context which excites conjecture. Was there an incipient initiative somewhere which for some reason has folded up? The possibility should not be ruled out despite the unsuspended bellicosity of Peking. At any rate the break in the raids proves the willingness of the USA to open the door if ever there is a sign of any helpful moves.

The Government in Saigon, as Washington's principal partner in the fighting, has not been as forthcoming as the State Department. But it has gone as far as it could in the given circumstances. After first describing the proposals as "very difficult to implement" (no one has any illusions about the difficulties), it has announced that it will cease to be an obstacle if Hanoi is convinced as Peking that the cause of the war in Vietnam is "American imperialism"; but at the same time it must be quite obvious to them, as it is to others, that China's ambitions are also stoking the fires. It is only so long as the war goes on, regardless of the sufferings of the North and South, that Peking can keep the screws of its tactics tight on Moscow: to hot up the international climate and make co-existence an impracticable doctrine, to interfere with Russian supplies for the North (the effect of interference is becoming increasingly patent) and at the same time to expose the Russians to merciless taunting for being sluggish in coming to the aid of Hanoi.

Peking also pays a price of course. its reluctance to take on the military power of the USA is becoming increasingly obvious in spite of the blood and thunder of its warnings. But on the whole the balance of advantage—Peking's, not Hanoi's—will continue to persuade China to prolong the war so long as ideological clothing can be found for these tactics. Therefore no efforts for a settlement, however reasonable, will bring a favourable response from Peking (or from Hanoi so long as it remains a prisoner of Peking). But that is no reason why countries interested in a fair and peaceful settlement, among which the Soviet Union can be safely counted, should be hesitant in their efforts; neither Peking's intransigence nor the resumption of bombing raids on the North should deter them.

INDIA'S ROLE

India can only play a limited rôle because her diplomatic reach is not what it used to be. But the direction which her efforts should take is clear: to keep ideological fires from rising still higher (these only help China to forge her own devices), and to help in giving shape to proposals for a settlement which the rest of the world, if not Peking and its retinue, would regard as fair and reasonable. Such proposals by themselves will not produce a settlement until some freedom of action is restored to Hanoi. But some potent though indirect results can follow which can not fail to help when the right time comes.

First, the state of world opinion will reveal itself more clearly to the two principal antagonists, Peking and Washington, and not only on specific aspects of their action, like the Communist infiltration in the South or the air raids on the North, but on some well-defined essentials of a long-term settlement. This should put a restraint on both, dissuading each (to the extent that it really values world opinion, which both claim to do in equal measure!) from becoming a permanent obstruction to peace. Secondly the grip of China's propaganda on Moscow will loosen. The grip is strong precisely because of Moscow's fear that world opinion in general and the Afro-Asians in particular would regard the Soviet Union as weak if it did not outdo China in being "tough" with the USA. But if the raids cease to be a issue Peking if een to be chances for ent. Release will also encouraging han so far, through its ng's.

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

G... nvention R ..ats Merger Demand

PANJIM May ..—The Congress Parliamentary Board's decision of April 7, 1964 to "keep" Goa as a Union territory for 10 years was "never acceptable" to the people of Goa, a resolution adopted today at the two-day Goa-Maharashtra merger convention here said reports PTI.

The resolution said: "If the Central Government and the Congress High Command are going to disregard the democratic verdict of the Goan people manifested through constitutional means and call for fresh elections on the same issue, the population of Goa will not give its concurrence to such a decision.

"The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party contested the general elections in accordance with the opinion of Mr Nehru that the future of Goa had to be decided by the people of Goa. The M.G. Party came out victorious in these elections which were fought on the principle of merger with Maharashtra whereas the United Goans Party fought the elections on the principle of a separate Statehood for Goa."

Yesterday the PSP leader, Mr Nath Pai, inaugurated the convention

He said one invariably got the impression that the Government of India had been always eager to find excuses not to implement the decision which the people of Goa had expressed in the General Election namely, that Goa be merged with Maharashtra. To build a country of united people determined to resist Pakistani aggression and to create a sense of emotional integration in the country problems like the merger of Goa with Maharashtra and inter-State boundary disputes should be speedily and boldly settled

Mr Nath Pai said any attempt to topple the Bandodkar Ministry and introduce President's rule in Goa would be resisted by the people.


RADIO TELEPHONES FOR RAILWAYS

The Railways have decided to introduce radio telephones in trains, says UNI.

The driver of the locomotive will be able to maintain direct telephonic contact with the central control office. The system will initially be introduced to meet only operational needs.

Later it will be extended as a passenger amenity.





POOR MAINTEN... OF TRAFFIC P...

Lack Of Co-ordi... Biggest Hindra...

BY A STAFF REPORTER

For long, a children's traffic park w... need of Delhi where thousands of childre... to the danger of road accidents every day, ... authorities never thought of providing one ...

Over a year ago, the Burmah-Shell Company donated a children's traffic park. The park, complete with equipment for imparting education in road safety, was opened with the usual pomp on Irwin road.

The children, however, did not benefit as much as they should have. The New Delhi Municipal Committee, which received the gift on behalf of the people, not only failed to maintain it properly, it also did not put it to the maximum use.

The biggest hindrance in the proper maintenance and utilization of the facilities at the park is the lack of co-ordination between the NDMC and the traffic police, who are supposed to run the show jointly, and between the different departments of the NDMC itself.

Though it is well over a year since the park was opened, no integrated, well-planned programme of traffic education has been introduced. Due to lack of planning, hardly any children are available for training during the current summer vacation.

ANNUAL FUNCTION

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THE POPE ... TWO ...

Russian artist V. A. Serov

Research Institute, Melukote Collection

Funding: Tattva Herita

the Vice-Premier of South Vietnam said in New Delhi that his Government would study the scheme very carefully. It is an interesting detail that between his first and revised comment he had a meeting with Dr Radhakrishnan at which "the difficulties", it is safe to presume, must have been considered at length. The Japanese Foreign Office has set up "a special study" of the plan and there has been welcoming comment in some of the non-aligned countries in Africa. In other parts of the non-Communist world the response has been a keen and generally favourable interest, though in some capitals it has been less vocal than in others.

USES IN MOSCOW

Reactions in Moscow should be less of a riddle than before Mr Shastri's visit there; it should now be easier for India to judge how far official statements and private views diverge in the Kremlin. The reasons for divergence are so many and obvious that it would be best not to take the statements at face value. The domestic cold war in the Communist world might have forced Moscow to speak in the accents of Peking. But it must be clear to the people in the Kremlin that they have been caught in a Chinese vice. They might be as convinced as Peking that the cause of the war in Vietnam is "American imperialism"; but at the same time it must be quite obvious to them, as it is to others, that China's ambitions are also stoking the fires. It is only so long as the war goes on, regardless of the sufferings of the North and South, that Peking can keep the screws of its tactics tight on Moscow: to hot up the international climate and make co-existence an impracticable doctrine, to interfere with Russian supplies for the propaganda asset for Peking if its main result is seen to be the wrecking of all chances for a reasonable settlement. Release from this handicap will also help Moscow in encouraging Hanoi, more firmly than so far, to see its interests through its own eyes, not Peking's.

But whether India's reach is limited or long it can do more with the President's proposals than with any others which have been put forward by anyone. Consultation with other countries might help to improve them, bringing in details which will refine and clarify the scheme, make it more broad-based, more widely acceptable. As the outline grows it will evoke a more ample response, and the response will certainly be more relaxed than to anything which originates directly from either of the principal antagonists But even as it stands the scheme meets all the principal viewpoints involved in the fighting: it provides for American withdrawal and—at a time to be chosen by the people themselves—elections on the all-important issue of unification; it also provides for the only practicable alternative—an Afro-Asian border force—to the American presence which is not able to do much more by way of checking infiltration than a police force of the neutrals could with adequate support by way of logistics. The first part of the scheme puts it directly in line with the Geneva proposals action on which has been repeatedly demanded by Peking and Hanoi; the second part removes the provocation of the presence of those whom Peking chooses to denounce as imperialists. In any case and however incomplete in its present form, the scheme is a good enough mirror to hold to each country in turn to see a reflection of its real intentions.

Fundi... Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKe...

POLITICAL COMMENTARY

CAPITAL FURY OVER OUR MEN IN PEKING

WAR NEWS DIVERTS ATTENTION FROM SHEIKH ABDULLAH

By INDER MALHOTRA

WHAT a week it was. The disastrous war in West Asia was followed by the disgusting war dance in Peking, and it was no surprise that the flaming anger against China's barbarous treatment of two of our diplomats diverted attention from other important issues of the day such as the mechanics of lifting the Emergency and the future of Sheikh Abdullah.

At the outset, a brief word of welcome may be said about a sensible decision taken by the Union Government. The Chiefs of Staff Committee at the Defence Ministry, it seems, has been asked to make a thorough study of the four-day war between Israel and the Arab countries, and to draw appropriate military lessons for India. There is every hope that the military experts' report, when ready, will be a valuable document.

Some of the lessons of what happened in the Sinai desert are self-evident. The dangers of complacence have been demonstrated most vividly, just as the immense advantage of a surprise attack has been underlined for the umpteenth time. And the overriding importance of self-reliance as well as the folly of depending on others has been laid bare for the wide world to see.

The vital rôle of the Air Force has been underscored, and it has been shown that a radar network with a gap in it is no better than no radar at all. Furthermore, the point has been driven home that the superiority of numbers can sometimes be overcome by technological superiority. A relatively small army was able to defeat a much larger force pitted against it because of not only superior and sophisticated equipment and streamlined organization but also superior training. It is said that the Israelis had five trained pilots to every aircraft.

Indeed, the point can be made that the four-day fighting in West Asia has rendered out of date a basically sound military doctrine. It has often been said, with ample justification, that in warfare the size, stamina and economic strength of a country are more important than the mere striking power of its military machine, although the latter might be of some initial advantage. Unfortunately, all this is true only of wars which last at least a couple of years, if not longer, while West Asia has confirmed what has been known for some time—that in the latter half of the twentieth century, wars [illegible] just more than a few [illegible] a few [illegible] haviour towards [illegible] had to go to unprecedented and revolting limits, before New Delhi decided to retaliate without, it must be said, the indecency that China displayed.

Until now, in the face of Chinese pin-pricks, provocations and even insults, the Union Government's reply used to be: "After all we are civilized people; we cannot stoop to their level". Some of the policy-makers, left to themselves, might even have preferred to practise the virtue of turning the other cheek.

In its dealings with Pakistan, the Government of India never wore the kid gloves with which it chose to handle the Chinese for many years. But even so, there has been no riposte by New Delhi to several excesses by Rawalpindi. Take, for instance, Mr Bhutto's infamous speech calling the Indians dogs. Our representatives at New York were too civilized to react, and the delegates of other nations presumably too blase to care.

Far worse was the Indian failure to do anything about the horrible treatment the Pakistanis meted out to the members of the Indian High Commission in Pakistan during the September war in 1965. There is no doubt that the inmates of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi also suffered some hardships at that time. But the discomfort of the Pakistanis was a luxury compared to the humiliation the Pakistanis inflicted on the helpless Indian diplomats in their country.

It was with great difficulty that the then Indian High Commissioner in Karachi conveyed his tale of woe to New Delhi. South Block's initial reaction was characteristic; the tragic telegrams were sought to be suppressed. When the untold story trickled out somehow, more energy was spent on locating the source of leakage than on doing something about the plight of our men in Pakistan. By the time the External Affairs Ministry prodded itself into making muffled protests, the Tashkent Declaration came along.

It is debatable if reciprocity or retaliation in every detail is a sound policy under all circumstances. But it is extremely doubtful if parliamentary and public opinion will allow the Government to act in any other way, especially in our relations with Pakistan and China.

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Apart from the indecency of the Chinese behaviour, the Government's decision to lift the Emergency from all parts of the country except specified sensitive areas on the border has run into difficulties. the uncertainty about the future of the Emergency is likely to add to the uncertainty about the re view of the Sheikh's detention

In fairness, it must also be reported that some other factors in recent days have strengthened the school of thought which is opposed to any change in Sheikh Abdullah's present status. Fears of an unsettling effect on Kashmir have always been urged as a ground against a sudden release of the Sheikh. To these have now been added apprehensions about possible Pakistani intentions this autumn. And current Chinese behaviour has led some to believe that next time the collusion between Peking and 'Pindi might be much worse than two years ago.

Those who have been advocating the Sheikh's release —irrespective of whether the Emergency remains or goes— have been making the valid point that the Kashmir leader should be released unconditionally and for an indefinite period, and that the past history of having to re-arrest him soon after release must not be repeated. This can be possible only under two conditions: either there is a political agreement with the Sheikh or the régime in Kashmir is strong enough politically to contain him. Of these two possibilities the first would appear preferable, if also more feasible. In fact, the strongest argument of the advocates of Sheikh Abdullah's release has been that the Sheikh is likely to agree that Pakistan has no longer any locus standi in Kashmir and that he may, therefore, accept a solution of the Kashmir question within the framework of the Indian Union.

In view of this hope, it was only to be expected that someone would see the Sheikh and try to probe his mind. But no such effort has been made even though the Sheikh has been in Delhi for a week. The reason, it seems, is the Sheikh's own reluctance to meet anybody to talk politics. This does not augur well for an understanding between the Centre and the Sheikh.

Apart from Sheikh Abdullah's future, there is another aspect of the Kashmir situation on which the Centre will have to take a quick decision. Jammu has long complained of a raw deal in comparison to the Kashmir valley, and its regional aspirations for equality and autonomy have received a powerful boost because of Dr Karan Singh's entry into active politics as a member of the Central Cabinet. Mr G. M. Sadiq and others, Ministers of the Kashmir Government have been grumbling about Dr Karan Singh's [illegible] views on regional [illegible] within the [illegible] goings-on in China—about the fact that the crucial post of the Director in charge of the China desk at the Foreign Office has been lying vacant for nearly two months.

a change in the venue of his detention as well as fresh legal sanction behind it.

But since the Government's

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

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the inconsequence of an aggressor's initial advantage has, therefore, become dangerous nonsense. Whoever strikes first and is able to grab territory can go a long way towards achieving his objectives. The Big Powers will stand back and watch, and the Security Council will be content with "calling for", "demanding" or "insisting on" a simple cease-fire.

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THERE has to be a first time for everything; even for reciprocity in bloody-mindedness. China's uncivilized behaviour towards our diplomats had to go to unprecedented and revolting limits, before New Delhi decided to retaliate without, it must be said, the indecency that China displayed.

Until now, in the face of

ALTHOUGH the continued restrictions on the movement of Sheikh Abdullah would have merited reconsideration in any case, for obvious reasons, the current consultations about the Sheikh's future have got inextricably intermixed with the issue of lifting the Emergency from the country. If the Sheikh were to be released, it is argued, the end of the Emergency would be an appropriate time to do so. If his continued detention is deemed necessary, the termination of the Emergency will warrant a change in the venue of his detention as well as fresh legal sanction behind it.

But since the Government's decision to lift the Emergency

Kashmir. The subdued squab
ble cannot be allowed to last
Mrs Gandhi and her colleague
will have to take a clear stand
one way or the other.

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Tailpiece: It has by now
become an accepted fact tha
during a crisis in any country
the Indian Ambassador i
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But the West Asia crisis was
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DANGER OF SHORT-CUTS IN THE JUNGLE OF UNREST

OVERHAUL OF STANDARDS OF PUBLIC LIFE IS NEEDED

By PRAN CHOPRA

IN a flurry of self-criticism in the past few weeks, Government and other authorities have taken many a belated step about the current unrest among students. State Governments have been told to be firm, colleges to be solicitous about the welfare of students, Vice-Chancellors to be impartial, teachers to be high-minded and virtuous.

If these exhortations are followed up by some action—experience amply justifies the "if"—some good may come out of the agony and shame of the past six months, in which society has been held to ransom by multifarious rowdies. Pressure areas and flash-points which have flourished under cover of long-neglected frustrations may be eased at last. But there is also much danger in the kind of fragmented thinking which has been going on; the past is witness to that as well. Palliatives may be mistaken for cures, temporary relief as a sign of sound health. That would be an invitation to disaster. The cushion of time has worn terribly thin, and even a year or two later it may be too late for basic remedies to cure the real ailments of the country.

That is what makes it so distressing to see so much time wasted on superficial diagnosis and patchwork surgery, such as Mrs Gandhi's search for similarities between our own students' conduct and what Indonesia, Japan or Korea have been through. Notwithstanding the occasional waving of banners about Vietnam in the streets of Calcutta, or the anxiety of the microscopic numbers of students in Andhra who might not get jobs if the State does not get a steel plant, there is very little of high motives behind the tumult by students. Rather, it shows a complete breakdown of accepted norms of behaviour.

NO SHORT-CUTS

This breakdown in turn has little to do with what the students themselves most often scream about when they start up a riot: rudeness by a bus conductor, in which students have found reason for an orgy of destruction by burning; the rate of tickets for the cinema, because of which whole towns have been shaken up; the strictness of a hostel superintendent, because of which Universities have been forced to shut down. If these were the causes of disturbances, cures would be simple; but they are only the occasions. That is why the current emphasis, by the patient and physicians alike, upon "students' grievances" is so misleading that it is dangerous. It creates the illusion that all will be well if grievances are quickly located and eliminated. But that is not so; in this howling jungle of unrest in which we [illegible] economic hardship and cruelty of the daily environment. These are important: from Negro slum-dwellers in Watts to those who risk their lives twice a day in riding Calcutta's city transport, people have been driven to insane acts when they cannot take it any more. Nor is this a reference to the deeper discontents caused by the wide gap between education and livelihood, which does in fact disorient the student seriously. For him, education has lost such limited purpose as it once had, alienating him from society instead of integrating him with it. It had alienated his forefathers too because Western education, as transplanted to India, aimed at producing docile clerks, not citizens; it was a gigantic case of brainwashing, and judging by results highly successful for some decades. But at least it gave them white-collar jobs and the synthetic prestige which went with them. Now education has lost even that limited and cynically conceived economic function. There are not enough clerkships to go round any longer; today's student comes out neither as a citizen nor as a cog in the machine.

FUTILE REBELS

But it is possible to overemphasize economic discontent as a source of the students' disorientation. Others more difficult to identify or define, may be more important. They could explain why rowdy behaviour is not less marked among students whose living standards are visibly higher than of millions of youth who are too poor to go to school; or why so many of our youth, till yesterday steeped in pervasive indifference in which all reactions, healthy or sick, had slumbered, have transited almost overnight to become violent rebels without a cause. For these, more deep-seated sources, however, there are no short-term remedies. There are certainly none in the squalid little teaching workshops which pass for our schools and colleges—none in New Delhi's exhortations for the rapid redress of the "grievances" of students, none in the discretion sought for the principal to decide whether or not he should call in the police while screaming students wreck the building. In the new promises to provide better education, with more teaching facilities and more worthy teachers, there might be some hope. But it is not easy to be enthusiastic about them; they have been heard many times before.

The seeds of the trouble lie in the general decline of all standards of public life, at almost all levels but more particularly at the top. It affects all walks of life and almost everyone, each person responding to the [illegible] according to his malaise there may never escape. But that, fortunately, is not so—yet. There are many reasons for hope, but three will suffice. For one, this is not the first time that there is an air of crisis or despondency in the country. There have been many anxious periods before, such as the tumult preceding the reorganization of States; there was never a darker crisis in recent years than at the time of the Chinese attack; gloom is not deeper now than in the last 18 months of Mr Nehru's decline.

Secondly, even now almost nothing is as dark as some people make out who are more articulate than perceptive. News reports by their very nature exaggerate, however honest they might be. New Delhi's traumatic experience last week is a recent and vivid example. Reports made it seem that the capital was a shambles; in a sense it was and probably will never be the same place again. But less than a week later the city wore a near normal look; Divali was, if anything, somewhat better than normal and by Saturday the city had taken the preceding Monday's shame in its stride. If spreading gloom had not become a way of life in New Delhi, probably other things also would not appear to be worse than they are.

Thirdly, and this is a more important reason than the other two, feeble, inept and prone to dithering though it is, the Government is not above learning a little from experience. The ability with which many Ministries are being run is not less in the aggregate than it has usually been; compared with some occasions in the past it is distinctly better and a few Ministries are being run quite remarkably well.

WASTED TIME

Recovery, therefore, cannot be ruled out by any means. But time has been wasted, and it continues to be, and in the one matter where it is of the essence—in improving standards of political conduct at the top. These too are improving at the apex, but not fast enough to stem the rot below. At the same time that Mrs Gandhi was exhorting students to behave better, such enormous Ministries were being formed in the diminutive States of Haryana and Punjab that every other member of the two legislatures became a paid employee of the Government. This is as blatant an example as can be found of the subversion of political process by those placed in charge of it by the country. These things incite other people to their own brands of irresponsible behaviour, not exaggerations in the Press as Mrs Gandhi implied on Tuesday when she spoke to the General Assembly of I.P.I.

For better or worse we have become an intensely political community, and contagion travels faster through our political veins than any other. If in spite of that the system still holds together as well as it does, it is only because societies are not destroyed overnight, even incipient societies such as free India's; it takes time to dismantle them. But equally, it takes much time to build them up too and even more to consolidate them. Therefore even if the Government—and the Congress, its inevitable companion in reform or decay—begin right away to be more mindful of their duties, it will not immediately make others more mindful of their own. But delay now, for the sake of winning elections in

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More noble sounding but not more relevant is a cause often talked about by students, teachers and university leaders—intrusions by the police into the campus. The intrusions are indeed a growing and disturbing phenomenon and many vice-chancellors, now with the backing of educational authorities in New Delhi, have demanded that they alone should decide whether or when the police should move in. But nothing would be more unwise in present circumstances. If disturbances on the campus were few and isolated, affected institutions could be left free to handle them. But when they become, as they have, frequent and widespread, often violent and part of a general wave of lawlessness (whether occasioned by the latter or contributing to it is immaterial), it makes no more sense to put them beyond the reach of the normal machinery of law and order than it would to treat the economic grievances of the students as something apart from, say, labour's or the country's as a whole.

What value is left—now—in the safeguard which is sometimes suggested, that the principal of a college or a university's vice-chancellor may appeal for police help when he needs it? Not in one instance but several these gentlemen have been held incommunicado by the leading lights of studentry; at the drop of a handkerchief they are cut off from the outside world, including the police. It is a drastic and distasteful remedy to give the police discretion to act on its own; but it would be a disaster to forbid it. We cannot first create the need for such unpleasant medicines and then throw them out of the window because the patient may not like them.

A LONG HAUL

Why places of education have ceased to be the fountains of enlightened behaviour they should be is more important in the long run than the means by which authority should cope with the disorders that pour out of them every day. An article on the opposite page suggests some of the causes: meddlesome politicians, as often Congressmen in search of support for their factions as some Opposition leaders with a grand design on the country; short-sighted management of individual courses and institutions which jeopardizes the future career of students or violates earlier promises by authority. But these, however important in individual cases, are only contributory causes. Others are more serious and deep-seated, which only the long haul of steady effort will cure—and that too only if time is not frittered away any longer, as it has been for years.

The reference here is not to economic hardship and the cruelty of the daily environment. These are important: from Negro slum-dwellers in Watts to those who risk their lives twice a day in riding Calcutta's city transport, people have been driven to insane acts when they cannot take it any more. Nor is this a reference to the deeper respond by ashamedly into the worst forms of opportunism, such as those to whom the opportunity is open to subvert society through political or money-making chicanery. Some by giving in to a corrosive mood of cynicism and gloom; they are unable to see good in anything at all, so that the good they could do if they would dies within them, doing far greater harm to the country than troublesome students or workers do. Labour responds by throwing all duty to the winds, capital by swallowing any kind of idealism it might have had once; self-destructively they sacrifice all our tomorrows to the passing moment today. Grown-ups respond by holding up trains, teachers and professors by walking out of their institutions, Government employees by bringing the Administration to paralysis; nurses, doctors and even policemen—themselves the arm of law and order—by descending to the most benighted forms of trade unionism.

MORAL DECLINE

Is it reasonable to expect then that students alone will remain models of good behaviour, undefiled by the air they breathe? All that distinguishes them from other people is that they are too young to have learnt the virtue of restraint, or to have directly experienced such responsibilities as still reduce at least some parents to more or less reasonable conduct. Or else some smattering of education distinguishes them from illiterate youth. But this only makes them more prone, not less, to what the Government is now loudly lamenting in them. The more perceptive they are, the more they imbibe of the general climate around them; the quicker, then, is their transition from apathy and the more violent and disoriented their behaviour. Their actions are nothing like a conscious revolt on behalf of large causes but only a predisposition to unsocial behaviour because they have lost all sympathy with the society in which they live; it gives them no chance to respect it at all. That only makes them still more pliable in the hands of the professional mob-maker and the non-students who have wormed their way into the campus.

In essence their actions do not differ a great deal from the irresponsible behaviour of other classes; only its form is different, more in keeping with the only kind of irresponsibility that is open to them. Public opinion is appalled when students go on strike against any effort to raise examination standards or otherwise to improve the quality of education. But is that very different from the manufacture and sale of shoddy goods to a public which has no option but to accept what it gets?

At first sight it would seem that from such a widespread malaise there may never be an escape. But that, fortunately, is not so—yet. There are many reasons for hope, but three will suffice. For one, this is not the first time that there is an air of crisis or despondency in the country. There have been many anxious periods before, such as

person or that or for restoring the prestige of one fallen leader or another, could very well mean that the whole game will be lost. As it is, disruption is spreading faster than consolidation, thanks to the dilution of political standards for many years in the past. But the race is not lost yet and will not be if the Government and the Congress allow the state of the country to jolt them into a more lively appreciation of their own obligations. From them, if from anyone, the example can spread to students and others.

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IS STYLE OUTMODED?

By A. MADHAVAN

I SOMETIMES fear that the English language will die of overuse. A relatively small vocabulary feeds all the books, magazines and papers with which we are deluged.

Writing, which is the art of arranging proper words in the proper order, has declined into a habit of stringing along cliches. How easily we reach for prefabricated phrases when we are too lazy to strain invention! 'Explore every avenue', 'leave much to be desired', 'in the larger interests of mankind', 'in view of these considerations', etc. These are thought-surrogates which flow down the nib when we begin to express our second-rate opinions in a second-hand diction.

The fastidious writer is handicapped by having to rummage in the same stock of words as is available to all and sundry. If he goes in for rare words, archaisms and neologisms, he will probably antagonise his readers. However well he writes, he will be swamped by torrents of standardised prose. Consider this sample:

> In appraising the long-run prospects for economic development of the underdeveloped areas, it must be recognised at the outset that economic assistance can only make available a basic requisite, capital, for economic development. The actual effectiveness of the aid itself would depend upon the extent to which it succeeds in eliciting increased national development efforts, which is not necessarily coincidental with a maximum increase in income.

You recognise at once the lumpy texture, the drab tone, so stale and anonymous in its conformity with the diction of modern mediocrity. In standardised prose you will find expressions like 'orientation', 'institutionalise', 'launching an offensive', 'envisage', 'visualise', 'integration', 'in the field of culture', 'experiencing a bottleneck', etc. Its hallmark is the absence of individuality, the utter lack of style.

Distinctiveness

Great writers, however, manage to leave the impress of a distinctive personality on their works. That is style—to have a voice which can be distinguished from the braying of the assess. There is no uniquely superlative style. The prose of Swift is quite different from the prose of Macaulay, though both are excellent. We are not likely to mistake Lamb for Landor or Joyce for Hemingway. There is room on Parnassus for many voices.

Most of us are not writers, but ordinary users of the language. Why should we aim to acquire a literary style? Is it not better to concentrate on writing good English in plain, workaday prose?

This functional approach is good, but if you have a distinctive personality, there is no reason why you should not allow it to be aesthetically reflected in your writing. One should, of course, be careful in the choice of one's model. There should be no jarring discord between one's own nature and one's adopted style.

If R. K. Narayan set out to write like Sir Thomas Browne, he would not carry conviction. That is why I have disregarded Dr. Johnson's advice that one should give one's days and nights to Addison. Personally, I agree with Voltaire, who said: "All styles are good, except the tiresome sort."

There are many Indians who are in the intermediate stage of having learnt the craft, but not the art, of writing. Among the few exceptions who can lay claim to style, I would include (1) President Radhakrishnan (*The Idealist View of Life*) (2) Jawaharlal Nehru (*Autobiography*) (3) Nirad C. Chaudhury (*Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*) (4) Ved Mehta (*Face to Face*) (5) K. P. S. Menon (*Russian Panorama*). A few others, like Rajaji and M. Krishnan, have also written with distinction.

The odd man out is Nirad Chaudhury. His prose is vigorous, but tortuous, querulous, bookish, oblique. It is inimitable, but hardly worth imitation. The other authors I have listed have a certain kinship in style: a simple, direct manner, an engaging tone, a preference for terse sentences; admirable virtues in any writing. What a pity that our text-book committees do not seem to have heard of any but the first two in my list.

Technique

The technique of style has been brilliantly treated by Cyril Connolly in *The Enemies of Promise*. He made an illuminating distinction between 'the Mandarin style' and 'the vernacular style'. The former is self-consciously literary, artificial at once removed from common speech. The latter is of the very stuff of colloquial speech. Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley were Mandarins, while Hemingway and Maugham were vernacular writers.

On the whole, I think it is easier and safer to cultivate the vernacular style, because the Mandarin style, unless it is skilfully done, tends to sound arty, inflated and insincere. Walter Pater, once famed as a stylist, has fallen from grace for this very reason. It is said that Pater used to give a whole page to each sentence, the better to scrutinise its balance, rhythm and construction. In certain passages of rarefied prose, he did achieve a studied brilliance: take, for example, the Mona Lisa passage, which impressed Yeats so much that he served it up as the first 'poem' in tht *Oxford Book of English Verse*.

> She is older than the rocks among which she sits. Like the Vampire, she has been dead many times and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants; and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, as St. Anne, was the mother of Mary. And all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands.

This kind of fine writing can be taken in small doses, but not in bulk.

Maugham achieved a monotonous perfection in the vernacular style. In *The Summing Up* he has compressed his opinions on the subject with wisdom and precision. Modestly he disclaims any lyric quality or gift of metaphor. "On taking thought, it seemed to me that I must aim at lucidity, simplicity and euphony. I have put these three qualities in the order of importance I assigned to them." His theory is that "to write good prose is an affair of good manners" and that "good prose should be like the clothes of a well-dressed man, appropriate, but unobtrusive." Maugham is terrified of appearing flashy or flamboyant. He is like R. L. Stevenson, who chose as his motto: "War to the adjective, death to the optic nerve!"

Not enough attention has been paid to the prose of major poets like Milton, Dryden, Shelley and Eliot. There is a close stylistic affinity between their prose and poetry. Yeats's prose is luminous and lyrical, like his best poetry. In the prose of Dylan Thomas, there is the same profusion of unusual images and word combinations which we find in his verse.

Auden, whom we knew to be a clever and facile poet, has revealed himself as a great prose-writer, an aphorist of rare intensity and freshness. No lover of good writing should miss his volume of essays, The Dyer's Hand. New directions in style should be sought in the disciplined diction of Yeats and Auden rather than the maudlin rhetoric of Joyce and Burroughs.

Literature, as distinguished from journalism, is something that will bear a second reading. Here form and content are too closely related to be analysed separately. The same writer may choose different styles for different purposes. But the main point is that his way of writing is personal to him; he does not write like a committee or a corporation of pen-pushers.

Shoddy Writing

One of the first things he must learn is to avoid shoddy writing, the deadwood of standardised prose. Orwell's essay on 'Politics and the English Language' should be required reading for journalists and speechifiers. He vigorously attacks current habits of literary sloth: stale imagery, dying metaphors pretentious and pseudo-scientific diction.

I conclude with a plea for style. If we go on taking refuge behind the impersonal facade of standardised prose, our thinking will also become standardised. It will lose its natural freshness. Let us not be afraid of being ourselves. Let us patent our own way of putting things. We should not merely tolerate, but encourage, little quirks and eccentricities of expression, quixotic flights of fancy, which may redeem a page or two from the oblivion that is reserved for most of our output.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

...tea it would have been surprising if they had not. But still one is amazed at the enterprise of the firm of record publishers which had "Israel's Finest Hour", the speech of Mr Eban to the Security Council, on sale as a 33-rpm disc within two days of its delivery. Also on sale is "Favourite Marches of the Israeli Army" for only $3.99.

BOOK TRADE BOOM

The Israeli boom in the book trade will surely pass, but what may remain and grow is the new militancy of the Jewish people. In an editorial in the June 16 issue of *Jewish Press*, a paper published weekly from Brooklyn, this state of mind was clearly expressed: "What may have been Israel's secret weapon was not a secret after all. That weapon has been the Israeli determination to never passively accept annihilation and never again be caught in indecisiveness or in the confusion that brought about the slaughter of six million Jews in Germany under the Nazi rule".

This was put differently by Barbara Rubin, a gentle, almost angelic person who makes underground films and who plans to adopt 20 Indian children and ...ballst that even the Chazon Ish referred people to him for help.

"Before his death, less than one year ago, he left instructions that his will be opened after Lag B'Omer. When it was finally read last week it told of a war that would take place between the Israelis and Arabs which would result in an Israeli victory in three days, followed by the arrival of the Masheach".

But I was not wholly despondent over the proceedings at the rally. For, while the faithful were listening to all the words of unreason, they were behaving in a most human fashion when the collection box came round to them. I noticed a woman take out first a fiver from her purse, look at the extent of financial sacrifice the woman next to her was making for their hard-pressed brethren in Israel, only a dollar, and quickly put the fiver back in the purse. She too was going to spend only a dollar for the carrying out of God's will in the Holy Land.

And it is not only in the essential humanity of the Jewish people that one could place one's trust that all will somehow find a way out of the tragedy of Palestine; one has to remember that if among the Jews some are

Russian artist V. A. Serov

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A MILITANT ISRAEL EVOKES U.S. ADMIRATION

HOPE FOR FUTURE IN REBELS AGAINST JEWISH ORTHODOXY

From JYOTIRMOY DATTA

LIVING in New York, the world's biggest Jewish city, this past one month has been a saddening experience. The wandering and persecuted descendants of Moses had so far been not just a people but an idea that burdened the conscience of the world; they are now, alas, a nation, with all the trappings of a State, not excluding armies and prison camps.

And yet, instead of grieving over the spectacle of this martyred people acting like drunken militarists, there seems to be universal rejoicing in America at the licking the Arabs got. There are almost as many Jews in this one city as in the entire State of Israel—1,836,000 to be exact—and they were all cheering General Dayan as the new prophet, the Masheach.

But the cheering is not limited to the Jews alone. The lightning war in West Asia turned yesterday's doves into flapping eagles; suddenly it is no longer possible to distinguish those who were protesting against the Vietnam war from those who wanted Hanoi bombed out of the face of the earth.

Senator Robert Kennedy was not alone in demanding that the USA more actively support Israel's cause. The *New Republic*, which is a liberal, even a Leftist, weekly saw in the war not a setback to Arab nationalism, nor even a victory for the technologically more advanced State of Israel, but America's victory and Russia's defeat played out through lifeless pawns on the West Asian stage. "It is painful to see how alive the cold war still is. It seems incomprehensible to many Westerners that new spirits are abroad in Asia and Africa, and Arab nationalism is one of them. Mr Nasser is not a puppet, a fact which Mr Ben Gurion, himself a product of Israeli nationalism, can understand but not those who see in every world event either a setback to Communism or a defeat for the "free world."

It is understandable, though, why the uncommitted and naive viewer should cheer little Israel in its fight against the big Arab bullies. A Manhattan cab driver, who had watched the Indian representative's performance in the Security Council on TV, told me: "You should be ashamed, man, that your country is supporting that windbag Nasser who talked like a lion and is acting like a kitten!"

And three Jewish children in the Brooklyn subway, pouring over General Dayan's *Diary of The Sinai Campaign* (of 1956), murmured: "Think of it! Five nations against one! And we won!"

On the counters of drug stores, books on the war have already appeared. In this culture of instant [illegible] live with them in India, who was pained by my implied criticism of Israel's "pre-emptive" war. "Can't we do anything right? All the world blames the Jews for walking sheepishly to their death in the gas chambers of Auschwitz, and now that we put up a fight, we are still blamed!"

It was difficult to make her see that to fight for survival is one thing, a most noble thing, and to grab territory, throw the inhabitants out, and seize a city for a stone wall, be it even the Wailing Wall, quite another.

The Wailing Wall can be important only to a certain kind of people. One such wrote a letter to the weekly I have already quoted from and which deserves to be quoted at length: "This is a fervent plea for the Jews that have strayed from yiddishkeit to come back to a Torah true way of life. To start praying to say Thilim and G-d being merciful and full of loving kindness will help us to destroy our enemies as in the days of old. Just as the Bible says, five of us will chase 1,000 and one hundred will chase 10,000... Let's now try earnestly for the powers of prayer are great and now is the time. (Mrs) Goldie Silverstein".

The author of the letter is surely not representative of the majority of Jews in this country. She is a confused person whose G-d, full of loving kindness, helps kill Arabs, and while letting five Jews chase 1,000 at one time changes the ratio from one-to-two hundred to the slightly more reasonable one-to-one hundred when it comes to driving away 10,000 Arabs. But Mrs Goldie Silverstein is not in that much of a minority either.

PROMISE TO JEWS

At a rally held in Brooklyn on June 17, I heard speakers rant about the land promised to the Jews by God and how He Himself would see to it that the desert of Sinai and the salt water of the Dead Sea remain in the possession of His chosen people. This despatch from Jerusalem was being circulated at the rally: "...a story that is sweeping the country and lifting morale everywhere offers a prophecy. Reb Yaakov Ribikov was a Tel Aviv shoemaker who enjoyed such an outstanding reputation as a Tzaddik and Kabbalist [illegible] orthodox, others, all through history, from Christ to Spinoza to Marx, have been rebels. These wanderers from yiddishkeit are our hope for the future; one hopes the Arabs produce as many from their side.

I was talking to Shirley Clarke, one of the leading avant garde film makers in the country, about her plans to try to get young Arabs and Israelis, brother Semites, together and make a film. She has got in touch with the head of the Jewish Museum in Tel-Aviv and is now looking for Arab contacts so that she could be on location later this year and make a documentary attacking the religious symbols that still fetter the Jewish and Arab minds.

Even more courageous is the stand that Allen Ginsberg, who happens also to be a Jew, has taken. He demands that Israel come to the United Nations, declaring that the Wailing Wall and the Holy Land are all pre-historic mumbo jumbo, that Israelis don't want the wastes of Palestine for their home, that the world community give them some other place, any place, in the wilds of the Congo, or Brazil, to live in. But after all, they must have some home.

There is no likelihood of the present rulers of Israel listening to such voices. But this is in keeping with the tradition of this great people. Was not the godfather of the State of Israel also the man who could proclaim: "I have never belonged wholeheartedly to any country or State, to my circle of my friends, or even to my own family... Such isolation is bitter, but I do not regret being cut off from the understanding and sympathy of other men". Would that Einstein were here to see what his dream State is like now! But then when an idea turns into a State, it is inevitably corrupted. Is India the land of Gandhi's dreams? Of Tagore's?

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The appalling consequent danger needs no stressing at all. The risks range from disruption of the world's oil supplies to a direct Russo-American naval confrontation in the Mediterranean, which might well entail nuclear war. In the absence of agreement among its permanent members, the U.N. Security Council will be helpless, not merely to stop the war but to prevent its spread. So far it has achieved little. In such circumstances of grave danger to the whole of mankind, perhaps the most serious since the Berlin crisis and more serious than the Cuban, the need of the hour is extreme restraint. Anything that can be done to help must, of course, be done, though it may be pitifully little. Anything which would aggravate an already ghastly situation—for instance, adopting partisan attitudes—must be scrupulously avoided. The studied moderation of the statements by Mr Chagla and the Prime Minister in Parliament on Monday should be a model for the future, in spite of natural resentment over the killing of Indians by an Israeli pilot.

Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Heritage and

WEST ASIA AT WAR

WITH the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on Monday morning, the danger of World War III drew horrifyingly near. For at least a fortnight, since both the UAR and Israel mobilized, the risk of such an outbreak had been imminent. Optimists still hoped that the confrontation might itself in some way or other bring about a solution, or at worst a stalemate. Israel, it was pointed out, had missed its moment if it expected to repeat the surprise of 1956. The UAR, said some military analysts, was far from convinced that its own moment of maximum strength had yet arrived. But such calculations laid too little stress upon the increasing degree of involvement, reflected in increasingly menacing dispositions.

President Nasser's initial support for Syria had led to an almost embarrassing enthusiasm in the other Arab States even including Saudi Arabia, which the UAR had been actively fighting in Yemen, and Tunis, with which Mr Nasser was upon the worst of terms. Arab concentrations upon the Israeli borders, and particularly the closure of the Straits of Tiran after the United Nations Expeditionary Force withdrew, had led to increasing Israeli conviction that, this time the Arabs really meant, as Syria put it, to wipe them off the map. Who struck the first major blow is, as usual, disputed; arguments about aggression in the Palestine area are invariably carried back at least to 1956, if not to 1948. What is beyond dispute is that the result is already a major local war; and that, bad as even this is, the world may consider itself lucky if the war remains local.

The decision in this regard lies with the Great Powers, whose policy has been, to say the least, volatile. In 1948 Russia was the second country to recognize Israel, even before the USA; Britain, still smarting under the attacks of the Irgun and the Stern group, tended to be pro-Arab, or at least pro-Jordan. Still, at that time the Powers had a joint concern for local peace, and backed the armistice. In 1956 Britain and France were in the Israeli camp, Russia threatening to intervene on the Arab side, and the USA using its financial power to halt hostilities—the really decisive factor. Now France is non-aligned, the USA and Britain are seriously worried both by the Arab blockade and by the frequent threats to exterminate Israel, while Russia again threatens to intervene on the Arab side should others support Israel.

COSTS OF THE CONFLICT


IT may be premature for us to calculate the economic consequences of the war in West Asia, which will largely depend on how long it lasts and how widely it spreads, but it would be wise to be forewarned about some of them in order to be prepared to the extent possible if the Suez route became impassable for world shipping. The mere disablement of a few ships in 1956 in the Suez Canal completely blocked all traffic from October 1956 until the Canal was completely cleared in April 1957; diverting ships to the longer Cape route had the effect of delaying movements of Indian exports and imports and increasing their cost. Foodgrains from the USA will be less affected than other trade (unless there is a shortage of shipping space); even so, it cost India nearly a crore of rupees more in 1956-57 and on the quantity now imported and at present freight rates, it should cost several times more. The creased the CIF value of our imports in 1956-57 by Rs 15 crores to Rs 20 crores, and it should now be considerably more for a comparable period of closure of the route even if the hostilities do not directly involve the major Powers.

The Statesman correspondent in Beirut indicates that the oil blockade may hit India if the Arab countries are determined to prevent the Western Powers from having access to their supplies: there will be time to speculate on alternative sources or other channels of obtaining oil from the same sources, when the likely trends of the conflict are better known than at present. Whether India's cotton mills will be able to secure raw cotton to cover their present deficiency is one of the imponderables of the situation. But it is a reasonable guess that most import orders, already much delayed by the uncertainty about foreign aid, will suffer further delays in execution and transportation.

Compensations on the export side will not wholly offset these disadvantages. Indian jute normally benefits from such situations and Mr Desai will probably have second thoughts about his recent concessions if the conflict lasts longer than a month. It is also customary for some foreign buyers to stockpile some materials at such difficult times —tea (in the U.K.), oilseeds, hides and skins and even some spices—and commodity prices may look up, giving opportunities to an alert Finance Minister to see how he can share in the gains, especially when the profit margins are sufficiently wide under the devalued rupee. Mr Desai is, however, unlikely to count the chickens before they are hatched; he may immediately be more worried by the somewhat diminished chances of holding the price line when an external factor sways it powerfully to aggravate the effects of internal forces.


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Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Foundation



On Tuesday morning the United Arab Republic claimed that American and British carrier-based aircraft had provided air cover over Israel during the latter's aerial bombardment of UAR territory the previous day, and had taken part in operations against Jordan. The broadcast over Cairo Radio, in the name of the UAR Supreme Command, said that it had "actual proof that American and British aircraft carriers played a rôle in the Israeli aggression". Immediate denials came from both London and Washington that American or British forces of any kind had taken any part in the present conflict. Nevertheless, on this ground, coupled with that of Israeli bombing, the UAR Government decided to halt navigation in the Suez Canal. Accepting the UAR version, its allies Iraq and Kuwait, hard on the heels of this announcement, stopped the export of oil to the USA and Britain. Algeria and Lebanon later did the same.

The alleged proof of these charges has still to be examined. If they were true, they would indicate conduct of barely credible ineptitude. Quite apart from the morality of the situation, Washington and London are perfectly well aware of the Russian threat to intervene to the extent that others do. Unless the U.S. Government is deliberately prepared to risk a nuclear holocaust, which does not seem even barely credible, it would surely not so gratuitously aggravate the position in the Middle East, especially when it is so heavily committed already in the Far East. If it did, the domestic uproar would surpass anything seen already over Vietnam—if there were time to see it before the super-Powers blasted each other into annihilation. In fact the Americans claim that their planes have throughout been several hundred miles away;

and the British, whatever they may have foolishly done in the Eden era, would be still more foolish to have stuck their necks out again by hostile action now. All the indications seem that the charges are propaganda; perhaps innocently based on misunderstood identification of aircraft (the Israeli Air Force is a very mixed collection of foreign types); perhaps a much less innocent attempt to make mischief.


Innocently or otherwise, mischief is afoot. Traffic through the Canal, once it was part of a war zone, might in any event have been expected to be limited, shippers for insurance reasons preferring the Cape. Even so, outright closure is something else again. So many threats had already been issued that Middle East oil supplies hung on a slender thread; yet their actual interruption may be more serious than the closure of the Canal. But most serious of all may be the further seeds of suspicion sown among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. These agree on the need for a cease-fire; but, so far, on almost nothing else.

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Heritage Trust

ISRAEL ON HORNS OF A SECURITY DILEMMA

From G. H. JANSEN

ISRAEL is on the sharp horns of a security dilemma. if it withdraws from the Arab inhabited territory it occupies it will return to frontiers that gave it little security from external threats. If it stays put on its present easily-defended "natural" frontiers it has to remain in occupation of Arab territory in which increasing resistance by the Arabs to the Israeli occupier presents a serious internal threat.

Israel's swift victory in the June war has created a security problem for it. Till June the Arabs in Israel formed a mere 12 per cent of the population; in the new Israeli territory they number 1.8 million against 2.3 million. And the Arabs in and around Israel are far angrier, because of a second defeat, than they were in 1948.

Also, the growing Arab resistance appears irrepressible, creating a serious internal threat for Israel. To withdraw or not to withdraw to the pre-June position is the Israeli problem; either course presents difficulties.

For nearly 20 years, up to last June, Israel had little or no trouble with the Arab community living within its borders, whereas within a mere three months a good deal of trouble with the Arabs has developed in the territory it now controls; and more is in store. Several factors explain the difference in the two situations.

But first a brief glance at the present security situation in Israeli-occupied territory. There have been armed skirmishes, and instances of sniping and mining both on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. There has been a general strike on the West Bank and most schools here are still refusing to open. As a result the Israelis have arrested scores of persons and handed down severe sentences; dynamited dozens of houses and deported several Arab leaders. From every town on the West Bank have come declarations signed by prominent persons from all walks of life, rejecting the legality of Israel's authority. With one exception, the mayor of Hebron, the Israelis have not been able to find a single Arab quisling of any stature to collaborate with them: minor Arab collaborators have had violence done to them What is more significant is that for the first time since Israel came into existence there have been bomb explosions in the heavily-populated central area of Israel itself, between Tel Aviv and Haifa. By joining Arab territory to Jewish areas Israel has only decreased its internal security.

Why, it may be asked, should the present state of affairs be so different from the state of quiescence that obtained between Israel and its Arab minority since 1948—a modus vivendi that deluded some well-intentioned Israelis into thinking that a beginning had been made towards permanent Arab-Israeli understanding?

MATTER OF EMOTION

The first reason is a matter of emotion. The Arabs in and around Israel are far more angry with the Jewish State than they were in 1948 because they have now been defeated for the second time. Also, on the one hand, Israel's military successes, by their swift decisiveness and the subsequent Israeli refusal to withdraw, confirm all the Arabs' fears of Israeli expansionism and, on the other hand, those same successes have made the Israeli contemptuous of Arab feeling. The will both to resist and to repress are stronger now.

The second reason is a question of numbers. Till June the Arabs in Israel were 12% of the population; in Israeli territory today there are 1.8 million Arabs to 2.3 million Jews. There is safety, and courage, in numbers.

[illegible] pact and confined, for the most part, to one particular area around Nazareth. Now within Israel's frontiers there is the whole area of the West Bank, hundreds of square miles in extent, where there are only Arabs and no Jews at all. The huddled enclave of Nazareth could be easily cowed, not so the West Bank: which is probably why the Israeli Government is putting Jewish colonies into the West Bank.

Also the Arab area is no longer surrounded by Jewish territory. Nazareth was physically isolated from the neighbouring Arab States; now the West Bank is separated from the Jordanian East Bank only by the modest stream called the River Jordan which is crossed, illegally, by dozens of people every day and night. It will be impossible for Israel to seal off this long frontier and so long as it remains open the West Bankers, through direct human contact, would receive encouragement, assistance and advice that sustain them in their resistance.

TRANSISTORS

The transistor revolution is a very important factor in the resistance movement. For several years after 1948 there were no transistor receivers and the radio stations of the Arab countries could barely be heard outside their own borders. Now the smallest transistor can pick up half a dozen Arab radio stations, all of them daily and even hourly, encouraging the Palestinians to resist, and giving them news of resistance in other parts of the occupied territory. Thus the feeling of "togetherness" so important for a resistance movement, is established now as was not the case before.

Even though the Israelis have arrested or deported several Arab leaders on the West Bank there are many others to take their place from within the Arab community, which is another point of difference with the old Arab community inside Israel. That community was leaderless or at least had very few outstanding men. For instance even today there are only about six Arab doctors in the 300,000-strong Arab Israeli community. On the West Bank things are very different There are hundreds of politicians educators, professional and business men who are well educated, travelled and sophisticated, and who can neither be bamboozled nor intimidated by the Israelis It is such men who have already publicly announced their rejection of the Israeli régime.

[illegible] Nazareth cut off from the rest of the Arab world, it had few contacts with the rest of the world at large. Though Nazareth is a place of pilgrimage, it is not one of the more important ones and visitors usually spent only a couple of hours there: the people of Nazareth could have little contact with them and, in turn, they knew little of what the Arab community was experiencing. In Jerusalem and Bethlehem things are very different: they cannot be anything but cities open to tens of thousands of pilgrims who cannot be shielded from local contacts or local resistance which, through these visitors, can get news out to the rest of the world in order to win moral support. Perhaps because of the impossibility of concealment, it is the Israelis who give the first news of arrests and dynamiting of houses (not, of course, that every incident is publicized). This may give an impression of assurance but at the same time news of each incident builds up the morale of the resisters.

TRADITION OF STRUGGLE

History also sustains this morale. There is the history of Palestine itself. For three whole years, from 1936 to 1939, the Arab community was in armed revolt against the British who were helped by the Jews, and during this time, according to official casualty figures which always underestimate, 5,000 Arabs were killed. This means that the Palestinians have a tradition of struggle and endurance. There is also the history of the Arab world since 1948, during which all the major Arab countries have achieved freedom from foreign masters. Except for the small and backward sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf Palestine is the only Arab area that is under non-Arab control. This is too glaring and too galling an exception to be accepted either by Palestine or by the rest of the free Arabs. This multiplicity of reasons ensures that the Arab resistance movement, now that it has got under way, can never be wholly repressed.

Being an occupying Power creates economic, psychological and moral problems for Israel. Because of the resistance, Israel has not been able to demobilize all the civilian reservists that were called up in June, which puts an extra burden on an economy that was already showing signs of strain. The Israelis are going to have to become increasingly repressive, which is not an easy rôle to sustain, especially for Jewish people, because of their memories of repression. Israel claims that she is the only socialist and democratic country in the area, but her credit in the world will slump if she is seen to be acting exactly like earlier colonial rulers. There is already talk of bringing back the death penalty in Israel so as to apply it to acts of violence which hardly accords with Israel's "progressive" image. All that the Arab resistance movement now needs is its first martyr—the first Arab "legally" executed by the Israelis.

The horns of Israel's dilemma —whether to prefer external security to internal security, whether to be reasonable or repressive towards the Arabs,— are sharp indeed.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Heritage and ...

MIDDLE EAST AT WAR

WHETHER Egypt or Israel started the fighting yesterday morning is a question unlikely ever to get anything but a dusty answer. It is not in any case a question of great relevance. The first act of aggression on either side was Egypt's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba. Though the minds of other countries, including Britain, will rightly be intent first and foremost on getting the fighting stopped, the original responsibility should not be forgotten. If Israel either fired the first shots or made a full-blooded riposte to shots fired on the Egyptian side she could justify her action by the original Egyptian act of belligerence and by the clear signs from Washington and New York that she could expect no help in countering that act either from the United Nations or from the West.

For the moment the narrower question of the Tiran Strait, on which the Western Powers' attitude is certain and inevitable, even though their readiness to support it by action is not, is merged in a much vaster and graver issue. It is an issue much less simple for Britain. Britain has, indeed, certain quarrels with President NASSER; over the Tiran Strait, the Yemen, his campaigns of subversion against Arab Governments friendly to the West and in areas where there are British interests and responsibilities. She has no quarrel with the Arab world as a whole, which is now ranged behind Col. NASSER in the sole cause capable of uniting it. She has no general reason for taking sides as between Israel and the Arab States. Once war has started, even the freedom of the Gulf of Aqaba must wait, though, whatever happens, any peace terms must include a guarantee of that freedom.

There are, however, two grave aspects of the conflict which the British Government and, much more important, the United States Government, must face; one primarily strategic, the other primarily moral. Egypt and Syria, and in a somewhat remoter sense Iraq and the Yemeni Republic, have been closely associated with and backed by the Soviet Union. Egypt has received Soviet diplomatic protection, though probably no active encouragement, in her present adventure. An Egyptian success, achieved with Soviet support, would constitute a totally unacceptable political defeat for the West in the Middle East and would mean the end of all Arab Governments well disposed to the West. It is up to the Western Powers to make it clear beyond the possibility of doubt that any Soviet intervention in the conflict would mean Western intervention too. Any risks inherent in making that clear would be as nothing compared with the perils which would follow if the Soviet Union thought she had a free hand to fish in these troubled waters with impunity.

Our consciences have a second challenge to face. Col. NASSER has declared his aim to be the annihilation of Israel. If this is true—and it is not the first time that it has been said—could we in fact watch annihilation idly if Israel were going down to defeat? Formal guarantees, such as the Tripartite declaration of 1950, may have atrophied. People may argue interminably about the wisdom and justice of the decisions, from the Balfour Declaration onwards, by which the State of Israel was founded. Nevertheless, the Western Powers were godfathers to Israel; the United Nations stood sponsor too. Genocide is outlawed both by the human conscience and by the U.N. Charter. It may be that the fortunes of war will pose a different problem, and that it will be the territorial integrity of Israel's neighbouring Arab States that will need support. Mr. GEORGE BROWN was assuredly right in asserting yesterday that Britain must not take sides, as was the United States Government in declaring itself a "neutral Power." That does not mean that either country can disinterest itself in a just and civilised peace. To call on Israel and the Arab States to cease fire is urgent and essential, but it is not enough without a plan to ensure that those countries can live together in peaceful enjoyment of their natural rights.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Foundation

FROM SUEZ TO AQABA

By CHRISTIAN PINEAU

The author was the French Foreign Minister at the time of the Suez expedition in 1956

THE present conflict in the Middle East, the threat which looms today over the very existence of Israel, brings the events of 1956—less than 11 years ago—into a new perspective.

It is perhaps as well to recall that, in the beginning, it was Mr. Dulles's blunt refusal to finance the Aswan Dam which brought about President Nasser's *volte face*, his more or less open alliance with the Soviet Union and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

British and French efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict have not been forgotten: conference after conference, creation of the Canal Users' Club, the calling of Security Council meetings—not to mention the countless discussions I had, in Mr. Hammarskjoeld's office, with Mr. Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister.

It is obvious that the absence of a spirit of solidarity between the Western nations at this time was in a great measure responsible for the failure of these attempts. The State Department came out on the side of Aramco's oil interests, against the cause of peace and the equilibrium of the Middle East.

Thus it was only after repeated failures to reach a negotiated settlement to the Suez Canal problem that the question of Anglo-French intervention against Egypt arose.

I do not wish to become involved here in the polemics to which this intervention gave rise both in Britain and in France. But to write an historical account, as objectively as possible, these events must be properly explained, not glossed over with pretexts which convince no one. For this reason, I must emphasise the part played by Israel in the final decision.

The Context

In mid-October, the British and French were in an embarrassing position. In spite of what has been said and written, no military decision had been taken. Although the General Staffs had drawn up their plans and the logistic experts had made their calculations, although fleets and troops were on stand-by orders, neither Government had given the green light for armed intervention.

It was at this point that Israel informed us that she could not accept Egypt's refusal to allow her ships to pass through the Suez Canal, the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Gaza incidents, and the concentration of tremendously heavily armed Egyptian troops in Sinai, not to mention the arrival of Russian planes in Cairo. The cup was full. Israel faced suffocation and ultimate defeat unless she intervened immediately.

She was determined on intervention, but wanted to know to what extent she could count on British and French help, especially in neutralising the Egyptian Air Force, whose strength at this time she overestimated.

This is the context in which the question was set. *Attempts to put it any other way would render inexplicable and unjustifiable Britain's and France's later decision to help Israel by intervening in Egypt.*

Obviously problems such as these cannot be examined without consultations among the interested parties, either bilateral or multilateral.

It is a fact, and it would be ridiculous to deny it, that three-sided conversations took place between Israel, Britain and France. The exact time and place, the identity of the three countries' delegates, scarcely matter. They are minor questions, not worth retrospective discussion. The only thing that does matter is the agreement on joint action that was reached.

Certainly, this agreement was kept secret. No other course was possible in the circumstances. But I contest the term "plot" which has been used to describe it. In international political life, no effective action would be possible if it were always to be subjected to public discussion and Press comment. When one country makes precise proposals to two others, when the others decide to examine them and a joint decision is taken, it is not a "plot," it is "negotiation." I do not believe anybody wishes to delete this term from the diplomatic lexicon.

On the other hand, it may be asked whether the British and French were right in not divulging the real reason for their intervention. The rather hypocritical pretext of a kind of arbitration between Israel and Egypt, so as to protect the Suez Canal against the troops of either nation, convinced no one.

In my opinion, it would have been better to admit that we had agreed to help Israel, for two reasons. First, it was in our own interest. Second—at least on the French side—we were not prepared to stand by and watch the young State of Israel perish. If our position had been made clearer, world opinion would have understood it better.

Moreover, if, as the French wished, Israeli troops had been allowed to cross the Suez Canal, they would have been in Cairo in three days.

Then no outside pressure could have forced Mr. Ben-Gurion to withdraw his troops after their complete victory. We would no longer be hearing from President Nasser today, and the Arab peoples would be no worse off.

If we are to seek the real reasons for our failure, it has to be admitted that the main responsibility lies fair and square on the United States. My loyalty to the Atlantic Treaty Organisation is well known and so is my sincere friendship for the American people. But truth is truth, and must be spoken. When, in 1956, the United States made a diplomatic alliance against us with the Soviet Union—at that time engaged in crushing the Hungarian people—she committed one of the gravest political errors in her history. She is still paying for it.

Many American statesmen fairly admit this mistake, whose first result was a deep rift in the Atlantic pact. Gen. de Gaulle's hostile policy towards the United States was echoed by French opinion after the Suez affair.

U.N. Guarantee

But while the diplomatic consequences for Great Britain and France were disagreeable, Israel, on the contrary, benefited. It is only fair to recall this fact, since it is the best justification of the action undertaken in 1956.

First of all, Nasser suffered a military defeat whose psychological consequences would have been much greater still if the Western Press had not so wholeheartedly stressed his diplomatic success. The Israelis had destroyed or captured in Sinai a tremendous quantity of arms and material, and it took Egypt 10 years to replace them. And, most important of all, they had solved—or thought they had solved—the problems of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba.

This latter result was achieved at the beginning of March 1957, when Israel, in exchange for the evacuation by her troops of these two danger points, obtained the protection of the United Nations Force, carrying with it the guarantee of the United Nations.

Here, again, negotiations were secret, and no one has since described them as a "plot." On this subject, I am able to give personal testimony, especially interesting in the light of present circumstances. Definitive agreement with Egypt was reached at a confidential lunch given by Mr. Hammarskjoeld at his own flat in New York. Egypt was represented by her Foreign Minister, Mr. Fawzi. I had received from the Israeli Government full powers to negotiate in its name. Compromise was thus arrived at by three people, and I am sorry no one else was present to witness it. Mr. Hammarskjoeld is dead, and Mr. Fawzi must keep silent.

This is an extremely important point, for it is proof that the solution adopted for the Gaza Strip and for navigaion in the Gulf of Aqaba was not forced on Egypt but formally agreed to by her, under the guarantee of the United Nations.

Thus it must be admitted that the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation exceeded his powers in terminating, without consulting anybody, a situation which arose, if not from a treaty, at least from an agreement between the parties concerned. Further, it may be considered that Nasser, in decreeing the blockade of the Tiran Strait, has violated, without justification or warning, an engagement entered into in his name by his Foreign Minister of the day.

The Lesson

So we have reached a point where the situation, for Israel, is more serious than in 1956. There is no longer a common Anglo-French front as there was immediately after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The Americans are beginning to realise the danger, but they are morally and militarily weakened by the war in Vietnam, which makes them hesitate to enter into new military engagements in the Middle East. The Russians, while they do not desire a generalised conflict, want to take advantage of divisions in the West to acquire a privileged position in the Middle East.

So, by a curious paradox, Israel's greatest strength today lies, above all, in the relative weakness of the Arab nations. Fortunately for the Jewish State, her adversaries are not so united as they would like to appear. Otherwise Israel's existence would be in grave danger.

In any case, present events justify, to a great extent, British and French attempts, 11 years ago, to put an end to Nasser's power and to find a balanced solution in the Middle East. If the United States, which complains today of lack of Western support, had understood what was at stake in 1956, if President Eisenhower, in particular, had acted like a statesman and not like an old man worried about his eternal salvation, we would not be where we are today, and the peace of the world would be less menaced.

Far be it from me to preach or to seek to justify preventive war. Too many crimes against humanity could be committed with that as the pretext. But in reminding the world, 11 years ago, that if, in 1936, France and Great Britain had not allowed the Rhineland to be overrun by Hitler, World War II, with its tens of millions dead, might have been avoided, the French Government was demonstrating, not a spirit of bellicosity, but political wisdom.

When the democratic world comes to understand that dictatorships and fascism, "carry the germs of war as clouds carry a storm," a great step will have been taken on the road to peace.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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P.M. BRAVE BUT INCONSISTENT ON VIETNAM

THE PRESIDENT SETS A ROLE FOR AFRO-ASIANS

By PRAN CHOPRA

IN the last few days the Prime Minister must have given considerable pleasure to those who look for assertiveness in him: he has been shaking Uncle Sam by the beard, with a courageous disregard for the implications. Thrice within six days and twice within one, he has told the United States in no uncertain terms that the air raids on North Vietnam must stop.

This must work like sandpaper on President Johnson's nerves, but a brave man must give his opinion frankly and not worry about its effect on others. And since Mr Shastri began giving his even before his trip to the United States was cancelled, he cannot be accused of wanting only to sock the tall Texan on the jaw; or even if some do suspect him of that they must at least admire his pluck.

Besides, Mr Shastri is in very good company. Half the world is telling President Johnson just that, in addition to some powerful members of the American Congress and thousands of young American citizens who have been demonstrating in Washington.

But good company and a show of guts do not justify two serious shortcomings in Mr Shastri's stand: it is inconsistent with his Government's recent decisions and policy, and it contains not a hint of his future course of action if America should suddenly agree to suspend the raids. The suspension seems highly unlikely now, or at least till the bombings achieve their immediate purpose of making it impossible for China to drown the South by opening the floodgates of its manpower. Therefore for India a convenient way of not having to do anything would be to make all action conditional upon the ending of the raids. But that cannot or at least should not be this country's aim in a situation which affects her as closely as the outcome of the war in Vietnam will.

RAIDS ON NORTH

Inconsistency with the past is even more conspicuous than the reluctance to share the burdens of this region. American raids on the North began in August, 1964, when the appeal by 17 non-aligned countries was still in the womb of neutrality. World opinion against the raids had already started mounting when the non-aligned ambassadors began their talks in Belgrade. They had ample opportunity from that time onwards to join the chorus against the raids. But they chose not to, neither then nor in the final statement by the non-aligned on April 1. Their silence obviously did not mean consent, nor did it suggest forgetfulness. It showed only that their concern was not with condemning one side or the other but with shaping an initiative that would look towards a settlement. In fact India is believed to have played a part in preventing a one-sided and unilateral condemnation of America. She would give up the raids without any parallel willingness being shown by the other side.

Consistency however is not always a virtue in diplomacy. India's lack of it in this case would be quite understandable if it enabled her in any way to do the two things which she cannot escape doing: first, to help in bringing the war to an end if that is possible, and if it is not then, secondly, to carve out a rôle for herself that would be consistent with her stakes in this region as well as with her own larger interests, particularly the defence of her northern frontier. Mr Shastri's latest views appear to have this virtue but the appearance is deceptive. They create further disharmony in India's relations with America without making any visible difference to the gulf that divides her from China. All that they do is to blur the only possible path that the non-aligned have shown through the poisonous jungle of the Vietnam war: the joint appeal to both sides to open talks without preconditions; the possibility, which the appeal has created and President Johnson has widened, of discrete exploration of the jungle by a few countries whose credentials might be acceptable to both sides.

The public stand that the Communists have taken makes the exploration seem an exercise in futility. They have flatly rejected the appeal of the non-aligned (a fact of which India has taken no public notice). Therefore it would seem pointless to propitiate them by asking America to stop bombing the North—pointless unless one is willing to go the whole hog with Peking and Hanoi and demand that America must simply quit the South and let the vacuum be filled by whoever will fill it. Since this presumably is not India's view, she has merely opened up an awkward—though fortunately remote—possibility for herself, of having to decide what her next statement will be if America should really go and stop the raids.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

But the non-aligned cannot abandon the alternative possibility, without testing it, that public and private views might differ (apart from Washington) in Peking, and if not there then in Hanoi, and if not even there then perhaps in the scattered centres of Viet Cong power in the South. Few countries have really looked the possibility in the face, closely and on the spot, that Peking's view of the irreducible minimum conditions for negotiations might not be Hanoi's Minister and the Foreign Minister is a different matter; but on Saturday he committed India to a most worthwhile course: "cessation of hostilities in both parts of Vietnam, policing of boundaries by an Afro-Asian force and the maintenance of the present boundaries as long as people desire it". This is a whole programme in a nutshell, and it is well worth discovering what Hanoi and the Viet Cong think of it—and again not through their public posturings but in the privacy of consultations.

On the other hand it is quite possible, in fact more likely, that the exploration will fail. The Communists' bite in private might turn out to be as bad as their public bark. They might refuse to budge from their public stand, which the non-aligned must regard as thoroughly unreasonable in the light of their own joint statement. The Communists' price might indeed be the last pound of American flesh, their determination to risk a full-scale war quite recklessly cynical. But this is a possibility from which India just cannot afford to flinch; if this is the truth then she must confront it, and, accordingly, shape her own policies in time. South-East Asia is a region to which she cannot be indifferent, and consistently with her own long-term needs and interests she must squarely face whatever the jungles might reveal. If they yield the slightest possibility of preserving the peace and independence of this area she must wholeheartedly exploit it, preferably in concert with a few other countries, whatever the displeasure this might cause in Peking or Washington. But if she finds the possibility unattainable, then she must verify herself who is responsible for that and then decide clearly to side with those who are right. There is no escape from this obligation for her; its links with her own defence are close.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE



Russia buys U.S. limousine.—
The Soviet Union has bought a $17,000 American limousine—furnished with television and bar—in the name of the Foreign Minister. Mr Andrei A. Gromyko. it was reported in New York on Saturday—AP.

Bank directors held.—All directors of the Banco Transatlantico were arrested in Montevideo on Saturday on orders of the ruling Government executive. A default of several million dollars was discovered and some of the directors were accused of fraud.—AP.

might also have played a part in ensuring that when the non-aligned did appeal for the suspension of hostilities they addressed themselves to both sides at once and in terms which closely included China. Yet within two weeks of the public statement by the non-aligned countries India departed from these very sensible precedents. She criticized the United States without addressing China and North Vietnam in the same manner. It was only in Kathmandu the other day that Mr Shastri returned to India's non-aligned way of not blaming one side when two are responsible.

There is also a more immediate inconsistency between what the Prime Minister said on April 20 and what an official spokesman had said on April 9. The spokesman made no reservations about the raids and described President Johnson's speech as "a constructive and positive response" to the appeal of the non-aligned. On the other hand Mr Shastri asked 11 days later what was the use of America accepting the appeal for "unconditional" negotiations if the air raids were to continue. This is neither fair to India's own earlier stand nor to Mr Johnson's speech. India is perfectly entitled of course to denounce the speech; it might be good for our independence, which is so constantly fed on imported wheat, to exercise its limbs from time to time. But we are not entitled to dismember that speech. Mr Johnson's offer was not that he would abandon the war in order to prepare for peace, but that he was willing to talk if the Communists were also; he held out no assurance in his "positive and constructive response" that he would or the Viet Cong's; either of the latter might feel, without any outlet given them for expressing the feeling so far, that it is being driven to courses which are not of its making when easier ways are available to achieve the main objective of the ultimate unity of Vietnam. Hanoi and the Viet Cong have tried war for almost two decades; peaceful methods might turn out to be quicker if the Viet Cong really have popular support behind them. Even during the possible interregnum of an "independent" South Vietnam only those who can carry the people with them will form the Government in Saigon.

It is important to discover what Hanoi and the Viet Cong think of this prospect, which is real; Peking will reject it of course but then its intransigence might well be a cloak for quite different objectives. That is why the wiser course is not the one suggested by Mr Shastri but by the Japanese Premier and U Thant: both favour a quiet exploration, of a kind which the combatants are never able to conduct on their own. Mr Eisaku Sato was especially specific when he said that a solution should be found in talks with the different parties. The talking could conceivably be quite rewarding if it is done in private; it might even uncover some room for reciprocity which would make the suggestion, if privately conveyed to Washington, more sensible than its public utterance now, that America should suspend the raids on the North.

Looking beyond a possible cease-fire by both sides President Radhakrishnan has made a most valuable suggestion. Whether the initiative he took more properly belongs to the Prime

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OBSESSIONS & HANDICAPS OF U.S POLICY IN VIETNAM

REEDOM OF CHOICE MUST NOT BE DENIED TO THE SOUTH

By S. NIHAL SINGH

THE Vietnam conflict has generated much fog in many capitals of the world, with the result that the issues in the War have become blurred. It is pertinent therefore to examine the situation on the ground in the context of American aims.

One of the main objectives of the present American exercise in North and South Vietnam is to redress the balance; the fact that the odds were much against them goes without saying. But Washington has introduced other, somewhat extraneous, factors in its approach.

The present American posture arises out of questions relating to Washington's strategy in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Even more than the future of South Vietnam itself, America's interest is in the relationship of the divided country's future to its own overall position in the area. Second, the Americans are becoming more and more obsessed with their attempt to make Vietnam an example of the futility of Communist-inspired "Wars of Liberation".

A recent Washington decision to substantially increase its military commitment to South Vietnam is guided by the desire to take advantage of artificially created and momentarily favourable factors to stem the tide. Washington apparently thinks that the attempt is worth making although there is a growing danger of this exercise inducing a sense of euphoria among important sections of American opinion.

VIET CONG ENIGMA

Here we get into official American misconceptions about the situation; it would of course be foolhardy to take for granted that Washington necessarily believes in all that it says for the record. But it is simply not true to suggest that the Viet Cong guerrillas and their political arm, the Liberation Front, are mere tools of North Vietnam; the Viet Cong are not the tail of a North Vietnamese dragon and it follows, therefore, that this non-existent tail will not stop lashing about just because you hammer at the dragon's head.

The situation in fact is more complicated and less favourable to basic American interests. It is true that the Viet Cong would not be what it is today but for the ideological and material help provided by North Vietnam over a number of years. This help was of course a gross violation of the Geneva Agreement.

to the strikes—the pause in implementing plans to bomb industrial targets in the North is a case in point. There are also limits to which Washington can afford to strain its relations with Moscow, particularly in relation to European problems.

It is the American hope to end the raids on the North only on the basis of certain concessions by the Communist side. (The technique of terminating something to which one does not have a right in the first place is borrowed from a familiar Communist practice). The Communists are so far equally adamant that they will not offer such a concession—in the obvious hope that the United States will have to terminate the raids for political considerations. The Communists no doubt shrewdly guess that once the Americans are forced to end the raids on the North, the situation in the South will follow a familiar pattern of crises and intrigues.

Washington is well aware that it is living on borrowed time in South Vietnam; hence its anxiety to press on with the raids on the North, thereby ensuring the continuation in office of Prime Minister Quat. In the meantime it is undertaking saturation bombing of Viet Cong strongholds, bringing to bear its superior weaponry to inflict hard blows on Viet Cong's future capability.

Presuming that the American raids on the North serve the purpose of ending future aid has simply not had a popular and effective Government. However misguided they may have been, there were good reasons for many idealistic young southerners to turn into rebels and join the Viet Cong. The result is that the Viet Cong today is something of a national force in the South in spite of the moral and material support and the measure of guidance they receive from the North.

The introduction of moral issues into international crises can often be misleading. And it is perfectly valid to argue that since the Communists used their own ground rules for subverting the South over the years, the Americans have as much right to introduce their rules for undertaking bombing raids on the North. The difficulties of pursuing the new American policy arise from political considerations.

While the process of subversion is a covert and long-drawn-out one, overt bombing exercises are plain for everyone to see. The weight of international opinion will invariably be against the present kind of strikes because they bring a war nearer. ...ractical limits from the North to the South, Washington will still be left with the formidable problem of coping with the Viet Cong in the South. The American hope that the Viet Cong will be withdrawn to the North is a pipe dream; all but a microscopic minority of the Viet Cong originally belong to the southern half. It is simply not possible for the Americans to wash the Viet Cong away.

Before the Americans took up their present posture on Vietnam, it was freely admitted by American military experts in Saigon that 95% of the problem of fighting the war against the Viet Cong was in the South. The basic situation today is not dramatically different from that prevailing six months ago and is not likely to alter radically in the future.

TOWARDS A CLIMAX

The American bombings were perhaps necessary to dispel the Communist euphoria that they had virtually won the war in the South. Now that Washington is convincingly making the point that it will not concede a walk-over, events are moving towards a climax—of negotiations or a bigger war.

There are grounds for hoping that the world will be spared a holocaust and eventual negotiations can only be based on a realistic assessment of the situation. President Johnson has indicated that his aim is an "independent" South Vietnam which is free to decide her own future. The Communist accent on the other hand is on the reunification of the two halves, apart from their tactical demand for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from the South.

All that Washington can ultimately hope to achieve is for South Vietnam to have a period of peace in which it can decide its own fate; the Viet Cong will necessarily participate in such a discussion. As the eminent French statesman M. Edgar Faure astutely remarked the other day, the South Vietnamese must be free to become Communist if they want to.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

...the Chinese outflanked the Se la by using the Tse la and scaling ridges even less hospitable.

PHONEY GENERAL

We have learnt at last to discredit that respected phoney General Winter. Somehow despite the growing interest in mountaineering in India and the experience of our mountaineers, we failed to realize that winter in the Himalayas is not lethal. Weather conditions can be unbelievably conducive to movement at high altitude. The sun can be warm, there is comparatively little precipitation, the snow is frozen so hard that it is easy to walk on, the danger from avalanches is negligible.

I know from the experience of a winter spent between 15 and 19 thousand feet near Everest that provided you are acclimatized, suitably clad and fed, a Himalayan winter need present no terrors. Once, crossing a precipitous 19,100 ft pass in late November, I was amazed to find herds of yak and sheep making the difficult crossing with innocent unconcern. Some of the herdsmen were children in their early teens. With me were about 200 Sherpa porters, men and women, almost all of them in crude felt boots. None suffered frostbite, even after sleeping a night on glacial ice at 18,000 feet, without proper bedding.

I was later to hear of a 23,000-ft pass, within the shadow of Mount Everest, sometimes used by Sherpas, Tibetans and their livestock. In Bhutan in 1959 several hundred Tibetans fleeing Tibet entered the country via a glacial pass nearly 19,000 ft above sea level. Many of these refugees were pathetically underclothed and undernourished, many wounded, yet they survived the ordeal.

The Chinese army in Tibet has been acclimatized to high altitude and snow conditions for several years. To them the Himalayan passes are no longer formidable, even in winter.

This process of acclimatization is important. Take a person from sea level immediately to 18,000 feet and he almost certainly will perish: the approach to high altitude must be gradual. Most people feel the effect of rarefied air at around seven and nine thousand feet. Twelve thousand feet is distinctly uncomfortable; the first altitude barrier where nausea, headaches, sleeplessness and lack of appetite can knock out the toughest of men. Above 18,000 feet the slow death of

...layan passes are safe.

A significant revel... that mountain dweller... Sherpas have an ama... ance to the effects o... tude. At the killin... 19,000 feet, for in... subjected to tests... as normally as you ... would to "hill station" a... des of five and six thousand feet. Again speaking in terms of safeguarding our Himalayan frontiers, the people who already live at high altitude are best suited to assist in their defence. Inevitably, however, the main responsibility must be the regular army's.

Happily now that we have recognized the real direction from which danger threatens India, our own army is being acclimatized to Himalayan conditions so that one reads of games of "kabbadi" being played at 13,000 feet in Ladakh by Sikhs from the burning plains of Punjab. In Sikkim jawans are happily entrenched at altitudes that made the first unacclimatized arrivals suffer agonies of high altitude sickness.

One of the real horrors of high altitude and one our army has come to appreciate in the recent border war, is frostbite. Surprisingly few people know how devillish it can be, how permanently incapacitating, how demoralizing. We have tended to minimize our frostbite casualties as if ashamed to own to them. I cannot think why, since there is nothing degrading about our jawans having suffered frostbite in an endeavour to guard our high frontiers. Rather credit to them for having braved the cold until they were crippled by it. Many will have lost feet, even legs as a result. It is one of the prices they have paid to defend India, and their wounds are no less heroic than those inflicted by enemy shells and bullets.

ANGUISHED THOUGHTS

I remember the jawan who suffered frostbite during the recent operations. Both his feet were bandaged. Like some others, he had had his confidence shaken.

He did not know that high altitude can humiliate the most stout hearted of men. He only knew that he felt terribly unwell, that he could neither sleep nor eat, that his nerves were perpetually on edge and that somehow all this was in direct relation to the attacking Chinese. Somewhere on the long track out from the forward position his regiment occupied, he contracted frostbite and his



Perpendicular cliffs
Nepal. Yet herds

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Russian artist V. A. Serov

Funding: Tattva Heritage and K



Perpendicular cliffs of granite and ice overhang the Tashi Lapcha Pass (19,100 feet) in Northern Nepal. Yet herds of yaks and sheep use the pass, even in winter. This photograph was taken in mid-November.—Photograph by author.

THE VULNERABLE HIMALAYAN BARRIER—I

LEARNING TO LIVE IN THE SNOWY WILDERNESS

By DESMOND DOIG

ABOVE the dust pall over the Indian plains the Himalayas ride like jewelled islands on a rusty sea. A few minutes out of Delhi's Palam airport and the great peaks stand on the horizon—Kedarnath, Kamet, Nanda Devi, Trisul. The plane drones east and above the unseen lower hills and valleys of Nepal tower the collected giants, Dhaulagiri, Annapurna, Ganesh Himal, Gauri Shankar, Everest itself, a pyramid of dark rock amidst towers of snow. In one breath-taking sweep it is possible to see five of the world's six highest mountains all at once, and the glittering peaks of four countries, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India (NEFA).

Unbroken and seemingly endless the line of mountains stands in awesome testimony to Nature's greatest barrier on earth, an obstacle until recently considered impregnable. Even now, looking upon this tumbled wall of rock and ice it is difficult to believe that armies swarm upon it; that men live there in frozen isolation and sometimes bloody the snow in death

If you look for it there is a pattern of vulnerability among the Himalayas. It is where the snow recedes or diminishes, where the brown plains of Tibet can be seen through gaps in the mighty wall, where enormous valleys as straight as furrows cut through the mountains, where the passes are. Above Delhi are the Mana and Niti passes; the gorge of the Kafnal; and the elevated bowl of Mustang in Nepal; in Sikkim the Tista Valley; the Ama and Lhobrak rivers in Bhutan, and the passes and gorges in NEFA that have now familiar names —Bum la and Se la, Subansiri, Siang and Lohit. There are hundreds more, some surprisingly low.

We know now how vulnerable the Himalayan passes can be. There is the lesson of the Se la and Tse la, two passes not far removed from each other: the one considered vulnerable and defended in great strength because it was a fairly comfortable 14,000 feet, the other disregarded because it was much higher and considered [illegible]

high altitude threatens even the acclimatized by dangerously reducing the oxygen in the blood stream, causing the heart to enlarge alarmingly, the lungs to drown in their own fluid, and the body to dehydrate because of the disinclination to either eat or drink. Halucinations become commonplace as the brain is starved of oxygen.

At sea level oxygen in the lungs maintains a pressure of about two pounds to the square inch. Above 18,000 feet this pressure drops to under 100 pounds so that the lungs are forced to labour in the way they would normally do after a strenuous sprint. The supply of oxygen at high altitude is barely sufficient even while the body is at rest. As a result any exertion, such as hand-to-hand fighting, cannot be sustained for more than a few minutes.

Some of the lessons learnt with the Hillary Scientific expedition in the winter of 1960-61 were that men cannot live indefinitely at over 18,000 feet without the use of oxygen; that a lethal deterioration can set in at some undetermined point of high altitude ac[illegible]tization; that this can be [illegible] by frequent retreats [illegible] below 15,000 feet; altitudes up to [illegible] human beings can live profitably for long

In terms of defe[illegible] means that most of [illegible] anguish deepened. The demoralizing effects of high altitude, more than the Chinese, was his undoing; a truth Mr Nehru has recently emphasized.

Even since the successful climbing of Everest and the creation of the Darjeeling and allied mountaineering institutes, Indians from every province have taken to the mountains. Their numbers have been small but their achievements impressive.

"Indians make good mountaineers," a person connected with one of these institutions told me recently. "What we need now is to make mountaineers of some of our army; not just a few officers and jawans, but whole regiments. And now, in the cold of winter.

"I know areas", he said, "where entire brigades can live, quite comfortably, high above the snow line; ample room for ski planes to take off and touch down, good skiing, strategically on top of everything. And incidentaly", he added, "in our border people we already have sturdy, acclimatized people."

I was reminded of the awesome procession of great peaks going slowly past an aircraft window; of a winter spent below Everest, often stripped to the waist in the burning sun; skiing at 18,000 feet; scientists at work in blizzards and intense cold performing delicate tasks unmindful of the altitude; Sherpa runners carrying our mail across a 19,000 ft pass, in cloth boots, in mid-January, and of a jovial tough people tilling the soil to within reach almost of Mount Everest's glaciers.

If we are to deny the Himalayas to the enemy we must learn how to live where only hermits once rushed in and snowmen tread. Right now, in the cold, while the cold war blows deceptively cool.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

threatening ours or the Chinese lines of communication in Sikkim or NEFA, there are some thirty high passes on the Tibet-China highway that would freeze solid if allowed to.

UNKNOWN NAMES

The happenings of the last two months have turned our attention on the isolated, forgotten people who live in the high Himalayas. The tragic flight of tribals before the advancing Chinese in NEFA made common names until then unknown to most of us—Monpas, Sherdrukpens, Khambas, Adis, Daflas, Idu Mishmis among others.

Mr Tenzing Norgay offered the services of Darjeeling's Sherpas to the Government of India for any scheme requiring the use of skilled mountaineers. From Sikkim we have learnt of the Lepchas' will to resist invasion (they are unarmed); in Bhutan 18,000 Drukpas have been conscripted. It would not be out of place here to mention the many thousand Tibetan refugees who have volunteered for active service. "We wish to fight in front of the Indian forces", one told me.

Now, when the Himalayas have become a vital barrier against Chinese expansionist aims and the people who live among the mountains are virtually first line defenders of India, it is necessary that we learn to understand the locals more fully than in the past. This is no difficult business. Our hill people are among the world's most immediately friendly, likable, uninhibited and trusting. They also are a proud people who, like the rest of us, resent being taken for granted.

A Tibetan could travel the entire length of the Himalayas and find himself at home in language, religion and costume in the areas immediately bordering Tibet. At the same time he would find strong political loyalties among these people to two Buddhist Maharajas, a Hindu King, and a Hindu President, beyond the common reverence for the Dalai Lama now in exile in India. And, because these people have a close affinity to Tibetans, he would discover among them a deep resentment against the Chinese and the godless Communism they preach. Tibetans after all have suffered more than most at the hands of the Red Chinese and their hopeless fight against Communism began while we were still on brotherly terms with the Chinese.

Not all the Himalayan tribals however are Buddhists; far from it. If one includes Nepal and Sikkim, Hindus and animists are in large majority. It is often difficult to distinguish Mahayana La positions. When I asked him to be specific about these "Lamas", he explained that they wore red robes and boots.

Later a select number of jawans and junior officers who had seen action at Se La and Dirrang Dzong told a gathering of Indian and foreign journalists that the first attack against their positions had been made by troops wearing "Lama and Monpa dress". Asked to qualify this statement they described the enemy as wearing a haphazard mixture of tribal clothes, also Indian Army uniforms. It took time persuading them that any tribal attire looking even remotely like a robe did not necessarily belong to a "lama". Besides we now know that the Chinese used Tibetans in their assault in NEFA. Some of them must have been Communist indoctrinated; a Tibetan official recently reminded me, "It is ten years now since the Chinese began taking our children to China—boys and girls between the ages of four and 10." But mostly the Tibetans who fought with the Chinese were reluctant conscripts, people with guns in their backs and threats ringing in their ears.

Hardly were the tribals recovering from the shock of the Chinese invasion than there was some talk of a scheme to settle several thousand sturdy peasants from the plains of India on NEFA's sparse agricultural acres. If anything is calculated to raise tribal fear and wrath it is a threat to their land. Nagaland is an obvious case in point. Political unrest in Sikkim can be traced to a Bhutia Lepcha fear of Nepalese intrusion into their preserves and a Nepalese resentment of Bhutia Lepcha property rights. There are similar examples wherever one cares to look, many nearer home than in the Himalayas.

This is a consideration not to be minimized. The returning civil administration in NEFA already has a difficult enough job to perform without the added complication of tribal suspicion and hostility now or later. It is as important that our relations with the independent Himalayan Kingdoms at this critical juncture be similarly unprejudiced. There may be no direct connexion between them, but what happens in one border country is of intense interest to the others.

INTEGRATION

One of the immediate criticisms against any policy that safeguards the culture, aspirations and rights of tribal people is that it opposes integration and so in some devious way is anti-national and worse at a time such as this, unpatriotic

National Research Institute, Melukote Collection

Funding: Tattva Heritage and Ins...



The Sherpa village of Na in the remote Rolwaling Valley of Nepal is 14,200 ft above sea level. All around tower giant peaks; the snout of a major glacier is only three miles upstream.—Photograph by author.

THE VULNERABLE HIMALAYAN BARRIER—II

NEED FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PEOPLE

By DESMOND DOIG

THE popular conception of life in the high Himalayas is of hermits and monks (unspecified) living out their days in ice caves performing Yogic exercises. And these there are.

In a remote corner of northern Nepal I met a jovial Tibetan lama who had spent 14 years in a cliff dwelling at 15,000 feet, alone. In Bhutan perched crazily on a fault in a sheer granite wall many hundreds of feet high, is a monastery inhabited by hermits. I took tea with them in a chapel that might have been the cabin of an aeroplane but for the decor. Outside the window was nothing but sky and cloud. Below, very far below, was a forest of tall pines on which I expected us to crash at any minute and be impaled. The Tibetan border was a few miles away, 16,000 feet at the nearest pass.

And there was the Nepalese mystic, an unimpressive person in cotton shirt, cotton pyjamas and a turban who spent several days with the Hillary Expedition to Makalu, sleeping in the snow, walking barefooted and eating whatever scraps of glass we reluctantly provided, in mid-January, at 15,000 to 18,000 feet.

There fantasy ends. Permanently occupied villages can be found at altitudes as high as 13,000 and 14,000 feet in the central and eastern Himalayas. In summer, yaks graze up to 16,000 feet and herdsmen follow to live in "sangars" just below the snowline. Immediately below Everest, in summer, Sherpa villages harvest a wild form of buckwheat to within four miles of the famed ice-fall. This sounds unique until we are reminded of the altitudes at which people live on the Tibetan plateau. Lhasa, for instance, is over 12,000 feet above sea level and there are several dzongs and villages at altitudes of 14,000 feet and above. Incidentally, when we talk of winter Buddhism from Tantric Hinduism or either from the peculiar form of animist witch-craft practised side by side with them.

I have come across animal sacrifice performed by Buddhists, and Buddhist saints enshrined in Hindu temples in the hills. The Bon religion still exists, its sorcery and black-magic performed in chapels hardly distinguishable from those of Mahayana Buddhism.

Neither are all those who live in the Himalayas related ethnically or otherwise to Tibet—a comparative few are. Some Buddhist tribes for instance have Burmese origin; though Tibeto-Burmans, most Himalayan tribals have a culture and tradition very much their own. Far from "all looking alike", a common assessment of hill people, the inhabitants of villages only a valley apart can differ completely in features, speech, mode of dress, and customs. The visitor to Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA cannot help but realize he is in a different country within minutes of crossing from one to another.

ROBES AND "LAMAS"

To most people who have had little or no contact with them, the inhabitants of the Himalayas fall into three categories: "Lamas" meaning anyone in robes; "Nagas", the lesser clad tribals, despite the fact that Nagas are not native to the Himalayas, and "Bhotias" meaning the rest whether in lounge suit or tribal attire.

So in Tezpur while the Chinese still prowled in the foothills above the Assam plains, I was told by a military officer that "Tibetan Lamas" conducted the Chinese behind the Se

Yet the underlying principle of any sound tribal policy is integration: unhurried, phased and always sympathetic to the will of the people it represents so that they suffer no psychological damage.

The problem to be faced in the context of border defence is whether a greatly enhanced population in the Himalayan regions will favourably outbalance the hostility among hill people that importation of plainsmen will arouse.

Happily Mr Nehru has already indicated the Government of India's outlook on the future of tribal policy. In the direct context of NEFA he recently declared that defence had nothing to do with the existence of various States. He saw no reason in changing the pattern of State administration: "Why should we", he said, "if it is good?".

The Prime Minister defended the Philosophy of NEFA by saying that he still thought it the fundamentally right approach. And he apparently spiked the scheme for settlement of unindigenous people in the NEFA highlands when he said he did not think large areas of the region were dangerously uninhabited.

Whatever the long-term Chinese design, whether communization of the Indian subcontinent (I do not believe they will ever attempt a physical occupation), or command of the Himalayan region, such of which they claim, the "Abode of Snow" can never be left to itself and the occasional mystic again. We may not have to spill more blood in its defence, but during every hour of the future we shall have to combat Communist infiltration along the 3,000-mile front. On our understanding and handling of the border people, be they Indians or citizens of independent kingdoms, will rest much of the success of the coming battle.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

REPORT ON BHUTA

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UNHAPPY OMENS

Mr Dorji himself rec
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tragedy is Bhutan, with
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and prehistoric Phon, its
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belief in oracles, and its
occupation with spirits
witches and supernatural
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The protective god, Ch
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The history of Bhutan is
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Whole families were wip
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take revenge. Even the

Sri Vedavyasa Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS

EPORT ON BHUTAN—II

OLD GUARD" FEARED THE WINDS OF CHANGE

SIGNS AND PORTENTS ON THE DAY OF TRAGEDY

By DESMOND DOIG

N a statement made shortly after the alleged ringlead-
ers of the plot against his family had been arrested
Thimphu, Mr Lhendup Dorji, Bhutanese Secretary-
eneral, was emphatic on two points: the country was
lidly behind the King, and responsibility for the at-
mpted coup rested with a few disgruntled officials, civil
nd military, who had either been dismissed from ser-
ce or were about to be retired in favour of younger, bet-
r-educated men.

The ex-Quarter Master-
eneral, Bachu Wangdi, was a
se in point: he had been
und inadequately equipped to
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ilities of his office. His alleged
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
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e bold new experiment fell to
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untry, even to foreigners. At
ast one Indian employed by
e late Mr Jigme Dorji was
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e continue to have dealings in
e country.

UNHAPPY OMENS

Mr Dorji himself received
everal such threats to his life
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nd prehistoric Phon, its devil
orship and witchcraft, its
elief in oracles, and its pre-
ccupation with spirits and
itches and supernatural mani-
estation, there had appeared
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een aware.

The protective god, Chondu,
f Ha Valley, the ancestral
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f the Dorji home on five con-
ecutive days and called loudly,
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few days before they were
oisoned, stabbed, or suffocated
y having ceremonial silk scarves
ammed down their throats.
Whole families were wiped out
o that none might remain to
ake revenge. Even the spiritual



A tough young Bhutanese second lieutenant, photographed in Thimphu during the recent crisis.

ed his reincarnation in a boy of ten, now living with them, so that India also possesses a Shabdung. The THU reincarnation of the original Shabdung, recognized in a Sikkimese prince, died out three centuries ago.

Endless rivalry existed between the warlords of Paro in the west and Tongsa in the east of Bhutan, and there were also lesser and almost continuous feuds between the country's great Dzongs which often attracted the support of foreign forces, from Tibet, Sikkim and the Indian plains. The beautiful 200-year-old home of the Dorjis, Namcholing, below Thimphu, is only one of many in the land with a history of political intrigue and wanton murder. Deep-rooted enmity between east and west Bhutan has been a constant factor in the country's history and can still be sensed, as in the boast of a young army officer that all the best officials in the Bhutanese Army and Government today are from Ha (in the west).

CLOSE HARMONY

The present King of Bhutan, Jigme Wanchuk, is a direct descendant of the Tongsa warlords, powerful rulers of the old Bhutan; his grandfather was recognized as hereditary ruler of the country by the British Government in India a century ago. The Dorjis are from Ha, but three ge... ations of the Royal and Dorji family have worked in the closest harmony; three successive kings have had a Dorji as their Chief Minister. When the present King declared that the late Mr Jigme Dorji had been his lifelong friend, a brother, and an invaluable councillor, he meant it, and it contributed to the undoing of the conspirators behind the recent coup that they underestimated the deep affection of their King for his Prime

JEEPABLE ROADS

Now jeepable roads reach far into the country, across impossible cliffs and through jungles so dense and infested with disease-dealing insects that they once halted invading Mongol hordes. A well-equipped army of some 20,000 men has been raised and trained by Indian Army officers, who speak highly of Bhutanese toughness, intelligence and smart turn-out. Schools and hospitals have sprung up in every important administrative centre, while others are being built and planned. Experimental farms are beginning to introduce new seeds, new livestock and new mechanical methods into a country that until a few years ago knew of no wheel except the Buddhist prayer-wheel. Exhaustive surveys are exploiting the potential of the country's mineral and boundless forest wealth, and already foreign teams have submitted plans for paper and rayon mills. Last year Bhutan was admitted to the Colombo Plan, and more recently it emphasized its independence by issuing its own postage stamps and winning recognition of its ruler as His Majesty the King rather than His Highness the Maharaja. Under active consideration was a revolutionary Constitution that would have appointed Ministers to relieve the King of his overall responsibilities. It may still find acceptance.

All this is on the credit side On the debit has been the back wash of this remarkable progres

First, such obvious prosperity and stability under India's guidance was not in the interests of Communist China, who would like to keep the Himalayan frontier in a state of turmoil. Secondly, in a country only just emerging from a mediaeval past, there are very few who can carry the burden of urgent change, however important may have been their status in the old régime. Those who can and will, must of necessity, be invested with disproportionate responsibility and importance which cannot help but stir envy and resentment among the country's diehard traditionalists. If these progressive few even innocently affect the trappings of their new importance they stand accused of corrupt practice, of losing touch with their culture and tradition, and of posing a threat to the Establishment they serve.

Would not Roman Catholic educationists, for instance, propagate Christianity in an essentially Buddhist country? Would not land reforms give a hold to Nepali settlers who for years have been resisted by the Bhutanese? Would not a new Constitution undermine the very foundation of the country's established Government? And friendship with a neighbour not invite interference?

So it appears that the very forces the late Mr Jigme Dorji employed in the cause of the country's advancement conspired to destroy him; the tragic end of so many men of raw genius who have awakened their countries from centuries of slumber.

(To be continued)

...ers of the country were not ...ond the reach of this evil. In ...7 the last Shabdung of Bhutan ...upying a position similar to ...t of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, ...d under strange circumst...es. His reincarnation was not ...ognized, and two further ...imants to his high office were ...rdered.

...he first and most famous ...abdung, Nawang Namgyal ...94-1651), generated three re...arnations when he died; a ...dy reincarnation (KU), a ...ech reincarnation (SUNG), ...d a mind reincarnation (THU). ...s KU was recognized in Tibet ...d has continued to enjoy re...arnation there, hence the like...ood of the Chinese rallying a ...ppet Government around a ...utanese Shabdung. The SUNG ...carnations remained in ...tan until the death of the ...h Shabdung, Chole Yeshey ...dup, in 1917. The Lamas of ...reat Gelugpa Monastery, in ...g, claim to have recogniz-

Minister.

Recently, when the King went to Europe he left the reins of the Government almost entirely in the hands of Mr Jigme Dorji. Even when the late Prime Minister had to take action against persons enjoying the Royal favour, and hastened to apprise the King of his action, he received the written assurance: "I need not assure you of my full backing in everything you do for Bhutan".

What Jigme Dorji was doing for Bhutan with the encouragement of his King has to be seen to be believed. When I visited the country five years ago, I found it without a mile of motorable road, without electricity and post offices, without an army, and without modern schools, hospitals, shops, or any of the basic amenities of twentieth-century living. Prisoners had their legs in irons or wore heavy wooden yokes about their necks. They languished in airless dungeons, and when the death penalty was decreed they were sewn in yak-skin and hurled into a river, a practice discontinued by the present King, who is opposed to capital punishment and has been responsible for several other enlightened reforms.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

REPORT ON BHUTA

A KING
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APRIL 13—A DA
DE

By DES

Though already old in
the story of the Bhutan
were few foreign obse
Thimphu, the capital, and
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Wireless contact betw
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Political Officer for Bhutan
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Should the King have had
flee his country, a helicop
alone could have effected
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was safe for him or member
the Dorji family during
tense days preceding the ar
of Brigadier Namgyal and
alleged accomplice, Ba
Wangdi. But for a helicop
the King might not yet have
turned to his mountain cap
and that could have spelled
end of Bhutan. But the fa
tell their own story and d
their own conclusions.

On April 5 at 8-30 p.m.
the dak bungalow at Phuntso
the Prime Minister was shot
point-blank range by a hi
assassin. The King was
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late Prime Minister's brot
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drive away.

SAD TRIBUTES

April 6 was a day of bew
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utta nosed after the killer
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Funding: Tattva Heritage and ...

EPORT ON BHUTAN—III

A KING COMES HOME IN AN HOUR OF CRISIS

PRIL 13—A DAY OF FRIGHTFUL DECISION

By DESMOND DOIG

Though already old in the context of today's headlines, e story of the Bhutan crisis has yet to be told. There re few foreign observers, the telegraph between imphu, the capital, and the outside world were so many les beside the tortuous road. Wire connected a few them. There were travellers between Thimphu and border town of Phuntsoling, mostly jeep drivers, who ried rumour that confused rather than clarified an rmingly vague picture of events.

contact between Wireless and Bhutan was so brief lia and Bhutan was so brief t it belied the gravity of the nation even though India's litical Officer for Bhutan and kkim then in Thimphu was efing journalists in Gangtok ery afternoon except April 13 en, by Royal command, Bhu- went off the air completely. ture conspired to make bad rse by enveloping the coun- in low, sombre cloud: rain ded the only road out of imphu, 120 miles of night- re driving in even the best weather. Helicopters were ounded, and suddenly in a untry that had deliberately sisted modernization for so ng, these aircraft had become most symbols of life and death, struments of national survi- l.

Should the King have had to e his country, a helicopter one could have effected the scue as no single mile of road s safe for him or members of e Dorji family during the se days preceding the arrest Brigadier Namgyal and his eged accomplice, Bachu ngdi. But for a helicopter, e King might not yet have re- rned to his mountain capital d that could have spelled the d of Bhutan. But the facts their own story and draw ir own conclusions.

On April 5 at 8-30 p.m. in e dak bungalow at Phuntsoling e Prime Minister was shot at int-blank range by a hired ssassin. The King was in rich. Mr Lhendup Dorji, the e Prime Minister's brother d Secretary-General of Bhu- n, was in Samchi, three hours' ve away.

SAD TRIBUTES

April 6 was a day of bewild- ment and mourning in Phunt- ling. People came and went or around, talking about "Old gs" (the late Mr Jigme Dorji); ey offered scarves and flowers the small room where his dy lay, or examined the fatal rtridge case still lying on the or of the room where he was ot. Mr Lhendup Dorji assum- d command quietly and effi- ently and when at last alone, ell after midnight, he took ave of his brother before the dy was sealed in its coffin. mewhere outside in the dense ngles and on slopes al- ost too steep for them to erate, police dogs from Cal- tta nosed after the killer. Shortly after dawn on April the funeral procession moved ut of Phuntsoling and made for himphu, the capital. 12 hours hard driving away. Every ere and there people lined the ad—road workers, Napelese of Bhutanese, a few Indian gs, some throwing flowers, ntsoling's dusty road. Below ncholing, the Dorji home Thimphu, stood a military ard of honour and high Bhu- anese officials. And here was the first breath of suspicion, the first suggestion of a coup d'état. The Deputy Chief of Army Staff was conspicuously absent, so was Bachu Wangdi, ex-Quartermaster-General, as also many other senior officials. Mr Lhendup Dorji remained in Phuntsoling to fly to Calcutta to receive the King.

April 8 was a day of comparative calm, but there was open talk of the "plot" behind the late Prime Minister's slaying and many young Bhutanese, particularly, in private talk, accused the Deputy Chief of Army of complicity in the crime.

The King was half expected to arrive on April 9. And ironically, grotesquely, while the body of the late Mr Jigme Dorji lay in the private chapel of his mother's home, just a few miles below Thimphu, the capital began to blossom with flags and grouped pennants, arches of welcome and bunting. The most colourful display was in the Military Training Centre above which is the house of Chabdah (Brigadier) Bahadur Namgyal.

ANXIOUS WHISPERS

On April 10 army units in Thimphu were drawn up on the parade ground of the Military Training Centre to welcome the King. Brigadier Namgyal was as prominent as the blue-and-white embroidered refreshment tent and the floral welcome arches. Whispers among some of those present suggested that the parade was a colourful trap for the returning King. In the crisp mountain sunlight it was hard to believe that the smartly-turned-out troops, the fixed bayonets, the Royal Land Rover bedecked with a silken ceremonial scarf, were so much camouflage. Would the King be joyously received, or taken into custody or shot down as soon as he alighted from his helicopter? We waited hours, wondering, and then news that bad weather had prevented the King from coming seeped through the crowd and it dispersed.

On the morning of April 11 the parade formed up again. Some of the officials of the day before were absent, but the Deputy Army Chief was there, large and jovial. Again the bayonets were fixed and the whispers persisted. But would the King come?

Suddenly there were the helicopters, two of them, too high for an immediate landing on the parade ground. As they roared overhead India's Political Officer for Sikkim and Bhutan, who stayed in Thimphu throughout the crisis explained to the immediately disappointed crowd that the planes were manoeuvring to lose height and would return. One did, to disembark Mr Apa B. Pant, an old friend of Bhutan. The other again roared overead to disappear in the direction from which it came. It had dropped the King in the palace compound, where he was immediately surrounded by his personal guard. The hours of real crisis had begun.

In the afternoon the same two helicopters returned, flew over the palace, and while returning one touched down on the Military Training Centre parade ground to collect Mr. Pant, the other in a field below the Dorji home, "Namcholing", to drop Mr Lhendup Dorji. White sheets laid out in the grounds of the Royal Palace informed Mr Lhendup Dorji before he landed that the King was safe. Had the signal not been given, he would have led loyal elements of the army gathered at Namcholing against the rebel forces who presumably would have been holding the King in his palace. Indian troops, already alerted, might have started moving into Bhutan. So might have the Chinese, known to be massed along Bhutan's northern border with Tibet. Thimphu slept uneasily that night if it slept at all.

On April 12 the still unrecognized forces gathered for a showdown. "Namcholing" was an armed camp, capable of holding out against two months of siege, and superior forces. Within the beautiful 200-year-old house the atmosphere was electric and yet the ladies of the Dorji household, Rani Chuni, her daughter Tashi, the late Prime Minister's wife, and Mrs Ugyen Dorji, already nursing a wound caused by the bullet that killed the late Prime Minister, were magnificently calm. Tea was served to the few visitors, and we talked about a still bright future for Bhutan, and local flowers.

In the Military Training Centre new roadblocks went up and Brigadier Namgyal apparently informed his King that the Dorji show of strength was an intolerable threat to the person of the Ruler which he wished to crush with all the forces at his command.

PALACE MEETING

In the late morning Mr Lhendup Dorji flew to the palace by helicopter to meet the King. Was the summons he had received written under duress? Was he being invited into a trap that would claim his life? With the same bravery that restrained the Dorji women, and certain only of his loyalty to the King and of the King's affection for his family, Mr Lhendup Dorji boarded the waiting helicopter. He was back in half an hour, reassured that the King was safe. But killers were at large, a coup was still to be sprung. Tension was at breaking point.

Monday, April 13, was a day of frightful decision and from dawn the stark valley of Thimphu was dressed for high drama. An accumulation of dark clouds postponed the day. It was unusually quiet, the roads suddenly empty of racing jeeps. I stayed in a military guest house and at 6 a.m. the young officer in charge of messing left on his usual daily visit to headquarters for rations. He was arrested at a newly-constructed roadblock and interrogated by Brigadier Namgyal himself: how many people were there? in the mess and guest house? How many officers? How many guards? How were they armed? What was the strength of the Dorji guard at "Namcholing"? Even earlier, the Brigadier had sent parties of heavily-armed men into the mountains above Thimphu. Their armament suggested that they might even try to shoot out of the sky any helicopter that made for the palace. A helicopter was expected to take Mr Lhendup Dorji once more either to see the King or ascertain from previously arranged signals that he remained unharmed after the planned showdown.

Rumour, so remarkably well informed, had it that the Deputy Chief of Army and the ex-Quartermaster-General would be called at 9 a.m. to the palace where they would be arrested. Simultaneously army units would be marshalled and disarmed by loyal Bhutanese officers. At 8-30 a.m. I joined the Political Officer for Sikkim and Bhutan, Mr Avtar Singh, in the mess belonging to the six Indian officers who are training the Bhutanese Army in Thimphu. It was conveniently above the military barracks, "a ringside seat", as Mr Singh said while positioning a chair on the front lawn from which to observe the proceedings.

When and how the QMG got to the palace I don't know. At about 10 a.m. Brigadier Namgyal asked an Indian officer for the loan of a jeep as none of his were available and he was wanted immediately at the palace. Thimphu held its breath. In the market below the great dzong people shuffled about expectantly. Shops closed. In "Namcholing", Mr Lhendup Dorji and his small force of loyal officers and men awaited a message from the King. Hours dragged by, hours in which imagination had the plan of arrest foiled, turned, the King under arrest, in danger, the Brigadier sending his army against the strongly-fortified Dorji home, the country plunged into civil war. In those tense moments I was given a splendid example of Bhutanese devotion to their Monarch, and of traditional Bhutanese bravery. At all costs the King must be saved, loyalty to his person was affirmed and reaffirmed while preparations were made for battle. With remarkable calm Mr Lhendup Dorji gave orders to cover any eventuality—a long siege, running fight, a bitterly contested retreat. "And if we have to go, we'll take Jigs with us", he said, and I wondered about any precedent in history that had a force of desperate men fight under the psychological leadership of a corpse.

ARMY DISARMED

When tension was capable of sudden and disastrous explosion, a message was received from the King. It was then 2 p.m. The alleged ringleaders were safely [illegible] conveners.

From Our Correspondent

DEHRA DUN Apr 29—District [illegible] elections virtually end- [illegible] here yesterday with the filing [illegible] nominations for the president- [illegible] of the District and City Con- [illegible] committees. Mr Harijiwan [illegible] Chauhan and Mahant Indresh [illegible] Das being the two respec- [illegible] contenders.

NO CONTEST IN DEHRA DUN CONGRESS POLL

The following is the list of those who have been declared elected: [illegible] Mahendra Prasad, Mr Bhartiai [illegible] Shastri, Mr Rajkumari Singh, Mr [illegible] Ramjas Prasad Pande, Mr [illegible] Mathura Prasad Dangwal, Mr Onkar [illegible] Nath Panwar, Mr Tej [illegible] Pratap Singh Acharya Jagannath, [illegible] Municipal Railwal, Mr Onkar [illegible] Nath Vindhyachal and Mr [illegible] Basanti Prasad (all Congress), Mr Tej [illegible] Bahadur (Com), Mr Virendra [illegible] Bahadur Singh (PSP) and Mr [illegible] Robin Narain Singh (Soc).

The Congress captured 10 seats [illegible] has been completed.

[illegible] local bodies constituencies [illegible] to the Parishad from [illegible] the biennial elections for [illegible] With the announcement of this [illegible] Congress one each to the [illegible] Socialists, Communists and the SP.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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McMAHON LINE

CONTRIBUTED

THE North-East Frontier of India, referred to in common parlance as 'the McMahon Line' defines the boundary between the North-East Frontier Agency of India and the Tibet Region of China. This is the traditional boundary defined n detail by mutual agreement at the Simla Conference in 1914. It runs in a wide arc bulges for over 700 miles from the eastern frontier of Bhutan to the tri-junction of the India-China-Burma boundary near the Talu Pass.

The boundary follows the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra except in the Migyitun sector and where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and the Namjang rivers break through. In the Migyitun sector the watershed principle was departed from in 1914 in order to leave in Tibet the sacred lakes of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpu, the annual Tibetan pilgrimage route known as Tsari Nyingpa and the village of Migyitun which is the starting-point of the 12-year pilgrimage. The watershed is for the greater part also the crest of the Himalayas and in other places the highest range in the area.

NEFA

The country between 'the McMahon Line' and the Brahmaputra valley comprises four of the five Divisions of the North-East Frontier Agency of India and has an area of over 30,000 sq. miles. Geographically and ethnically it is distinct from Tibet. While Tibet is a high plateau of 'the roof of the world', the North-East Frontier Agency area is a submontane belt with sloping north-south spurs thrown by the high Himalayan range. The fauna and flora are, therefore, different. The Mishmi, Abor, Miri, Aka, Daphla and Mon tribes who inhabit the area are akin to the Assam hill tribes and have neither ethnic nor cultural affiliations with Tibet. Tibetans refer to these tribes as *Lopas* (out-siders) and to keep the latter out they have established watch-post villages along the border.

Tibet has not exercised any jurisdiction over these tribes. On the other hand India has had long association with them. The tribes paid tribute to the Ahom Kings of Assam. The Government of India concluded treaties with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, with the Abors in 1862-63 and 1886 and with the Miris in 1853 extending the authority of the Government of India over these tribes. British Indian officers regularly visited the tribal areas from 1855 for settling disputes and other such purposes. The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12 the Dihang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13 and the Abor area in 1913 Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of this detailed information that the Indo-Tibetan boundary was settled at the Simla Conference in 1914. In 1912 the tribal area was constituted into the Sadiya Frontier and the Balipara Frontier Tracts each about 10,000 sq. miles in area.

Simla Conference

The Tripartite Simla Conference was held in 1913-14 to settle the boundaries of Inner Tibet with China and with Outter Tibet as also the status of Inner and Outter Tibet. Tibetan, British Indian and Chinese Plenipotentiaries attended the Conference as equals in status and dignity. The Indo-Tibetan boundary was agreed upon between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives and the agreement was completed by an exchange of Notes on 24 March 1914. The agreed boundary was delineated by a pink line on two sheets of 1"=8 miles Map of the North-East Frontier (a Rough Compilation by the General Staff, India) During the negotiations the Tibetan Plenipotentiary sought and obtained modifications of the proposed line to include in Tibet certain sacred places — Tso Karpo (White Lake), Tsari Tsarpo (New Tsari), Tsari Nyingpa (the shorter annual pilgrimage route) and the village of Migyitun. The frontier in this sector was, therefore, withdrawn south of the watershed to include in Tibet the lakes of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa, the village of Migyitun and the shorter pilgrimage route In the Notes exchanged the Tibetan Plenipotentiary informed the British Indian representative, Mr A. H. McMahon, that he had submitted the map to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders and that he had received orders from Lhasa agreeing to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps. He also signed and sealed the two copies of the map.

The agreed boundary runs from the Irrawaddy-Salween divided near 27° 40' N in Burma to the eastern frontiers of Bhutan. The Burmese section, which is 120 miles long, follows except where it crosses the Taron, the northern watershed of the Irrawaddy. The Indian section starts from a point near the Talu Pass and follows the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra except where the Lohit, Dihang Subansiri and Namjang rivers break through. It crosses the Lohit at a point above the village of Kahao, the Dihang between Mongku and Karbo and the Namjang along the Tangla ridge. This northern watershed of the Brahmaputra is also the southern watershed of the Tibetan rivers of Lat Te, Rong Thod Chu, the Tsangpo and Chayul Chu.

In Chinese maps the international boundary in this area runs along the foothills overlooking the Brahmaputra valley thus including in Tibet a part of south-eastern Bhutan, and the Kameng, Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions and the greater part of the Lohit Frontier Divisions of the North-East Frontier Agency.

To sum up 'the McMahon Line' merely formalized the traditional frontier between India and Tibet and defined it in greater detail in 1914. The area south of the line has been administered by the Government of India for many years. The Government of Tibet has not exercised jurisdiction anywhere in the area south of 'the McMahon Line'. If British Indian maps did not show this area as part of India in their maps published before 1937, it was because it was hoped that China would eventually adhere to the Simla Convention, When this hope became a forlorn one the British published the line.

(Continued From Previous Col.)

1924 expedition, when almost within sight of the Summit, summed up the problem (after 1921 reconnaissance) in these words: "In all it may be said that one factor beyond all others is required for success. Too many chances are against the climbers; too many contingencies may turn against them. Anything like a breakdown of the transport will be fatal; even so small a matter as a boot fitting-shade too tight may endanger one man's foot and involve the whole party in retreat. The climbers must have above all things, if they are to win through, good fortune. And the

(Continued on page IV)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



A seven-member Indian Press Delegation, on a fortnight's goodwill visit to Burma at the invitation of the Burmese Government, is seen visiting the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. Mr. K. P. Biswas, Patrika's Roving Reporter is seen on the front of the Delegation.

Mandalay Has Rich Store Of Indian Thought

Best Place To Collect Materials About Netaji

From K. P. BISWAS

Who returned lately from Burma

MANDALAY, Jan. 22.

I was in a reminiscent mood when we started for Mandalay from Rangoon by train. The journey by the night train through an area which suffered badly from advancing and retreating Japanese and British army movement and which during the same period saw the emergence of the national army, was most uneventful. No war-time scar, except when we made a boat journey from Mandalay to Maigun through the Irrawadi could be seen. If the report available here is correct that the biggest bell of the world at Moscow was smelted during the war then the Maigun bell accommodated near the biggest but unfinished pagoda here can claim for itself that distinction to-day.

There in the Irrawadi the retreating Japanese sank steamers, which are still seen embedded in the river. On the way we passed through a countryside which is topographically and physically the same as is noticed either in Assam or North Bengal. Social habits and even mode of habitation are also the common heritage of the two peoples. A trip through the Irrawadi in this Upper Burma is exactly what it would be between Gauhati and Dibrugarh or Tezpur through the Brahmaputra. A sleeping countryside, a peace-loving people and a quiet surrounding—these are the features of this part of Burma.

Association With India

And yet Mandalay, more than any other city or town of this country, stirs up the imagination of an Indian for its association with the Indian thought and aspiration in the past. Its importance to the Burmese is also universally recognised. Mandalay was Burma's capital when Rangoon was only a commercial mart town, just as Murshidabad was Bengal's capital when Calcutta was only a village.

It is a charming Burmese young lady, the Secretary of the Mandalay National Museum, who helped me further to appreciate the importance of Mandalay in the national life of the Burmese. She took me to the ancient relics, manuscripts, photographs and illustrations kept in the tiny halls of the two-storeyed modest building standing on the other edge of the extensive and spacious moat of the Mandalay Fort—two miles long in each direction—and

(Continued On Next Page)



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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Indonesian Question Marks

JAKARTA.

By
DENIS WARNER

NO ONE should ever look too far into the future in Indonesia, but it no longer seems incautious to suggest that the era of Governmental insanity and Communist collaboration that began seven years ago with President Soekarno's assumption of full powers, and endangered all South-East Asia, is approaching its end.

Nasakom, the irreconcilable alliance of nationalist, religious and Communist groups which was the foundation of Dr. Soekarno's political structure, remains, but primarily as a principle that cannot be liquidated without irreparable damage to the prestige of its architect. Jakarta-Peking relations may not collapse, but the much vaunted axis is as dead as the dodo, and while Dr. Soekarno himself has survived as a symbol of Indonesian unity he has become more of a constitutional monarch than a President with dictatorial powers.

This does not mean that Indonesia has suddenly become pro-West—it is unlikely ever to be that. It does not mean that the struggle for power is not continuing, or that there are not bitter times ahead. President Soekarno will not lightly accept the position of a figurehead, and no one should underestimate his powers of persuasion or even, in his own curious way, his powers of leadership.

"I am not optimistic," said an Indonesian leader of moderate political inclinations. "The Communists have certainly had a major setback. It will take them a long time to recover, but I fear we have only delayed things by three or four years."

This represents a gloomier view. Others, many others, are much more cheerful. They point with satisfaction and hope to Communist slogans ripped from hoardings and walls and to the "Hang Aidit" injunctions that have taken their place, to the smoke from burning Communist and Communist front buildings still rising above almost every Indonesian town. These, they say, represent the passing of the point of no return.

Outrage at Murders

The Indonesians are not cruel people, and the initial sense of outrage at the murders on Oct. 1 has been kept alive by the discovery of lists of people earmarked for liquidation, and medieval instruments of torture in the possession of the "Gestapu," as the Sept. 30 coup planners are known.

More significantly, even the voice of Dr. Soekarno, raised now in defence of the Communists (or, as he euphemistically puts it now that his friends are endangered, in the defence of law and order), has gone unheeded. When he complained that actions against the Communists had been misrepresented, and that Aidit's home, contrary to Press reports, had not been wrecked, the Moslem mob, under Army supervision, quickly set the record straight.

Yet the very fact that Dr. Soekarno is back in office at this time, making speeches, however guarded they may be, and flanked by his closest ally and architect of the Peking-Jakarta axis, Dr. Subandrio, is just one insight into the difficulties of self-preservation and control that now confront the two principal survivors of the plot—Gen. Suharto (who was spending the night at a hospital with his sick daughter when the assassins called) and Gen. Nasution.

pened before the coup is never likely to be known. But it is possible to piece together some fragments of the Presidential picture during the hours of crisis, and to draw some obvious conclusions.

According to the President's own version, the palace guard became concerned about the unexplained presence of troops around the palace in the small hours of Oct. 1. At 6 a.m., under escort, he left the palace for Halim Air Force base, a curious destination at any time, but even more curious on this occasion because it was headquarters for the coup d'état in progress, a coup about which the President, by inference, knew nothing. Yet, knowing nothing, he thought the base would be a good place to go in case he needed to fly to a place of safety.

Halim air base is only 15 miles from Jakarta. In the early morning the roads are relatively free of traffic, but even at peak periods the President and his escort would be able to make the journey in less than an hour. On this day it took an unexplained three and a half hours.

Generals Kidnapped

He arrived at the base at 9.30 a.m., the precise moment at which his friend and Air Force Commander, Omar Dani, chose to issue an order of the day explaining that a movement had been conducted through the night to protect the President from American "CIA subversion."

Converging on Halim air base from other parts of Jakarta, along with the Presidential convoy, were the trucks containing other elements of the palace guard, members of the Communist youth and women's organisations, armed and trained by the Air Force, and the kidnapped generals. Two were probably dead. The rest were almost certainly alive, although in poor shape.

From the neighbours of one general I had an eye-witness account of his capture. Representing themselves to be members of the palace guard—which, in some cases, they were—the assassins persuaded the general to open his door. He appeared in his pyjamas and was quickly grabbed by the legs and dragged off, his head bumping on the ground, to a truck waiting 50 yards away. Later, the general was killed at Halim after suffering the vilest tortures and indignities.

Another eye-witness account has Dr. Soekarno at Halim at 10 a.m., sitting in the shade of a tree with his hat and shoes off and in the best of humour. During the day the President's aides visited him from the palace with reports of what had happened in the city. He was also visited at some period during the day by Dr. Leimena, Second Deputy Prime Minister and a Christian, whose quick intuition led him to escape over the garden wall when the assassins called at his home early in the morning.

Safer Base

During the day Dr. Soekarno issued a statement which was published the following morning only in the news agency bulletin, Antara, now purged of its Communist controllers, and the Communist daily, *Harian Rakjat*, which has been banned by the Army. Dr. Soekarno announced that he had taken command of the Army in his own hands and named Gen. Pranoto, an inept personnel officer, sometimes, but inaccurately, labelled a Communist, as "caretaker."

he had no reason to believe he had been murdered, and, if he knew him to be dead, how he acquired this information.

There were certainly doubts in Dr. Soekarno's mind, however, about the wisdom of the course he should now pursue. His friends, Omar Dani, in whose sphere of command the Communist assassins had been armed and trained in secret at Halim, and the Communist leader, D. N. Aidit, who had long campaigned for the creation of just such a "people's army," took off for another and more secure air base at Madiun in central Java.

They wanted Dr. Soekarno to go with them. Instead, he chose to go to his palace at Bogor, a hill station south of Jakarta, thereby establishing his "neutrality." Gen. Suharto ignored the appointment of Pranoto and secured Jakarta. He then drove to Bogor for a five-hour conference with President Soekarno. Out of this meeting came Dr. Soekarno's first brief taped broadcast message. It perplexed the outside world and puzzled many in Indonesia. But it accounts very largely for the continuing Army-Soekarno relationship.

The situation in central Java was tense and explosive. Jogjakarta had fallen to rebel groups and the Diponegoro division, which controls this densely-populated and Communist-impregnated region, was in a state of disunity and ready to throw in its lot entirely with the Sept. 30 movement. Gen. Mokoginta in Sumatra, possibly influenced by Dr. Subandrio, who was in his territory for reasons which have never been adequately explained, appeared convinced that Col. Untung had broken some sort of plot.

Whether delivered freely or under duress (and only the degree is really questionable), it may be argued that Dr. Soekarno's broadcast saved the day from what still could have been civil war or, worse, a bloody and brutal Communist take-over. It has also left Dr. Soekarno with highly dangerous negotiating powers.

Army's Power

Effective control is in the hands of the Army, and one of Suharto's first orders after his official appointment as Chief of Staff and Army Minister was to give his regional commanders wide authority to close down Communist party organisations if there were indications (not evidence) that the local leadership had been involved in, or supported, the Sept. 30 movement.

But the lack of reaction on the part of the Communist party does not mean that it has been broken. For the moment it is lying very low, hoping, no doubt, that Dr. Soekarno's "political settlement" will provide the umbrella under which it may function normally again. If it does not, there is still much that the three million party members and their eleven million followers in "front" organisations can do to frustrate the Army.

At this point, the Malaysian confrontation is the least of the Army's worries. But crushing Malaysia is still an article of faith and it was one policy the Army shared with the Communists. If it is unlikely to be pursued with any great spirit, it is also unlikely to be dropped, at least in the foreseeable future.

If the Army succeeds in its efforts to separate Dr. Subandrio from President Soekarno—and there are leaflets around Jakarta accusing him of having organised the September coup—future relations with China are likely to pursue a very different course. They are, of course, severely

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Peking—Yenan Of World, Say Chinese Troopers

From DAVID OANCIA

PEKING, Nov 11.—The article in Thursday's Peking Daily was signed by three troopers from an artillery unit based in the area around the capital and it aptly summed up the official view of this nation's position in the world.

Peking they wrote, evoking the long bloody struggle that led to the Communist victory in 1949, has become the Yenan of the world's revolutionary people and Chairman Mao Tse-tung is the greatest and most outstanding leader of these people.

"Yenan", as every Chinese schoolboy knows, is the agglomeration of caves and huts in the barren hills of northern Shensi Province which became the beneaguered Communist base from which Mr Mao Tse-tung and his fellow-revolutionaries led their war for power. From this base, the Communists successfully fought the hostile ring of encirclement, first of the Japanese occuupation forces and, later, of Mr Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Army.

The evocation by the artillerymen was apt for China's leaders now see their nation as a pure, revolutionary force valiantly resisting an anti-China ring of encirclement fostered by the USA with Soviet collusion while they continue to preach the gospel of armed struggle to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

PARADOXES

The situation is one of striking paradoxes. On the one hand the Chinese openly accuse the Russians of collaborating with the USA to stamp out so-called wars of national liberation and thus with snuffing out revolutionary movements. On the other hand, European Communist diplomats in many world capitals persistently canvas their non-Communist counterparts for even the slightest hint of any Sino-U.S. accord which they apparently feel.

It is against this background that China, snaken to its foundations byth e great proletarian cultural revolution marked the 50th anniversary of the Communist victory in the Soviet Union. The official ceremonies were small and marked by propriety and good taste. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires gave his traditional October Revolution Anniversary reception, once an occasion for many Chinese leaders to put in an appearance. Two years ago, the official guests included the Premier, Mr Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, and the former Peking Mayor, Mr Peng Chen, one of the first victims of the cultural revolution purge. Last year, Marshal Chen Yi attended.

This year the Russians invited about 100 Chinese. No fewer tha a dozen showed up and they wer Lin Piao, whose position as Mr Mao Tse-tung's top deputy is being reinforced by a massive publicity campaign, charged in a speech to a rally on Monday, that the revisionists represented by Messrs Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin openly opposed the revolution, have abandoned the proletarian dictatorship and have restored capitalism in the Soviet Union.

"This is a monstrous betrayal ofth e October Revolution", he continued in a passage that some interpret as an allusion to Soviet pressures on China and an attack on those Chinese leaders who favoured further attempts to cooperate with Moscow

"MONSTROUS BETRAYAL"

"It is a monstrous betrayal of the great Soviet people and the people of the world. Therefore, if the proletariat fails to smash thewa nton attacks of the modern revisionists, if it does not firmly defend the road of the October Revolution opened up by the great Lenin continue to advance along this road under new historical conditions and thoroughly solve the question of how to seize and consolidate political power, it will probably lose political power even after seizing it and, like the Soviet people, will come under the ruule of a new privileged bourgeois stratum."

Mr Lin Piao declared, after repeatedly emphasizing that Mr Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era, that people in countries where "political power has been unsurped by revisionists" will be able to overthrow this rule.—*(By arrangement with The Toronto Globe and Mail).*

ted by the Vice-Foreign Minister Mr Chiao Kuan-hut, a cond indication of the state of r tions at present between giants of the Communist wor Strict security precautions wei in evidence along the streets lead ing to the embassy to prevent an incidents but little attempt wa made to deter the zealous fighter of revisionism from putting u wall posters denouncing Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin.

The uRssians proposed no toast thus diplomatically making it unnecessary for the leading Chinese guest to make any sort of a statement. But Peking's view had been rather dramatically advanced in newspaper articles, an editorial and a major speech by the Vice-Chairman, Mr Lan Piao, now invariably described as Mr Mao's close comrade-in-arms.

"You renegades to the October Revolution, by what right do you commemorate the revolution?" Asked a thundering editorial published by all major newspapers on Monday.

"The only place for you is in the dock of history to be tried by Marxist-Leninists and the hundreds of millions of revolutionary people all over the world". Mr

HEIKAL'S CALL TO EGYPTIANS

CAIRO, Nov 10.—Mr Hasnein Heikal, editor of Al Ahram, today warned Egyptians to be prepared for a "bitter and long war", reports PTI

In an artucle in the newspaper he stressed that there was no alternative but force to solve the Middle East crisis as the United States had blocked all efforts to find a political settlement

He said: "Continuation of the war is inevitable, although it does not mean war tomorrow or the day after, most probably we shall be faced with a bitter and long war".

FRANCE TO GIVE $15M. TO INDIA

PARIS, Nov 9.—France wi pledge some $15 million fo specific development projects the meeting to be held here o Monday and Tuesday of the A India Consortium, according authoritative sources quoted b AFP.

The total amount of pledges be offered next week is not y known, and will probably only b disclosed at the end of the mee ing.

The meeting is to be attende by Mr K. B. Lall, secretary t the Indian Ministry of Commerc as a member of his country delegation.

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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

PUBLIC SECTOR ADDS NEW ILLS TO OLD

By DILIP MUKERJEE

Weakened already by its bureaucratic mentality which prevents it from functioning on sound commercial lines, the public sector is now exhibiting further defects in the light of the recession.

Lacking flexibility and dynamism, and, too closely limited to specific kinds of production, public sector enterprises are failing to pick up such short-term demands as they could have in spite of the recession, long-term demands are not easy to get because of the decline in the private sector, the main client of the capital goods producing capacity in the public sector.

CONCERN over the public sector's performance is of long standing. But a new development is the use being made of its poor operating record to put the zealous Socialists on the defensive. Men like Mr S. K. Patil are arguing with considerable finesse that the country must go slow on the further nationalization envisaged in the AICC's 10-point programme until what is already in the public sector can be made to function better.

It is not necessary to subscribe to the conclusions Mr Patil is drawing to agree with him that the public sector has been in many ways a sore disappointment. The return on Rs 2,415 crores invested on it so far has been exceedingly low. That apart, the public sector has failed to inspire confidence in its ability to further the social objectives it was intended to subserve. All the ills of the Indian private sector—among them the lack of long-range thinking—have been perpetuated in State-owned enterprise, plus the whole gamut of problems peculiar to itself.

Early during her first term in office, it looked as if Mrs Gandhi intended to mount a major effort to mend matters. To start with, she called a conference of public sector managers, handpicked for ability and enthusiasm, and got them to pinpoint for her the problems holding back the enterprises. The ideas thrown up on the occasion were sifted by the Prime Minister's Secretariat in consultation with the Ministries concerned and put down in a Cabinet paper.

This paper went to the Cabinet before the election, but nothing came of it mainly because of the objectio raised on some points of detail by Mr Manubhai Shah, then Minister of Commerce. The paper was retrieved and placed before the Cabinet some weeks ago, but the exercise petered out once again when several issues raised by another economic Minister pushed the discussion off the rails. A major argument advanced for doing nothing was that the Administrative Reforms Commission was seized of the problem, and it would be unwise to anticipate its recommendations.

The Commission has now reported, but this takes matters no further. The issue remains one of infusing a new dynamism, by allowing the managers scope for initiative within the limits set by accountability to Parliament. Whether units are run each by its own board or merged into larger groupings as envisaged by ARC, the basic problem is one of getting the public sector to function on sound commercial lines. Managing Director Rs 36,000 a year, although the predecessor was receiving a total of Rs. 1,50,000.

None of these problems are new. They have been debated over and over again in Parliament and outside. Most people accept that if the public sector is to operate on sound commercial lines, the whole concept of Civil Service management now applied to these units must be replaced by a new system geared to the objectives of profitability and efficiency. But acceptance, unfortunately, does not get translated into action, largely because of the opposition from vested interests. The Civil Service does not want to give up the rights it has acquired in the public sector "colonies". They provide a suitable place to mark time for those whose way up the Civil Service ladder is temporarily blocked for some reason or the other.

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PERSONNEL problems apart, public sector industries are faced with a whole range of new difficulties on account of the current recession. The slow pace of development of the user industries has placed the producers of capital goods, both in the private as well as in the public domain, in a quandary. For the first time they have no firm orders to go on with. Instead of turning away customers they have now to go out and look for them. Vigorous marketing is something which neither the public nor the private producers of capital goods know very much about. The flexibility required both in production and selling policies to attract new business does not at the moment exist.

The requisite adjustments towards a commercial, market-oriented approach would have successfully pressurized the Centre to order these from Canada when Bhopal could have been geared to produce the same equipment if more time was allowed.

On the other hand, long-term orders are also lacking. These involve taking a decision here and now on the needs for 1970 and beyond. Both politicians and administrators are too obsessed by current difficulties to be able to argue for bold long-term decisions. Their diffidence has been strengthened by the collapse of Mr Morarji Desai's package proposals, one object of which was to raise additional resources to permit a step-up of investment as soon as a good harvest steadied the price level.

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THE way the decisions are made and unmade in present day New Delhi is illustrated by the case of two blast furnaces for which an order was urgently to be placed on the Heavy Engineering complex at Ranchi. The idea of placing an advance order was mooted as an anti-recession measure: it was decided upon during a visit that Mr Asoka Mehta and Mr Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed made to Ranchi at the end of August. Their recommendation was accepted though the question where the furnaces should be located was left open; this fact seems to have been used since in making it look as though no firm conclusions were reached on the recommendations at all.

The aspirations of individual Ministries appear to have played a part in all this. The Steel Ministry has strong reservations about the idea of an advance order. It takes the view that there is not much point in going ahead with the fabrication of blast furnaces and their ancillaries unless a decision is simultaneously taken to build the supporting facilities required for their operation, as for example transport and mining development. Secondly, the Ministry suggests that it is not very economical to put up blast furnances by themselves because there will be no means of utilizing surplus coke oven gas. In other words, the Ministry does not wish to place an advance order until it is decided where these blast furnaces are to be located.

There is, of course, some justification on technical grounds for the view the Steel Ministry is taking. But not to be missed is the fact of Dr Chenna Reddy's interest in pushing his colleagues to a decision on the fifth steel plant. If blast furnaces were ordered by [illegible] more all Jews in Europe.

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public sector manufacturers to lose but to competitors because even minor adjustments of selling terms require too many time-taking approvals. This is specially a handicap in export markets, more so in countries where it is customary to offer inducements to clinch a deal

The recession has also brought to light a fundamental failing of the economic strategy upon which public sector plants are predicated. Capacity has been developed according to concepts of physical planning under which the demand for capital goods is worked back from assumptions about targets of production for industries to which these goods are to be supplied to augment capacity. This kind of planning is exposed to the danger of the assumption being proved wrong because the investment decisions in respect of user industries lie mostly in the private sector. During the first decade of planning the private sector for a variety of reasons forged ahead faster than the planners had envisaged, but the onset of recession has brought about a sharp reversal of the situation According to some estimates made in the Finance Ministry, the problem of excess capacity in capital goods will be with us for several years until private enterprise recovers the elan it has lost.

Public sector units may have been in a better position to meet the problems of recession if they had not been designed to do too specific a job. At the time when most of these heavy projects were set in motion, the confidence in growth was so strong that hardly anyone bothered about contingency planning, in case anything went wrong. For instance, the whole planning of the mining machinery project at Durgapur was based on the assumption of a very steep rise in coal production from year to year. The whole outlook has now changed: apart from the current slackness of demand, the long-term demand perspective has been put out of gear by the shift of emphasis away from iron and steel.

The gap between capacity and production will continue to widen as public sector units like Bhopal and Ranchi get into style They are suffering on two counts. In the first place, likely users are not prepared to wait for equipment these plants could manufacture provided they were allowed the time they need to get started on the long production cycle involved in building, say, power generators or drilling rigs. Kerala, for instance, insisted that its needs were too urgent to wait for the two hydel sets it needs for the first phase of the Idikki project. Mr Namboodiripad successfully pressurized the Centre to cite the

Mrs Gandhi and several of her colleagues (but unfortunately not all) are sensitive to the needs and aspirations of enterprising public servants, whether in the Ministries or in the enterprises. They would like to provide scope for initiative but cannot do so because of the entrenched vested interests.

Mrs Gandhi's idea of promotion on merit in the Civil Service got scuttled before it started, even though lists were drawn up Likewise, her efforts to give the public sector managers a new deal became enmeshed in a tangle of trivialities. As things now stand, anything not sanctified by rules, old or new, cannot go through Any Minister who wishes to recognize merit or offer a special incentive cannot do so.

For example, salaries of the top managers are fixed by reference to the capital investment in an undertaking regardless of other germane considerations. The sulphur plant in Hyderabad is far more complex than the sister unit for antibiotics in Hardwar but the General Manager of the first cannot be paid a higher salary than of the second. In another undertaking, it is proving difficult to obtain approval for paying the Indian successor to an American

able. Not surprisingly, Dr Chenna Reddy thought that the advance order for two furnaces would delay a decision on the fifth plant. In retrospect, one is entitled to wonder whether it was really indisposition that prevented Dr Reddy from joining Mr Mehta and Mr Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed on the Ranchi trip, as originally planned

'MERCY KILLING BY NAZIS COULD HAVE BEEN RESISTED'

FRANKFURT (Germany), Oct 26.—A physician told a euthanasia trial court yesterday that the Nazi "mercy killing" programme could have been effectively resisted, reports AP.

Dr Karsten Jaspersen, former chief physician at the Bethel Hospital near Bielefeld said not one of the 6,000 to 7,000 patients at the hospital fell victim to the programme because of the resistance by himself and others.

Dr Jaspersen testified for the prosecution at the trial of three men charged with complicity in the killing of thousands of mentally ill and physically deformed people.

The physician said he had sent a letter to Martin Bormann, Hitler's top aide, in August, 1940, to protest against the killing of the mentally ill.

Bormann's reply, which was laid before the court, was that the Nazis not only found it irresponsible to keep the incurable mentally ill alive but also opposed letting crippled children be "artificially sustained"

Dr Jaspersen said he was able to stall in carrying out Nazi directives until the programme was stopped in 1941 under pressure from German churches.

NEW BOOK

The Administration of President Roosevelt knew Germany was carrying out a planned massacre of Jews but obstructed, thwarted and delayed actions that could have saved thousands of victims of Nazi persecution in the 1940s, a new book charges.

"There is no doubt from evidence at hand that additional thousands of refugees could have been saved" Mr Arthur Morse says in his book, "While Six Million Died: a Chronicle of American Apathy", scheduled for publication in February.

Mr Morse is a former Columbia Broadcasting System news executive, now in Germany as director of the International Broadcasting Institute.

As a newsman, Mr Morse was granted access to the State Department's restricted files and Government archives in London, Geneva and Stockholm, the New York Times reported.

Mr Morse says that there was an "almost co-ordinated series of inactions" based on Mr Roosevelt's silence, stringent enforcement of immigration laws by the State Department and the reluctance of Congress to relax immigration policies.

He charged it took the Division of European Affairs five months to act on the information that Hitler had ordered the extermination of all Jews in Europe.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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WHAT SORT OF CHINA WHEN MAO GOES?

By RICHARD HARRIS

Just as the all-important question about India three years ago was "After Nehru Who?" the all-important question about China now is "After Mao Who?" The answer to the second, says the author, is exactly the same it was to the first—that who matters less than what.

After Mao, China's world ambitions will, in all probability, be shelved for a generation though its nationalist demands will not be whittled down in the slightest. Internally too the drive towards collectivism and the insistence on continual class struggle may slacken. But the Mao era will not end suddenly; there will be an interim period.

RECOUNTING his talk with Chairman Mao Tse-tung in *The Sunday Times* in 1961 Lord Montgomery had this titbit to record:

"He said there was an old Chinese legend which laid down the ages of 73 and 84 as being the difficult years of a man's life; if he passed these two successfully, he would live to become a hundred. He himself had no wish to go on living after 73 (that was in five more years); he then wanted to join Karl Marx, who was his hero—his God almost."

For students of the Chairman's more subtle and less publicized thoughts this paragraph offers a rich little mine. Does he have a hankering belief in these legends? Does he tell plain lies about his ambitions for the future? Could he tolerate any but a Chinese hero? And more to the point at this moment, with his seventy-fourth birthday coming up next Boxing Day, does he now look forward to an easy passage for the next decade?

We can agree that the 12 months since his seventy-third birthday have been very tough indeed for this resilient revolutionary. Nothing he has said or done suggests that he has had enough of the struggles of life: for him life is struggle and he offers China years, decades, centuries of struggle because the bourgeoisie is always popping up and has to be put down. Certainly he wants to go on. As for the Chairman's capacity to worship heroes, the evidence points one way only—Chairman Mao's hero—his God almost—is Chairman Mao.

Naturally enough the question that has become insistent is "After Mao who?" as "After Nehru who?" was for India some years ago. But in 1961 it seems Mao had the answer to Lord Montgomery's question: "He replied that the succession in China was clear and had been laid down—it would be Liu Shao-chi, the present Head of State". "I asked", Lord Montgomery goes on, "who would come next after Liu. He didn't know or care; he himself would be with Karl Marx and they could work it out for themselves in China."

If there was a muttered rider to this the interpreter would not have dared to translate it. Now one could write it in Liu Shao-chi is today vilified as a saboteur of the revolution almost from 1925 onwards, never failing to stab Mao in the back; the arch-revisionist against whose power and plotting the cultural revolution is directed. Wild and incredible as the charges are against Liu there is certainly little doubt that at the moment when he was talking to Lord Montgomery Mao was indeed gnashing his teeth at the power Liu had acquired, was working out precisely how he could undermine his position, and knew that it might take enough for the next decade until 84 brings another test to the heart's firm beat. There are, however, reasons for thinking this tenure unlikely, and that China's revolutionary temper will not be kept hot that long by this indomitable stoker. His health is not good and his mental capacities are somewhat suspect. For much of this year he seems to have cherished illusions about the success of the cultural revolution which were rudely punctured by the Wuhan incident in July and revealed plainly by his own secret tour to five provinces in September, the first such tour he had made in China since 1958.

Of course Mao Tse-tung could survive for many years as a nominal leader, after the cultural revolution tails off in 1968. But that might only be possible if more men of substance can be brought back to give some stability to the Government. They are all bound to be men now under a cloud as revisionists rather than newly promoted men from the Maoist rebel ranks.

Of the alternatives to be considered after Mao goes—by death or by voluntary or involuntary retirement—the first would be his designated successor Lin Piao taking over power. In the past 20 years this brilliant military leader has spent almost as much time convalescent—from war wounds and tuberculosis—as in active service. Only in the past two years has he been publicized as a national figure over all China. It is doubtful if either his temperament or his health could cope with the difficulties that would follow on Mao Tse-tung's departure. Knowing, as Lin especially must do, what opposition Mao's cultural revolution has raised not only in the Party—which he might be able to ignore—but in the army—for which he is responsible—he must know his passage could not be smooth.

Lin Piao, then, may be a wiser and a less ambitious revolutionary after two years of the cultural revolution. If he were [illegible] he Russians, his summons to world revolution, or his attempt to remake the revolutionary leadership in the cultural revolution, one asks oneself how many of his senior colleagues did he carry with him For the great leap one is tempted to say hardly anyone, so quickly were its excess reversed. But externally, in his battle with the Russians, and on behalf of world revolution, it did seem that he had some men beside him. Any student of China in 1965 would have named both Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary-general of the party, and Peng Chen, Peking's boss, as men of the Yenan-guerrilla breed and true followers of Mao.

If we are to believe even a part of the personal attacks on such men publicized by Red Guard newspapers, this was quite untrue.

In the 10 years since 1957 the majority of China's top leaders have become more and more estranged from Mao Tse-tung's policies, both external and internal.

Resisting collectives for the peasants, anxious to promote incentives, preferring fertilizers to politics, seeing class warfare as increasingly irrelevant—Mao seems to have been surrounded by revisionists. Save for the faithful servant Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai's ready capacity to come over to Mao's side whenever crisis threatens (as he did before with the first serious party split in 1959), Maoist zealots have been rare among the men at the top in China since 1949.

The answer, surely, to after Mao who? is thus shown to be exactly the same as it was to after Nehru who?, namely that the who matters less than the what. Does anyone think that India's experience in the last three years would have been much different under any other leader? Mao's spirit has done wonders for China; none of his colleagues questions his great services.

For 20 years he dominated them and the Party; Mao more than anyone else personified their nationalism and fathered their unity. Because Chinese tradition tends to equate the man and his policies, opposition to one is taken to be opposition to both. Hence the differences developing within the Chinese party ever since 1956 or 1957 have been blurred or concealed. Yet all the pressure of circumstance in China today goes one way—towards rational policies, towards a lessening of revolutionary turmoil, towards an ending of interminable struggle in whatever jargon labels it is promoted.

FUTURE INFLUENCE

The cultural revolution will mightily have increased this pressure among the whole population but for the excited young—and even the excited ones are only a minority above the teenage level.

No doubt the magic of Mao Tse-tung's personality, raised during the cultural revolution to heights of pure fantasy, can safely be left to cast its light on the future. No one need question Mao as an exemplar of Chinese Communist virtue. But to [illegible]

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him well past 73 before he could achieve it. As for not caring who might succeed Liu, it remains precisely Mao's purpose in the cultural revolution to keep China in its Maoist groove at least until the day when Liu's grandchildren will have brought their mundane intelligence to the Sages Mao and Marx.

COOLED BY AGE

From all this it follows not merely that Chinese leaders are not wholly truthful in conversation with British Field Marshals but that the first answer to our question "After Mao who?" may be Chairman Mao himself, hale and hearty to succeed Mao he could do so only with the manifest support of Chou En-lai, the senior man and Lin's one-time teacher in the Whampoa Military Academy. If Chou were to give this support, feeling that a transitional period at least was necessary before China could move away from the Maoist era, then a partnership between these two might conceivably form the core of a new leadership. But if it does so happen—and presumably Chou En-lai has his own expectations—then it would probably be he and not Lin Piao who would be China's main policy-maker.

YOUNG VANGUARD

A third possibility that should be considered is that the young men who have come up with the cultural revolution can form a new advance guard to keep China in its Maoist groove. After all Chou En-lai is 69, might he not be pushed aside in the succession? Certainly some change of this kind might be the expected outcome of the cultural revolution, but already it seems possible to rule it out. This new group of activists in the cultural revolution comes partly from the army, and partly from among those writers, film, and theatre people who have shown themselves the most eager supporters of the Maoist cultural line and most venomously hostile to the intellectuals who have been hunted as revisionists.

From whichever source they have sprung, whether the sword or the pen, none of these men seems likely to last, much less do their rivalries suggest a coherent group able to take power. Many have fallen already as fast as they have risen. Wang Li, the "hero" of the Wuhan incident, was missing from the national day parade and has since come under wall-poster attack. Like all other revolutions that encourage hysteria, this one in China is also devouring its children.

Perhaps an historical perspective can help in forecasting the trends of the post-Maoist era. Looking back over events in China since 1949 three phases seem to emerge. The first, until 1955, was of a country righting itself after many years of crisis and building a base for its renewal. Then Mao Tse-tung seemed to develop a new and personal revolutionary impulse which led to the great leap forward of 1958 to his dispute with the Russians, and in the propagation of his image as the sage of world revolution. Since 1962 there has been the third phase of which the cultural revolution is the climax—Mao's attempt to turn on the revisionists of China as well as of Russia and to make China safe for Maoism.

Looking back at Mao's great leap, his belligerence towards the Russians, his summons to world revolution, or his attempt to remake the revolutionary leadership in the cultural revolution, one asks oneself how many of his senior colleagues did he carry with him? For the great leap one is tempted to the question "After ... what?" there seems no sign of any alternative but the rational one. Externally Chinese policies have been the outcome of Mao Tse-tung's personal obsessions—in his struggle with the Russians or in his own revolutionary model as an example for the developing world. These are not policies that can be inherited. Of course China's nationalist demands will not be whittled down in the slightest; but we are likely to see China's world ambitions shelved for a generation.

Internally, too, the drive towards collectivism, the insistence on continual class struggle, the rejection of any material incentives, could hardly be sustained under any other leader. China's need for a better balance between public devotion and private cultivation must surely be desperate.

Of course the Maoist era will not end suddenly. There is likely to be an interim period. It is hard to tell at this moment how any coherent leadership could emerge from the confusion were Mao to die or retire. It is the pressures that matter and they seem all to point in the same direction; they are too strong to be held off for very long.—*From The Times, London.*

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Egypt: The Nasser Years

Post-revolutionary Egypt is still behind President Nasser — but with reservations

By ERIC DOWNTON

CAIRO.

SOMETHING is definitely very odd about the situation here these days. The political atmosphere, with hints of hidden tensions and rivalries and frustrations, is unlike anything I have known in Cairo since the revolution 13 years ago.

With the exception of the Suez crisis, which was an external challenge, President Nasser seems to be facing the most critical days of his career on the domestic front. The Egyptian revolution gives every appearance of having run out of breath.

Nasserism has struck one of those grim grey testing patches that come periodically to all Communist-tinged revolutions. Tearing down has outstripped building up. The demands of guns and a struggling young heavy industry have made most of the butter disappear.

Grandiose foreign adventures have failed, and all Cairo's adroit propaganda cannot conceal these failures from the ordinary Egyptian. Faulty planning in domestic projects, much of it probably hidden hitherto from President Nasser, is coming into the open.

Lack of foreign exchange to buy imports seriously handicaps many sectors of industry. Much uneconomic sleight of hand is necessary to conceal the threat of a nasty unemployment problem.

These are the black aspects. Perhaps they will prove to be necessary short-term sacrifices in Egypt's period of economic and social transition.

Prestige Spending

The defects are accentuated by heavy spending on the military establishment and prestige projects, such as rockets and propaganda.

The revolutionary régime's impressive achievements—such as the Aswan High Dam, social welfare development, Suez Canal improvements—have not had time to bear fruit. But whatever today's trials and disappointments it is likely that only a negligible handful of Egyptians, remnants of the old "have" class, would want to turn back the clock to the time of Farouk's fantastically corrupt monarchy.

A crop of incidents over recent weeks, unprecedented during President Nasser's rule, has clearly indicated some degree of popular discontent and what may be clashing power groups within the Government apparatus, especially the all-powerful intelligence and secret service agencies.

The demonstrations at the Cairo funeral of Nahas, the old Nationalist leader; the alleged Moslem Brotherhood plot to assassinate President Nasser; serious clashes between fishermen and police at the Mediterranean port of Damietta; the arrest of Mustafa Amin, Cairo editor and propagandist, once a close adviser to the President—these happenings received a good deal of international attention. The ramifications and infighting behind them the world will never know.

In the economic field the Government last month inadvertently gave a remarkable admission of administrative failure. It was officially announced that the Prime Minister and full Cabinet had discussed the problem of how to overcome the shortage of school books. This is symptomatic of the widespread weakness in economic administration.

After recent rebuffs abroad—the Yemen withdrawal, diplomatic isolation at the Casablanca Arab summit conference, the Egyptian Army's admission that it does not want a confrontation with Israel for at least another three or four years—President Nasser is now devoting most of his prestige and energies to the unsatisfactory domestic situation. The recent formation of a new Cabinet may mark a fresh phase.

The Government-guided Cairo Press has significantly recalled the role of the new Premier, Vice-President Zakariya Mohieddin, as the revolution's top security and intelligence expert. The mass circulation *Al Akhbar* said pointedly: "He believes that if the revolution is to succeed it must be protected from conspiracies and subversion. He has in the past uncovered a number of plots."

For Westerners in Cairo hints are being dropped that Col. Mohieddin's appointment presages a less anti-Western foreign policy. This should be taken with a large pinch of salt.

President Nasser has committed himself so deeply to the Communist Powers that any change of attitude is likely to be for tactical reasons, especially the need for economic aid. That famous gibe at the Americans by President Nasser, telling them to "go jump in the Red Sea," may mean a lot of hungry bellies among the *fellaheen*.

The stated purposes of the reshuffle also include efforts to strengthen the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only legal political body, defined as "an alliance of active popular forces." The ASU, the third attempt by President Nasser to create a durable political organisation, has lately been under considerable criticism.

President Nasser is apparently well aware of the elements of instability contained in two major omissions. These are the absence of a solid political structure and body of theory; and complete uncertainty over the pattern of succession to the Egyptian leadership.

Domestic Gains

Taking stock of domestic progress, the Egyptian revolution has plenty to be proud of. The industrial great leap forward is producing more setbacks and disappointments than expected, but a major breakthrough has been made. Allowing for over-optimistic official statistics, inefficiencies and shortages of equipment, large strides have been achieved in most fields of social welfare.

The annual health service's budget is now equal to the total spent on such services in the 25 years before the monarchy was overthrown in 1952.

Birth control propaganda is part of the health services' job. The Government knows all too well that where there were 21 million Egyptians at the time of the revolution, today there are nearly 30 million.

Egypt today has six universities with 117,000 students, compared with one university and 40,000 students 13 years ago. In primary schools last year there were 3,200,000 children against 1,400,000 ten years before.

Problems of land reform, the redistribution of big estates among small farmers, have been tackled with considerable success. Agricultural co-operatives have almost quadrupled. Production from the land, notably of cotton, the main export, has increased substantially.

The centuries-old problem of poverty and backwardness among the *fellaheen*, the peasantry toiling in the Nile's silt and mud, is such a vast deadweight that little physical improvement has been achieved since the revolution. In his hovel the *fellah* still eats and lives more or less as he did under Farouk.

But important psychological beginnings have been made. The *fellah* is being given a sense of dignity and participation in public life that did not exist before.

Debts Wiped Out

The communal radio and television sets daily remind him of his crucial role in the country's econo[my] assure him that President [Nasser] and the Governm[ent] h[as] interest constantly [at] *heen* are strongly [re]p[re]s[en]t[ed] in the Arab Socialist Uni[on] and the 360-member National Assembly.

Many have become small farmers, receiving land from the 860,000 acres that have been redistributed. Debts have been wiped out.

Like his cousin, the city worker, the *fellah* this year is grumbling about food shortages. The Government propaganda machine is working hard to explain the grain situation, emphasising the population explosion and the need to spend foreign exchange on industrial imports.

Observance of the Islamic faith has been encouraged by the State. Deeply religious himself, President Nasser has deliberately avoided the error of other Middle Eastern revolutionaries, particularly the Syrians, in attempting to secularise Moslem peoples.

Foreign observers here seem unanimous in believing that the Army remains solidly loyal to the President despite some grumbling over the Yemen campaign. Ultimately the Army is still the decisive political factor.

President Nasser probably needs the Egyptian people today more than at any time since 1954, when he deposed Gen. Neguib as leader of the revolution.

Whatever they may think of some of his lieutenants and of the administration's failings, the vast majority of Egyptians are still behind President Nasser, but that support is showing signs of becoming increasingly passive.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Why an Empire Fell

By David Rees

The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918. By C. A. Macartney. (Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 6gns.)

IN the preface to this noble history of the decline and fall of the Hapsburgs, Dr. C. A. Macartney tells us that as a young man in Vienna, immediately following the first world war, he looked in vain for a study which would explain the collapse of the Empire whose still-smoking ruins lay around him.

He conceived the idea of writing this history himself, and now, after 40 years, he has given us a narrative in the great tradition of the story of the struggle between the Empire and the forces of nationalism, democracy and separatism which finally toppled this benevolent autocracy in 1918.

The story begins in 1790, when Joseph II became resigned to defeat at the hands of the Hungarian nobles, the emperor granting "that the advance of centralism and absolutism had been pushed beyond the line which it could hold, and with that admission the retreat began." After half a millennium, the power of the Hapsburgs had begun to contract.

Yet it remains an astonishing feat of survival that the Empire lasted until well into the 20th century, given the immense centrifugal forces at work. For the possessions bequeathed by Maria Theresa to her son stretched from Galicia to the Adriatic and from Transylvania to the Alps, an amazing congeries of kingdoms and duchies, margravates and fiefs, military zones, free cities, and hereditary estates. These lands were held together mainly by the prerogatives of the Crown and the ponderous Hapsburg bureaucracy which cushioned the forces of disintegration.

Partly, of course, the Empire's survival was a result of the skill and selfishness of its rulers. In the traumatic year of 1848, following the fall of Metternich, perhaps the greatest servant of the House of Hapsburg, "none of the Imperial family had troubled to ask him how he was going to make the journey [to England] or how he would fare after it: but Baron Rothschild had more decency and sent him sufficient cash to get him and his family to safety."

After the catastrophe of Königgratz in 1866, which yielded European hegemony to Bismarck, the hapless Benedek was publicly disgraced by the emperor for his failure in a military task for which he had protested his unsuitability. Yet this same Franz Joseph, following the Prussian war, evolved the constitutional innovation of the Dual Monarchy, a settlement which lasted for 50 years, longer than any subsequent political arrangement for the area.

When the old emperor died in 1916, in the 68th year of his reign, the pent-up forces restrained by his rule swept away dynasty and empire in less than two years. Even the demoniac personality of Hitler was incubated in this apparently placid atmosphere of the last years of Hapsburg Vienna.

At the time many agreed with the view which the British Foreign Office put to Asquith in 1916. These experts argued that "the conglomeration of States" which would supplant the Monarchy would provide an "efficient barrier" against both Germany and Russia in central Europe. As the events leading to the second world war showed, this was a highly mistaken assessment. All these matters, and many more, Dr. Macartney discusses with much learning and urbanity.

Besides teaching the history of Central Europe, the author has served in the Foreign Office and has written many books on his chosen subject. This new history synthesises all the themes of his earlier works, and really explains the underlying reasons why there is still no stability in Central Europe, as the continuing crisis in Prague testifies to us every day.

Napoleon, the Last Campaigns

By Sir John Elliot

Imperial Sunset: the Fall of Napoleon, 1813-1814. By R. F. Delderfield. (Hodder. 50s.)

Napoleon Recaptures Paris, March 20, 1815. By Claude Manceron. (Allen & Unwin. 45s.)

ONE of the fascinations of history is the speculation which it inspires concerning great events. Here, in new books on the beginning of the end of Napoleon, two historians, one British and one French, ask themselves, in the bicentenary of the Emperor's birth, the same question.

Was it not, they wonder, a tragedy for Europe and the world that Napoleon, with his eyes fixed on the future, and "Merit not Rank" inscribed on his banner, was in the end destroyed by a mean collection of incompetent autocrats and backward-looking politicians who, after Waterloo, clamped all Europe back in chains? Were not the inevitable penalties of such folly the wars of 1870, 1914, and 1939, and the megalomanias of the Kaiser, Hitler and Mussolini? Was not Napoleon's vision of a united Europe similar to Churchill's 150 years later?

R. F. Delderfield, in **"Imperial Sunset,"** answers vehemently "Yes"; Claude Manceron, in **"Napoleon Recaptures Paris,"** implies the same but leaves the reader to decide. Powerful as their arguments are, I wonder. Long before the end the Emperor was beginning to disintegrate in mind as well as body and like Hitler he had to defeat Britain or fail absolutely.

There is much more, of course, in their books than speculation of what might have been. Mr. Delderfield, fortified by his impressive knowledge of the period and his footslogging over the battlefields, clarifies these last-gasp campaigns with shrewd analysis of the immense issues involved. His vivid account of the bloody struggle on the plains of Saxony and on French soil itself showand on French soil itself show the Emperor in all his earlier brilliance: the lightning marches, these; the lightning they had suffocation, despite all and the dividi of his soldiers, tempestuous ma alties of his told. The book are finely ... Imped with XVIII, help... gout, s clamped in his chair, surrounded by pompous nitwits. His pathetic attempts to mobilise public opinion in his favour are here dismissed in a memorable phrase: "They were like a flight of dragon-flies over troubled waters."

The author says the architects of the return from Elba made history, but did not know how to write it. M. Manceron has written it for them, once and for all.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Big Powers' Role In Middle East

By WINSTON CHURCHILL

THERE are today two crucial questions at the heart of the Middle East crisis: will the Russians increase the scale of direct military intervention? Will the USA tolerate such an increase? Russian intentions and the extent of American resolution will determine the course of events in the next few weeks. The probability is that neither has made up its mind.

Israel has made her position clear. As Mrs Meir, the Prime Minister, reiterated last week, without a proper peace settlement Israel will "not budge one centimetre". On this the Israeli Cabinet stands united and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Israeli people.

AIR STRIKES

Nasser's "war of attrition" and Arab guerrilla activity have convinced the Israelis that in the absence of a peace settlement they must at all costs stand fast where they are.

The Israelis today find themselves outnumbered by approximately 10 to one in firepower and in troops along the Canal front. Their only effective means of retaliation against the massive Egyptian artillery barrage is to attack the artillery with air strikes.

Mrs Meir has made it clear that Israel will engage any aircraft that seeks to interfere with Israel's principal means of retaliation, "no matter who is in the cockpit". For nearly a month now since the shooting down by the Israelis on several occasions of Egyptian Migs that sought to intercept them, the Israelis have met with no opposition whatever from the Egyptian Air Force, and have been able to carry out strikes of four or five hours' duration at will against Egyptian concrete gun emplacements.

When Mrs Meir or General Dayan, her Defence Minister, declares that Israel will not hesitate to engage the Russian pilots should they intervene in the Canal fighting, they are neither bragging nor bluffing.

Nor are Israeli pilots, whose average age is only 22, alarmed at the prospect of close combat with Soviet pilots. The Israelis are convinced that they are the best-trained and most experienced pilots in dog fighting.

But Israel has also made it clear that she will not provoke the Russians.

What are the intentions of the Soviet Union? Seen in isolation the Soviet Union's supplying of air defence to Cairo and Alexandria when its Egyptian allies are unable to provide it, may seem innocuous enough. Seen in the context of ever-increasing Russian involvement in the Middle East over 15 years, it acquires a far more sinister aspect.

The Russians have been quietly but deliberately carrying out what Mr Hubert Humphrey, the former Vice-President, who is visiting Israel, described to me as "creeping aggression". They do not go in with a fanfare. They do not make great announcements or public commitments of their political intentions, but silently and surreptitiously they involve themselves more and more deeply".

Soviet intervention began with the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955 and has increased in scale through many phases: from economic and technical assistance (for example the Aswan dam, military training missions, Soviet Army "advisers" with every unit of the Egyptian Army, and Soviet pilots flying reconnaissance missions over the United States Sixth Fleet and the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean for the past year) to the present situation where Soviet pilots are flying operationally in the Middle East conflict and Soviet military staff are manning and controlling missile sites.

SOVIET AIM

The Russians have moved into Egypt not for love of the Egyptians but to protect their colossal economic and military investment and bolster President Nasser's position. It is ironic that President Nasser, whose prestige was founded on moving the British out of Egypt, should have fallen into a Russian trap from which he cannot escape, making Egypt in the process the vehicle for the founding of a Soviet empire in Middle East and Africa. It is noteworthy that several countries among them Algeria, Tunisia and perhaps even Libya, seeing what has happened, have become increasingly wary of falling victim to Soviet imperialism like Egypt, whose economy has been ruined while the Russians speed her young men like glum heroes up the line to death for Soviet interests.

The Soviet Union, like a pusher of drugs, has created a situation by the supply of armaments and military staff in which the Egyptians have fallen into the power of Russia and President Nasser has pawned his country to maintain his supplies. Today it is not President Nasser but the Russians who run Egypt. It is they who regulate the intensity of Egyptian shelling across the Canal, it is they who have it in their power to re-establish a ceasefire tomorrow or to increase the scale of the crisis to a new level.

It is most unlikely that the Russians are keen to tangle directly with the Israelis. It would run counter to the whole basis on which the Soviet empire has been founded which unlike the British, Roman or any other empire, is not based on military conquest, except, of course, for her immediate neighbours.

If the Russians do not already have the intention of increasing the scale of their military intervention by extending their air protection to the Canal, how long can 100 Soviet pilots sit in Cairo and Alexandria while the Israel Air Force metes out a savage retribution on the Egyptian Army along the Canal, whenever the latter insists on shelling?

QUESTION FOR U.S.A.

For America the question is can she, in her own interests, allow the Soviet Union to extend its power still further in Middle East and can she risk the possibility of the Israelis stopping the Russians at the Canal with military force in the event that the USA fails to do it first with political force?

It is now clear, in spite of recent Press speculation to the contrary, that the fact that Russian pilots are today providing the air defence of Cairo and Alexandria is not attributable to Israel's deep penetration of Egyptian air space

The Russian decision was taken in response to requests by the Egyptian Government which since July last year had found its 1,500 pieces of artillery and armour along the Suez Canal subjected to the full fury of Israel air attacks

Although Israel's deep penetration raids did not provoke the deployment of SAM 3 missiles or the arrival of Soviet pilots in an operational role, they may well have accelerated the process and caused the Russians to switch their priority from the Canal to Cairo and Alexandria. At those points Israel's air strikes against military objectives were far more damaging because they demonstrated to the Egyptian and Soviet Governments to the Egyptian people and to the whole world, the impotence of the Egyptian military machine—after 15 years of Soviet training and the provision of equipment sufficient to supply the British army and the RAF several times over.—**From The Times, London**

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

THE COUNTRY PAYING DEARLY FOR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT

23/5/70

By S. NIHAL SINGH

THE most complimentary thing that can be said about Mrs Gandhi's Government at the end of the Budget session of the Lok Sabha is that it has survived in office. Faced with the problem of presenting a Budget on behalf of a minority Government, Mrs Gandhi proved equal to the task. At the same time, her performance proved the high cost to the country of a minority Government.

It became plain early in the session that the Opposition's heart was not in toppling the Government. The enthusiasm for toppling Governments (in the States) was confined to Mrs Gandhi's party, until she arrived at a point when her cup of problems was full and she cried a halt. Members of Parliament wanted to get the full five-year value out of their tenure in the Lok Sabha. And the CPI, the CPI (M) and the DMK were content to let the Government stay, so that they could extract the maximum concessions.

At the end of the session the costs of a minority Government seem exorbitant. For the first time in India's history, the Communists have emerged as an important factor in decision-making at the Centre. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the domain of foreign policy, in which the new watchword seems to be that it is better for India to be in the company of Communists than on the other side on any major foreign policy issue. Adding to this distortion of non-alignment is the regrettable fact that many politicians appear to judge issues through the spectacles of the foreign policy interests of outside Powers.

It is not only in the field of foreign policy that the weak and ineffective nature of Mrs Gandhi's Government is demonstrated. The Preventive Detention Act was given the go-by even before the Budget session had got into its stride. Until Mr Ajoy Mukherji forced the Centre's hands into imposing President's rule on West Bengal ministerial statements on the law and order situation in the State gave the impression of the Centre being a helpless spectator of the West Bengal drama.

The privy purse issue dogged the Government's footsteps. Divided between fulfilling a paper resolution and the princes' resolve to bring into play their political levers to ward off the threat to their purses, the Centre was caught in a dilemma. There were the political compulsions of notching up another "socialist" victory, but Mrs Gandhi was painfully aware of two jobs, in defiance of noises off stage.

If the Budget session proved the dangers of running a minority Government, it also reflected in a fair measure the sorry performance of the first Opposition party in Indian parliamentary history. It seemed that many members of the Organization Congress had not reconciled themselves to sitting on the Opposition benches. Dr Ram Subhag Singh, an effective lobbyist, is too inarticulate to be a good leader of the Opposition. And many of the leaders in the Congress (O) seemed to have other priorities, in the States than keeping the Government on its toes


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THE Government's performance in the Budget session is leading some members of the party to have second thoughts on the value of the Government limping along till the next General Election is due in 1972. Mrs Gandhi's followers realize that nothing of substance will be done to energize the party till four months before the election. There is thus, no advantage in gaining time for fighting a new election. The recent run of by-election victories has naturally been a morale booster for the party, whose members are now asking themselves: Why prolong the period of popular disillusionment with the Government?

Mrs Gandhi has yet to make up her mind. But she has left her calendar uncluttered by resisting demands for holding the non-aligned summit in New Delhi in August or September this year. She is in an unassailable position till 1972 because of the circumstances in her party and the mood of the Communist Opposition. But the temptation to try to convert a string of by-election victories into a success in the General Election is tantalizing. The privy purse issue, meanwhile, could be shelved by referring it to a joint select committee—so that the princes do not work as a group against the Government.

Whatever posture the Government chooses to adopt over the demand for an Indian atom bomb, the bomb will be a major factor in the General Election. Predictably, the Government's spokesmen have confined themselves to repeating old policies like mantras. Mrs Gandhi has the option of scoring a major political coup by announcing India's intention to go nuclear or of giving the advantage of the bomb to the Jana Sangh, the most pro-bomb party. Thanks to the Chinese sputnik, the present 66-2/3% would be [illegible] grant to municipal schools from The feasibility of increasing the Minister for Local Administration, Mr M. Muthuswamy, said years, programme spread over five or ten be done only under a phased dro- The actual taking over could municipalities, reports PTI. all High Schools run by various cepted in principle to take over Tamil Nadu Government has ac- COIMBATORE, May 21.—The

STATE TO TAKE OVER MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS



The central fact to emerge from the two Delhi seminars is that irrespective of India's decision on the bomb, the country needs a broad-based scientific effort on several fronts to be able to utilize the world's nuclear achievements and the advantages of space exploration in the future. The Government's present policy of piecemeal decisions on nuclear power stations can hardly give the nuclear scientists the defined goals they need.

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THE Jana Sangh is fast emerging as Mrs Gandhi's bete noire—for the good political reason that it is expected to be the most formidable opponent of the Congress (R) in the Hindi-speaking belt in the next General Election. Mrs Gandhi's flashes of anger over Mr A. B. Vajpayee's assessment of the Maharashtra riots expressed more than a distaste for communal carnage. They were rather an attempt at a political answer to the Jana Sangh's growing strength. Members of Mrs Gandhi's party are freely conceding that the Jana Sangh will probably return about 60 members to the Lok Sabha in a General Election—double their present strength.

The post-mortem on the Bhiwandi riots is beginning to take on a familiar pattern. Men are killed, houses are burnt, there are Ministerial visits and a judicial inquiry is ordered. Political parties' addiction to judicial inquiries is a hangover from the past. For the Government, it is a convenient substitute for action. By the time the inquiry report is submitted, it is ready to be consigned to the archives.

It remains to be seen whether the set of conferences called to debate the communal problem will lead to more than a momentary flurry of activity and the creation of new cells. Will some basic questions get to be asked and answered? Why does the police force, for instance, prefer to err on the side of inaction?

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ELECTIONS to Mrs Gandhi's Parliamentary Party executive were a curious affair. By common consent, the value of being on the executive was put at a little above zero, reflecting many members' feeling that it had become a rubber stamp after the split in the party. The senior leaders had kept themselves somewhat aloof from the elections in the initial stages. The result was an orgy of nominations from Lok Sabha

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GOVERNMENT TYING ITSELF UP IN KNOTS OVER PRINCES ISSUE

By S. NIHAL SINGH

THERE are limitations in bringing about a half-hearted bourgeois revolution nowhere are these limitations more apparent than in the issue over privy purses. Having been saddled with the commitment to abolish privy purses, Mrs Gandhi is now seeking to move towards abolishing them while intense backstage parleys are in progress to have the best of both the worlds—abolish privy purses and yet have the support of the princes.

After it is all over, Mrs Gandhi will have a second trophy in her socialist collection; the first was the nationalization of 14 major banks. The Council of Princes, already soured by the Government's decision to become socialist at the princes' expense, is in a mood to fight it out all along the way. The Concord members refuse to be placated by sweet words.

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By themselves, the privy purses and princely privileges are not an important issue. They cost the nation less than Rs 5 crores a year. But in the context of Mrs Gandhi's 'new' Congress, its socialist slogans and the confusion that prevail in the party, the princes' issue has acquired a bigger-than-life importance. On it hangs the party's backlash against the "Young Turks" and the future election prospects of the Requisitionists' Congress.

As the day for the introduction of the Bill to abolish privy purses draws near, the situation is becoming curiouser and curiouser. The Government is tying itself up in knots, and if the draft Bill is introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 18 in its present form, it will contain a provision de-recognizing the rulers while deleting the constitutional guarantees protecting their privy purses and privileges. This provision (since deleted) adds a comic opera effect to an already comic situation. An interesting story is behind this subterfuge to avoid the payment of privy purses.

It seems that at a rather late stage the Government has been having second thoughts on abrogating the covenants between the princes and the Government. This is for two reasons: to try not to invite the opprobium of the better part of the world by breaking solemn covenants and the President's reported unwillingness to break them. Hence the Law Ministry's recourse to the de-recognition stratagem. There would be no recognized rulers to give the privy purses to. These technical ploys are interesting only for demonstrating the spin the Government is in over the privy purse issue. More interesting was the emergence of the puckish Mr D. P. Mishra from the wings to take a hand in resolving the issue. His interest, however, was not entirely to the liking of all the princes—those of Madhya Pradesh in particular had old scores to settle with him. But a stormy meeting of the Concord decided not to shut the door on Mr Mishra.

Mr D. V. Singh of Ajaigarh paid a call on Mr Mishra, but the expected meeting between the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra and Mr Mishra did not come off. Mr Mishra met others and mulled over the problem. The result was a trial balloon he launched. It was not necessary to abolish privy purses but merely to make them "an office of profit" which would debar privy purse holders from coming to Parliament and the State Assemblies But the balloon failed to take off, although it had the reported support of Mrs Gandhi and Mr Jagjivan Ram Mr Chavan was against it because it came too late in the day and the princes were naturally against it because they interpreted it as a Machiavellian scheme to clip their political wings.

While Mr Jagjivan Ram entertained the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra to dinner one night, the privy purse issue kept spilling over into the meetings of Mrs Gandhi's Congress Parliamentary Party. The princes were heartened by the phenomenon that many more in the party had gathered the courage to support them. The "Young Turks" were in a subdued mood —not knowing which way Mrs Gandhi would jump—although Mr Mohan Dharia continued to demonstrate that he could not be easily subdued. Mr Chavan wrote to each of the former rulers informing them of the Government's intention to bring forward a Bill to abolish privy purses But the letters failed to produce immediate results except for a reply from the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra along expected lines. Who started the canard about Mrs Gandhi's invitation to the princes to meet her before the introduction of the Bill? Was it to shoot down the proposal?

For Mrs Gandhi, the only option left is to sweeten the bitter pill after the Bill is introduced in Parliament by talking to the princes. But her talks can only touch upon more generous terms of compensation. Probably the princes can be divided, but the majority will swing behind the Concord in fighting the Government. It will be a long battle. If the princes do not succeed in defeating the Bill, if it is taken up for consideration in the monsoon session of Parliament, they would challenge it in the Supreme Court. A long legal battle over the Bill might perhaps suit the Government as well.

Some members of Mrs Gandhi's Congress are building their hopes on the Bill's passage. They feel that they could extract political advantage out of the measure. They are heartened by the run of by-election victories their paty has secured. Obviously, there were local factors in the wins but perhaps also the plus factor of Mrs Gandhi's radical image, tarnished as it is. According to an Assam member, it takes three to six months for an idea or a mood to percolate down to Assam from Delhi!

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BEHIND this much ado about princes and their privy purses lies the stark reality of the approaching General Election. Few are prepared to give the Requisitionists' Congress more than 150 seats in the Lok Sabha in a new Parliament on the basis of its present performance. The Organization Congress will perhaps not count for much as a party, but it will cut into the votes of the Congress (R) If the princes as a group are also to band themselves against the Requisitionists' Congress, where will Mrs Gandhi and her party stand in the next General Election?

Some members of Mrs Gandhi's party are already toting up the losses. They seem to have written off Madhya Pradesh, with or without privy purses, in view of the inroads the Rajmata of Gwalior and her son are making into Congress territory in the State. The Rajmata's inclination towards the Jana Sangh is not in doubt, and it is expected that a majority of the princes in the State will climb on the Jana Sangh bandwagon. Three other States in which the princes will play a crucial role, in view of their preponderance, are Rajasthan, Orisss and Gujarat.

Although the princes are concentrating for the moment on fighting their battle over privy purses, they have begun moves to plan for the General Election. Rajasthan is a case in point. With the princely house of Udaipur, traditionally a supporter of Mr Mohanlal Sukhadia, having developed a coolness towards the Congress (R) Government, the way has been opened for the major princely houses to come together to fight their political battles jointly. Efforts are being made to bring together the princely houses of Udaipur, Jaipur, Jodhpur and Kotah to fight for the common cause. If these efforts at reconciliation between historical enemies succeed, Mr Sukhadia can write off his chances of heading a post-General Election Ministry.

Orissa is already largely in the hands of the princes and the Swatantra Party. It is likely to stay that way unless Mr Biju Patnaik takes courage in both hands and forms a State party to win the State and the princes. The fourth State, Gujarat, is caught up in the State Swatantra leaders' passion for toppling the Organization Congress Ministry. Whatever the ultimate result of these efforts, the princes will play their part in the next General Election, and the honeymoon between the Swatantra Party's Gujarat unit and the Requisitionists Congress group is not likely to outlast the abolition of privy purses.

With their influence in these States and in other pockets in the country, the princes and their supporters can bank on returning as many as 50 members to the Lok Sabha in the next General Election. The princes will perhaps prefer to spread themselves out into different Opposition parties to fight the elections because a princes' party might have too much of a revivalist ring. But as their combined efforts over the privy purse issue show today, party labels are likely to be less significant than their desire to act together for a common cause. In this lies the danger to Mrs Gandhi's Congress.

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AN IDEA EVOLVES IN A NEW AGE OF ASIANISM

By PRAN CHOPRA

Five countries of South-East Asia have come together as the Association of South-East Asian Nations to promote economic co-operation in the area. The chances of the success of this experiment and the difficulties it faces are discussed in this series of articles.

The first article discusses the displacement of the former more comprehensive and continental concept of Asian co-operation by a sub-regional concept and the contribution made to this change by the politics of the Big Powers.

ASIAN countries are no strangers to the Asian idea, to the notion that they share a uniqueness which sets them apart from the rest of the world and upon a basis of togetherness at least if not of oneness. But the notion has gone through so many changes of context and content that each reincarnation of it provokes, for new speculation and interest; so does the latest—ASEAN, Association of South-East Asian Nations.

The Asian sentiment, as it was seen at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 or eight years later at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung will probably never return, not in that form at any rate. And there is not much reason to regret this. It was a luminous idea, comprehensive in its geographic extent but rhetorical, impractical and unproductive in its purposes. Whether it would have grown into something more effective is one of history's many unanswered questions, because before it could it was overtaken by two of the greatest post-war world forces, Communism and anti-Communism. Before they could come together as Asians, Asian countries were drawn into the respective orbits of these rival forces. Each country began to look more towards the centre of its own orbit than towards its Asian neighbours, and both centres were outside Asia (until the Sino-Soviet split shifted half of one centre from Moscow to Peking).

Before these orbits could break, the old continental concept of Asianism did: it yielded place to a sub-regionalism. Much of West Asia became still more tightly drawn into the Arab community, Iran into groups which had more to do with the West than, say, with South-East Asia; India turned in concern to her northern border and instead of remaining the western abutment of South-East Asia as she was through earlier history and more recent illusions, she became—if she became anything other than a troubled mass with its eyes turned inwards—a possible centrepiece in a South Asian configuration; South-East Asia developed a separate awareness of itself which it might not have otherwise.

To this awareness belongs another difference between the old continental Asianism and the new sub-regionalism, especially in South-East Asia and in the most easterly cluster of which the natural nucleus is Japan. This change is still working its way towards expression but its emergence is unmistakable. It has given the togetherness of the sub-regional groups, especially of these two sub-regions, a specific economic orientation. Other factors have contributed: economic necessity for instance, the urges released by freedom, the ready availability of economic aid from outside. But the largest contribution has been made by the fact that sub-regional groups, being more comprehensible to each of their members than Asia as a whole was to any except a visionary, could be understood by each in more concrete terms and the understanding could be translated into the practical problems of day-to-day living.

SUBTLE CONTRIBUTION

And a subtle contribution was made, and is still being made, perhaps unwittingly, by China and the USA, the two Powers which by their opposing pressures had so fractured the old idea of continental Asianism that as a platform for policy it has ceased to exist although it remains attractive as a sentiment.

So long as some at least of China's neighbours thought that Peking's threat was of a directly military nature, they were more interested in direct relations with the USA, the only Power whose assistance could be adequate, than in any mutual arrangements independent of America. This, in the first place, gave the USA room for manoeuvres in South-East Asia which were not conceived in Asian terms only. In the second place it isolated Thailand from the purely South-East Asian context and reduced the diplomatic capability of the one capital which, as recent and remoter events testify alike, is an excellent springboard for sub-regional diplomatic initiatives.

But with the growth of the belief that its main threat is of subversion, China has begun to promote sub-regional cohesion instead of discouraging it. The lesson of Vietnam has not been lost upon its neighbours: that if there is an answer to the threat of Communist subversion, it has to be compounded out of economic stability of the area and of each country, and a more positive feeling of identity between non-Communist neighbours. Subversion is best prevented if economic discontents are forestalled; if it should raise its head even then and outside help were needed, the most suitable source would be countries of the neighbourhood, whom people regard as one of themselves and whose assistance would strengthen local identities instead drowning them as the U.S. presence sometimes does.

How important this idea is now to some countries is best illustrated by Thailand's rôle in a controversy which a few weeks ago threatened to swallow ASEAN at birth. When Indonesia proposed that ASEAN should concern itself not only with cultural and economic co-operation but the security and defence of the region and member countries, the Philippines staged a strong objection, perhaps expecting support from Thailand as well because that country too has accepted an American military alliance and large military bases. When a deadlock threatened, Bangkok put forward a compromise formulation, that the ASEAN countries would jointly announce that foreign military bases were on their soil only at the request of the host countries and would be withdrawn or handed over to the hosts upon the latter deciding that the need for them had disappeared. The Philippines objected even to this and Thailand retorted that if necessary ASEAN would be formed without the Philippines. Manila's opposition quickly disappeared thereafter, and this was not just a conference table coup but acceptance of what is becoming a policy attitude of the whole area.

In a tour through all the ASEAN countries this month I found everybody agreed that this transitory dispute need never have erupted. Even the Indonesian Foreign Minister now agrees as readily as the others I met, that the answer to subversion lies in stability, first in each country and then the area, and no conflict need exist between sub-regional institutions for economic improvement and those which might be more directly concerned with security. Should supranational military operations be needed at all, they should in the first instance be sub-regional, more particularly ASEAN; help from outside the region should be taken only if China directly intervened.

ANTI-AMERICAN MOOD

The contribution of the USA is less direct but not less remarkable, and perhaps even bigger when measured in negative terms than in positive. Its more positive and direct contribution, as is obvious, is in the form of offers, already made or in the offing, of substantial economic assistance if the countries of the region would band themselves together for receiving it. The negative contribution, however, may have done more to make the ASEAN idea more popular in the region. By its performance in Vietnam it has created an aversion for alien military aid without winning for itself the awe and respect which a decisive victory might have won it. Apart from strengthening the advocates of regional self-reliance, it has accentuated the anti-American sentiment which is seeping through the area, not least among the military allies of the USA.

(To be continued)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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SEARCH FOR NEW TIES WITH THE FADING OF THE OLD

By PRAN CHOPRA

In three of the most important members of ASEAN, a shift of moods is taking place which makes it difficult to classify them in cold war terms. There is a growing disenchantment with the USA in Thailand and the Philippines, and in Indonesia a strong mistrust, even hatred, of Communism. Correspondingly there is an ambivalence in the attitude of Big Powers towards ASEAN.

This should strengthen the indigenous character of ASEAN and make it even more deeply rooted than it is in the hopes and ambitions of the area itself, more free of the machinations of global politics than some of its predecessors were.

IN the Philippines as well as Thailand there is a disenchantment with America which is at present confined to the educated middle classes—those who may generally be described as the intelligentsia—but given the chance can spread. In the Philippines a campaign is being publicly run, and with increasing success, by Senator Tanada and his movement for the Advancement of Nationalism against the existing treaty with the USA which they denounce as an "unequal treaty" in the classic terms of anti-colonialism. The feeling which the movement arouses against the American presence, particularly against some of the bases which are enormous in size, might have been sharper but for the precautions taken: most areas of Manila have been placed out of bounds for Americans in uniform, and the extent and depth of their civilian jurisdiction which fans out of their bases is being checked whenever opportunity arises.

As a reaction against the excessively close identity with the USA so far maintained by the Philippines and still favoured by the Government—and still favoured, it should be added, by the majority of the apolitical people at lower levels—I found in many men of the professions a desire for closer identity with Asia, a desire which in its emotional quality reminded me of the Asianism of the earliest vintage in India. There is a close overlapping between the spokesmen of disenchantment with Washington, "the re-examinists" as they are called, and those who desire a closer link with Asian neighbours. The former could possibly include those who are Communists by persuasion as well as those who for various reasons welcomed the Government's decision to open commercial contacts with Russia. But the numbers of the "Asianists" are quite impressive too; incidentally, they are also well represented among the people who wish to see the Philippines become more truly a democracy (and rather less of the oligarchy it is in economic and social terms and hence also in political terms beyond a point).

THAILAND

In Thailand one finds very little of the tendency to seize upon every irritation offered by an American soldier and to make it a grievance against the USA. Several causes account for the difference. The historical background helps. Thailand has never been a colony and does not have anti-colonial chips on its shoulders. On the other hand, as a small independent Power placed between an expansionist British empire on its western frontier and a French empire on its eastern, Thailand has learnt to tread the middle path with clear eyes, unclouded by emotional reactions. I do not think there is in the whole of Asia a Foreign Ministry today where hard-headed and sustained pragmatism is so ascendant over prejudice, pride or sentimental nonsense of any kind or where there is such steady purposefulness and self-assurance. Hence Thailand's success, not only maintained but enhanced by the present Foreign Minister, Mr Thanat Khoman, in resolving not only Thailand's own disputes with neighbours but also in resolving the disputes of the region: for example Malaysia's with Indonesia and the Philippines and Indonesia's with the unilaterally decide that the need for bases is over, and when it does the bases must be handed over to it—including a brand new deep-sea harbour and an air base ready for the latest aircraft. Even before that, the bases remain under joint control and may not be put to operational use without Thailand's permission. Not a bad deal, and now Thailand expects to sign shortly a new Treaty of Friendship with the USA to replace the existing treaty of military alliance.

"SEGREGATIONISTS"

Even so, and perhaps because it is doubted whether Thailand is really free to exercise these options, there has been a sufficient rise in sensitivity about American forces in Thailand for the Government to take some precautionary steps. Paying heed to the "segregationists"—a mixed lot some desiring to segregate U.S forces from the general population to spare the ties between the two countries possible frictions of contact, some displaying the friction already by complaining that U.S. soldiers are "disturbing our cultural patterns" (an euphemism for the vulgarites rampant in Bangkok) some exploiting the friction to whip up feelings against the USA—the Government has taken steps to set up "entertainment" zones closer to the main American bases so that fewer U.S. soldiers are seen in the streets of Bangkok, and a Bill to enforce this was taken up a few weeks ago much to the disappointment of those for whom every G.I. Joe means that much more of quick money. American soldiers have also been asked not to carry arms unless on operational duty.

There is probably no tendency in Thailand, as there is among some leaders in the Philippines, including President Marcos, to use the growing "Pan-Asia" sentiment for a mild form of blackmail of the United States in discussions on aid and concessions, etc. But the need seems to have been felt to allay such American misgivings as there might be, and to present the move towards ASEAN as aimed not at the existing connexion with America but at forestalling any vacuum that might arise following a possible American withdrawal from the area. The argument helps the Government to "sell" ASEAN to three kinds of critics at once: those who think Thailand is being false to an old ally, suspect ASEAN is an American-sponsored idea, and favour Indonesia's insistence upon some acknowledgment of the need to recognize security objectives.

their minds: What exactly is the meaning of the Indonesian insistence upon aiming a shaft at foreign bases in the area? Did they have in mind only the British base in Singapore, against which Soekarno had railed at length, or were they being critical of American bases also? Who would be the rulers of Indonesia in the coming years and what would be their impact upon ASEAN? After all, even the present rulers, much more acceptable to the West than those they have replaced and those who still wait in the wings for the chance to emerge, did read into the ASEAN Declaration (August 8, 1967) a paragraph which has a few uneasy-making u n d e r t o n e s: "Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly process of their natural development." To what ends would this affirmation be used by a future council of ASEAN?

RUSSIAN ATTITUDE

The Russian attitude too is distinguished by ambivalence. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Adam Malik's stock is said to be high in Washington for the reasons that he is the most conspicuous civilian in the Cabinet and dilutes the impression the Suharto regime would otherwise give of being a military dictatorship, and has been bold enough to advocate a total break with the legacy of Soekarno. Correspondingly his stock should be lower in Moscow, where the Suharto régime, as it is, has caused displeasure by the strong action it has taken against the Communists. It would not have been surprising if the inclusion of Indonesia in ASEAN had made the latter totally unacceptable to Moscow. But Moscow has been much less critical of ASEAN than Peking has been, and lately Russian criticism has been particularly muted.

This lends credence to the belief being propagated by Indonesian Foreign Ministry sources that Russia has dropped its objections both to the new Indonesian Government and to ASEAN. As evidence of the former they claim that the recent Indonesian Air Force delegation to Moscow succeeded in persuading the Russians to resume supply of military spares. In support of the latter they say that they have carried conviction with Moscow with their plea that jointly the ASEAN countries will be able to resist outside pressure (which in the context of their conversation means American) much better than each can by itself. Whether these claims are correct in every detail remains a matter of conjecture. But I found far less evidence of Russian unhappiness over ASEAN than I had expected to, just as the incipient feeling against the United States in the Philippines and Thailand turned out to be stronger than was expected.

At the root of the ambivalence of both Russians and Americans is the fact, impressive on every count, that ASEAN is far more rooted in the soil of South-East Asia and in South-East Asian hopes and ambitions than in the machinations of global politics. It is at least as indigenous as MAPHILINDO was and far more than ASA could ever have hoped to be. The countries concerned take a pride in the product, so much in fact that rival claims are

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Philippines over the Muslim South of the Philippines, and in promoting first USA and now ASEAN. There is not much in her foreign relations today about which Thailand needs to be bitter or unbalanced.

The more immediate background has also helped When Thailand agreed to accept military bases on its soil—and "agreed" in circumstances in which few could have disagreed with the need for doing so—it took good care to safeguard its own interests. Thailand can

BIG POWERS AMBIVALENT

American spokesmen in the capitals of all the ASEAN countries display an interesting ambivalence in their attitude to the project. Should ASEAN remain what most of its present members would like it to be, it would coincide exactly with the most enlightened part of U.S. aims in South-East Asia: to make the area safe against insurgence or infiltration. Therefore the first American reaction is to welcome ASEAN. But uneasy questions also arise, in

made, especially by Indonesia and Thailand, to authorship of the idea. The fact of course is that no single country can claim to be the author, the project has emerged from many inter-connexions and over a period of a few years and is in line with sub-regional shapes, especially economic, which are emerging in many parts of the world. What is new about it is that the project is more serious, more specific, more hardheaded in its aims and objectives, and more likely to be acceptable to most countries of South-East Asia. The crucial question is whether it will live up to the belief prevalent in ASEAN capitals that it is more likely to yield economic benefits to its members than any organization which has been seen in any part of Asia in the earlier sub-regional or still earlier continental phases of Asianism.

(To be concluded)

...ed Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Coll...

ASEAN—III

ENDS ARE DESIRABLE BUT THE MEANS ARE NOT EASY

By PRAN CHOPRA

ASEAN countries have given a higher priority to lowering of tariffs than to co-ordinated development of manufacturing capacity. The former may be easier but the latter will prove to be more worth while in the long run.

However, dovetailing plans for industrial development will call for a very high degree of political decision-making which in turn will put to the test the political stability of each regime and the willingness of each country to think in terms of the area.

TRAVELLING through South-East Asia, however hurriedly, one cannot fail to be impressed by the obvious need for economic co-operation in this area. Nearly every country has an airline of its own, and at the main airports there are, side by side, the facilities, aeroplanes and exquisite air hostesses of the airlines of Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines—all the ASEAN countries that is—and occasionally there is a glimpse of Burma Airways as well. The services are run well, but each by itself is so unviable that it is kept up only by the support, amounting to tutelage, of one or another of the main airlines of the world.

Thai International is heavily beholden to SAS, the Philippines Airways to KLM the Malaysian Airlines to the British aviation industry. Pooled together they could not only be independent of outside control; they could aspire to be the SAS of South-East Asia. Even their brief experience in ASA the Association of South-East Asia formed in 1961 by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines and now merged in ASEAN, should have showed them how fruitful the possibilities are.

The main capitals of South-East Asia are now burgeoning new cities of which India remains largely unaware because of an unjustified pride and indefensible ignorance; the best among them are superior to any that India can show, whether the comparison is made in terms of the palaces of the rich, the welfare of the citizenry, the quality of civic management or the beauty of modern architecture. But the shops in their streets, though bursting with goods, have little to show which is of indigenous manufacture. They represent enormous urban markets and serve a fertile and —by Indian standards—rich hinterland, but they are served almost entirely by goods manufactured outside the region.

HOMOGENEOUS

Probably none of the countries of South-East Asia can provide by itself sufficient market for large and modern industries. But together they are as good a market as any, with attractive possibilities of economies of scale. They are so homogeneous in so many ways that many items made for any one of them would be suitable for all. Throughout the ASEAN area, the requirements of rural and urban living, whether by way of implements or amenities, edibles or durables, textiles or transport, housing or ploughs, are so very similar that it can be treated as a single consuming and manufacturing area of 160 million people and 365,000 square miles.

To reinforce these similarities, there are some compulsions which have given a powerful reminder of their existence in recent weeks. The economy of all ASEAN countries—except Singapore, which [illegible] them: their economies are competitive, not complementary, a fact sadly reflected in their trading figures. According to an ECAFE study, trade within the region accounts for only one-fourth of the trade of the ASEAN area as a whole with the rest of the world, and the proportion is further declining instead of rising with years. In 1952-54 this share was 26.2% but 10 years share was 22.5%, and current projections suggest the decline will continue if things are left as they are. As the ASEAN countries try to develop their industries, and therefore use more and more of their export earnings for importing capital and technology from the industrially advanced countries, their trade with each other will decline still further. So will it as living standards in these areas rise and with them the demand for consumer manufactures which, as things are, come almost entirely from outside the region.

LOWER TARIFFS

Against this background it was surprising to find in all ASEAN countries a high and unrealistic priority given, among the economic tasks of ASEAN, to a lowering of tariffs by each ASEAN country in respect of the rest. When ASA was set up its members turned their attention first to a study of the reduction of tariffs as soon as the customary homage had been paid to the usual first item of regional co-operation—"cultural exchanges".

Later, the first serious product of ASA consultations was also a list of 21 items grown and produced (mostly grown) in the area on which they agreed to reduce tariffs. This list became, in turn, the second controversial item (next only to Indonesia's proposal for co-operation in defence) when the transition from ASA to ASEAN began to be discussed last August. Malaysia proposed the scrapping of the ASA agreement on tariffs—at the prompting of Indonesia, commercial people in Manila suspect, because Indonesia did not take part in the discussions on the agreement, not being a member of ASA. The Philippines, on the other hand, believing itself (on rather slender evidence) to be substantially more industrialized than the other ASEAN countries, was anxious to go of the area. But these economies do not yet have the specialized capacities or the variables and flexibilities which already existed among the ECM members before they began to lower their tariffs; their industries were ripe to profit from the freeing of demand from the narrow confines of each nation's own market, and they had the flexibility needed for specialization to grow out of the flow of demands in a vigorous market.

A conversation with two ASEAN Foreign Ministers—left nameless as desired by them—suggests that the emphasis upon the Common Market example is not sincere. It seems to be realized that tariff reductions would not make sense in the present conditions in South-East Asia unless accompanied by certain complementary steps. But it is thought the decision will make a splash in the newspapers of the world without producing any repercussions for ASEAN members to cope with. It would be as painless as "cultural exchanges" but more newsworthy, seemingly more earnest and therefore a good example to quote while making out a case for foreign aid for ASEAN.

On a par with this is a comment made by one of the Foreign Ministers, that it would be "safer" for ASEAN members to co-operate in those areas first where they have few vested interests to sacrifice—hence in developing common shipping for example (few have any) rather than a common airline. From such "achievements", however insignificant each may be by itself, a "trend" would grow, he thought, which would help ASEAN members to move on to more difficult items.

Sound in appearance but not in fact. If the new regional idea is not to go the way of its predecessors it must work faster towards more solid success. This will only come, as a strong section in ECAFE led by Dr Kitamura of the Research and Planning Division, has begun to realize and propagate, by deeper and more bold decisions to dovetail the industrial development plans of these countries together so that while industries are developed a more conscious effort is made to create complementary and matching features in economies which do not have them now, to promote specialized production of different items in the countries most suited to produce them. To do through deliberate policy decisions, in other words, what has been more freely done in ECM through the natural flow of the demand for things and the supply of resources and know-how in different countries. And even there the process could not be left entirely to market forces.

If the development plans of the member countries are to be properly co-ordinated for the better development of the area as a whole, each will have to move away from the autarkical tendencies which are developing in all of them. Many industrial

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which lives by the tradesman's wits—is dependent upon the export of one raw material or another, each one of them vulnerable to strong price fluctuations. The most vulnerable, because of the competition of synthetic substitutes, is also the most important—rubber. Since the middle of August, South-East Asia and especially Malaysia has been increasingly in the grip of anxiety over a fall in rubber prices. The crisis has given rise to a strong demand among the countries of the region—apart from inducing them to invite Ceylon, another rubber producer, into ASEAN even though Colombo is well outside any geographical definition of South-East Asia—for joint action both in improving production and in bargaining with the industrialized countries of the West which are the main buyers of rubber.

Their bargaining power is poor but the prospects of joint confrontation between the raw material producing countries and the importing industrialized nations has given a powerful fillip to ideas of regional cooperation in South-East Asia and particularly to ASEAN because all the main rubber-producing countries, except Ceylon, are founding members of ASEAN.

But the similarity between these countries is as much a problem as an opportunity for ahead with tariff reductions first and to ensure the transference of the agreement intact from ASA to ASEAN.

A preference for low tariffs has been allowed to become a consideration in deciding who should be members of ASEAN or what their rôle should be. In Manila, sniggering remarks are heard about the status of the membership of Singapore: "They do not produce anything themselves; allowing Singapore into the low tariff ASEAN market will only open up this area to a further flood of foreign manufactures from the industrialized West." Japan's entry into ASEAN, not very justifiable on other grounds either, is opposed by the Philippines for the reason that inviting a highly industrialized country to join ASEAN's low tariff area will permanently condemn other ASEAN members to remain producers of primary raw materials.

The thinking on economic cooperation in these countries appears to have come under the spell of the example of the European Common Market; in many conversations this parallel comes up in full justification for the high priority given to the reduction of tariffs. They seem so highly conscious of the smallness of their markets that enlarging these by lowering tariff barriers is accepted as panacea for the economic ills ambitions will have to be sacrificed in one country in favour of those of another, and this will not be easy. For one thing, as the economies of these countries are more or less similar, each can claim only marginal advantages over the others in respect of most industries; only in a few cases will any country be able to make out such a clear case for the right to play host to a particular industry that the others should accept it without hesitations. Secondly, economic and political power are concentrated in the same hands in most ASEAN countries (except where political power is in Malay hands and economic in Chinese). Therefore agreeing to allocate an industry to another country instead of one's own will involve in each country a sacrifice of some personal interests also, and that too on the part of people who in many cases will have the power to prevent it.

All this is going to call for political decision-making of a very high order, and very firm exercise of political authority in each country in the interests of all. Only régimes which are stable, firmly in power, and reasonably free of extraneous distractions can display such decision-making and authority. How do ASEAN and its members measure up to these demands?

(To be continued next week.)

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ASEAN—IV

SPECTRE OF SOEKARNO STILL HAUNTS INDONESIA

By PRAN CHOPRA

Effective economic co-operation between the ASEAN countries requires, as suggested in the third article last week, political stability in each country and competence in each government to take authoritative and sophisticated decisions

In the most important country of the area, Indonesia, there is not much political or economic stability today, and what shape authority may take is not known. But on balance the chances seem reasonably good that the economy will stabilize itself and a normal and durable government will emerge.

OF all the countries in the ASEAN area, the winds of instability blow hardest in Indonesia. No one knows for certain at present what forces will emerge from the wings or when, or where the final balance will be struck between normal processes of government and authoritarian control, between the Old Order and the New, between the fact and fiction of Soekarno. The country is rather like Russia would have been if Stalin, instead of dying, had been deposed and had lived on.

To all the difficulties of understanding a country so deeply beset by the problems of transition, Indonesia adds one which is peculiar to itself: its political diction. Ideas are capsuled into slogans, policies and institutions are spelt out in initials or anagrams, aphorisms take the place of argument. The result is that an exposition of the state of affairs by an Indonesian reads like the axioms of a faith grafted upon a kind of political animism

NASAKOM is gone, along with NEKOLIM, NEFO, and GANEFO and the rest. But the AMPERA Cabinet remains, retaining the anagram invented by Soekarno Now it has Two Duties and four Decrees before it, and its objective is to create PANTJA TERTIB or Five Kinds of Order. The State has Five Permanent Foundations, its foreign policy has Five Principles, and the Army is guided by the Sapta Marg. The Supreme Council of the Apparatus of the Revolution, the Committee for the Fostering of the Revolutionary Spirit, and KOTI and PEPELDA have all been abolished. Trust is now placed in BAPPENAS, the body for Directing National Development. The final hope is that the Apparatus of the Revolution will be filled with the Supernatural Powers of the Pantja Sila, and this will come to pass because Indonesia is a "Democracy Led by the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation" (MUSHAWRAH) leading to Consensus (MUFAKAT).

Everyone still swears by the Pantja Sila, though it means different things to different people. No criticism of anything done by the Old Order can be stronger than that it deviated from the Pantja Sila. Thus General Suharto on August 16, Indonesia's Independence Day, this year: "Pantja Sila was distorted and lost its purity with the birth of the NASAKOM that brought into participation an unclouded Communism in the execution of Pantja Sila. Communism that is based upon dialectical materialism is obviously anti-God, while Pantja Sila includes the Principle of the Awareness of God." On the other hand, "the function of objectives" of the New Order is "to extend to purify the manifestation and to purify the execution of the Pantja Sila and the 1965 Constitution". (the two Beings which the Now Order always places side by side in its pantheon).

THE LEGEND

The legend of Soekarno continues to tug at the heart of Indonesians, despite the chaos and the madness he let loose at the end. He is still remembered with gratitude for what he gave Indonesia and no one else could have: a sense of nationhood, a as one plank of his attempt to keep in control the power of the N'hadut-ul-Ulema, a Muslim party of orthodoxy. The extremists are being exposed to anti-Soekarno "mass movements" in which the official hand is not invisible. But the power of the two parties is far from extinguished yet.

Few people expect that the Old Order will ever be in the ascendent again in quite the shape that was given it by the charisma of the Bung; with his passing, it is bound to lose heart and its decline will be steeper than it has been yet. Many people who are impatient with the pace at which Suharto is weeding out the incumbents of the Old Order believe that if there were an outright clash between the Old and the New, the former would be vanquished. They are perhaps right. Any active alliance between the pro-Soekarno forces, which include the Navy and more particularly the Marines, would be opposed by a stronger force, a combination of the Army with the organized power of the Muslims, especially the N'hadut-ul-Ulema which is bitterly against Soekarno.

But everyone thinks, and the more responsible he is the more strongly he believes this, that any clash between the two forces would be ruinous for the country. Whoever won out in the end, the country would pass through such a period of chaos that its recovery as a unified and orderly society might become impossible Therefore impatience with Suharto is shared by far fewer people than admiration for the tact, the skill and patience with which he is trying to root out the Old Order without breaking up the country. Even those in whom enthusiasm outruns discretion are forced to admit this

FRUSTRATION

There are, however, unmistakable signs of a frustration at some levels, especially among young people, which still can take forms which are as yet unpredictable. Frustrations arising from the state of the economy, which may offer shelter to political ambitions as well, are reflected in the demonstrations last week by the University Students Action Front (KAMI) demanding cheaper rice or the resignation of the Government. A month earlier KAMI had threatened to lead demonstrations, in defiance of a ban imposed by the Army, against corruption which is known to be widespread in the higher ranks of the Army. A KAMI representative in the Madjelis read out a list not long ago of Army commanders who have however, see in all this a reflection of a tussle within the Ampera Cabinet. Some of Suharto's colleagues are pressing him for early elections (without giving time for the new Muslim party to strike root) and it is believed that they expect much more support from the N'hadut-ul-Ulema than Suharto hopes for.

There is nothing to indicate yet whether or when Indonesia will return to the normalities of rule by elected civilians. In fact no one yet knows when elections will be held. Estimates vary from one year hence to three, and the reasons range from procedural delays to a frank admission that if held too soon they might not give the New Order the strong majority it would need to hold its own in the midst of free debate on the one hand and, on the other, the unextinguished influence of the Old Order in many parts of the country; "there are still 3,000,000 Communists in the country whom we have not been able to crush" a New Order luminary confided.

HONEST REPORT

Suharto himself is aware that the New Order is incomplete without a constitutional form of government. In a detailed and quite obviously honest report to the country, he admitted on Independence Day "I wish to stress that the New Order has not yet become manifest today. The New Order will become manifest later on only after the formation of a Madjelis as the outcome of the forthcoming general election, a Madjelis that will appoint a President who will further form a new government". A fortnight ago he issued an order that although military commanders may continue to be members of the Cabinet for the time being, they will not be known as Ministers in future. In many discussions with Mr Adam Malik, his Foreign Minister and the most important civilian member of the Cabinet, he is believed to have agreed that civilian rule should be restored. But equally readily he agrees, when in the midst of his commanders, that this cannot be done very soon. In the meantime the conquest of more posts by the commanders continues.

This is the dilemma of a man who fully realizes that the Indonesian Army has no barracks to go back to—and this is true in two senses, of which only one does credit to the Armed Forces and the country. In the first place Indonesia's is not a professional army, trained to take orders from the government of the day instead of forming one itself. As Suharto put it: "The Armed Services of the Republic of Indonesia were born together with the physical revolution, they were born from the sons of the people. The Armed Services were born and grew up with the consciousness to give birth to independence, to defend independence and to give substance to independence. The Armed Services are not just paid men, but are also services giving substance to our independence and are entitled and feel obliged to take part in deciding the policy of the State and the running of the Government." For what consolation there might be in these words, he added a little later "The Armed Services will not and cannot possibly conduct military dicta-

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white public, especially regarding housing and employment. White teachers, as members of the public, share the feeling and transmit it to their coloured pupils, Pitt contends.

Last year there were 57,000 West Indians, 24,000 Indians and 7,800 Pakistanis in English schools. The numbers grow yearly as the population multiplies. It is this second generation of non-whites that will hold the key to Britain's race situation.

"Immigrants who come to this country looking for opportunity bring the attitudes of their homelands with them," said Pitt. "They expect hardship of a kind.

"They know they will be competing with the native-born for jobs and housing and they expect some kind of discrimination. But those who are born here and grow up enjoying the privileges of the society and its higher standard of living will expect more from the country of their birth."

The Department of Education and Science, aware of the coming problem, recently published a report on the work of youth services for young immigrants. They found much lacking.

"The first essential," says the report, "is to acknowledge that problems do exist and not to pretend that they are not there for fear lest, by talking about them, we might enlarge them.

"The second and succeeding generations of coloured Britishers, fully educated in this country, will rightly expect to be accepted on equal terms, and to have the same opportunities as the rest of us.

Inertia

"Within ten years there will be enough of them to make their voices heard. Will each one be accepted on his own intrinsic merits, as one of us? This is the crux of the matter.

"We subscribe to the view of the Brixton YMCA. 'If England is not to be the scene of race riots, the time for action is now. Tomorrow may be too late'."

American experience with race relations and their disastrous breakdown in recent weeks has left a profound impression on those involved with them in Britain.

They feel that Britain is going through what the United States did two or three generations ago when the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People began its circumspect drive against discrimination.

"We should not neglect the experience of others, and in particular the USA, which indicates quite clearly that where colour is an element, race relations, if left to themselves, deteriorate, that inertia and inaction in this field solve no problems and merely create greater problems in the future," says last April's report of the Race Relations Board.

Paul Stevenson, a West Indian field worker for the committee that looked into non-white youth services, feels that the situation in the United States can only get worse.

"I am certain that Britain will be affected by what happens there," he said.

Pitt ... this opinion. Although



Michael de Freitas

the situation is much different and far more stable in Britain, he senses a sort of association based on colour between the non-whites of Britain and the rioting Negroes of America.

The feeling is contagious and spans the Atlantic. It is unrelated to any formal international movement, but, he thinks, born of a spirit of brotherhood and mutuality. He likened it to the emotions of Jews far from Israel whose sentiments and support were aroused during the war between Israel and Egypt.

Lately, this international kinship has been fanned by "black power" agitators in Britain and from America. Michael de Freitas, known as Michael X and leader of the Black Muslims in Britain, speaks glibly of the possibility of violence.

"We have a number of precedents of what the British do to non-whites," he said in an interview. "Like Rhodesia, or Aden, where they do awful things to those they do not consider kith and kin. I have no doubt that it may go to violence within a very, very short time—maybe much shorter than anyone would care to estimate."

A disciple of Elijah Muhammad, head of the Black Muslim movement in America, Michael X follows in the footsteps of the late Malcolm X whom he met in London two years ago shortly before he was assassinated in New York.

"Nasty people"

"The British," he continued, "have more experience in ruling and subjecting people than the Americans. They are more likely to destroy the black man mentally rather than threaten him physically.

"I am not really sure which is the greater evil, but I would rather take on physical threats to my existence than be brainwashed. "The British are more subtle. In the long run their methods are likely to do more damage to the black man. But their retribution will also be greater."

Michael X now is under investigation by the Home Office for a recent speech at Reading in which he was reported to have admitted having killed and encouraged others to do so.

The public prosecutor's office wants to know if he has violated the law against incitement to racial hatred.

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Britain acts to avert racial violence

By Gene Sherman

APPALLED by the outbreak of racial rioting in the United States, Britons are asking themselves a sobering question: "Can it happen here?"

In the last decade Britain has acquired a substantial and growing coloured minority as the result of immigration from Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, India, Pakistan and Africa.

Of the white countries it is second only to the United States in the size of its non-white population.

With this have come the same problems that beset the United States in the early days of the civil rights movement — discrimination, discontent and militant agitation.

Although the situation differs basically in many ways from that in America, the seeds of disruption are noticeable in Britain. Spurred by the American experience, Britain is moving to forestall the tragedies of Watts, Detroit, Newark and other riot cities.

Dr David Pitt, chairman of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), discussed the course of action from the minority viewpoint in his cramped little office near Euston station.

CARD was organised about two and a half years ago when Dr Martin Luther King, the American civil rights leader, visited London en route to receive the Nobel peace prize in Stockholm.

Its nearest US counterpart is the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Support comes from about 50 organisations, including some labour unions, and from individuals.

"Our goal is legislation against discrimination," said Pitt, a massive, easy-grinning West Indian from the island of Grenada.

Disturbances

"To do anything in the field you must have the law behind you, not against you. Our biggest victory was to get people to stop pretending the problem was one of immigration and admit it is racial. As soon as we got them to discuss race, then they had to talk about the degree of discrimination. To get laws you have to show there is discrimination.

"Probably the chief difference between the movement in the two countries is that in the United States the fight is against an established situation, while in Britain we are fighting to prevent the situation becoming established.

"We want to eliminate violations against equality with good solid constitutional means, and the Government seems to be thinking ahead of events instead of letting events dictate action. I think any kind of racial violence in Britain would be stupid."

In fact, the country has had little. A few years ago the "Teddy boys" of the time engaged in some disturbances with non-whites at Nottinghill Gate, an area of many coloured residents. That remains the nearest thing to mass racial violence to hit Britain and was a scuffle compared to the American uprisings.

During the 1964 general election, race as an issue was injected into the campaign at Smethwick, a heavily non-white suburb of Birmingham. More than anything else that brought the racial question into the open.

The next year, the Labour Government passed the Race Relations Act outlawing discrimination in public places and making incitement to racial hatred illegal.

As Detroit burned recently, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins announced that new legislation would be introduced in Parliament to broaden the Act.

This will make discrimination because of race, colour, or ethnic or national origin in employment, housing, insurance and credit extension an offence.

A non-discrimination clause in Government contracts is also proposed.

The new move followed an exhaustive investigation into racial discrimination by the Political and Economic group (PEP) at the behest of the National Committee for Immigrants and the 18-month-old government-appointed Race Relations Board.

West Asians

The survey shows unquestionably there is substantial discrimination against non-whites in areas covered by the proposed new legislation. Pitt counts this as a distinct victory for CARD's effort to provide legislative basis for equality.

"Of course," said Jenkins, announcing the tighter legislation, "we cannot solve the whole problem by legislation. We cannot, as we are often reminded, change men's minds and men's hearts by legislation. But the correct legislative framework can make it much more difficult for men's minds and men's hearts to move in the wrong direction, and much easier for them to move in the right direction."

Unlike the United States where the genesis of today's troubles was the Negro slave of two centuries back, Britain traces its "coloured problem" to World War II, when 8,000 West Indians served in the Royal Air Force.

Many stayed. Others returned as immigrants when they found conditions unbearable at home.

They formed the nucleus of a non-white population that today approximates one million, or two per cent of the population, and is expected by the end of the century to number three million, or more than four per cent.

Immigration of West Indians rose sharply in the early 1950s, followed by a flood of Asian immigrants later in the decade. They arrived from Commonwealth countries to escape economic hardship, enjoy full employment in Britain and a better life with wider educational opportunities for their children.

Concentration

Alarmed at the potential of the steady influx, the Conservative Government passed the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962 which gave it power to restrict the number of immigrants without work permits.

But unskilled labour was needed, and coloured immigrants continued pouring in with work vouchers or as dependants. Three years later a white paper restricted the number of work permits to 8,500 a year.

The single designation "Negro" does not cover the major racial variance in Britain. That is why the words "non-white" and "coloured" are used.

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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

COMMON STAKE IN STABILITY AT THE CENTRE

PROSPECTS OF FRESH TERM FOR KAMARAJ IMPROVE

By DILIP MUKERJEE

ANY suggestion that a Bhopal-like coup can be staged against the Congress at the Centre is nothing but wishful thinking. The party has much greater cohesion than some imagine, but, what is more, any bid to topple it will have to contend with sections of the Opposition which have a stake in maintaining the status quo.

Taking this into account, it seems that at least 100 MPs would have to change sides to unseat the Congress. No one, not even the most rosy-eyed Swatantra or SSP strategist, can count upon support on this scale in the foreseeable future. The pockets of discontent that are known to exist within the Congress Parliamentary Party do not therefore pose any serious danger to the Government, more so because they lack a common focus.

Discontent is not necessarily a prelude to defection. Floor crossing of the kind witnessed in three northern States is in some ways a by-product of a politically backward environment. The more evolved States —Madras, Kerala and West Bengal—are proof of this, though the additional factor at work there probably is that the ruling groups do not need or do not wish to have the support of the defectors. The Congress Party does show in the more active political environment of these States greater cohesion than it gets credit for.

At the Centre, the political stakes are high—far higher than in any single State. This gives MPs on either side of the House a greater sense of commitment to the parties to which they belong. A controversial issue such as the abolition of privy purses may erode this commitment, but this can be expected to work both for and against the Congress. Should the party lose support from its eight or nine princely members, many more than that number will be willing, and even eager, to strengthen its hands against feudal challenge.

Secondly, no party—barring the SSP—wants to topple the Congress-run Centre until it sees a satisfactory alternative. To the SSP the overthrow of the Congress is a legitimate end in itself, but all other parties are inhibited by the thought that a successor régime may suit them even less than the present one.

Immediately after the elections, both wings of the Communist Party were almost willing to go along wth the SSP in making a Congress debacle the first objective of policy. This phase is over; unhappy experiences in States like Bihar, Punjab and U.P. where Communists are coalition partners have inclined their leaders to tread more warily. The caution towards a change at the Centre is more pronounced in the case of the CPI than the CPI (M), but the difference is probably more a matter of public postures than of policy. In any case, compromises feasible at the innocuous level of State Governments are inconceivable at the Centre, not only to the Communists but also to possible partners.

The Swatantra, as the largest single group on the Lok Sabha's Opposition benches, nurses high ambitions. But with its own membership accounting for less than 10% of the Lok Sabha total, it can get nowhere without a broad-based alliance including not only the Jana Sangh but also some Left elements. This raises issues on which the Swatantra itself is in two minds. Some of its more thoughtful members feel that an alignment of the kind the SSP advocates will land the country from the frying pan into the fire.

As for the Jana Sangh, the RSS elements within it want no truck with any other party, least of all the Communists. These elements are probably in a majority at all levels, from the district to the national leadership, as Mr Balraj Madhok, the present President, is finding out for himself. The conflict between the RSS and the more liberal faction is getting more pronounced in States where the Jana Sangh is associated with Government, and it could lead to a breakdown of the coalitions. In the circumstances, a Jana Sangh initiative for a non-Congress front is becoming increasingly unlikely. Even an understanding with the Swatantra is not easy because of sharp differences in approaches to problems like the Nagas or non-alignment.

Given the present composition of the Lok Sabha, the smaller parties and the Independents may come to hold the balance in the event of either the Right or the Left making a bid for power. By and large, they prefer the Congress to either alternative. This is true of the Bangla Congress, as Professor Humayun Kabir candidly admits. The position of the DMK is less well-defined, but the odds are that it will line up for the continuance of the Government, as presently constituted, if it comes to the crunch. The confidence Mrs Gandhi inspires in the minorities, linguistic or communal, is her greatest asset.

*

WHAT about the Congress Party itself? Does it have in its ranks a leader who may walk across to the other side with a following sufficiently large to give either the Right or the Left Opposition a reasonable chance of offering a viable alternative Government? Barring those who have still to show their mettle, this involves probing the possible intentions of Mr Desai, Mr Chavan and Mr Jagjivan Ram.

It is hard to envisage any of them in the rôle of a Charan Singh. Mr Desai certainly does not want the Congress to move away from its traditional middle course: he has no sympathy with the plea for the abolition of privy purses or the cry for bank nationalization. Yet he cannot be a dissident; a lifetime spent in the Congress makes it impossible for him to want to wreck it. His own predilections apart, the fact is that some of his most ardent supporters within the party are moving towards radical policies. They—mostly people a good deal younger than Mr Desai—see no salvation for the party unless the gap is narrowed between its socialist professions and practice.

Mr Chavan has already been billed as a defector by a language newspaper of Bombay, his home State. As far as one can judge the story is spiteful and mischievous: it seems to be the handiwork of people in Maharashtra anxious to compromise him in the eyes of the party. Its only possible basis is a belief that he and Mrs Gandhi have lately cooled towards each other.

This reporter does not pretend to know the workings of either's mind. It is sufficient for him to go by the fact that both have a common interest in preserving the Congress hold on power. No situation is conceivable in which either will gain from letting the party be engulfed by dissidence. They should therefore be expected to stand together, more so because Mr Chavan in his early fifties need be in no hurry. Judging from the way in which he has gained in stature in less than a year, no prize is beyond his reach—if he waits.

Mr Jagjivan Ram is often described by gossip-mongers as the dark horse, but there is no warrant for it. His following within the party is largely among the representatives of the underprivileged sections of the community. There is undoubtedly considerable dissatisfaction over the failure of the Government to do more for these sections, which made the Opposition's victory on a snap vote during the discussion on the report of the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Tribes seem more ominous than it really was.

But this should, if anything, confirm Mr Jagjivan Ram in his support for the more radical policies towards which the Congress seems to be moving. He would be better off guiding the Congress towards these policies than fall in belatedly with the more recent champions of the Scheduled Castes. The first course would preserve his identity more distinctly than the second.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



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
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Third Round of the Battle

By EDMUND TOWNSHEND

WAR which erupted yesterday in the Middle East is the third round in the life and death struggle between Israel and the Arabs in the past 19 years.

War signalled the very birth of Israel. The day after its proclamation as an independent State, at the end of Britain's mandate in Palestine in May 1948, the country was invaded by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Lebanon and Syria.

Both sides in this Israeli "war of independence" accepted on June 9 a month's cease-fire ordered by the Security Council. But fighting went on again. Although the Israelis were ill-equipped, they profited from lack of co-ordination between the attacking forces.

Renewed Threats

This first war with the Arabs lasted more than six months, until January, 1949. Raids went on, however, and the second round of warfare came in October, 1956, when Israel took the initiative after renewed Arab threats of attack.

This was the final stage of the Suez crisis which had its roots in the seizure of the Suez Canal by Nasser on July 26, 1956. A week earlier Mr. Dulles had withdrawn America's offer of financial aid to Egypt for construction of the Aswan Dam.

British and French forces joined in Israel's attack on Egypt. The Israeli Army quickly occupied most of the Sinai Peninsula east of the Suez Canal. Objectives were to wipe out Egyptian outposts and suicide commando bases in the Sinai desert, to open sea communication through the Gulf of Aqaba to Eilat, and to destroy Egyptian batteries at the mouth of the Gulf.

American and Russian pressure now came to bear, and a United Nations resolution put a stop to continued Anglo-French intervention. With the arrival of a United Nations Emergency Force all three invaders of Egypt withdrew.

In the years since Suez, clashes along the Israeli frontier have been frequent. Hatred built up to the point when on May 23 Egypt renewed her blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's oil-tanker route from the Red Sea to Eilat.

A fortnight of international diplomatic manœuvres to cool down the crisis has ended in failure.

Arabs' 2-1 Advantage

By RICHARD COX

IN combined strength the Arab forces outnumber Israel's by more than two to one. Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt between them can field some 564,000 men against Israel's 275,000, including reservists. Equally they have more equipment both in tanks and aircraft.

This is not necessarily an indication that the Arabs would win. In modern warfare the handling of the weapons is almost more important than anything else, and Israel's standards of training are considered to be extremely high.

Of Israel's 275,000 men, 71,000 are regulars. The rest have been mobilised since the emergency. The army accounts for 204,000. Israeli armour includes 200 M.48 Patton tanks, 250 Centurions and 200 Shermans.

The navy is small, with two British-built destroyers, four submarines and a number of landing and patrol craft. The air force has abou 350 combat aircraft, including three interceptor squadrons with Mirage IIIC aircraft, some of which are equipped with air-to-air missiles. There are also squadrons equipped with French-built Mystee fighter-bombers and Ouragan fighter-bombers. Israel has two batalions of Hawk surface-to-air missiles.

By comparison the Egyptian forces are larger. There are 190,000 regulars with 120,000 reservists. Of the army's total regular strength of 160,000, about 40,000 are estmated to be in the Yemen. Egypt has 1,200 tanks and assault guns.

The navy has four Russian-built destroyers, nine Russian-built submarines and minesweepers, patrol boats and torpedo boats. The air force has 550 operational aircraft, including 130 MiG21 interceptors with air-to-air missiles and 80 MiG19 all-weather fighters.

The anti-aircraft command has 20 batteries of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Egypt has a separate missile command and is believed to have missiles capable of carrying a warhead up to 375 miles.

The forces of Iraq are estimated at 82,000 men with 320 tanks, 12 strike aircraft and 75 interceptor aircraft. Syria has approximately the same numbers of men and tanks with Russian MiG aircraft.

Jordan has a strength of 36,000 men, including the famous Arab Legion. Her air force striking power consists of two squadrons of Hunter fighters and one squadron of ageing Vampires.

Saudi Arabia has 55,000 men. She has recently concluded a contract with the British Aircraft Corporation for £120 million air defence system including Lightning aircraft. But at the moment she has no fully trained pilots.

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The Jews' search for Promised Land

ISRAEL has in almost all ages, whether in their land or in exile, produced men of renown in almost all fields of human activity, besides the early prophets mentioned in the Bible.

Palestine is a small country, about 10,000 sq. miles; but the scriptures and culture of the Jews have influenced the entire world, and particularly so the history of Europe.

Although a small country, its position gave it prominence. It became the meeting place of many races and civilisations. Indeed, it became the cockpit of Western Asia in the struggles for supremacy among contending parties and rulers, foreign and indigenous.

Neither the ancient Hebrews, nor their descendants, nor the modern Israelis, can claim purity of blood. They have absorbed many races but have preserved their identity in race, culture and religion.

The vast majority of them have had to live in foreign lands during the past 1800 years, but their desire to return to the old country never died out.

Seed of Abraham

The ancestors of the Israelis were men of the Arabian desert, Semites. They led a wandering life with their flocks and herds. The earliest and greatest of their shepherd chiefs was Abraham who lived some where about 2000 B.C. His grandson was Jacob. The twelve tribes of Israel sprang from Jacob's twelve sons.

Joseph, a great-grandson of Abraham, rose to a position of power in Egypt under the Pharaoh. He invited his kinsmen to emigrate to Egypt where they lived in Goschen. By about 1460 B.C. their population grew to over two million.

A later Pharaoh, long after the death of Joseph, oppressed them. But they produced a mighty leader in the person of Moses. He defied the Pharoah and led the people out with a view to settling them in Palesine.

He led them through 40 years of journey in the Sinai peninsula and gave them a religion and a moral code of a very high order. He cemented them into a nation and brought them up to the eastern bank of the river Jordan before he died at the age of 120, handing over the leadership to Joshua a great warrior and man of vision.

Under Joshua's leadership, the Israelites occupied Palestine somewhere between 1451 and 1444 B.C. Up to 1095 B.C. they had no kings but leaders called Judges. In 1095 B.C. they chose as their king Saul who ruled over them for 40 years. After him came the warrior king David, 1055-1015. He extended his kingdom up to the Euphrates towards the east, towards the north up to Damascus in Syria where he placed garrisons, and towards the south-west right up to the border of Egypt.

David was succeeded by his son Solomon (1015-975) who became world famous as a man of wisdom His ships traded with countries both on the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. He was the builder of the magnificent Hebrew temple the foundations of which may still be seen in Jerusalem.

After his death the Israeli kingdom split into two: the Northern called Israel of the Ten Tribes, and the Southern called Judah of the Two Tribes. Although the southern kingdom produced some great rulers, from time to time, Israeli power declined, and the outlying non-Israeli vassal princes broke away.

The northern kingdom lasted from 975 to 721 BC. It was conquered by Shalmanesar, the King of Assyria. The ten tribes were deported beyond the river Euphrates. The southern kingdom (975-588 BC) was vanquished by the Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar, the Chaldean Emperor. He destroyed the temple.

The two tribes were also deported and settled beyond the Euphrates. Some Jews managed to stay on in their country as the subjects of their conquerors.

In the 6th century BC, the Medo-Persians rose to power overthrowing Babylonia, and inherited the Chaldean Empire. The Persian Emperor Cyrus the Great ruled from 558 to 529 BC. The Jews now became his subjects. Palestine remained under Persian domination up to 332 BC.

The Persian emperors were men of liberal ideas. They permitted the Jews to return to their land. Thousands of them under the leadership of Ezra and Nenemiah gladly took advantage of the favour, and rebuilt the wall as well as the temple of Jerusalem. The emperor contributed liberally towards the expenses in money as well as in material. He appointed a Jew as Governor of Judea with Jerusalem as the capital.

In 335 BC Alexander the Great of Macedon overthrew the Persian empire, and Palestine became a part of his dominions. On his death in 323 BC, his empire was split up. Palestine passed under the Greek Ptolemies of Egypt; but the Jews under their priest-rulers enjoyed complete autonomy, and paid tribute to the suzerain power.

In 198 BC. Palestine was conquered by the Greek Seleucid Emperor, but continued to enjoy autonomy up to 169 BC when Emperor Antiochus Epiphanes began religious persecution of the Jews. The Israelis rose in rebellion. They fought for their independence with success, and in 142 BC set up their own rulers under the Hasmonean Dynasty (The Maccabees) the founder of which was Simon. He was followed by four other kings.

But there was lack of unity among the Jews, so that in 63 BC they passed under the control of Rome which by now had become a powerful empire. During the period from 63 BC to 135 AD the Roman emperors appointed both their own governors and Jewish kings, over changing portions of Palestine from time to time.

The greatest of these kings was Herod the Great, 37 BC-4 AD. He built a great temple in place of that which Ezra had built.

In 66 AD the Israelis rebelled against Roman tyranny and fought gallantly to regain their independence. The Romans suffered a number of defeats, but ultimately in 70 AD the Jews were crushed. In revenge the Romans destroyed the temple and scattered the Israelis, but many still remained in the land.

In 135 AD the Jews rose in rebellion again led by Bar Cochba who won a number of battles. But the Emperor Hadrian finally defeated him, and with his fall the Jewish national organisation in Palestine ended.

Dispersion

The period from 135 to 1038 AD is one of Jewish dispersion in countries near and far. They, however, clung on to their religion and scriptures, and Babylon became one of their important centres. Large numbers of Jews still continued to live in Palestine, but they were not permitted to reside in Jerusalem; however, they could visit the city as pilgrims. They continued to do so and wept by the foundation wall of their temple which the Romans had demolished.

From the 7th century AD onwards, the Arabs rose to power and created an empire under their Caliphs, spreading out in all directions. Palestine thus came under their control. A small community of Jews still lived there.

In the 11th century AD the Seljuk Turks overran Persia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, and to all appearances Palestine became a part of their empire. In 1099 the Christian Crusaders of Europe burst into Palestine and took Jerusalem. Godfrey de Boillon became the first Christian King of this new Latin kingdom consisting of Jerusalem and the greater part of Palestine. [illegible] Saladin the Turk, ruler of Egypt, recovered Jerusalem, and that was practically the end of the Christian era in Palestine.

During 1300-1307 the Ottoman Turks spread into Asia Minor, and Palestine passed under their control, the Arabs as well as the Jews becoming the subjects of the new Sultan. Palestine remained thus, when at the end of the Great War (1914-18), the Ottoman empire ceased to be, and Palestine became a British mandate.

Under the Arabs and the Turks Palestine was completely neglected, so that economically it became one of the poorest areas in the Muslim Empire: practically a barren land with Jewish and Arab slums.

National home

Although the vast majority of the Jews lived scattered in almost all the countries of the world, there were still Israelis who clung on to their native land during all these centuries of war, bloodshed and persecution. Jews, particularly of Eastern Europe, also began moving into Palestine drawn as if by a magnetic urge, and seeking also to escape from Russian persecution.

In Great Britain, France, and in other such European countries where "liberalism" was spreading, the Jews began, from the close of the 18th century, to enjoy the rights of citizenship. A few from these regions too came to Palestine, but many more went to the USA.

Many Jews in these lands began to dream of a revived Jewish State in Palestine. The greatest of these was Dr Theodor Herzl of Vienna (1840-1904). He was not just a dreamer. He got into touch with Kaiser William II (Emperor of Germany, 1888-1918), who favoured Herzl's idea of acquiring land in Palestine and settling Jews there. He contacted the King of Italy and the British authorities too. He even had more than one interview with the Turkish Sultan, but found no favour there.

Herzl, however, gave the Jews a vision of "Zionism": a Jewish State of their own in Palestine. According to him in 1898 there were 45,000 Jews in the cities of Palestine, mostly in Jerusalem and Jaffa, and 4,500 on the land. Armed with funds from their benefactors abroad, Jews began to settle in Palestine buying agricultural land.

The Turkish Government got alarmed and forbade transfer of land to Jews. However, bribery could do wonders. By 1914 the Jewish population rose to 100,000 out of a total population of about 750,000. Before the Great War ended, came the Balfour Declaration (1917) of Great Britain promising a National Home to the Israelis in Palestine; and at the end of the war Britain obtained the mandate for the country.

In the centuries before 400 A.D. the Jews had formed the majority of the population in Palestine. Next, the Christians became the majority community; but later with the rise of the Arabs, the Muslims became the dominant community, and this was the position when Britain undertook the administration of the country. Large numbers of Jews now began entering Palestine from Eastern Europe and from Hitler's Germany.

At first about 10,000 came yearly, but by 1933 the number rose to over 60,000. The Arabs of Palestine as well as of the surrounding countries were alarmed. Britain therefore cut down the number to the minimum. Illegal immigration, however could not altogether be stopped.

The Hitler regime (1933-45) further intensified the Jewish desire to escape from Nazi persecution. Hitler managed to kill some five

by Prof. W.S. Desai

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

to six million Jews belonging to his short-lived European empire. At the end of the war the Jews made up their mind to achieve their independence in Palestine. British authority in the country collapsed, and Britain decided to withdraw.

The UNO in November 1947 proposed to divide the country into two States, Arab and Jew. It was, however, a hopeless plan, because the two communities were intermingled almost all over the country. Besides, the Arab States around refused to countenance the partition.

The Arabs were in the majority in the country, so they wanted one State, an Arab State. The Jews refused to agree to this. They were returning to their old homeland, in such large numbers that they would become the majority community; also hoped to redeem the country economically, modernise the State, and thus bring prosperity to both the peoples.

When, on May 14 1948, Great Britain withdrew, the Israelis proclaimed their independence and established the State of Israel. The Great Powers as well as the UNO accorded recognition. Israel thus became a member of the UNO.

Egypt and the other Arab States refused to accept the situation, and advanced their armies to destroy Israel. They were, however, defeated by the infant State, and under UNO intervention they agreed to a truce, but refused to make a treaty of peace.

During the struggle a new political geography of Palestine was created. Egypt was in occupation of the Gaza strip, while the Arab State of Transjordania had crossed the Jordan and occupied a bulge of territory to include the old city of Jerusalem besides projecting westwards towards the Israeli city of Tel Aviv.

The Israelis, however, accepted the situation and went on to create a modern democratic State of their own. The Jews, prevented long from entering the country by the mandatory power, began pouring in, so that the Israeli population rose to nearly 3 million.

When the Arabs invaded Israel, they asked the Palestinian Arabs to get out of the way. They were assured they would be comfortably rehabilitated in Palestine after the Israelis had been suitably dealt with. They therefore fled into the territories of the neighbouring Arab states, where they still remain as refugees, for Arab armies failed to destroy Israel.

Although defeated, the Arabs did not give up the resolve to destroy Israel. They began arming themselves for the purpose. At the same time, Egypt and Syria began commando raids into Israeli territory.

The result was that in 1956 Israel carried a victorious punitive war into the Sinai peninsula and drove the Egyptians out of the Gaza strip which is a part of Palestine proper. The UNO intervened and the Israeli army withdrew after opening up the Gulf of Aqaba as a maritime passage for herself.

Again the Arab States refused to recognise the State of Israel, and said that they would never agree to a treaty of peace. They continued to deny passage to Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. They collected armaments on a colossal scale, and though at enmity among themselves, in May 1967 they agreed to destroy Israel: a struggle between 110 million Arabs and 3 million Israelis!

They first blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba and advanced their armour towards Israel. Next, they called upon the Secretary-General of the UNO to withdraw the UNEF. The Arabs openly declared that they would annihilate Israel. The UNO took no action.

Brief war

The friends of the Arabs felt sure that Israel would be crushed, and encouraged the invaders Israeli peace offers were spurned. Israel then attacked the aggressors eastwards, northwards, and southwards. Within five days Arab armour was destroyed. The Egyptians fled across the Canal suffering great losses, the Trans-Jordanians fled across the river losing their territory west of the Jordan, and the Syrians were expelled from the Northern hills.

The friends of the Arabs raised a hue and a cry that Israel was the aggressor and that she should withdraw from all territory occupied by her. Israel's rejoinder is that she cannot withdraw without guarantees; besides Egypt, Transjordania and Syria should relinquish claims over Palestinian territroy proper, recognise the State of Israel and accept treaties of peace by direct negotiation.

The Israeli State is a settled fact It would be well for the Arabs to accept the situation. Their action has further increased the number of Arab refugees: now over one million.

Instead of wasting their money over armaments to destroy Israel, it would be wise on their part to settle these unfortunate refugees in the very extensive and sparsely populated Arab lands.

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EGYPT—1

NASSER'S DECLINE AFTER WAR WITH ISRAEL

From G.H. JANSEN

THE military and economic consequences for Egypt of The Second Battle for Palestine in June are grave and obvious; but the really important result is this: that the Egyptian political power structure which, for many years, had been as massive and solid as the pyramids,—and of much the same shape—now resembles an open-ended conduit with ideas and political forces following through it. After years of rigidity this fluidity is healthy but it also could be dangerous.

The most easily apparent change had to be that in the personal position of Mr Nasser. He, after all, publicly assumed final responsibility for a defeat that was as complete as it was unexpected. That was an act of moral courage but, as a result, the charisma has departed. He remains the foremost, the most influential, Arab leader but he is no longer the unquestioned head of the Arab World. In late June and early July, Mr Nasser, in private conversation, described himself as "dazed" and "defeated", and he lapsed into passivity. One of the main purposes of the visit of his old friend President Tito was to encourage the UAR Prime Minister to "get going" again. The great public welcome he received in Khartoum and the resolutions of the Summit Conference there, which reflected his thinking, revealed his continuing popularity and influence but their bases are different—no longer awe or fear but sympathy and respect.

A determinant factor in any Arab's feelings for Mr Nasser is how much the person knows of what actually went on during the six days of fighting. Soon after the hostilities ended, and because of utterly inaccurate communiqués, not much was known in the Arab countries and still less in Egypt. But now educated people have gained a fairly complete picture and the man in the street has a pretty shrewd idea. In Egypt that tremendously useful safety valve, the Egyptian sense of humour, has come into play: there are innumerable jokes about army officers running away from battle,—which means that people know that that is one thing that happened. They have also just been told that Egypt lost much of its armament. Articles in the Egyptian Press have gone out of their way to stress that it was not American pilots or soldiers who won the victories in Sinai but Israelis and, above all, there can be no concealing the bitter fact that the Israelis are encamped on the east bank of the Suez Canal from which they can, and often have, bombarded Egyptian towns.

There is much bitterness now in Egyptian feeling and a lot of it is directed against Mr Nasser personally. This, paradoxically, has been increased by the Nasser-Feisal agreement over Yemen which will get Egyptian troops out of that country. Egypt's involvement in Yemen was never very popular with ordinary Egyptians but now that it is coming to an end Mr Nasser is blamed for achieving little or nothing after the expenditure of much blood and treasure. The agreement is said to be unpopular with the Army for the opposite reason—that the withdrawal looks like a cowardly retreat; and there are dark hints that the expeditionary force when it returns home may give vigorous expression to its disapproval.

Such being the new complex of Egyptian public feeling why, it may be asked, was there the overwhelming demand that Mr Nasser withdraw his resignation, and why do people still want him to stay on? The June 9 reaction had two motivations: an outburst of genuine love and loyalty and, secondly, a refusal to see the foremost Arab leader fall a victim to Israeli aggression. There are conflicting strains also in the presently prevailing attitude towards him. A large majority inside and outside Egypt wants Mr. Nasser to stay on; but while a smaller disgruntled section within this majority says he should do so to clear up the mess he has created, the much larger section wants his presence because they believe that only he can get things straightened out.

It is a curious fact that there seems to be more respect and support for the Egyptian Prime Minister from people, especially the educated class, outside Egypt than there is from Egyptians themselves; even though the outsiders know more about the extent of the disaster than the Egyptians do. If Mr Nasser is overthrown in the proximate future that will bring down on Egypt the scornful condemnation of most of the rest of the Arab World.

Now that the Egyptians have been able to piece together what actually happened in the disastrous war with the Israelis their respect for Mr Nasser has distinctly suffered. He enjoys more respect and support outside Egypt than inside but he is no more the head of the Arab world though he remains more influential than any other Arab leader.

A second consequence of the conflict has been a great shake-up of men and ideas, resulting in a marked tendency towards greater professionalism, both civil and military. The present rulers realize that soldiers cannot be both fighters and reformers. One reason for Marshal Amer's suicide was that he refused to accept the inevitable changes in Egypt.

NEW DEBATE

On the internal Egyptian scene new ideas are being debated and applied in the political and military spheres Politically there has been something of a controversy in the Press between spokesmen of the left-of-centre and of the non-Communist left (the rightists and the Communists are not allowed to express their point of view publicly). In this rather unreal debate the former have suggested less antagonism towards the West, a more pragmatic socialism, more freedom of expression, and have asserted the primacy of the Government as against the Arab Socialist Union the UAR's only political organization. The leftists, because they are strong in the ASU, want it to have even more power, with less tolerance of any opposition opinion, still larger doses of socialism and unrelenting antagonism toward the West. The Communists have observed these polemics with tolerant amusement, as well they might, for they are not going to change policy but are merely symptoms of a fluid situation in which policy could be changed, but by other considerations. Indeed these debates recall "The Hundred Flowers" period in China, though in Egypt there will be no lethal consequences for those who argue on the losing side.

Appropriately it is in the military sphere that there has been the biggest shake-up of ideas and, of men, and this was decided on weeks before the suicide of Marshal Amer: indeed one reason for his tragic death was that he refused to accept these very necessary changes. In terms of military theory there was some debate on whether there should be conventional war against Israel or "unconventional" peoples, guerrilla war, or both. Egypt has decided for conventional war alone and this represents a victory for the left-of-centre against the leftists.

POLITICAL SOLDIER

It has also been decided to take the political soldier out of armed forces. They have been cashiered or retired and replaced by the professional non-political officer and by the trained specialist. This change was partly the result of bitter Russian criticism that most of the officers they had trained had ended up as civilian bureaucrats.

It has also been decided to remove the non-professional soldier-politician from civilian life. As the Egyptian Press has said, the privileged life they led was bad example for the armed forces, nor were they particularly efficient civilian administrators.

This dual move towards increased professionalism, both military and civil, constitues an important basic change in the character of the present régime in Egypt. That régime was the product of a military coup, and ever since 1952 the armed forces were popularly regarded not only as the defenders of the country but as keepers of the national conscience and prime exemplars of the national virtues. It has now been discovered that they cannot be both fighters and some sort of socio-political avant garde, and it is the latter role that has been abandoned: which means that the Egyptian regime is, to a very large extent, being demilitarized.

The professional quality of the military rank-and-file is also being improved. The not very startling discovery has been made that peasant conscripts cannot handle modern weapons so now an atempt is being made to recruit only those who have at least finished their elementary education.

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WOES OF WEST ASIA

So serious have been the recent breaches of the cease-fire across the Suez Canal that U Thant has been constrained to call upon both Egypt and Israel to "exercise utmost restraint", an appeal that every right-thinking country and individual will readily endorse. But, as even the experience of the Indo-Pakistan war of September, 1965, showed, a truce is bound to remain tenuous until there is a proper and mutually satisfactory disengagement of the hostile troops. The failure of the two sides to move towards military disengagement in West Asia has thus given rise to dangers of renewed fighting on the one hand and on the other blocked a lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By their refusal to face up to the inescapable reality of having to live with and therefore talk to Israel, the Arab nations are not making things easier. But there can be no gainsaying the fact that the Israeli responsibility for the lack of progress towards military disengagement and political settlement is also great.

Withdrawal by both sides to the positions held by them before the hostilities is the first prerequisite for military disengagement just as safeguarding the security of Israeli borders as well as Israeli right of free navigation in international waterways must be the first step towards a lasting settlement. But Israel's refusal to vacate Arab territories conquered by armed force is as arrogant as it is absolute: by starting to settle Israeli population in occupied territories Tel Aviv obviously wants to translate its intransigence into reality and present the world with a *fait accompli*. This is wholly unjustified and merits unreserved condemnation. Even though it fired the first shot, Israel got much sympathy and support in India in spite—or because—of an element of partisanship in favour of the Arabs in official policy: the lightning Israeli victory added to sympathy a tinge of admiration. Some of this goodwill has already been lost because of Israel's failure to match its brilliance in battle during the subsequent fight for peace: indeed, Israeli arrogance may have lost Tel Aviv many friends, not only in India.

Faced with the woes of West Asia, the special session of the U.N. General Assembly has proved pathetic and helpless; the regular 22nd session of the Assembly can have better luck only if all concerned make earnest efforts to enforce the wholesome principles of vacation of Arab territories by Israel and recognition by the Arabs of Israel's right to secure existence and free navigation; principles upheld by U Thant as well as Marshal Tito. Even though reports of a secret "Glassboro deal" may have been denied belatedly, particularly great is the responsibility of the two super-Powers, especially the USA; Israeli belligerence and brashness would be unthinkable without U.S. support.

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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

MR. NANDA'S INITIATIVE MAY BOOMERANG ON HIM

By DILIP MUKERJEE

The Congress attempt to give itself a new image in West Bengal may not come off. While the top leadership recognizes the need, Mr Atulya Ghosh may win out because of the way in which Mr Nanda precipitated matters. At any rate, the Congress move need not have an immediate impact on the State's United Front Government which remains more vulnerable to internal dissension than anything else.

Mr Nanda claims to have acted in the best interests of the party and says he was prompted by "surprise developments". Such a move had earlier received the tacit support of Mrs Gandhi, Mr Kamaraj and Mr Desai But he might not get Mrs Gandhi's backing now while Mr Atulya Ghosh will have some powerful support in the Congress Working Committee

MR Gulzarilal Nanda's precipitate intervention in West Bengal politics may backfire on him. While it is true that Mr Atulya Ghosh has now few friends left in high places, Mr Nanda has fewer still. Instead of gaining the fame of a David vis-a-vis Calcutta's Goliath, he may yet find himself made a scapegoat.

There are two reasons for fearing this outcome In the first place, Mr Nanda has quite clearly gone beyond his brief. The right to set up an ad hoc committee in place of an existing provincial Congress committee vests, as Mr Ghosh has pointed out in his letter to Mr Kamaraj, in the Congress President acting on behalf of the Working Committee. This procedural irregularity amounts, it is being suggested, to Mr Nanda arrogating to himself the President's authority—something which Mr Kamaraj cannot be expected to like.

Secondly, the irregularity may have been overlooked by Mr Ghosh's colleagues in the Working Committee but for the fact that some like Mr Patnaik or Mr D. P. Mishra may feel that the fate that threatens to overtake Mr Ghosh may be visited on them next. They are likely therefore to insist upon the right forms being observed since these offer a certain security against surprise attack of the kind Mr Nanda has mounted.

Mr Nanda, as he himself readily admits, acted on his own. An agent, he explains, has the right in some circumstances to anticipate the decision of the principal, the Congress President in this case. Before taking the plunge in Calcutta on September 24, he tried to get in touch with Mr Kamaraj over the telephone but a connexion could not be established even though Mr Nanda put off the announcement from 10 a.m to 3 p.m.

Why did he not wait any longer? To this, Mr Nanda's answer is that there were some surprise developments on the night of September 23 which forced his hand. He refuse to say what these developments were except to hint at his own sources of "information" and "intelligence" about happenings in the State

There has been some speculation about a secret meeting between Mr Nanda and the West Bengal Chief Minister, Mr Ajoy Mukherjee. This has been denied by both; the two demonstratively sat at extreme ends of the first row of the IAC Caravelle by which they travelled on September 25 to New Delhi and walked off the plane separately.

Admittedly, this public display of distance proves nothing but in the absence of any supporting evidence it is difficult to imagine that Mr Mukherjee had anything to do with Mr Nanda's sudden decision. Perhaps he acted from a compulsion of an altogether different kind. There have been whispers in New Delhi about the possibility of a sizable number of Congress legislators defecting to Bangla Congress as part of an arrangement for an alternative Government, excluding both Communist wings. In that event, the Congress would be left high and dry. This move, talked of for some months, may have looked on the night of Parliament. The West Bengal leader tilted the balance against Mr Nanda in the Congress Parliamentary Party Executive, a manoeuvre for which Mr Ghosh had evidently some very influential backing.

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WHATEVER the motives from which Mr Nanda has acted, there is not the least doubt that he set out to present his colleagues with a fait accompli. His calculation evidently was that Mr Ghosh might succeed in blocking the move if the matter was left to the Working Committee to decide at its next meeting on October 7 and 8. Mr Ghosh could have claimed with some justice that an ad hoc committee was needed as much for faction-ridden Bihar as for West Bengal, although Mr Nanda has given Bihar Congress a clean bill of health. The coupling of West Bengal with other States may well have made the Working Committee pause. This is precisely what Mr Nanda set out to prevent.

In fairness to Mr Nanda, it needs to be acknowledged that the idea of setting up an ad hoc committee in West Bengal as an urgent face-lifting operation did not originate with him. It had been canvassed in New Delhi for weeks by anti-Ghosh Congressmen from West Bengal, and had received the support, tacitly at least, of Mr Kamaraj, Mrs Gandhi and Mr Morarji Desai

With Mr Nanda putting the fat squarely in the fire, the top leaders are in something of a quandary. Mrs Gandhi evidently takes the view that Mr Nanda may have done the right thing but his manner of doing it was unfortunate. In other words, she is leaving an option open for herself in case Mr Ghosh's expected counterattack should look like succeeding.

Mr Kamaraj is maintaining, as is his wont, an inscrutable silence. Despite urgent requests to return to New Delhi to take West Bengal developments in hand, he is holding himself incommunicado. Mrs Gandhi is apparently irked by the President's elusiveness, a situation which several intermediaries are trying to resolve by frantic long-distance telephone calls

founder-member of the now defunct Syndicate, should be counted among the latter.

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EVEN assuming that an ad hoc committee does take over the Congress in West Bengal, what impact will this have on the future of the United Front Government? It is an interesting commentary on Indian politics that the impetus for both moves and countermoves comes primarily from New Delhi, instead of Calcutta. At least seven West Bengal Ministers have been in the capital this week, but that apart the strategy of both the Congress and its opponents is being fashioned here. The National Executive of the CPI is in session, while that of the Kranti Dal organizing committee has just concluded a meeting.

Even though all parties are playing their cards close to the chest, the notion of an immediate danger to the United Front can be safely dismissed. The West Bengal Assembly does not re-convene until November. At any rate, no one in the Congress wants to move in until the harvest has been gathered and the spate of Puja bonus disputes has subsided. More important still, influential members of the Congress leadership agree with Mr Ghosh that a return to power via defections may boomerang on the party.

The primary calculation underlying the ad hoc committee is that this will accelerate the break-up of the United Front by opening up a possibility of reconciliation with those, like Mr Ajoy Mukherjee, who left the Congress on account of Mr Ghosh. Mr Mukherjee shows no sign however of responding; anyone who has talked to him this week has come back with the strong impression that he will not agree to lead a minority government supported by the Congress. Much in his mind is the fate that overtook Mr Pattom Thanu Pillai, the PSP leader in Kerala: he had to quit the State once the Congress ended a short-lived honeymoon.

Mr Mukherjee's predilections notwithstanding, his ability to influence the future course of events is strictly limited. Quarrels within the United Front are brewing on two counts. Food raises issues of basic policy while any move to replace the Labour Minister, Mr Subodh Banerjee, may do so at second hand.

While the United Front has adopted a million-ton programme of procurement through producer levies, Dr P. C. Ghosh, the Food Minister, disavowed both decisions at the Chief Ministers' Conference this week. He wants to procure only 500,000 tons and will have nothing to do with levies except upon very big farms (of which West Bengal has extremely few). A clash over food policy is inevitable, more so because a section of the Bangla Congress is already taking to "militant" struggle against attacks on rural property rights.

Even before a fight breaks out within the Front over food and farm policies, Mr Mukherjee has to make up his mind whether his Labour Minister

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September 23 like succeeding, giving Mr Nanda a justification for bypassing the correct procedures.

While Mr Nanda predictably claims that he acted in the best interests of his party and the country, it is impossible to disregard his unhappy personal equation with Mr Ghosh. It is no secret that Mr Ghosh was largely instrumental in securing Mr Nanda's departure from the Home Ministry following the assault mounted by a cow-crazy procession on

As things now stand. Mr Kamaraj seems unlikely to take upon himself the responsibility of endorsing Mr Nanda's precipitate decision; he will want the Working Committee to decide the issue. While it is too early to predict the outcome, Mr Ghosh knows he can count upon the firm support of two members of the Committee, Mr M. L. Sukhadia and Mr S. K. Patil, and perhaps of others as well depending on how the wind blows. Mr S Nijalingappa, a

should continue in office after having been held guilty of contempt of court. The political implications of a change may be such as to make both Communist wings dig in their toes, in which case a trial of strength may become inevitable

But a trial of strength need not necessarily open the way for the immediate return of the Congress to power. Time will have to be allowed for the dust to settle down for new political alignments to take shape after the Assembly reconvenes. Should the trial come about, the problem before the Congress Working Committee will have solved itself. It will provide post-facto qualification for Mr Nanda having rushed in where angels fear to tread.

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POSTSCRIPT: In a reminiscent mood, Mrs Gandhi recently recalled to her Cabinet colleagues the case of a Minister whom Mr Nehru moved from a State to the Centre. The Minister, a little apprehensive of the change, was reassured by friends that it would not take him more than a fortnight to find his feet. Whereupon, the Minister came to Mr Nehru to ask if his induction could be postponed by a fortnight.

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Ching versus Kuang-mei

By Stanley Karno

FROM the devious Empress Wu, who reigned in the seventh century, to the ambitious Madame Chiang Kai-shek, China's long history has been periodically punctuated by iron-willed females.

Their emergence, the Chinese traditionally hold spells trouble—and that ominous belief is currently being confirmed as communist leader Mao Tse-tung's cultural revolution convulses China.

For unlike any other phenomenon in the 46 years since the Chinese communists founded their party, the cultural revolution has propelled women into unprecedented positions, of prominence. Indeed, there are respectable analysts who seriously contend that the fight between Mao and his foes is less an ideological struggle than an old-fashioned feminine contest for power of the kind that pitted concubines against each other at the courts of China's ancient celestial emperors.

Squabble

Whatever the validity of that theory it is a matter of fact that the cultural revolution has thrown up two rival female factions that logically side with the principal male protagonists. The ladies' auxiliary backing Mao is headed by his spouse Chiang Ching while Wang Kuang-mei, the wife of China's disgraced Chief of State, Liu Shao-chi, apparently leads the distaff "counter-revolutionary" position.

The Maoist women, moreover, feature the wife of Lin Piao, Mao's heir apparent, as well as Nieh



Liu's wife

Yuan-tze, the redoubtable communist party hack credited with launching the cultural revolution at Peking University last year.

The less publicised anti-Maoists are said to include Chang Hsi, whose husband, Foreign Minister Chen Yi reportedly denounced her not long ago in an effort to salvage his own reputation.

Even daughters bearing Gilbert and Sullivan names have joined in the squabble, their loyalties crossing family lines. Lin Piao's girl To-to, a student, is a vocal Maoist like her father. But Liu Shao-chi's daughters Ting-ting and Ping according to a Peking source acquainted with her, is as dull as a Mao quotation, while Wang Kauang-mei is said to be handsome, urbane and intelligent. A young Chinese who witnessed a recent Red Guard rally against Wang Kauang-mei reported that the crowd which came to jeer, fell strangely silent before her proud, dignified manner.

It is tempting to speculate, as many Chinese do that jealousy plays a large part in Chiang Ching's bitterness towards Wang Kausang-mei. The difference in their backgrounds lends a certain credibility to this conjecture.

Minor actress

At the same time, as Professor Stuart Schram suggests, Chiang Ching's currently brutal effort to "purify" the Chinese theatre smells of revenge against the performers and authorities who may have slighted her when she was a minor Shanghai actress in the 1930s.

Born into a middle-class Shantung province family about 56 years ago, Chiang Ching initially studied for a career in traditional Peking opera then drifted down to Shanghai to become instead a movie bit player called Lan Ping.

Actors who knew her recall a cheerful, untalented girl, somewhat casual in her love life despite her marriage to Tang Na, a film writer and director. Her vital measurements a former theatrical photographer remembers were roughly 32-24-34.

It was probably the Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1937 that prompted Chiang Ching to flee to the communist zone in Yenan. There she met Mao, who was married to his third wife at the time. Mao solved the triangular problem by sending his wife, a school-teacher named Ho Chih-chen, to the Soviet Union for "medical treatment." He wed Chiang Ching, or Blue River," as she called herself.

Reminiscing recently to a communist group about her early days in Yenan, Chiang Ching candidly conceded that she was treated as a joke by the rough Red guerillas. Later, she said, she learned to serve Mao as a sort of informal secretary, directing his attention to newspaper items, rumours, gossip and other titbits. She reportedly bore him two daughters. Mao's eldest child, a fighter pilot, was killed in the Korean war.

'Valuable ideas'

Though officially portrayed these days as a veteran Red activist who laboured for decades to eradicate "the decadent old culture of the exploiting classes," Chiang Ching appears to have been a political nonentity until the cultural ideological revolution thrust her into the limelight.

The guessing among China-watchers is that her present importance mirrors Mao's increasing reluctance to trust anyone as much as his wife.

For Chiang Ching herself, some analysts submit, the cultural revolution may be permitting her to perform the dramatic roles she was unable to fulfil on the stage or screen. And, of course, she has been grabbing scenes away from Wang Kuang-mei, the unlikeliest creature to become the First Lady of Red China.

Now 45, Wang Kuang-mei was born in the coastal city of Tientsin, the daughter of a shrewd Chinese official who used his con-



Mao's wife

graduate work in English at Yenching, a university then connected with Harvard and Princeton. She became so proficient in English that a communist delegation then in Peking negotiating with American and Chinese Nationalist representatives appointed her its interpreter.

In retrospect, it seems doubtful that Wang Kuang-mei had strong political proclivities, since she considered going to the United States to study when the negotiations broke down. However, the communists persuaded her to join them in Yenan instead. Shortly after her arrival there, she met and married Liu Shao-chi. She was 24 at the time. Liu was approaching 50, and had just divorced his fourth wife.

When Liu became China's Chief of State in 1959, Wang Kuang-mei happily assumed the functions of First Lady. She travelled abroad on State visits to Rangoon, Karachi and Jakarta, and she visibly enjoyed playing hostess to foreign dignitaries in Peking.

In contrast to the wives of other Chinese communist luminaries, who never lost their revolutionary rigidity, Wang Kuang-mei often attended diplomatic receptions, chatting in English with foreign envoys as she flitted around the room in prescribed cocktail party fashion.

Hostess

But at the same time, she was, as wife of the man most responsible for moulding China's communist machine also devoted to the party organisation. It was on Liu's instructions that, starting in 1962, she disguised herself as a peasant, adopted the pseudonym Tung Pu and toured the countryside in order to spy on rural communist officials. What she discovered shocked her.

In the dismal aftermath of the "Great Leap Forward" Mao's 1958 attempt to modernise China rapidly, party morale broke down so badly that communist officials became corrupt, slothful and profligate.

As the cultural revolution gained momentum last year Wang Kuang-mei apparently tried to preserve her prominence in the new offensive. Nothing she could do was satisfactory, however. Even her confessions of error were rejected in the fury of Chiang Ching scorn.

The first trap to snare Wang Kuang-mei was laid in January this year by Red Guards from Peking's Tsinghua University. Informing her by telephone that one of her daughters had been hit by a car—a phoney story.

They lured her to a hospital, then dragged her off to their university for a humiliating "struggle session." Again in March, they forced her to appear before 200,000 people, dressed in a gown she had worn at a party in Jakarta with a necklace of ping pong balls to satirize her allegedly lavish jewellery.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

ping, have been in the forefront of the campaign against their parents.

The operatic quality of the conflict is also reflected in the way the characters are costumed. Wearing no make-up or other bourgeois artifices, Chiang Ching and her coterie are invariably garbed in baggy uniforms presumably tailored to symbolise revolutionary austerity. Their allegedly pro-capitalist adversaries, however, are luridly depicted in Maoist propaganda.

Oddly enough, the rival women reportedly do correspond to their ideological images. Chiang Ching nections with the region's warlords to build up a substantial real estate fortune.

Whether he admired the United States or was actually travelling there at the time of his daughter's birth is not clear. In either case, father Wang registered his feelings in Kuang-mei's name, which connotes "beautiful America." He later named his son Kuang-ying, a similar compliment to England.

Unlike Chiang Ching, whose theatrical youth was slightly Bohemian, Wang Kuang-mei grew up in prosperity and among western influences. After college in Peking, she stayed in the capital to pursue

With Mao's efforts to unseat her husband currently intensifying, it seems likely that Wang Kuang-mei's future is dim. But with Mao's opponents also accelerating their resistance to his tactics, Chiang Ching's moment of glory appears to be waning as well.

It may be a long time before they are back in the kitchen, however. And until then, their gyrations will continue to be symptomatic of China's turbulence. — **By arrangement with "The Washington Post."**

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NO PERFECT UNION

...dian Federal Structure. ...Sri. Ram Sharma. (Cen... Book Depôt, Rs 5.)

...Polity. By B. M. Shar... and L. P. Chaudhary. ...a, Rs 22.)

...rs, particularly profes... ...el in categorization and ...s. Mr Sharma's preoc... ...as those of hundreds ...has been the form of ...t in India. Is it fe... ...it unitary? Is it quasi... These questions, rele... ...a point, are wholly ...to the success or fai... ...emocracy in india. If ...t Constitution proves ...et professors of cons... ...law call it by any ...it fails, mere nomen... ...not going to save it.

...rma is prepared to call ...n polity a federation ...qualification that the ...definition of federation ...undergone change. But ...rried that the federal ...makes a concession to ...Governments which is ...of slanting its working ...favour. For instance, ...il servants spend their ...e years in the States, ...liable to be recalled by ...es. Mr Sharma feels that ...il servants thus acquire ...achment to the States ...ve served, and are liable ...the broader perspective. ...looks askance at the ...Government, mainly ...the agency of the Con... ...ertaining complaints, ...ld better be dealt with ...States. All these, he be... ...ay ultimately affect the ...character of political ...e in India.

...S. Sharma and Mr ...ry have produced a re... ...comprehensive book ...ations past and present, ...n detail the historical, ...and constitutional as... ...each federation, and ...g their characteristics. ...e note of the changing ...nd argue that centrali... ...federations is the only ...to an effective use of ...ing international bodies ...uments of human wel...

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BOOK REVIEWS

YANKS AS HERENVOLK

The New American Commonwealth. By Louis Heren. (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 50s.)

MR Louis Heren, only once misspelt as Heron, an interesting species of birds with long legs and necks, has been The Times man in Washington since 1961; he had earlier been in Malaya, where he had healthy skrimishes with local authorities, and in India. He apparently works on the sensible principle that, if one is going to report a country for any length of time, one had better find out a thing or two about the country and its people. The corollary follows: in that event one might as well write a book on the place. Despite the title of his not unambitious book, Mr Heren may not mind it being said that he is no Tocqueville or Bryce or Brogan. His book is still a very useful guide to changing and contemporary America. Not many important facts are left out and they are served with occasional humour, if not much wit. Mr Heren writes as an Englishman and a journalist: neither need be held against him.

Early on is presented what, with Roy Thomsonish modesty, is called the Heren Theory of American history. It is quite simple, if not too much so: "The modern American Presidency makes sense as a political system only when it is seen to be a latter-day version of a British medieval monarchy. . .The triumvirate of Monarch, Barons, and Church was no less real than the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court". The author then proceeds to pursue the three institutions in considerable detail, which must have entailed not a little research; at this point it does the reader little harm to forget the parallel of the medieval monarchy. Indeed, concentration on America yesterday and today is far more rewarding.

The Presidency, which "defies legal definition", has in truth become a monster in terms of power, patronage and size of establishment. The constitution certainly wanted the President to be the supreme executive; but the USA has travelled far since 1787; and Mr Heren produces some telling figures. In President Grant's day the White House staff cost $13,800 a year. President Hoover, "who was a first-class administrator if a second-class President", had a staff of only 42. Today the White House costs some $100 million a year, and the staff never ceases to grow. Apart from the many branches of the executive, among which the Departments of State and Defence are the most powerful and in not always healthy competition, there are such frightful Presidential agencies as the CIA and the FBI, about whose activities too little is known and sometimes too much is talked. In the chapter on the National Security Council, Mr Heren observes: "If the President is not above the law, it is only because the law and practice have conceded him an almost unchallengeable position".

If the President is the U.S. Government, as so often appears even in military operations in Vietnam, the frequently effective role of Congress shows that there are powerful interests, political and economic, to remind the White House that its powers have limits. Mr Heren is not nearly so informative on the lobbies, the "subgovernments", constantly functioning in Washington as Mr Douglass Cater (Power in Washington, 1964) but he is good on U.S. federalism in relation to the States and the cities. He is particularly interesting on the political and other effects of demographic changes in America. The White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) is still politically dominant, though in a minority; but it is pointed out that in the technical areas of American life there is a growing abundance of European names. For once the immigrant's part in developing America in various ways is handsomely acknowledged; and it is fascinating to follow how the politician's need to woo his vote has at once regionalized the American polity and integrated it. Since the WASPs were entrenched in agriculture, the immigrants flocked to the cities; and so the cities grew to their present proportions. Urbanization and industrialization made modern America, to which European, frequently Jewish, enterprise and capacity for bearing with injustice contributed not a little.

The Supreme Court has evolved itself into a significant instrument of social and political justice by interpreting the constitution in a manner which may have aided "aggrandizement" of Presidential and hence federal power; but it has also helped Mr Heren's other trio—the revolution of rising expectations, technological advance and the Negro revolt. The opposition to all three is real. Public squalor, a product of poverty, still worries few; such elementary things as medicare are aggressively resisted. The Jew has a long way to go before achieving acceptance and equality; the Negro a far longer. Mr Heren suggests a monument to the poor European immigrant as a companion to the Statue of Liberty. The Negro may have to build his own monument, some day.

Mr Heren is by no means blind to the many deficiencies of the American system and the American way of life; he even speaks of the built-in inefficiency of the system, which is sometimes a curious combination of extreme confusion and dangerous competence: brutal frankness and his intensity of learning and his intensity of expression. Mr Styron is rarely sentimental; it is his sensitive craftsmanship that impresses most. The subject stirred him all right; but there was something in him to be stirred, which means he has other good novels in him.

Mr Baldwin is nothing if not contemporary. His time is the present, his style strident. And, sure enough, there is plenty to be strident about. From Harlem through Greenwich Village to San Francisco, the Negro actor



Book case, 1928, by Gordon Russell, designed so that all titles can be easily read.

STUDY IN FORM

Designer's Trade. By Gordon Russell. (Allen & Unwin, 60s.)

Typographer, stone-cutter and industrial designer, Director of the British Council of Industrial Design for over 12 years, Sir Gordon Russell is basically a designer of furniture. Furniture that is functional and unencumbered, yet elegant in form. The story of his life is both instructive and entertaining. He tells us, for instance, how he learned "the very valuable lesson", that in a radio cabinet there should be no stress on its virtue as a piece of furniture; it should merge into the background in a discreet way, "like a well-cut suit of clothes". He feels that the best way of knowing the real man is through his work, and gives us an insight into his basic attitude towards design. He attributes his success to his teachers in the grammar school at Chipping Campden, who inspired in him a love and respect for material; men who took him "to the quarry to look at stone and to the coppice to look at the trees". At this school he had an opportunity of familiarizing himself, at first hand with stained-glass, wood-carving sculpting and the silversmith's craft. He even had a bash at house-building.

Came the war of 1914, and, though he was expected now to destroy and not create, he insists that the army, where he ended up with a Military Cross, had a lot to teach him. The first designing job that he took up after the war was to solve a personal problem. He and his brother had got married within six weeks of each other, and they bought old furniture and remodelled it to suit their own purposes. In this he received much help and encouragement from his father, a man who had tremendous enthusiasm for the new; whenever the son produced something he considered worthwhile, the father was always at hand with a camera and photographed it. These photographs proved to be of great help later when Russell went to see the assistant editor of "The Cabinet Maker", the journal in which they first appeared.

As expected, the author's

...ssion. Mr Styron is rarely sentimental; it is his sensitive craftsmanship that impresses most. The subject stirred him all right; but there was something in him to be stirred, which means he has other good novels in him.

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...ng; an aggrandisement of women but only as handmaidens."

Wagner adores Siegfried with his strength, arrogance and ruthlessness. The author points out that Siegfried is not the only neo-Nazi of the operas: "A mystique of battle, a schoolboy heartiness about killing, shrieking Valkyries and corpses incarnadine the whole story". He expresses surprise that G. B. Shaw of all people, who abhorred violence, could ever have admired Wagner. But then, Shaw admired dictators too.

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HOLLOW ARBITERS OF THE WRITER'S DESTINY

By BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

It is perhaps an exaggeration, but an observation not entirely devoid of truth, that book-reviewing has become the preserve of frustrated writers. Though there are very honourable exceptions, book-reviewers, in India particularly, tend to attempt an exercise in literary essays, mainly dealing with the author rather than the book, and usually ending in verbal nothingness. Else they tend to extoll the writer sky-high, giving him an unwarranted status of genius. Book-reviews generally fail to tell readers what the book is about, whether it is well done, and whether it was worth doing, with disastrous consequences for writers, particularly new ones. So runs the argument of this article.

IT has been stated, maybe somewhat sweepingly, that would-be authors (creative ones in particular), when they fail to place their book-manuscripts with publishers, turn their frustration into the stuff of cynical zest and record stern critics of the works of their successful fellow-writers. This is even believed to be the real genesis of the art or craft of book reviews! A part-truth, obviously, but one that cannot be glibly dismissed. It is a fact, of course, that well-known authors the world over write random reviews at the time when they have no stirrings of the creative spirit. Authors of a lower calibre take up this pastime, understandably, with almost clockwork regularity, provided that they get the opportunity.

There have been great exceptions, of course. Forty years ago, Arnold Bennett ran his famous two-column feature every week in London's *Evening Standard* for a considerable period, and the books he condescended to notice from his olympian heights moved routingly to the best-seller lists. About the same time, Frank Swinnerton found an outlet in a like pastime in the *Evening News*, but his success was not spectacular. Since those remote days, there have been several powerful book reviewers on either side of the Atlantic with the financial fate of authors held tight in their fists.

Here in India, no reviewer, not even Rabindranath Tagore, not even Promotho Chowdhuri with his epoch-making Sabuj Patra, ever enjoyed a comparable power—in the matter of financial recompense at any rate. And, saddeningly, it is here in India perhaps more than anywhere else in the world that writers whose pens continue to our futility in an unabated stream find it easy enough to take 10 hurried strides to an adjoining pasture where they find welcome relief, the refuge readily accorded to the makers of literary commentary.

LITERARY CRITIC

Lest I be misunderstood, I feel that I may as well make a pallid reservation. When I speak of a book reviewer I do not always have in mind a person who wears the solemn label of a literary critic. The dividing line between the two may be simply a matter of width—a thick black crayon in lieu of the faint marking of a cheap ball-point. On the other hand, this line may not be just something that joins two points—it may be a zone of space. Splendid space if one may use such an expression.

In American periodicals, such as the *New York Times* and the *Atlantic*, the distinction is very often illusory: a review may easily run to 1,500 words, the usual length of an article. Not so in India: and I am concern-

[illegible] himself with the imagined radiance of a critic's superb responsibility and splendid prowess! Decked with such colourful plumes, he has no hesitation in patting his literary superiors patronizingly on the back, even while he may seek to damn them with faint, warily weighed, praise.

The other side of the book review scale often tells a different story. That side is simply brimful, overloaded. In a thousand instances, it holds every superlative ever applied to a genius. This may have a propagandist motive, which is just faintly regrettable. Again, it may simply reflect the book reviewer's innate goodness of heart, his fond concern to do a fellow scribe a good turn; and even if that makes literary commentary lose the balance it deserves, no terrific harm is done. Time is the implacable leveller. Nothing that is not deathless will ever escape death. In course of the ages-long epochs of literary history, everything by way of words must ultimately slip into the right perspective and find the true value: some will blossom forth into glory out of sheer dust; others, acclaimed with fanfare, will shrivel day by day and resolve finally into decadence.

THE CRITERIA

A comment by an American editor may be quoted here profitably: "It is difficult to say in a few words just what an ideal book review should be from the standpoint of an editor. But if I may put it in a sentence or two, it seems to me that a criticism should answer three general questions: what is the book under consideration? How well is it done and, was it worth doing? In addition, a literary critic should have creative power of his own. That is, he should be able to write out his material in a form that has an independent value in itself as literature. Saints-Beuve comes as near as anyone to my ideal of a critic; yet, of course, I should not wish to see other critics imitate him, for each writer must be free to follow the dictates of his own genius."

Having set down these remarks of an impersonal kind, perhaps I shall be excused if I turn to reminiscence in order to illustrate one or two of the points of in London. The decision from the Bombay publisher came in a bare week. A generous contract followed and the book was printed in what was perhaps record time in those days of severe paper shortage. Then, with a beating heart, I waited for the reviews to appear. The very first one, printed in a Bombay paper, was one of the most painful shocks in all my experience. Every word in its fifteen-or-so lines was dipped in venom. (It was an unsigned review.) One would not need a great deal of imagination to realize my tormented state of mind. (My first novel, remember, and one on which my future writing career was to be based.) I came to the dismal conclusion that I was not destined to be a creative writer. I could do newspaper work, I could teach, I could .. well, whatever else I could do but as for writing a novel it was a terrific no! . . . No! . . .

LUCKY ESCAPE

That could easily have been the story's end. But destiny decided otherwise. Within a few days a cable came from London conveying the British publisher's acceptance of my novel. Scores of other reviews appeared in old while, and one of the most discerning ones was in the *Sunday Statesman*. Soon after, by a lucky chance, Mrs Sarojini Naidu, then Governor of Uttar Pradesh, inquired of a top-ranking journalist who had come to her for an interview: "I have just read a novel which has deeply impressed me. It is by Bhabani Bhattacharya. In case you know this writer, will you please tell me about him? . . ." And, as luck would have it, the interview appeared in the same Bombay paper which had furiously condemned this book of mine just a few weeks earlier! To my satisfaction, further, the same paper soon headlined the news that this novel had become a Book Club choice in England!

One other comment may not be out of place. In the days when I was an unknown writer I had a feeling that potential book reviewers tried to keep me at a safe distance. These demi-gods with their sad lack of imagination obviously feared that I would try to make use of their heart's goodness and try to extract some lines in my favour! I mention this fact as one more point in my arguments: our book reviewers' lop-sided sense of self-importance; this is, I am convinced, one side of the coin which has something else inscribed on the other—futility, frustration.

What a contrast it was when, later in New York, I met Orville Prescott, literary editor of the *New York Times*, who had the power to make a book (or destroy it) by a few lines from his pen. He had written a 1,500-word review of a later novel of mine in his renowned "Book of

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SUGARCANE BOARD DISSOLUTION

NOTICE ISSUED TO BANSI LAL

From our Correspondent

Such love is bound to show in one form or another. Some of the Ministers, for instance, seem to have fashioned their working hours almost on the pattern of these in the film business. Their attendance in the secretariat is casual, unless the Assembly is in session. Appointments are seldom kept. Their houses are virtually

ed here with book reviews in my own land. An analysis of such reviews illuminates several points of view that are frequently in evidence. One, which has been steadily gaining ground, is that here is a legitimate outlet for a person to exhibit his own literary talent; his command over not-so-common words (many keep careful note of the off-beat word, discovered in Thesarus or elsewhere), as also his ability freely to meander over large areas of the creative field—in short, such a review is a great deal more concerned with the writer himself than with the contents of the book dealt with. (That book may simply be a convenient peg on which to hang one's own great thoughts.) If well written, such a piece would be worthwhile as a literary essay. But then, does it serve its real purpose, the crux of its intent? Does it give both author and publisher a deal that is fair enough? Is it any pleasure for the author and publisher to see the words of the review they eagerly pore over blaze skyward as a multi-coloured firework and then, in the space of a minute, dissolve into sheer nothingness?

EXCUSABLE EGOTISM

To vaunt one's intellectual acumen (even if quite needless) is an act of excusable egotism, so common that it hardly needs any justification. Why deny a person his paltry pleasure? There is, however, another kind of reviewer who does not act out of plain innocence. He swears by Kafka, who may be nothing more to him than a name to remember, like certain others. In his hurried rush through the volume on his desk, he fixes his sightless eye to the inescapable virtues while his good eye studiously scans every petty deficiency. A case of pure conceit but excusable again. However by underscoring these deficiencies, the reviewer invests himself with the imagined radiance of a critic's superb responsibility and splendid prowess! Decked with such colourful plumes, he has no hesitation in patting his literary superiors patronizingly on the back, even while he view I have just indicated.

Would it be a truism to say that the book reviewer holds at the point of his pen the immense power of life and death, metaphorically speaking? It is undeniable that he could, by a sense of sheer irresponsibility or by utter ignorance, destroy a writer who is still under the grim compulsion to establish his standing. On the other hand, the enlightened reviewer could lead the uncertain author toward the path of fulfilment. It was a misfortune for John Keats that he drew upon his early poems the stupid commentary of a third-rate scribe of the *Edinburgh Review*. Keats, who must have known himself well enough even then, qualified under the vile invectives. He saw darkness. He felt that all his creative striving was bound to be fruitless. I am stating this well-known episode for a specific reason. The same reaction, in a set of like circumstances, struck another person (surely, far less self-aware than Keats!) who had just written his first novel: myself.

That was 20 years ago. Having completed my first novel I mailed two typed copies to publishers—one in Bombay, the other

the week" column. Yet, that enough commendation for seeking an interview with a person of such eminence? Hesitant, I rang up his secretary at the *New York Times* office. To my utter surprise the answer followed in a minute. "Mr Prescott would love to see you, sir. Could you come today? Come any time at your convenience."

And Orville Prescott spent with me no more than an hour of his precious office time, keenly discussing literary topics of interest to us both.

One more episode may be briefly cited. A well-known writer who had had a non-fiction volume just off the press called at my office—I was then editing a weekly—and gravely spoke: "Would you care to do a review of my latest book? It has some hard remark on your writing, but I am sure you can take that."

"My review of your book is already in the press," I told my visitor. "I also had to make some hard remark, but I am sure you can take that."

And relishing retort for retort, with no feelings strained, we looked merrily at each other and laughed.

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RUSSIAN TESTAMENT ON INTERVENTION

From S. NIHAL SINGH

THE events leading up to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a deep tragedy for the Czechoslovak nation and people, throw a curious light on the Kremlin. They are a catalogue of the singular ineptness of the Soviet Union in ordering its relations with a fellow Communist country sensibly.

Mr Brezhnev went to Prague in December last year, and rightly came to the conclusion that Mr Novotny had lost the support of his party and had to give way to a new leader. Soon after the historic January meeting of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, Mr Dubcek came to Moscow, as was required of him by Communist protocol.

Then we were treated to a series of conferences—first of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty in Sofia, with Rumania's participation. Rumania was left out of the subsequent meetings; it proved too obdurate, in the eyes of the rest—except, of course, Czechoslovakia's.

There was the hurriedly-convened meeting in Dresden, further Czechoslovak-Soviet meetings in Moscow and Prague, a Moscow meeting of the Five without Czechoslovakia, and finally the Warsaw meeting to which Czechoslovakia did not go. In Warsaw, the Five drafted their ultimatum—the joint letter which won a dignified and unfrightened answer from the Czechoslovak leaders. (The Soviet Press failed to print the Czechoslovak reply in full.)

BRATISLAVA MEETING

After laying the groundwork for intervention, Moscow hesitated, then climbed down to meet Czechoslovak leaders on their soil in the border settlement of Cierna and Tisou; the Soviet leaders reportedly went back to their territory to sleep in parked railway saloons each night. Then followed the full-scale Bratislava meeting, important more for its symbolic value than for substantive talks. The outside world interpreted it as a Czechoslovak victory.

All this time, the Soviet Press conducted an unprecedented round of polemics with an allegedly friendly Communist State. There were a few breathing spaces—after Mr Kosygin's famous "rest cure" in Czechoslovakia, after the Cierna meeting. Not long after the Bratislava gathering, the attacks were resumed. They were first centred on erring writers and journalists, but the fire had got closer and closer to Mr Dubcek and came to be aimed at some of his main advisers in the Central Committee.

Even after a shocked world learnt on August 21 of the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, with token support from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and East Germany the tragicomic aspects of the Russian action came to the foreground. With Soviet troops having taken control of Czechoslovakia, President Svoboda was welcomed in Moscow as an honoured State guest. Mr Dubcek, meanwhile, had been denounced in *Pravda* as the leader of a "Right-wing opportunistic" group.

Russian bewilderment at their reception in Czechoslovakia was genuine, based as they had their action on the belief that the Czech reforms were the work of misguided counter-revolutionaries who were in a minority. They came to realize quickly enough that it was not so. The invasion to foil the imagined "counter-revolutionary coup" did not get the expected reception from the Czechs.

But as the talks progressed in Moscow, it became known that Mr Dubcek, first reportedly manacled after being forcibly taken away from the Central Committee office in Prague, was also participating in them. And a few days later, after the end of the talks, *Pravda* reinstated him as the Czechoslovak Central Committee's First Secretary. Seldom in Communist history has a declared "Right-wing opportunist" been so quickly rehabilitated.

THE SLOGANS

The Russians quickly gave up the transparent ploy of having been "invited" to intervene by a still unnamed group of Czechoslovak Government and Party leaders. They realized that there were no takers for the crown of Soviet-sponsored rulers of Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Russian soldiers saw with some disbelief slogans of "Russians Go Home", written by their Slav—and "class"—brothers.

The sense of Soviet bewilderment at their reception in Czechoslovakia was genuine. Although Czechoslovak defiance was quickly blamed on "counter-revolutionaries", inspired by U.S. and West German "imperialists", the sense of shock did penetrate even the Soviet Press. S. Borzenko, writing in *Pravda* from Prague four days after the invasion, said: "Yesterday some unkempt milksop, having heard me speak Russian, drew a knife. I, a Soviet colonel, a military correspondent whose only weapon is a sharply pointed pencil. . ."

Time and again, Borzenko told *Pravda* readers of his disillusionment. "It is painful for us to see a dirty hand draw a Swastika on Soviet tank which stands on Soviet Tankmen's Square in Sinikhov". At another point he wrote: "We have shed a sea of blood for Czechoslovakia, and now the people of Czechoslovakia are told, at the penalty of death, not to give us a drop of water".

Borzenko and his colleagues were prisoners of their own ideology and had been led to expect that Czechoslovak "deviations" had been the work of misguided or "counter-revolutionary" people who were in a minority. The Soviet leaders, one would assume, knew better. Yet their actions betray hesitation, divided counsels, *ad hoc* and piecemeal decisions and, at the very least a misreading of the situation.

Out of the millions of words poured out of Moscow on Czechoslovakia, the two key documents are the Warsaw Letter and *Pravda*'s justification for the invasion, 13,000 words long. The Warsaw Letter set the limits of Czechoslovak freedom in economic reforms, a new ordering of relations between Czechs and Slovaks and the correction of past "mistakes" within the framework of conventional Communism.

The letter contained four demands: offensive against Right wing and anti-socialist forces, and to all political organizations opposing Communism, control of the Press, radio and television and the return of the party to the norms of "democratic centralism". The Warsaw Treaty was invoked; the Five Powers declared they would never permit Czechoslovakia to pose a threat to them by leaving the Communist world.

The Russian testament justifying intervention details how the Soviets had time and again warned the Czechoslovak leaders of the dangers of the situation developing in their country, of the Communist Party being in danger of losing its "leading role", of "reactionary forces" taking the country out of the Communist world. But, says the document, the Czechoslovak leaders failed to act: "When the principles of party life were discarded and the party core was defamed, the conclusion that the Communist Party was in danger was quite warranted". Further, history has so ordained that the USSR bears the tremendous responsibility of maintaining the security of the socialist camp".

COMMUNIST GOAL

The Czechoslovak leaders' pleadings that they were trying to develop their own methods of reaching the Communist goal, that they were aware of the dangers from the Right-wing, that they had no intention of deserting the Communist world or the Warsaw Treaty were beside the point for Moscow. It was not left to the Czechoslovaks to assess the situation for much longer. Moscow had assessed it. Moscow had assessed that Mr Dubcek was a "Right-wing opportunist", the Presidium member, Mr F. Krigel, supported "counter-revolutionary actions", the Foreign Minister, Mr J. Hajek, sought to revise the country's foreign policy, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr O. Sik, had criticized his country's economic relations with the Communist world, the Communist leader, Mr C. Cisar, had made a "frankly revisionist speech" and Mr I. Spacek, Presidium member, had assailed Leninist principles of party organization.

So Russian troops marched into Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20—allegedly to foil a "counter-revolutionary coup". This was before the deadline of September 9, the day the Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress was to meet to crown its victory for new Communism.

(Concluded)

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TEL AVIV FINDS INDIAN APATHY IRRATIONAL

By NIRANJAN MAJUMDER

Israelis find India's attitude towards their country mystifying Even if it be conceded that India needs the vote of abstention in the U.N. of some Arab countries on the Kashmir issue and trade relations with them, there seems no reason why it cannot have relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. As it is India seems the only considerable country frightened by the Arab League's Hallstein doctrine Most thinking Israelis are distressed that the only two real Socialist democracies between Peking and Peru should be so far apart The first of the two articles appeared on July 23.

FOR almost 20 years Israel has watched the gyrations of India's West Asian policy and failed to divine much neutralism or non-alignment in it at the United Nations or elsewhere. It is probably nobody's fault that in the Arab countries India is not considered sufficiently pro-Arab while in Israel India seems definitely non-aligned against the Jews. The consequent alienation distresses a surprising number of Israelis, diplomatic politeness only occasionally exploding into Dullesian assertions, that India's attitude to Israel is "immoral" After pointing out that morality or ethics might not be the best ingredient of a political discussion, an Indian may yet find it difficult to defend his country's indifference to Israeli aspirations which need not be but are very much at variance with very articulate Arab claims. Israel finds India's automatic support for all Arab attitudes mystifying even after making all allowances for this country's desperate need for every support, if passive, from at least some Muslim countries on the nagging question of Kashmir. I am afraid I had to turn down the suggestion, made in jest by an Israeli in one of the two night clubs I inspected in Jerusalem that India might get his country's vote—if India had made many compromises on the score of Kashmir Why not one more? The ethical stance dies hard Why another compromise?

EXAGGERATED

Israeli distress over the present inadequacy of relations with India is probably exaggerated. The Israelis are too shrewd not to know the unimportance of India in the present world context: equally, they are too discreet not to point out that any Indian dismissing the absence of rapport between India and Israel as an irrelevance in international affairs is denigrating his "great country" in which they have "great faith". Any riposte to the effect that a large country need not be equated with a great country or a large population with a great nation brings forth polite contradictions There is no reason why India should not be a great country, they say. One can hardly agree more; but, again, potentialities can hardly be equated with realities.

[illegible] India's trade with the Arab countries vastly exceeds that with anything likely with tiny and highly developed Israel. Neither argument can be dismissed lightly. With the Russian guarantee virtually gone which, incidentally, may one day infect Cairo, India does need all the support, or non-opposition, she can get on the question of Kashmir. Secondly, trade with the Arabs is certainly valuable and capable of expansion for a long time. Why, then, support Israel, a European interloper in Afro-Asia? The question is valid; the answer complex but not irrelevant, even if the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi would rather bypass both the complexity and the validity and reach for a copy of "Made Easy to the Middle East through Bleary Secular Eyes". If there is no such publication, South Block may have to "create" one. That this writer is wholeheartedly in favour of secularism between the Hindus and Muslims of India and beyond is no reason why the issue should not be argued in clear daylight at least occasionally and at an intellectual level. The present illusions and slogans seem altogether too many.

Anyone aware of the intrinsic character of historical and present relations between Hindus and Muslims must consider it something of an anomaly that New Delhi should for 20 years fall over backwards to support everything done by Muslims in the Middle East and rise consistently against Israel which for all its sins has never been in conflict with Hindus. Israel thinks, not entirely without reason, that India has more than once gratuitously insulted Israel; with reasons unexplained, India has spurned every gesture of friendship from Israel with contempt and treated this as a triumph in international and Middle Eastern diplomacy. It has to be reported as a fact that most thinking Israelis are distressed that the only two real socialist democracies between Peru and Peking should be so far apart. It is not a heartening thought that the reason may be the declining relevance of political and other ideologies in the configuration of international relations. Not even national selfishness, it seems, is all. Many and diverse may be the factors behind India's apathy, which often looks like hostility, towards Israel, while the latter has come mainly with fertilizers and other tokens of friendship. All were scorned for reasons untold to the country which was entitled to know on what principles, if [illegible] spoke of the hero's Japanese slippers, English trousers and Hindustani heart. With my inadequate Hindi, I had to translate the song for the driver's edification; at that moment it seemed a bit of secularism-cum-neutralism which I have not since experienced very often. Mr Krishna Menon's pronouncements over the years about the Middle East have not sounded to Israelis as very neutral; and I cannot say that my efforts to explain that Mr Menon was only an exponent of policies made elsewhere while Mr Raj Kapoor could, albeit through playback singers, order his own lyrics, were very successful. It is strange how often the song and the singer remain indistinguishable. It is hardly Israel's fault that it has seen the singer on Turtle Bay and not heard the song which in South Block at a certain point of time, June last year, came to be a ghazal with some very rude words in it.

India seems the only considerable country frightened by the Arab League's ersatz Hallstein doctrine. Most people seem to think that New Delhi could have done at least what Nicosia has done—doing business with both Egypt and Israel. The dire threats against giving full recognition to Israel might never have come about. Trade with the Arab world and similar exchanges with Israel might have gone on parallel lines with no unpleasant encounter en route One does not know for certain, although plenty of other countries have had formal and fruitful relations with both Israel and the Arab world at the same time without falling foul of either. It may never be known whether Indian policies were based as firmly on home-made calculations as on borrowed emotions

In the context of India's treatment of Israel in the last 20 years, Israeli gestures are understandably suspect. There may still be no good reasons why New Delhi must view Jerusalem with a touch of our traditional untouchability In the strictly Hindu view, all foreigners are mlechchas, untouchables. A quirk of history, which may be correctible, has made Israel more untouchable than the other harijans in the international comity, and we may deceive only ourselves in thinking that only political ideology, and not casteism or racialism, determines policy. It has not been stated yet why India must have missions in Ulan Bator and many other places of marginal consequence while ignoring such important places of international communion as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

MODERNISM

No special virtue attaches to Israel, apart from its acquisition of three holy places which interest Judaism, Christianity as well as Islam; but to ignore today's Israel is to bypass modernity, science, technology and all that they imply. The fourth religion, founded without many tall churches, represents science and modernism. The late Mr Nehru, who was the architect of the foreign policy from which for his own unknown reasons he discarded Israel into the dust-heap, also believed in science and technology. Yet he turned away from the one country in West Asia as left behind a huge legacy of lacunae in Indian thinking. Most of this country's institutions are modelled on those British, little thought being given to the obvious fact that this is a much larger country with a very heterogeneous population Independence brought the idea of "thinking big"; hence the proud yet pathetic approaches to America and Russia when the two were not on speaking terms. The late Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri endeavoured to correct the neglect of smaller neighbours such as Nepal, Burma and Ceylon. So far so good. But on West Asia some people in New Delhi have been wearing an eyepatch rather like Moshe Dayan's and not seeing Israel at all and concentrating all attention on the larger and amorphous Arab world. A country with a purpose needs to look to another which has achieved its purpose. In West Asia, that means Israel from which country both Arabs and Indians can derive a great deal.

(concluded) ...

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ISRAEL MAY ACT TO FORESTALL EGYPTIAN RECOVERY

By G. H. JANSEN

CAIRO: With gloomy determination the leaders and people of the UAR accept the near-certainty that Israel will deliver another heavy blow on them in the next two or three months.

The reasons for this melancholy prognostication are something of a paradox. Israel, it is felt, will strike not so much because no settlement is likely to come from the U.N., even if a mediator is appointed, nor because Egypt is militarily weak but rather because Egypt is becoming stronger with some speed.

The general military weakness of the Arabs does enter into Israel's calculations, because everyone knows that if Israel attacks Egypt around the turn of the year, or a little later, she will not have to worry about any diversionary attack from Syria or Jordan. Jordan does not have the means and Syria does not have the will to fight Egypt itself is not remotely considering any offensive action.

In July Israeli spokesmen were saying that Russia had only replaced a third to a half of the armament Egypt lost in Sinai and that it would be two or three years before the Egyptians could recover sufficiently to fight again. It was then argued that time, in the long run, may favour the Arabs but that in the immediate future time was on the side of Israel, because of her military gains. However since then circumstances have changed considerably, so that in mid-October the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Eshkol revised the first estimate upwards and said that Russia had replaced 80% of Egyptian arms, and doubtless there has been a comparable downward revision of the second estimate of Egypt's recovery time.

AN UNDERESTIMATE

Indeed even Mr Eshkol's latest percentage seems to be an underestimate, for the Egyptians are not far from the exact truth when they say that they have been re-equipped 100%.

The first-line fighter strength of their Air Force is more than 80% of what it used to be. And the Army once again has two complete armoured divisions. It is very likely that the Egyptians not only have ground-to-air missiles as before, but new ground-to-ground missiles as well, and, as the sinking of the Eilat showed, the Navy has and knows how to use the latest ship-to-ship rockets.

The defence infrastructure is being improved with equal rapidity. Many new and reconditioned airfields have been brought into use so that planes can be dispersed, and these are now being housed in underground or concrete-covered hangars. Every precaution is being taken against a repetition of Israeli's first crippling surprise air-strike of June 5.

Egypt believes that another Israeli attack in the next two or three months is certain. Its fears arise from its own speedy military recovery. Russia has made good almost all of Egypt's losses in arms. is giving Egyptian forces new professional training. Thus time, the Egyptian argument runs, is no longer on Israel's side.

Israel will therefore try to knock Egypt off-balance once again before it is too late. There is fearsome logic in what the Egyptians say. Every day that passes without an Arab-Israeli settlement therefore means another day nearer the next round of fighting.

Even more important than all this is the fact that, under professional non-political generals, the Egyptian forces are being trained or re-trained with gruelling severity. Leave, even for units in the vicinity of Cairo is not being granted because all units are on 24-hour duty.

RUSSIAN MISSION

The Russians, too, are not taking any more chances with their equipment. They now have a training mission in Egypt numbering at least 1,000, and perhaps going up to 2,000, men. These are to be found down to brigade level and perhaps even in battalions.

The morale of the Army and Air Force has, inevitably, been somewhat shaken by the June defeat and by the attempted coup and suicide of the Israeli Air Force and the build-up of Egypt's air defence, through fighters and anti-aircraft guns and missiles. It is known that Israeli reconnaissance planes are still slipping in and out of Egyptian airspace unscathed, so that it would seem that there are still holes in the Egyptian defence screen.

There is a fearsome logic in this Egyptian prediction which means that everyday that passes without a settlement is another day nearer the next round of fighting. And the prospects of a negotiated settlement are dim indeed.

This being the manner and the pace of military renovation in Egypt time, even in the short-term, is no longer on Israel's side. The Egyptians argue that it would be most unlike Israel for her to permit this process to reach the level of solid, well-organized efficiency which could be attained in about six months. Israel they say, has to try and knock the Egyptian military machine off-balance again, and soon. Yet another defeat in quick succession would, in all probability, bring down Mr Nasser: that is Israel's prime political objective, which she almost achieved but not quite, in June.

There is one (possible) major politico-military obstacle that Israel has to take into account Informed Egyptians express the belief that Russia has given the UAR an assurance that it will not permit Israel to make any further military advances. This sounds entirely plausible, because Russia has reacted to the angry Arab criticism that its support to the Arabs was far less firm and fruitful than America's backing of Israel.

If this is true, and given the presence of Russian naval ships in or near Port Said, any Israeli attempt to capture the west bank of the Suez Canal so as to open up and run that waterway can now be ruled out.

According to the Egyptians this would leave the Israelis two other possibilities—both of them through air action where there cannot be any direct Russian intervention. On the lines of the Israeli destruction of the refineries and fertilizer plant at Suez the Israeli Air Force could bomb other industrial and power plants especially those near Cairo or Aswan, so as to destroy Egypt's economic base. Or the air attack could be directed against military targets such as the assembly plants and storage dumps of the new equipment; or both.

If these Egyptian fears are well-founded then there is a race in time between the penetrating and striking power of

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THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY—I

THE PERMANENT RELEVANCE OF THE REVOLUTION

By MOHIT SEN

The real and lasting relevance of the Russian Revolution lies in its two most original and unique contributions to the annals of man.

It firmly transferred the main means of production to public ownership; and it transformed workers in factories and farms, enabling them to rule and run the social process. These contributions remain, despite the detractors in Peking who decry "peaceful transition."

T is a very rare, if not an al- together singular, experi- ce to celebrate the 50th anni- rsary of any revolution in e field of social change. One n certainly speak of a certain ntinuum in the scientific tech- al revolution and, perhaps, a certain trend towards the dustrialization of all economic tivity. But social revolutions e soon enough lost their mentum. Thermidor follow- the storming of the Bastille ess than a decade and earlier mwell, after suppressing the ellers and Diggers, was him- subsumed in the "glorious" promise.

nd why does one need to go far afield in time and space en we feel on our backs the ll breakdown of whatever dhiji had hoped for and the ing into its opposite of what Nehru had worked out as historical rôle in the cele- ted *Autobiography*? There something like the nemesis a Greek tragedy when that h of non-violence found his ia free but torn and born h a blood-bath and again en the man who "outmoded" rx ended his life by appoint- the Mahalanobis Committee the Monopolies Commission.

Has the same fate overtaken breakthrough in November 17? Have Marx and Lenin en betrayed by their creation d the actualization of their als? It is a discussion of this ne that leads one to the very rt of the relevance of the sian Revolution. It is the wer to this problem that ex- ins the reality or the farce the 50th jubilee. And let it remembered that both Marx Lenin insisted that the new alist formation would, above build a new civilization on basis of higher labour pro- ctivity.

ACHIEVEMENTS

The answer does not lie in the ading of striking statistics, ich can be produced easily ough. It has become impossi- e now to deny the stupendous ides Russia has taken in in- stry, science, education, alth housing and the like. ese achievements are now ely admitted in the most ndical of quarters as one uld discover even in the most reary persual of articles and ecial numbers. The sputnik ped its way through a brass of mendacity about the called ramshackle nature of e Soviet economy. The soft- ding on Venus, the anti- BM missile, the swingwing are also rather rude remind- of achievements that many uld wish away.

The critics, not all of them by y means friendly, have now ered on to another tack. Pre- ously their argument had en that the Bolsheviks could stroy capitalism but they uld produce chaos and eakdown thereafter. Now the aim is that what has been ilt is nothing but a second- and capitalism. Rostow talks this impending ascent to the sters consumption society d others join in to interpret the new economic reforms as a ecisive turn to the accomplish- ment of what Kerensky was nigrated by Lenin for aiming at mellow capitalism.

history and the real history of humanity.

This, indeed, is the most fundamental and striking element in the continuum of the November Revolution. A basic property-ownership transformation in the form of the abolition of the private ownership of the main means of production, has proved to be irreversible. Private property was supposed to be inalienable from civilization and the desire for it the main motivation of human activity. Not the profit motive but the possession instinct was said to be necessary for man as the air and the sun. It is the November Revolution which made a revolutionary departure and demonstrated for 50 years that social ownership is the future and that it works.

Complete equality in living standards was never the ideal but complete absence of private property certainly was. The contrast is with the USA where productivity increases are tied up with constant monopolistic mergers, more and more in "fewer hands" as Kefevaeur put it.

Linked with this radical transformation is the other aspect of the basic relevance of the November Revolution. This is the question of whether the workers, the toiling peasants and the working intelligentsia have it in themselves to rule and run the social process.

It is amusing now to read the sardonic accounts of the *emigres* who smugly thought that the men and women with dirt on their hands were too crude and stupid by far to be able to manage the complicated mechanism of State and social development. They believed that their restoration was certain because of this inherent inability of the submerged classes, the "damned of the earth" to ever do without those who rode on their backs and believed they were running the earth.

Crude, stupid, clumsy the workers and peasants were until they made the "festival of the oppressed", as Lenin always termed revolutions. Then the sap of creativity rose and it has never stopped running. The surprise of the Junker Von Paulus when his sword was accepted in surrender by the son of a shepherd is paralleled by the astonishment of some U.S. journalists at the discovery that Gagarin claimed his descent not from some Baron Gagarin but from honest-to-goodness farmers who became workers.

THE NEW CLASS

Singh's Hindustan Socialist Republican Army or the first Communists in Bengal, Bombay, Madras and Punjab who took up the building of militant trade unions—it was these aspects that shook them and changed their radical anti-imperialism to something very close to Marxism even in the 1920s. Later Mr Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote of the new civilization of the Soviet Union and expressed his preference for international Communism as against international social-democracy. Something like a merging of nationalism and Marxism seemed to be on the brink of happening. It appeared as if India, too, might have its Sun Yat-sen. Why this did not happen is, however, another story.

It is interesting to recall, moreover, that it was these contributions that, above all, attracted the attention of Tagore as he went in the 1930s to the Soviet Union to complete his world pilgrimage. The lamp which rested on a pillar of darkness had become a pillar of fire. The Great Sentinel conveyed the meaning of it all to an India that had embarked on the quest for identity through emancipation. The meaning remains. So does the quest.

(To be continued)

(2)

And oddly enough, similar noises are heard from Peking and the admirers of Mao in different parts of the world who have a whole "theory" about the peaceful transition back to capitalism even as they decry any attempt to formulate the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism Thermidor, the Restoration—these historical ghosts are once again conjured up to destroy faith in the very idea of human progress.

Hence, the supposed dilemma: if, after all, the Bolsheviks did learn to build, is it that they have reproduced yet another class society of exploitation?

SMALL DIFFERENCE

It might be recalled that the celebrated *Time* story on the so-called Liberman reforms while making much of the so-called "return" of profit (the authors had evidently "forgotten" what Lenin and Stalin wrote about the necessity of socialist surplus, to say nothing of Marx himself) had noted a "small" difference that still existed between the Soviet Union and the USA. This "small" difference, it transpired, was that public ownership of the main means of production was still the bedrock of Soviet economy and society! This "small" difference is precisely the crux of the matter and is, essentially, a difference between the pre-

(3)

Any analysis of the leaders of the Soviets, the Commun Party or the scientific academ would reveal this fact of ori from the class of labour. all the laborious "research of various abundantly finan Centres of Soviet Studies h been able to bring to light eit the resurrection of the rep sentatives of the expropria property owners or the ex ence of a special self-perpetu ed and perpetuating caste. "new class" exists only in disordered imagination Djilas.

And as any sociologist kn a class requires both roots the existence of generations crystallize. The workers in factories and the farms most truly transformed th selves from a class in itself class for itself and, thus, p the way for the abolition o classes and the emancipatio the whole of society.

These are the two most or al and unique contribution the November Revolution to annals of man. The thru that Revolution has made contributions a living, invin reality. And it is here tha real and lasting relevanc the Revolution lies.

It was these contribu that drew intrepid patriots India to the Russian Revo almost as soon as its a became known. Whether the Hijratis or the Ghadr or the members of the

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50TH ANNIVERSARY—III

ON THE CRITICS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

By DR. DAVID SLUTSKY

Western statesmen and theorists, argues the author, have always misrepresented the character of the October Revolution. In the beginning it was said that the revolution was un-Russian representing the "International", an institution entirely alien to civilization. And it is said now that it was a specifically Russian movement, a product of Russian society. Yet other theorists see in the growth of a technocratic hierarchy in Russia the dilution of the socialist ideals, the argument being that specialists, intent as they are on their own jobs, shed some of their ideologies; therefore the socialist society would draw ever closer to the capitalist society.

Viewed in the context of the triumph of socialism in Russia and its expansion to a large number of other countries, says the author, the Western theories appear vain attempts to render socialism innocuous. If anything, the growth of technocracy in Russia proves that private ownership is no longer necessary for the functioning of the social machinery.

WHEN the October Revolution in Russia, ushered in a new world 50 years ago, the old world pundits prophesied its inevitable doom. Lenin, as he in *Golero* plan in 1920 charted out the path of Russia's social revolution through the cryptic formula of "Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country", was chastised by a sympathetic H. G. Wells as a wild visionary. "Electrification" was the term coined to describe "the fantastic project of the Bolsheviks".

In Lenin's time Russia had electrical energy totalling only two billion kW hrs; in 1966 the total capacity of electrical energy was 507 billion kW hrs. Facts have proved stranger than fiction. In 1913, the last affluent year of the Tsarist régime, industrial output did not exceed 4% of the world total. In 1966, the USSR, with less than 10% of the world population had 20% share.

And with national income standing at 60% of that of the USA in 1966-67, the Soviet rate of growth has been nearly 10% as against the USA's 3. Given these rates of growth, the national income of the USSR will surpass that of the USA in less than 10 years.

During the last half a century of the development of the socialist system, there has been no lack of theories, speculations and prophesies by Sovietologists, Kremlinologists, Communistologists—as they are called. And the interesting evolution of such theories can perhaps make a stimulating subject-matter for study. Such theories mainly relate to the characterization of the October Revolution and nature of the socialist economy and Soviet society.

BOLSHEVIKS

During the early days of the October Revolution, the event was sought to be described as a case of forcible usurpation of power by a minority group styling itself as "Bolsheviks" (majority party) that had no roots in the Russian soil. The October Revolution, it was contended, was "a military operation", a "conspiracy of the minority". A year after the revolution, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau said that the Bolsheviks did not represent Russia, that they represented only the "International", an institution and idea entirely alien and inimical to civilization.

Those were the days when the new Soviet State was sought to be upset both from within and without. And now quite opposite views are being presented about the character of the Russian revolution. Quite a number of important sociologists and historians of the USA and West Europe, such as R. Daniels, M. Hindus and E. H. Carr, have stressed the predominantly national character of the Russian revolution. According to R. Daniels "the Russian revolution was not an example of the contemplated international trend but a characteristic national event." He contends that for all its international

peasant, stemming from the reality of Russian life and the barbarity of Russian history. A more sophisticated version of this idea was given by another author when he said that in essence the October Revolution was an industrial revolution of the Russian variety.

Such attempts to describe the October Revolution as essentially a Russian phenomenon and to bypass its international bearings are particularly significant at a time when its impact has been felt on an international scale and when Lenin's prediction about "the historical inevitability of the recurrence on a world scale of some basic features of our revolution" is being borne out by facts of life.

OTHER THEORIES

More significant, however, are the theories flowing from the new trends in science and technology. Literature on the theory of technology is voluminous. In itself the theory of technology is not a new discovery but of late it has been advanced not as an independent idea but as an argument in support of the broader idea that socialism and capitalism are bound to draw closer together and that "a system of mixed economy and political pluralism" is desirable. Technocratic sociology holds that with the expansion of the productive forces a hierarchy of specialists has emerged under socialism. And it is typical of specialists, be it under socialism or capitalism, that they are so intent on their particular jobs that they are inclined to shed their ideologies. It has been suggested that Russia is growingly accepting the technocratic principle.

In short, the array of arguments shared and widely supported by the so-called technocratic sociology seems to be designed to play up the idea that socialist society is drawing closer to capitalist society. These totalitarianism and democracy and not between capitalism and socialism.

The meaning of these semantic gymnastics is obvious—they imply that since socialism cannot be dismissed one should try to reshape it by fusing it eventually with capitalism in a politically loose "industrial technocratic society"

In the past the argument was that all progress under socialism was spurious, that in reality socialism was declining or would do so before long because it could not raise the standards of living. And now it is a "coming-togetherness" of the two systems! The evolution in the thinking of the bourgeois ideologists and politicians may be evidence of a "reappraisal" of their ideas; or rather of a change of shades in them to suit the changing times.

Within half a century of the October Revolution socialism has been placed on a firm material and social basis, and has reached beyond one country to develop into a mighty system encompassing one-third of the world's population. Seen in the context of this growing reality the attempts of the ideologists of the West to render socialism innocuous by offering the theory of a "growing convergence of the two systems" can be easily understood. Moreover, it shows that some of the anti-socialists are shedding their illusion about the imminent collapse of socialism and are instantly taking refuge in the illusion that capitalism and socialism will draw closer and subsequently merge.

What the growing rôle of the technocrats in the capitalist economy really proves is that capitalist ownership is no longer necessary for the functioning of the social machinery. No amount of improvement in the capitalist society, in Government regulations, or a bigger share of State ownership and a bigger rôle of specialists in the direct functioning of capital—can in itself change the nature of capitalism. But in the long run these trends may ease and facilitate the transition from capitalism to socialism in the developed capitalist countries. Meanwhile, the social processes that were released through the October Revolution will continue to have their irresistible influence on all societies irrespective of their levels of development.

(Concluded)

vestments and plans. Communism remains a specifically Russian movement, a product of Russian society. M Hindus admits that the October Revolution was not only violent but also creative, but he adds that the creative character of the revolution stemmed not from its socialist nature but from other specifically national factors. The creative aspect, the author insists, was attained in the traditionally Russian spirit.

Both Daniels and Hindus hold that the revolution was never international or proletarian, but national and peasant.

theorists try to overlook the important fact that the social content of the historical process is not confined to technology; social relationships and production relations are the key factors.

Another U.S. sociologist, R. K. White, in one of his rather learned articles—"Socialism and Capitalism—an international misunderstanding" appearing in the January 1965 number of Foreign Affairs—goes a step further to suggest that use of the words capitalism and socialism has become obsolete in modern days for both are "full of semantic pitfalls" and because the fight is going on between

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THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY—II

NEW PATTERN OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN ASIA

By ZAFAR IMAM

As it completes the first half century of the Revolution, the Soviet Union is making radical changes in its attitude towards countries near its frontiers, including Pakistan, which are aligned with the West. It is trying to draw them into the zone of neutral nations.

Its purpose is not to spread new instability in this area but to pave the way for a purposeful local balance of power and some indigenous solutions of the problems which divide some of these countries.

THE recent visit of the Pakistani President to the Soviet Union must be viewed against the background of the changing Soviet policy on Asia. In fact, the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan is one of the series of moves the Soviet Union has made in recent years to lessen the dependence of the aligned Asian States on the USA.

The Soviet Union began reappraisal of its policy on Asia during the early part of 1965 when the crisis in Indonesia deepened. The failure of Dr Soekarno and his policies compelled the Soviet leaders to reexamine the efficacy of exclusive attention to the non-aligned Asian States. They felt that such a policy could no longer ensure the strengthening and consolidation of the neutral zone between the socialist and capitalist camps. A new dimension to the Soviet disillusionment with the non-aligned nations was added by the growing schism between the Soviet Union and China and by the latter's skilful efforts to create her own zone of neutral nations.

There was no desire, however, to part company with the non-aligned States; the objective was simply to strengthen and consolidate the neutral zone by drawing the aligned States into its fold. But the area of manoeuvring for the Soviet leaders was limited. There was the stalemate in the balance of power in Europe and in Latin America. In West Asia the Arab-Israeli confrontation had already assumed a definite pattern and had maintained a balance between the two antagonists. Moreover, Russia's commitment to the Arab nations had already reached a point where the law of diminishing return was beginning to apply.

On the other hand, the importance of the African States in the East-West confrontation was marginal and not well-defined, except on the question of South Africa's racial policies and the liquidation of the remaining colonial régimes. Hence the aligned belt in Asia was the only area left open for manoeuvring and probing. Even in this area the war in Vietnam had reduced the scope for manoeuvring to only the aligned States in West Asia, namely Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. It was no coincidence that the initial Soviet diplomatic moves were made in this area during the early part of 1965, with visits of Pakistani and Turkish Presidents to the Soviet Union, and the offer of Soviet economic aid to these countries.

its weight in favour of ending the conflict. Hence a series of letters from Mr Kosygin to President Ayub and Mr Shastri calling for a cease-fire, almost a judicious balance in reporting the fighting in the Soviet Press, and finally the proposal for the Tashkent conference. Thus, for the first time, the Soviet Union took an active interest in a local Asian problem with an avowed desire to confine the conflict locally and not to turn it into an effective exercise in confronting the West. The Tashkent conference benefited Soviet leit-motif as much as it benefited India and Pakistan. Definite and concrete steps to develop Soviet relations with countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were therefore the logical next step.

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE

The long-term objective of the new Soviet rôle in Asia seems to have been the maintenance of the status quo in the continent and creation of a local balance between the Asian States within the framework of the neutral zone. This objective is primarily based on the Soviet view of localized conflicts or wars between States in the Third World. The Russians feel that localized conflicts might escalate into a major war leading to World War III; hence the main danger to the world peace today is localized conflicts and regional instability. The short-term Soviet objective is thus naturally directed at reducing this danger. In practice, all this means that a full play of Soviet diplomacy and Soviet economic and military aid in the area must be expected.

There is one major dilemma however before Soviet leaders, how to prevent loss of traditional and more important friends in the area while making new and less important friends. They have been trying to resolve this on the basis of three careful considerations. First, the inherent logic of economic and military aid to developing nations—the increasing dependence of the recipient nations on the giver nations—is entirely in favour of the Soviet Union; moreover, Soviet friendship is as essential for non-aligned Asian States as their friendship is for the USSR. Secondly, the sincere desire of all Asian States to resolve their local disputes and to go ahead with the task of rebuilding their societies; hence active Soviet interest in local disputes and local conflicts would widen the scope for manoeuvring and increase the flexibility of the parties involved. Thirdly, the tacit understanding with the USA to encourage stability in the area and to reduce the potential causes for direct East-West confrontation.

The success of the Tashkent conference proved the soundness of these considerations. The visit of the Pakistani President to the Soviet Union is another good example of the success of the new Soviet policy. As the official communiqué on President Ayub's visit clearly indicates, there were long-drawn out discussions on India-Pakistan relations without either side conceding its own fundamental approach to the question. Yet the Pakistani President not only established a useful rapport with Soviet leaders but also secured more and long-term Soviet economic aid for Pakistan. The net result of President Ayub's visit seems to have been a gain for those directly concerned—the Soviet Union, Pakistan and India. For the Soviet Union, it would mean increased dependence of Pakistan on the Soviet Union and thus a chance to increase her manoeuvrability vis-a-vis China, the USA and India. For Pakistan, a real alternative to China and the USA in the form of a more active Soviet interest in Pakistan's economic prosperity and the friendship and understanding of a powerful neighbour who is also very close to Pakistan's main antagonist, India. For India, a more flexible and an increasingly introvert Pakistan.

Thus viewed against the background of the changing rôle of Soviet policy in Asia, a further strengthening of relations between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey cannot be regarded as a deliberate exercise in spreading instability in Asia. On the contrary, in the long run, this might well lead to a purposeful local balance of power on the European pattern. Only then can local areas of national conflicts be shielded against extraneous influences and the way paved for some indigenous solutions.

PAKISTAN


Of these three countries, Pakistan was ideally suited for a bold Soviet initiative. First, the disillusionment in Pakistan with the USA was growing because of the alleged failure of the Americans to promote the leit-motif of Pakistani policy towards India. Secondly, Pakistan's flirtations with China had created the possibility of the latter encouraging hostility towards the Soviet Union near another flank of the Soviet border. Although the local confrontation between India and Pakistan had long been the cause of an imbalance and instability in the area, yet the two countries could be counted upon to localize an armed conflict and even to contain its stresses and strains, and this, in Soviet eyes, would minimize the danger of a local war escalating into a thermo-nuclear one. All these considerations were still in the pipeline of Soviet decision-making machinery when the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September, 1965, forced the issue.

After initial reluctance, the Soviet Union decided to throw

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BOOK REVIEWS

TO DEMI-PARADISE

Peace in Indo-China. By Anthony Eden. (Oxford .)

! Vietnam ! By Felix Greene. (Penguin, 12s 6d.)

prisingly, Lord Avon, was one of the chief of the Geneva agree- 954, still believes that even now serve as a for ceasefire nego- and a guaranteed in Vietnam. He underestimate the ess by which the the agreements has ally eliminated. Still alistic seems his con- the rôle that can ayed by the members airmen of the 1954 or by the members pervisory Commission. se of the war has not ced but also radically he possibilities of a settlement; a discus- how the Geneva agree- uld be revived and to the present situation most wholly academic. Avon is sad that the d China "should be- ed and determined in eous conviction of the policy". As an English- man, he knows that the Chinese are wrong in supposing that the U.S. Government wants to keep American troops in South-East Asia. Surely he also knows what value the Chinese will attach to this view; even the Ameri- cans may find it somewhat naive. Lord Avon's well-inten- tioned advice to the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnam conflict is un- likely to be regarded as rele- vant by any of them, but some of his observations on their motivations may be usefully studied in the USA and Britain. In general, he advocates a rela- tively moderate approach; he has also pleaded for a more humane attitude in dealing with prisoners of war. "It is im- portant to show by practice that every obligation to which the free world is pledged is kept, whatever the behaviour of the Vietcong ... Torture is debasing and sadistic and it is a sorrowful mark of the times in which we live that it should be tolerated in war and so constantly publicized in peace".

The same point was made much more tellingly by Mr Graham Greene in a comment, quoted in Mr Felix Greene's book, on pictures of torture of Vietcong prisoners by their South Vietnamese captors, with the connivance, sometimes in the presence, of American sol- diers. "The strange new fea- ture about these photographs of torture now appearing", said the novelist, "is that they have been taken with the approval of the torturers and published over captions that contain no hint of condemnation". Several such photographs are reproduced in Mr Felix Greene's book; in one a U.S. soldier looks on. In fact, the book is mainly a col- lection of pictures, some more horrifying than others.

Mr Greene has no time for mealy-mouthed platitudes, nor perhaps much for trying to look at both sides of the picture. His avowed intention is to present the case against American policy and practice in Vietnam, and this he does most effective- ly. The text is brief, but clear and forceful; well-chosen quo- tations not only reflect growing criticism of U.S. policies by people from different parts of the world but also reveal glar- ing and most disturbing con- tradictions between Washing- ton's own statements. But even more effective than the text are the photographs, some by the world's leading news photo- graphers. The pictures are competently arranged to show how a small, backward and placid Asian country has had its encounter with the West; the fight against the French and the Geneva Conference are on graphic record, but the pictorial representation becomes more detailed thereafter; both the ferocity of the escalating U.S. onslaught and the resistance in the South and the North are shown in a series of photo- graphs which are bound to leave a deep and disturbing im- pression. Certainly not the whole truth, but a very im- portant element of the truth nevertheless.

... of most naked "military dictator-

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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

P.M.'S TOURS SHOULD BE BETTER LINKED WITH FOREIGN POLICY

By DILIP MUKERJEE

THE cancellation of the visit Mrs Gandhi was to have paid to Japan at the end of this month should be put down to mischance: her advisers had assumed that the West Bengal poll would not be held in November but the Election Commissioner, to their surprise, stuck to his original time-table. Her Japanese hosts will surely understand Mrs Gandhi's difficulties—the ruling liberal democrats have as much trouble with Tokyo's political turbulence as the Congress Party here has with Calcutta. But doubts are still valid, in Japan as well as at home, about the priorities shaping the Prime Minister's travel plans.

In putting off her visit to Japan, Mrs Gandhi is acting under obvious domestic compulsions. Even so it is valid to ask whether the Prime Minister's travel plans could not have been made with greater regard to the demands of national interest. The question has an added relevance because of the widespread impression that India's interest in her neighbours is perfunctory. Much has been done in recent years to undo this impression but the weight of past mistakes lies heavily upon the present. Better headway could perhaps be made if India clarified in her own mind her long-term objectives vis-a-vis the neighbouring region, and what she is prepared to contribute towards their realization.

The time Mrs Gandhi is devoting to Latin America—on the first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister—is undoubtedly yielding a valuable dividend in terms of goodwill. The visit also makes sense in the context of the current effort to diversify India's foreign relations to gain greater leverage in a multi-polar world. But should this diversification not have begun nearer home in South-East Asia, an area of direct relevance to the national interest? There are many countries in this region which she has not visited yet.

A visit from Mrs Gandhi to Burma is overdue. It is no secret either that Thailand and the Philippines have been expecting Mrs Gandhi for some time. Indonesia is another country to which New Delhi's attention has been drawn by several of India's friends, among them Tunku Abdul Rehman. A gesture is called for even otherwise, at a time when the Suharto regime needs support, moral no less than material, in its hard fight against heavy economic odds.

Mrs Gandhi, like her predecessor, Mr Shastri, is keenly aware of India's stake in the goodwill of neighbours. But when she goes off to the western hemisphere for three weeks, before she can find time to attend to more pressing needs close at hand, one must ask whether she is correctly apportioning her scarce time. Misgivings on this score gain added weight from the fact that she has at the last minute called off the visit to Canada, the only country on her itinerary with which there was business to discuss. [illegible] Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, contrary to what some Press reports suggest—but this will hardly be the same thing.

To make any judgment on India's foreign policy attitudes solely on the basis of Mrs Gandhi's travels would obviously be wrong. But since there is a strong impression in most Asian countries that India's interest in them is casual and perfunctory, we need to make special efforts to prove our bona fides. Frequent contacts at a high level are one way in which we can begin to live down an unfavourable image.

*

OUR poor image is in many ways of our own making. For a long period we overrated our importance: we felt that our size and relatively stronger economic base entitled us to a role of leadership. In 1946, when Mr Nehru made a quick trip through some South-East Asian countries on the eve of the Cabinet mission's visit to discuss the transfer of power—he described India in Kuala Lumpur as the "pivot" of Asia. This striving for a pivotal role was reflected in the Asian Relations Conference held in early 1947, and afterwards in the conference on Indonesia called in 1949.

We managed in this period—mostly through inadvertence—to make ourselves appear to others as a Big Brother. But soon we ourselves began to see that our role had to be much more modest. China's emergence introduced a new factor with which we sought to come to terms, both directly vis-a-vis Tibet in 1950, and indirectly at Bandung in 1955. Secondly, the realization grew that economic development on which we had embarked with high expectations in 1950 was going to be far more difficult and time-taking than we had allowed for. As India became increasingly dependent upon others for her sustenance, her credibility as a pace-setter in Asia was steadily undermined. The debacle in the Himalayas in 1962 carried this sorry process to a conclusion.

Even while this was happening, New Delhi did not stop striking extravagant attitudes. We often sat in judgment on our neighbours to their intense annoyance. Thailand's endeavour—admittedly modest—to build up domestic industries was dismissed by Mr Nehru as amounting to nothing more than the installation of Coca-Cola pale. This may have had some justification in Pakistan's case—her military ties with the USA impinged on our security—but in almost all others our lofty moral stance had no connexion with the national interest. Non-alignment was our article of faith, but there was no reason to expect others to conform to it.

It was a carry-over of the same habit which put us in the wrong with Nepal. When the King dismissed Mr B. P. Koirala in 1960, Mr Nehru told the Rajya Sabha that he was very unhappy at the setback to democracy. Recalling the part India had played earlier in helping to dislodge the Rana rule to put the King in power, some Nepalis construed Mr Nehru's verdict as a desire to remould the regime to India's liking, more so because the rebels took sanctuary in India. Mr Nehru had two years earlier described Ayub Khan's takeover in Pakistan as the establishment of the world's most naked "military dictatorship". This it may well have been, but Mr Nehru's remark perhaps struck even Ayub Khan's opponents as unwarranted moralizing.

*

IN contrast with the sententiousness with which we treated neighbours in the past we are prepared today very sensibly to subordinate moral and ideological predilections to mutual interest (just as China has done vis-a-vis Pakistan and Cambodia). We are, in other words, growing up and learning to reckon with realities. Many in India were unhappy when General Ne Win put U Nu in cold storage in 1962, but we are no longer letting this come in the way of seeking Burma's friendship to promote our common interests. Likewise, fences have been mended with Nepal and Ceylon. A line of credit of Rs 10 crores was extended to the new regime in Indonesia to mark the start of a changed relationship, while co-operation with Thailand in the fields of trade and tourism is currently under discussion. More important, India is giving Malaysia valuable support in terms of military training, and has offered to supply small arms on commercial terms. On a different plane it is satisfactory to note the large contribution made by India to the Asian Development Bank, next in size only to that of the USA and Japan.

India's policies towards the region are thus taking more coherent shape under Mrs Gandhi, but we still need to define our long-range objectives so that we can deal with the situation as it may emerge at the end of the fighting in Vietnam. We have also to prepare for the time when China, sooner or later, re-enters the world scene after overcoming the internal crisis set off by the cultural revolution. By that time she will probably have completed developing intermediate range nuclear missiles, giving her a decisive military edge over her neighbours.

Quite clearly, India's interest lies in Asia developing an internal balance of power, resting basically upon the counterpoise of nationalism versus Communist expansionism. This has been India's main argument in favour of a locally negotiated peace in Vietnam in the spirit of the [illegible] for a balance of power in the region, and we need to come to terms with it. Mere incantation of the "hands off Asia" doctrine is not going to do any good.

There is yet another major issue to decide. What is it that India herself is prepared to contribute towards establishing this balance of power? It is obvious that no significant contribution can be expected from India as long as she has to cope with a twofold threat to her security. This calls for examining what way, if any, is open to us to make the security problem more manageable. A judgment on this must depend on which of the two threats is considered more damaging to our long-term national interest so that priorities can be established on a sound basis. Mrs Gandhi and her Government have still to start educating public opinion to make a reasoned choice.

'CRISIS [illegible]

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SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT—I

MOSCOW ASSESSING PEKING'S MOTIVES AND MOVES

From S. NIHAL SINGH

WHILE new border incidents between the Soviet Union and China cannot be ruled out —along the still frozen Ussuri or elsewhere—Moscow is using the present as a time for a breather to assess Peking's motives and intentions. Its recent suggestion for border talks was more for the record than from the conviction that China will agree to come to the conference table on terms put forward by Moscow.

The way the March 2 and later border incidents on the Ussuri have been treated by Moscow provides an insight into the Soviet Union's fears and anxieties. The Soviets beat the Chinese in putting out their version of the initial incident, an action which seems to have been guided by securing a tactical advantage. Then followed a studied silence for a few days.

As Chinese demonstrators besieged the Soviet Embassy in Peking for days on end, Moscow decided it was time to act. An angry Press conference called by the Soviet Foreign Office at short notice coincided with one of the most massive peacetime demonstrations in Moscow—outside the Chinese Embassy. It was followed by an even angrier demonstration the next day. Chinese protests outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking were ridiculed as organized affairs even as neat rows of buses took thousands of Muscovites to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST PEKING

Meanwhile, a fullblown Press campaign against Peking was mounted. The general lines, repeated ad infinitum, were laid down. The border incidents were a pre-planned Chinese "provocation" to serve the purposes of whipping up support for the Mao regime at the 9th Party Congress and a device to distract Chinese people's attention from their allegedly dire straits.

Soviet border guards were glorified and the highest military honours were bestowed on those who took part in the initial Ussuri incident. One report implied shades of hara-kiri. It said: "When I met the wounded in the hospital, V. Zakharov, Pavlov and G. Serebrov returned one cartridge each. When I asked them about these cartridges, the lads replied: 'To be on the safe side, we kept the last cartridge for ourselves'."

Soviet frontiers were invested with an almost religious sanction, the adjective most often used being sacred. There were obvious efforts to induce more settlers to go to the forbidding Soviet Far East; one report suggested there were "warm homes" waiting for new arrivals. At the same time, reports from the area declared that life had resumed its normal rhythm.

Previous attempts at discrediting the Mao regime were taken to a crescendo of vituperation, the most violent of them covered with the figleaf of quotations from foreign sources. The Hongkong Press and Western sources were quoted on China with approval. Almost as an aside, the Soviet Press said it would never confuse the present Chinese leadership with the Chinese people. The nearest thing to asking the Chinese Communists to rebel was an article in the authoritative theoretical journal *Kommunist* saying its latest series for profundities on China was being published to help the Chinese people "regenerate" their Communist Party.

But in spite of the obvious propaganda overtones, there has been an apparent Soviet groping for Chinese intentions. There is concern over the impact of the escalation of border disputes on Soviet foreign policy and its inevitable limiting influence on the Soviet bargaining position with the West, particularly the USA. There are fears of a partial coincidence of interests of China and West Germany, two anti-status-quo Powers on either flank of the Soviet Union.

COUNTING FRIENDS

There is tendency in Moscow to count friends—those prepared to come out on the Soviet side. There is obvious disappointment that India did not fully support the Soviet case. But remarkably few Communist parties have come forward to do so, a phenomenon that can only cause heartburning in Moscow.

The world, at any rate, is a little wiser about the state of Sino-Soviet border relations, with both China and Russia having presented their cases on the Damansky or Chenpao island, the latter rather belatedly in its note of March 29. Border incidents have been a continuing phenomenon since the "early sixties", and Maj-Gen Alexander Anikushin of the Soviet Border Guard troops claims there have been several thousand frontier violations by the Chinese, who have also set up "powerful loudspeakers" to blare quotations from Chairman Mao and "filthy fabrications" about the Soviet Union.

General Anikushin says: "As the Maoist clique whipped up anti-Soviet moods, so did the number of these (border) violations increase and so did they change in character. They began with cattle being driven into Soviet territory and the deliberate emergence of fishermen beyond the frontier line. This was followed by the appearance on Soviet territory of individual servicemen and subsequently of whole units."

On the specific dispute over Damansky or Chenpao island, the main Soviet contention is that Sino-Soviet borders were determined along "natural frontiers" over many years and were legalized by the three treaties which Peking calls unequal. Moreover, in 1861, the Chinese and Russians sanctified a map with the border line curiously passing "directly along the Chinese bank of the Ussuri" in the Damansky district. Further, the Russians say that a new Soviet-Chinese agreement in 1924 annulled inequitable or secret arrangements. And the three treaties of Aigung Tiensin and Peking were not so considered.

The Chinese say that even the unequal treaties had given China Chenpao since the internationally recognized method of demarcating river frontiers is to take the middle point of the main stream. The Chinese backed up their argument with a map showing Damansky or Chenpao as clearly within the Chinese frontier. The Russians say the main treaties are not negotiable but minor adjustments can be made in border talks. And to show to the world that the Soviets are sensibly solving border problems with other States, Tass carried reports on successive days (March 18 and 19) detailing successful border negotiations with Iran and Turkey.

For the outside world, the main interest is not in the specific Sino-Soviet dispute over Damansky or Chenpao, a shrub covered frozen island in a frozen river. It is rather curious how a border area at a certan point can lead China and the Soviet Union to react in the way they have done. It is also significant from what the two sides have to say, that tension along the Sino-Soviet border in recent years has been at a higher pitch than the world had imagined.

SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

Today, the official Soviet Press is talking about Chinese "cartographic aggression" and the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 is being written about for the first time as the "Chinese invasion of India". Logically, a redrawing of the Sino-Indian border in future Soviet maps to conform to Indian arguments should follow. Secondly, there should be a more serious Soviet concern for studying the merits of the Sino-Indian border dispute. To New Delhi's knowledge, the Soviets have made no effort to seek Indian assistance in the past for doing so.

The border crisis has brought to the surface Russian fears about China. Perhaps Moscow has been surprised at China's capacity to limit its foreign policy options at a given moment. Perhaps the crisis, undesirable as it is for Moscow in so many other respects, is not entirely unwelcome for the patriotic fervour it has been able to arouse among the Soviet people—after the misadventure in Czechoslovakia, the enigmatic shots fired at the cavalcade of cars carrying cosmonauts and leaders and pessimistic prophesies about a bad agricultural year due to freak weather.

I can vouchsafe for the fact that the tenor of Soviet Press comments on the border incidents has had the desired effect. An ordinary Russian told me with obvious sincerity: "Mao is a durak (fool). If the Chinese come again, we shall wipe them off."

Whoever started the shooting on the Ussuri, all present evidence points to the conclusion that, except for one benefit the Soviet leadership has secured, China stands to gain more from border tension than the Soviet Union. Peking can put a new hurdle before the much postponed world Communist conference, now scheduled to be held in Moscow in June. It can influence Moscow's actions, both in East Europe and in the West. And, most importantly, it can keep Moscow's foreign policy course off balance at any time of its choosing.

(To be continued)

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increasing emphasis ... on "cash crops" for export: for example, some of the world's finest cotton is grown in Egypt.

MISSION FROM GOD

But since the cultivated land is itself poor by Western standards, there is need of a vast commitment to irrigation and fertilisation. This, in turn, requires an enlightened political climate and the money to go with it. In the political clash between "traditionalists" and "progressives" in the Middle East, the former have, in the past, tended to have the available capital resources but generally lacked the inclination to either distribute the wealth or adequately put it to work to develop the land; the latter have been long on economic theory but short on cash.

And all the while, the destruction of Israel has been almost akin to a mission from God in much of the Arab world. In most countries this seems to mean that economic logic takes somewhat of a back-seat in terms of national priorities. Published costs for military spending, like most statistical information about the Middle East, must be treated with considerable reservation. But what is clear is that the military is well paid (compared nationally ... does to a commendable extent. But the Government's printing presses tend to undermine the true value of its currency, which now is almost certainly overvalued.

The six main Arab States in the Middle East in terms of "confrontation" with Israel—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia—are, in the economic sense, divided into revolutionaries and evolutionaries. Egypt, Syria and, to an extent, Iraq are in the former camp, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan are in the latter. Lebanon, now the established business centre of the Middle East, is a separate case, its main preoccupation being to present to the world a stable political climate in which the Lebanese expertise in the marketing of services can continue to develop.

Egypt: In terms of economics, Egypt's overriding problem is people—far too many of them! The Nasser regime provided political stability to the country over the past decade or so, but the constant threat of nationalisation in its early years made potential overseas investors think twice. Under State control, a vast industrialisation

Continued on page 10

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ARAB-ISRAEL WAR

The Economic Realities

By DOMINICK COYLE

THE Arab "confrontation" of Israel since the Jewish State was proclaimed 19 years ago has dissipated on both sides natural resources and manpower badly needed for the economic development of the general Middle East area; when that "confrontation" goes over the brink—even temporarily—to actual fighting, the economic damage to the region is obviously enormous.

For Israel, continued tension with its Arab neighbours entailed the maintenance of a costly defence establishment, while the boycott and blockade operated by the Arab League interfered with its lines of communication, hampered its trade and commercial relations and blocked the natural outlets for its products and services. For the Arab world, or at least for most member-countries, the state of war with Israel has led in the past to vast sums being spent on defence which might otherwise have gone towards the vitally urgent task of raising the living standards of the people. This collective defence expenditure is partly direct—from oil revenue—and partly indirect—through foreign aid, whether from the Soviet bloc or the West.

UNIQUE ASSET

In the economic sphere, the unique asset of the Arab world is oil. It has already transformed ways of life in areas where it is exploited and brought unexpected wealth to such port terminals as Bahrein, Tripoli, Sidon and Benghazi. Even in those countries without oil, there is always the hope that a significant strike will be made; meanwhile, as is the case with Syria, there is transit revenue from pipeline dues, while Egypt benefits from Suez Canal revenue—apart from itself now being almost self-sufficient in oil. The dependence of the Middle East on oil is, of course, a variable factor from country to country; the 64 million people in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt would have a GNP (gross national product) poorer by some £560-odd million were there no oil interest. Oil revenue represents nine-tenths of GNP in both Kuwait and Qatar, 50 per cent. in Saudi Arabia and just under 30 per cent. in Iraq. In annual per capita terms, it means £680 in extra revenue in Kuwait, £30 in Saudi Arabia, £15 in Iraq and £2 in Syria.

The Middle East picture for agriculture and industry is, of course, less satisfactory and, as with oil deposits, the position changes from one country to another. By far the greater part of the area's land surface is either mountain, desert or swamp, and in total the cultivated land is extremely small—10 per cent. at the most. Despite this, 80 per cent. of the region's population earns a direct living from the land, the chief food crops being, barley and rice in the north and millet, maize and rice in the south. Barley apart, the quality of these crops is indifferent and is mainly for home consumption. However, an [illegible] is being put

with general income levels in the region), a situation arising no doubt from the fact that the army in most Arab countries is nearly identical with the ruling system.

Excluding some 120,000 reservists, Egypt has a full-time army of 200,000 men—against roughly 75,000 in Iraq, 50,000 in Syria, 40,000 in Jordan and about 10,000 in Lebanon. All five countries maintain an air force, while both Egypt and Syria have naval strength. The maintenance of all this fighting potential is a vast payroll in itself; arms and modern equipment are a direct cost on the national economies concerned since, in theory at least, much of the foreign aid revenue currently taking the shape of military hardware could take on the much more useful form of capital equipment for industry or direct finance for the better exploitation of natural resources.

IMMIGRANTS

Israel: In any analysis of the economic position of the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli "confrontation", it seems logical to look first at Israel since, despite its clear military competence, it is the nation permanently in the firing line.

The continuous flow of immigrants (now declining) and the state of war with its neighbours have not only affected Israel's political progress but have also left a deep imprint on its economic conditions and development. The immigration programme entails heavy support costs, while the military situation demands heavy defence spending and a considerable disruption of trade. Yet, despite these difficulties, the country has seen impressive economic growth—without which no progress is possible, whether in Israel, the Arab world, or elsewhere. But this has only been achieved at the cost of continual pressure on Israel's internal and external reserves. In turn, this has led to a severe deficit in its balance of payments and a certain degree of dependence on capital imports such as foreign loans, commercial investments from overseas, reparations and restitution payments—and charitable remittances, especially from Jews in the United States. Not unnaturally, all this has resulted in inflationary tendencies and currency depreciation.

TWO CAMPS

The economy is at present under strain and the 1967-68 budget was aimed partly at relieving some effects of the enforced recession (such as rising unemployment) and partly at curing the uncompetitiveness and high costs which led to it. Current expenditure is being increased only slightly—the outbreak of fighting was, naturally, a post-budgetary happening—while development spending plans provide large sums (mainly from foreign borrowing) for industrial advancement, mining, agriculture and irrigation. A country the size of tiny Israel with its European-minded population in terms of average income, must exploit every available [illegible] resource—as indeed it

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programme has now gone ahead—but never fast enough to keep pace with the 2.7 per cent. population growth. A combination of excessive military spending and overambitious economic development has been financed mainly by foreign aid and international borrowing, the latter having now reached the point where servicing annual interest charges is itself becoming intolerably high—and requiring new borrowing just to pay off old loans and to service long-term ones.

BAD IMPRESSION

After the 1956 Suez campaign, the Egyptians' drive for economic self-sufficiency clearly tried to do too much too quickly. The country's socialist philosophy and Nasser's drive to spread his political gospel to other Arab States has created a bad impression in the West at a time when foreign aid is much harder to obtain and when donor countries (especially the United States) place a high premium on political philosophy.

Syria: With no exploited oil, the Syrians have set about to cultivate their land. In the early 1950's agriculture was quickly expanded through large-scale irrigation projects and considerable mechanisation. But the private enterprise system then widespread in Syria took a knock during the country's three-year (1958-61) link up with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. After 1961 many of the controls were unscrambled—only to be replaced by political uncertainty through a series of Government changes. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had taken an interest in the development of the Syrian economy—starting with a £60 million loan at 2-1/2 per cent. interest in 1957.

Despite its needs, Syria has been very selective in what foreign aid it will accept. Providing transit facilities for Iraqi oil to the sea, it is always anxious to increase its dues revenue—now standing at just under £10 million and representing some 13 per cent. of the total foreign exchange earnings. But lack of capital is holding back many major agricultural developments; it also has, thus far, frustrated the great dream of Syrians to harness the waters of the Euphrates for power.

Iraq: This greatly under-populated country has made impressive economic strides over the past 15 years—financed entirely by oil revenue. But while income per head has more than doubled since 1952, national development programmes have all too often got caught up in internal politics with Government changes leading to economic principles [illegible] ween socialism and [illegible] doctrines. A [illegible] has been [illegible] tion. [illegible] oil [illegible] ption [illegible], des-

pite their skills, has presented vast economic problems. King Hussein has provided the internal political stability which has attracted foreign investment, but the long-term answer to the Jordanian economy demands a vast irrigation programme to bring the great desert areas into cultivation. Jordan has received more foreign aid per head of population (2 million) than any other Arab country—three times more per capita than Egypt.

Saudi Arabia: Economic development in any Western sense came to Saudi Arabia only three years ago when King Feisal took over (forcibly) from his brother, King Saud. Previously, the massive oil revenues were either hoarded or squandered away. Thus, a very late entrant to the Middle East development stakes, Saudi Arabia is now busily trying to catch up—and fast realising that a shortage of educated and trained manpower is massive disadvantage. In the context of the general Middle East region, it thus far seems to have the odds over the Nasserite type of revolutionary approach.—FWF

NEW DELHI, June 13: Starting on August 15, commercial broadcasting by All India Radio is expected to be in full swing by October 15, according to a proposal of the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Commercial advertising will, for the first instance, be accepted from August 15 only for the Vividh Bharti programme beamed to the Bombay region. Films the Bombay, Poona and Nagpur

"Use Tata's ... for day-long ...
Tata's Eau de Cologne ...
NDOZ
ere are no ... And we had some
rds are high. ... brains in the world
for ... Day and night.

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the Muslim emirs ... stility to non-Muslim politans was the largest single disruptive factor in Nigerian politics.

DAUNTING TASK

Col Gowon now faces a daunting political task in his own region—that of retaining the leadership of the North (which will probably conserve the name Nigeria) in spite of being a Methodist and a member of none of the North's great power-tribes, the Fulani, the Hausa and the Kanuri.

Tribal nationalism in Nigeria is stronger, on the whole, than the "Nigerian nationalism" which brought independence, and it is one of the lessons of the era that the chances of national unity in an African country are largely in proportion to the degree of Westernization of the leadership. An African assimilated to French or British society could think of himself as being Senegalese or Kenyan: his less Westernized compatriot remained only a Wolof or a Kipsigis. Because the Belgians "assimilated" so few Africans, there are few genuine "Congolese". In Nigeria, a man who speaks only Hausa can hardly think of himself as belonging to the same nation as a Yoruba.

In diplomacy, the Arab countries will throw support to the predominantly Muslim rump of the Nigerian federation, but Israel can be expected to recognize all Southern secession States. Since the reconquest of these States is scarcely feasible, it would seem in the West's and the Commonwealth's interests to recognize the facts of life and offer—perhaps through the U.N.—to help create a "common market" headquarters, perhaps in Lagos, maintaining the vast customs-free consumer market, the present common services, the currency and common economic planning: the aim should be new frontiers as friendly and informal as those between Canada and the USA.

NO SOLUTION


By encouraging the well-meaning Col Gowon on his present forlorn course, present Western policies seem only to be contributing to the intra-Nigerian acrimony and economic breakdown. It is in nobody's interest, Nigerian or foreign, that the North should be stranded with its soaring pyramids of nuts or the South with its unexported oil.

Even if compromise is achieved between the former Nigerian federal States, other problems will remain. Litigation on State borders will be more acute when these become international frontiers. The Yoruba population of Ilorin—now part of the North—will be among many irredentists. Poor, frustrated, English-speaking West Kamerun may well be to oil-rich Biafra: but C kwu may negotiate co-ope from French-speaking Kame by agreeing not to encourage "join Biafra" movement in Kamerun's "English" province.

The task of holding the Nigerian common market together may well preclude any ambitious economic integration with Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia, the other former British West African colonies: but these smaller countries may well link up more easily if they do not have to consider the Nigerian giant, and a hopeful first step may be taken soon by combining their airlines and tourism secretariats.

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NIGERIA MAY EXPECT FURTHER SECESSIONS

From RUSSELL WARREN HOWE

BIAFRA'S declaration of independence, inevitab ever since the "anti-Ibo" Nigerian coup of July, 196 offers Western and Commonwealth Powers an opportu ity for imaginative diplomacy.

It is not only important that the former Eastern Nigeria should be helped to avoid an economically and politically costly period in international purgatory, but that everything should be done to preserve economic links with the rest of Nigeria and to re-establish working ties with Western and Northern Nigerians.

Col Yakubu Gowon, the titular head of the crumbling Nigerian federation, has threatened military action against Biafra and effected further blockade measures. The major Powers have supported him, and international business awaits a Government lead from Washington, London, The Hague and elsewhere before using Biafran ports. More than ordinary trade is involved: Nigeria is already the world's 10th largest oil producer; both Biafran oil and some of the oil from the still-federated Mid-West State is exported through Biafran ports.

Fortunately, Nigeria is almost certainly incapable of civil war. The non-Biafran rump of the 10,000-man Nigerian Forces (perhaps 7,000 soldiers, four or five tiny ships and the mini-est of air forces) could never fight a "Vietnam" in the Biafran forests, where every hand would be turned against it. Nor can Biafran forces do more than repel invaders.

GOING WEST

The next political development in Nigeria will presumably be the secession of the former Western State, which will probably be called Yoruba and will almost certainly include the federal enclave of Lagos—tribally, a Yoruba city. The Mid-West State might just agree to join the West, but more probably it will declare its own independence, either as a republic or a kingdom, and take the historic name of its capital Benin.

In an eleventh-hour move to save the federation, Col Gowon, a Northerner himself, created new federated States—in particular dividing Col Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu's Eastern State into three. This was presumably intended to face Col Ojukwu with a secessionist problem of his own: small East-groups have sought for capital, by the capable forme federal Minister, Mr Mathe Mbu, Ogoja's best-known polit ician. The new so-called River State, rich in modern oil dis coveries and old memories o being (a century ago) the rich est trading zone in all Africa is more genuinely secessionist.

This Niger and Cross River delta area will be a great test o Col Ojukwu's statesmanship. Hi own tribe, the inland Ibos, out number all other Biafran tribes Enugu is their city and Ibos occupy most of the top jobs in the new nation. Col Ojukwu's task will be to override opposition from some of the entrenched Ibo leadership and give at least their fair share of top Biafran posts to the Ijaws and Ibibios, insular peoples by nature and by habitat.

TOP-HEAVY STATE

Transforming Nigeria into a federation, a few years before independence, was a Nigerian idea, but Britain must take historic responsibility for agreeing to a system which gave tribalism sovereign form—and for the federation's top-heavy shape, which left the North with 52 per cent of the population and about the same share of power, while contributing little economically, and almost nothing in terms of skill to a country which is largely poor and intensely difficult to govern. A federation whose States cut boldly through tribal lines might have worked: what Nigeria got was a sort of Lebanon-Israel-Cyprus federation.

The threat to break up Nigeria always came from the Northern leaders, particularly the late Northern Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, assassinated 17 months ago. It is an irony of history that what looks like happening is a series of Southern secessions, leaving the North as the only "un-seceded" State, and faced with the problem of how to export the world's largest peanut crop—600,000 tons—if it remains without access to the principal Biafran harbour, Port Harcourt.

It is similarly ironic that all that may remain of Gowon's new-States move will be the six that he created in his own Northern region—a step which will break some of [illegible]

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Melukote Collecti

DELHI, JULY 9, 1967

LIGHT IN WEST ASIA

PRESSURE of events has created shifts in Arab and Israeli positions which may have marked already the beginning of the end of the present impasse. No longer are the Arabs demanding, or indeed expecting if one reads between the lines of what Mr Mahmud Fawzi, the UAR Vice-Premier, is now saying, that the Israelis must unconditionally withdraw from all areas they have conquered without the Arabs mitigating any of the causes of last month's war. The pressures which the conquest itself let loose upon the Arabs have been reinforced by Russia's obvious unwillingness to stick its neck out too far to help those who cannot help themselves, by the determination which Israel shows not to sell away the fruits of its victory cheaply, by the failure of the non-aligned effort at the U.N. which revealed rather more the weakness than the strength of India's uncompromising anti-Israeli stand. Nor has Israel shown itself to be impervious to shifts. The advice of friends may have changed it or the loss of their sympathy because of its harshness in victory, but it is no longer as adamant as a few weeks ago in demanding the right to retain all its gains.

The ingredients of a dialogue have thus begun to take shape. Mr Fawzi now talks of Arab willingness to recognize Israel if the latter ends its "aggression" and takes Arab refugees from Israel back. Neither condition forecloses a compromise from which, given a stabler environment, a settlement may flow. The word "aggression" violates the law as well as facts: the Arabs have been in a declared state of war with Israel for years and cannot complain if the consequences of belligerency become unpleasant; they were, as once they proclaimed and even now do not deny, as poised and determined to annihilate Israel as the latter to survive, and willingly would have been the first to strike if they had not been forestalled. But since ending the "aggression" amounts now to no more than Israeli withdrawals, a reasonable settlement may secure them for the Arabs more easily than renewal of hostilities. Similarly, the right of the refugees to return to their homes—whether a plebiscite, such as Mr Fawzi suggests, is the best way of determining who are the refugees and who wishes to go back may be debatable—is as unquestionable in legal as in human terms and Israel cannot deny it. It may at best ask for financial assistance, and other countries should be willing to help since the cost to them would be less than an unending and possibly escalating war's would have been. In urging the "commonsense course that "all together, with everybody around without exclusion" should work out a settlement, Mr Fawzi proposes no more than the negotiations which Israel also demands; the main difference, that Israel would like the negotiations to be only with the Arabs, is not an unsurmountable hurdle. Nor are Tel-Aviv's latest views about the conquered territories impossible to discuss. "Free access to the Holy places of Jerusalem, free navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula" are not, as terms, a hopeless starting point for negotiations and compromise.

But by as much as these shifts improve the chances of a settlement, they add to the regret that the war should have broken out at all over issues which could have been foreseen to be negotiable. Differences of this kind become causes of war only when one side resolves that the destruction of the other, not protection of its own rights, is its true aim. The Arabs had quite clearly convinced themselves that such was their aim, being encouraged in this by the memory of Israel's own folly eleven years ago, by the reckless manoeuvres of Big Power politics, by the irresponsible jingoists of the PLA, by the magic of the rhetoric of President Nasser and the failure of his "friends"—the loudest among them being India—to urge him towards wiser courses. Should Mr Chagla be inclined to learn from experience—little in his behaviour suggests that he is—he would see now where the folly of diplomacy of screaming had led him and the country. The right tone for this diplomacy was set by Mrs Gandhi when she addressed the Congress Parliamentary Party on May 21 about the rising crisis in West Asia. Thereafter the vehemence of Mr Chagla took over and at every step we failed to urge restraint upon the Arabs. We not only recognized but encouraged the exercise of their right, ruinous for them and others though it was to become later, to close the Gulf of Aqaba and push UNEF out.

we did even in the heyday of Mr Krishna Menon, the chance of manoeuvring constructively and applying the healing touch when opportunity offered. This is only folly, not non-alignment or the service of either principles or enlightened self-interest.

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INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

"OUR NEIGHBOUR PAKISTAN": By B. G. Verghese, Yusuf Meherally Centre, Bombay-1. Price Rs. 3/-.

This is a reproduction in book-form of a series of thoughtful articles originally written by the author in the *Times of India* on India-Pakistan relations, after a visit to both wings of Pakistan more than a year ago. Some additions and revisions became necessary in the light of the upheaval during this year. The author's approach is that ignorance lies at the root of much of the conflict between the peoples of the two countries: to fill this gap, he has given detailed descriptions in a number of chapters of the progress made by Pakistan, East and West, in agriculture, industry and general economic development.

The progressive forces at work in Pakistan, which the author claims to have observed in the course of his tour, he would commend to India's attention and support in its own long-term interests. The challenging question in his view is, "whether the price each country is paying for standing firm against the other is greater or less than what would have to be paid for an honourable and equitable settlement". From India's standpoint he is convinced that "the status quo is costing us considerably in human, political, diplomatic and economic terms."

The author is aware of the implications of Muslim nationalism preached in Pakistan sometimes with a dangerous fervour. Nevertheless, he cherishes the hope that it may in course of time, "with education and modernity", learn to distinguish between religion and politics, even though Islam may continue to be the established faith.

Against the background of the Rann of Kutch dispute and the more recent tragic fighting between India and Pakistan, the author discusses future relations between the two countries, undeterred by these happenings. A search for a solution of the problems which keep the two countries apart he would not abandon or even delay, even if they appear to be "complex, the suspicions deep, and the irritations numerous". Piercing through the crust of bitterness, so obvious at the present moment, he earnestly pleads that "each country must consciously assist rather than needlessly embarrass the other for each desperately needs the other's friendship."

Deserving of wide endorsement is his conclusion that "as friends and partners, closely bound together by such future ties as joint defence, a customs union and joint planning, the 600 million people of this sub-continent could better serve their own interest as well as that of Asia and the world".

It is refreshing to come across a sane, wise and forward looking analysis of India-Pakistan problems by one of our most competent journalists.

B. Shiva Rao.

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INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS: A COMMON MAN'S VIEW: By D. S. Marathe (Booksellers Publishing Co., Poona-2, Rs. 3).

"India and her Neighbours" expresses the disillusionment felt by many people with the foreign policy which failed to avert the Chinese attack on India. Mr. Marathe is not alone in proclaiming that we have not been realistic on the question of putting our national interest first and joining hands with the Western powers against Communist aggression. To him non-alignment is a failure and *Panchshila* is *mumbo jumbo*. Yet in his chapters on India's relations with Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Malaysia, etc., he does not favour a politics of power. No country can think solely of its own interests. It has to reconcile them with those of its neighbours. It is precisely this that our policy tried to do.

Our foreign policy was framed in the context of the decolonisation of Asia that followed the second world war. The countries that had broken free of Western imperialism naturally wished to see Asian countries deciding their own future, without getting involved in the struggle between the Great Powers. Alignment would mean joining alliances that were relevant to non-Asian disputes. Even alliances within Asia would mean the formation of mutually hostile groups that would ultimately come to blows. Unfortunately, two of the leading powers of Asia made such alliances: China with Russia and Japan with the U.S. The long-term interests of Asia would be served if these Asian powers were fully independent and operated through the Security Council of the United Nations. It is ironical that just when Indians like Mr. Marathe are attacking non-alignment, China and Japan are moving towards it, and Russia and the United States are also ready to get rid of their Asian commitments.

The Chinese exposed India's military weakness in the Himalayas just as in the second world war, Japan surprised the defenders of Singapore by attacking through the jungle. The Chinese move appears to have been made because of their suspicion of India's designs on Tibet, following the Dalai Lama's flight to India. (It will be recalled that the Panch Shila pact was signed with China after talks on Tibet). The revolt in Tibet, like the smaller rebellions in Sinkiang, led the Chinese to hostile action against India and Russia. The consequence has been a drawing together of these two countries and the weakening of the Sino-Russian pact. The smaller nations of Asia like Pakistan and Indonesia, who dislike India's role in Asia, have made haste to court Peking. The real issue is whether the long-term goal of India's policy is right or wrong, not whether non-alignment and *panch shila* have paid immediate dividends. Until the U.N. Security Council becomes really representative and capable of keeping the peace, there has to be a stable balance of power in Asia and this can happen only if there is genuine understanding between India, Japan, China, Russia and America and the *panch shila* doctrine of non-interference and respect for territorial sovereignty is observed by the Asian countries themselves. Ten years ago, it seemed that India was guiding other countries towards this goal, but to-day the picture is very different. Yet even while we rearm and seek outside assistance, the goal outlined at Bandung has to be kept in view.

J.B.A.

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CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1958-62 : By Vidya Prakash Dutt, Asia Publishing House, Bombay-1, Rs. 25.

Prof. Vidya Prakash Dutt of the School of International Studies at Delhi is well qualified to write a survey of Chinese foreign policy, since he has spent several years in China and learned the language. After sketching the domestic background in China just before 1958, Dr. Dutt has arranged his material into chapters on Chinese policy towards the United States, the Soviet Union, Asia and Africa. In the epilogue to the book, however, Dr. Dutt says that while at present the Chinese are directing their struggle against four countries in the world, the USSR, Yugoslavia, the U.S.A. and India there are signs that the struggle against the first two will intensify while that against the U.S. and India may diminish.

This is a rather strange prediction since the Chinese still list their enemies as "the imperialists, the modern revisionists and the reactionaries". For "imperialists" read the Americans, the revisionists are the Russians and Yugoslavs while the "reactionaries" are India and Japan. Chinese policies, both at home and abroad, have been marked by violent somersaults. Up to 1958, Russia was the big brother who supplied China with modern weapons, hundreds of modern factories and plants, and educated thousands of young Chinese in Russian Universities. The quarrel with Moscow flared up in 1959 and has gained strength, the Chinese having found that the Russians were not prepared to back them in the conflict with the United States or even in the attack on India in 1962.

Dr. Dutt frequently points out that Mao Tse-tung is anxious to establish China as a Great Power, but Mao seems to have hoped that Russia's superiority in big missile technology coupled with Chinese manpower could force the U.S.A. to back down. When he found that the Russians were not prepared for this or even to concede Chinese supremacy in Asia, he started the polemic which still continues, his aim now being to mobilise the underdeveloped world against the advanced countries with China as the leader of the latter. But the United States remains the main enemy, not only because it maintains a rival regime in Formosa but also because it stands for a democratic order which would prove fatal to the Communists if it gained popularity in China. We should remember that many of the leading scholars and scientists were educated in America or attended American colleges in China. There is a large educated middle class in the country, many of whom believe that American ideas and technique will help China more than the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung. Though China has certainly made a splash in Asia and Africa and Latin America, Dr. Dutt points out that Chinese diplomacy suffers from limited knowledge of the outside world. The Chinese have spent enormous sums (in relation to their capacity) in aid and propaganda, but they can scarcely hope to compete with the U.S. or Russia. It is therefore not surprising that they are stressing the need for the self-reliance of developing nations. Indonesia has taken this advice seriously and is sinking into a bog of inflation and poverty.

Though Dr. Dutt does not discuss the question, it is clear from his recent statements that Mao is greatly concerned at the fate of his regime, once he is out of the picture. China has seriously weakened herself by her attempts at Great Power status, and the successors of Mao will face the kind of problem that the successors of Stalin faced in Russia.

J.B.A.

ANCIENT INDIA'S CONTACTS

INDIA'S CONTACT WITH THE WORLD IN THE PRE-BRITISH PERIOD: By K. M. Panikkar. Published by the Nagpur University, Nagpur, Rs. 3.50.

This is a reprint of Sardar Panikkar's lectures on "India's Impact on the Ancient World," "India's contact with the Far East and South-East Asia", and "India's Impact on Western Asia and Europe in the Middle Ages," delivered in 1963 under the auspices of the Nagpur University in the Mahadeo Hari Wathodkar Lecture series. In the first of these lectures he deals with India's contact with China, Babylon, Greece and Rome in ancient times. The second outlines India's contact with South-East Asia and the Far East, leading to the spread of Hindu influences in these regions, while the third shows how Indian works on astronomy, mathematics and medicine spread in the Islamic Empire which extended from the Hindu Kush to Spain during the Middle Ages.

Dr. Panikkar presents the all-too-brief account in his characteristically lucid style. Though he is tempted to generalise occasionally on the basis of insufficient data, he deserves to be remembered as one of the very few Indian writers who have produced readable books on the History of India. An index and a Bibliography could have been provided by the publishers.

K. K. Pillay.

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...EN IN LAOS—II

...AO NUMBER ONE TROUBLE SPOT

...ld War Manoeuvres

By M. SIVARAM

...e unique ... that is ... Laos. After ... Malaya, ... I found it neither ... spectacular, in terms ... devastation.

... today is Asia's number ... spot. Its name is being ... bated breath behind ... doors of the world's ... They have turned ... landlocked kingdom into ... ground for cold war ...

...ders, now in power at ... tell You that what goes ... country is a life and ... They claim that it ... between the forces of ... Communism, that ... depends the sur... as an independent ...

...ders accuse the Soviet ... "aggression" in Laos, ... communist-led North ... are actively en... fighting the Royal Laos ... Plain de Jars.

...tian leaders, fighting ... regime, deny the ... Communist ... They insist that their ... struggle against corru... ... places in the Vientiane ... to ensure peace and ... the country.

...ge Against U.S.

...rge the United States ... ...nds with armed inter... ... Laos. They claim that ... ...ctives is to save Laos ...American plot to turn it ...tary base.

...hon people of Laos tell ... ...tragedy that is over... ...r country. They remind ...os has had little inter... ...for well over twenty ...ough they have always ...violence and bloodshed. ... you the bullet-ridden ...long the main streets of ... They tell you of friends ...es, innocent men and ...o died in the three-day ...ght of the ... last ...

...n, they sigh: When will ...ce? When will the Inter... ...commission come to Laos? ... military experts at ... take a dim view of the ...in Laos. According to ... a phoney war—the pho... ...oney wars. They point ...Laotians, by nature, dis... ...that they are more at ... their pipe than with ... They are certain that ...e has its heart in the ... their normal strategy is ...cisions through ...

...[illegible] ... to fire more shells in the air ... to create enough noise, or eight days ... the opponents [illegible]

A well-informed ... observer told me: "I have ... to see a grim-faced Laotian soldier in action. It is all mainly sound and fury, except at the operational conferences at headquarters and at the press briefings in the capital."

According to this observer, the three-day Battle for Vientiane was unique in military annals. For all the shells fire and mortar bombs that rocked the city, the military casualties were almost negligible—15 killed and about 65 wounded. Civilian casualties, on the other hand numbered about 200 killed and 700 wounded. The damage to buildings and property was considerable.

This observer said that he had seen armoured cars racing along the streets, with troops at the front raining shells right and left, while their comrades in the rear sat sipping beer and playing the pipe. Never has so much ammunition been used to so little purpose in any armed conflict, he added.

Strange Campaign

It is a strange campaign even at the "major" battle fronts. The usual line, adopted by both sides, is to inform the "enemy" in advance about an impending attack. The enemy retreats promptly and the battle is won amidst the thunder of gunfire all round. The "enemy" returns the courtesy the next day and the ding-dong battle goes on almost interminably. The main casualties are the villagers in the neighbourhood and the buffaloes in the fields.

This is no reflection on the Laotian fighting material. The average soldier's attitude towards the fighting is conditioned not only by his innate hatred for bloodshed but also by the confused leadership that has thrown him into the war. The soldiers to whom I spoke knew what the fighting was all about. Many wanted to get out of it and go home early but found themselves helpless. They, too, made anxious enquiries about the "Indian Commission", which is the [illegible] by [illegible] the International Control and Supervisory Commission is known among the common people in Laos.

Yet the battle goes on. Arms supply and other forms of assistance to the warring factions, by the United States on the one side and Soviet Russia on the other, have made the situation more complex than ever before. Big Power intervention has thwarted all moves to arrest the dangerous drift in Laos.

The Vientiane regime and its American supporters are impatient. Even the introduction of artillery has not speeded up the operations. With Captain Kong Le acquiring Soviet artillery, the balance has been restored on the main battle front in the Plain of Jars. Intense guerilla warfare by the Pathet Lao forces has slowed down troop movements and supplies along the highway. Major-General Boun Leut, smart young commander-in-chief in charge of the operational command at Luang Prabang, told me that his main problem was to maintain the supply lines against the increasing Pathet Lao ambushes along the highway between Vientiane and Muong Kassy.

The Strategy

According to Kong Lae's associates at Xieng Khoang, whom I met in Pnom Penh last week, the battle for the Plain of Jars was "going according to plan." Their strategy seemed to be to draw the Vientiane Government forces as far away as possible from their supply bases and then annihilate them in a series of hit-and-run assaults.

The position is that, while the Vientiane regime holds the towns in central and southern Laos and the roadside villages in these regions, the Pathet Lao and the Kong Lae forces are in control of the entire northern Laos, in addition to numerous "pockets" throughout the country. The Vientiane Government has staked its future on the battle for the Plain of Jars. But nobody in Vientiane or Luang Prabang believes that a permanent victory is possible. The only certainty seems to be that the fighting will become more intense than hitherto, with the resultant increase in devastation in the Laotian countryside.

The plain fact is that a military settlement is impossible in Laos. In some respects, the war in Laos is similar to the Malayan campaign against Communist insurgents. But there are major differences.

In Malaya, the rebels were largely Chinese city-dwellers who were easily identified in their jungle hideouts. In Laos, there is no way of distinguishing between Pathet Lao elements and other Laotians. Malaya had an efficient administration, good roads and railways, a strong police force and a first class army under able generals. Laos has none of these. The Malayan insurgents had only the jungles to escape into, besides the well guarded exit to Thailand, whereas Pathet Lao forces can run across the border into Burma, China and North Vietnam, or cross the Mekong to the province of Sayaburi.

Many Complications

There was no foreign intervention in Malaya, whereas East-West pressures and cold war intrigue have created far too many complications in Laos. It was the Vientiane regime's move to bring about a military settlement with massive foreign aid, that led to the present crucial phase in the Laotian civil war.

Laos is strategically located in the mountainous hinter-land of the Indo-China Peninsula. With its long frontier with Communist China and North Vietnam in the north and east and an equally long border with pro-West Thailand in the west, Laos is a buffer between two conflicting ideologies. Each of the power blocs feels that Laos is being built by the other as a bastion against it.

The survival of Laos as an independent country, therefore, can be assured only by the maintenance of internal peace and by adopting a policy of strict neutrality and non-alignment with the Big Power blocs. The General Agreement of 1954 had stipulated this. It was confirmed in the Vientiane Agreement of 1957. It was the violation of these agreements that precipitated the present crisis.

It is futile to try and fix the responsibility for it. But it is vital that something is done promptly to stop the fighting and to check the flow of alien war material into the country.

The only alternative to the present chaos and confusion in Laos is a political settlement, with some form of international action to prevent a major flare-up. This calls for a measure of national reconciliation and a tacit agreement between the

(Turn to Page 7, Col. 2)

Asia's Number One Trouble Spot

(From Page 6, Col. 8)

Big Power blocs to suspend their manoeuvres in Laos. Today, however, the gods seem to be very much against any such accord.

Two Govts.

Laos claims to have two "governments", one at Vientiane which has the backing of the United States, Thailand and South Vietnam and the other at Xieng Khoung in the north, supported by the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam. Neutral Cambodia in the South still "recognises" the latter.

A compromise between the contestants for power in Laos might have been possible. But today the chances are meagre. The gulf between them has widened. Unwittingly or otherwise, they have now firmly aligned themselves to the conflicting sides in the global cold war.

The deadlock is complete. Even an uneasy truce is now beyond sight.

Is Laos heading for a permanent partition on ideological lines? Or, will the cold war powers force an unwanted war on the peace-loving people of Laos?

And what is the guarantee that it will be a war waged on strictly Laotian lines?

(To Be Concluded)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Think It Over . . .

One of the chief objects of medicine is to save us from the natural consequences of our vices and follies.

—H. L. MENCKEN.

Laos Cease-fire

REPORTS of Soviet Russia stepping up the air-lift of supplies to the Pathet Lao, of the United States poised for similar countervailing action, of delay in the signing of the International Control Commission's report to the Geneva Conference Chairmen (Britain and Soviet Russia) was the none-too-bright prospect for Laos on May 1. In the meanwhile King Savang Vatthana opposed the proposal for an international conference on Laos as it would be a reflection on the nation. Prince Norodom Sihanauk of Cambodia withdrew his sponsorship of the 14-nation conference on the future of the neighbouring kingdom, and his proposal for a meeting of the contending Laos factions in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, to negotiate a cease-fire. It was an altogether dismal picture, with Soviet Russia insisting that the Control Commission should not go to Laos before the cease-fire.

This picture was transformed overnight by agreement in Delhi between Canada, Poland and India on the report to be submitted to the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954. It was immediately despatched to London and Moscow and the Control Commission is all set to leave for Laos on the receipt of instructions from the co-chairmen. Only the response was lacking to appeal for a cease-fire issued by Britain and Russia six days earlier. The Pathet Lao radio on May 2, appealed to all its fighting units in Laos to cease fire. A crisis has thus been averted and the stage is set for the negotiations.

There can be no question of going back on the proposal for a 14-nation conference despite the belated objection raised by King Savang Vatthana. He had every opportunity to raise his objection earlier as he has been King of Laos since October 1959, when his fahter King Sisavong Vong abdicated in his favour. That King Savang Vatthana should have waited till death of his father to lodge his protest against an international commission deciding the future of Laos suggests that the old king had a decisive voice on all crucial questions even after his abdication.

Whatever the reason for the belated protest, the danger should be obvious to King Savang Vatthana of re-opening the entire question on grounds of national prestige when national survival is at stake. The cease-fire and the Control Commission proceeding to Laos without delay and assuming its supervisory functions are but the beginning of the consideration of the future of Laos.

Every development since 1954 has served only to emphasise the point that Laos cannot solve its own problems. Admittedly these problems arise from the interest amounting to interference by external powers on the two sides. Premier Souvanna Phouma's decision to dispense with the good offices of the International Control Commission was, to put it mildly, somewhat premature, and it is the steady deterioration of the situation since which has necessitated going back all the way to an international conference and to the reimposition of supervision.

The fate of Laos hangs very much in the balance and if it can at all be retrieved by the negotiations which are shortly to be initiated, the lawfully constituted authority will do well not merely to agree but to insist that the Supervisory Commission should remain in control for a long time after a neutral Laos has been established. The authority concerned should consider itself lucky if it is given the opportunity to insist on this condition being fulfilled.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



Digitized by Siddhanta eGangotri Gyaan Melukote College

TALKS ON LAOS

(From Page 1, Col. 7)

capitals of the other delegations from the war-torn kingdom.

In Vientiane, the royal Laotian Government made the surprise proposal today after the return of the negotiators from the Na Mone peace talks that it was ready to have all Laotian political parties seated at the Geneva conference.

But, in apparent contradiction of this statement, the acting leader of the Royal Laotian delegation here announced his group would not attend the conference if the Pathet Lao and the "neutralist" group were admitted on an equal footing.

An American source said the USA still did not think the Pathet Lao should get equality, but was going in for the arrangement to avoid "wrecking" the conference even before it began.

Informed U.S. sources said President Kennedy himself "reluctantly" gave the go-ahead signal.

The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, informed Lord Home of the gesture.

Tomorrow's session will not be just a formal opening ceremony as originally planned, but will plunge straight into substantive discussions.

In Washington the State Department charged today that the pro-Communist forces in Laos are continuing to attack the anti-Communist Meo hill tribesmen behind Communist lines in violation of the cease-fire. Attacks were reported on Sunday.

The State Department spokesman, Mr. Lincoln White, said he understood that the Royal Laotian Government has asked the International Control Commission (ICC) to investigate this continued military action. He said he did not know what the ICC's response or action has been.

Mr. White also said the Soviet airlift of arms to the Pathet Lao forces is continuing.

Conference sources said they thought that even if the rightwing Laotian Government delegation boycotted, it, the conference would still go ahead.

Guerillas 'Active' In Laos

WASHINGTON, May 16 (Reuter — Pro-Communist guerillas are continuing their attacks on Meo tribesmen in Laos, a State Department spokesman said yesterday.

He said he understood the Royal Laotian Government had asked the International Control Commission to look into the clashes as a breach of the cease-fire.

The Soviet airlift of arms and supplies to the rebels from Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam, was continuing. It had fluctuated, but the rate of arms flow at present was "about normal, perhaps slightly below normal".

'SUBSTANTIAL' AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

LONDON, May 16 (Reuter).—Mr. Joseph Godber, Foreign Under-Secretary, said yesterday the South Vietnamese army had had some successes against the Communist guerrillas in the past month but the security situation was "precarious".

He was replying in the House of Commons to Mr. Arthur Henderson (Labour) who asked for a statement on the present situation in South Vietnam and on the extent to which foreign military aid was being given to both sides in the civil war.

Mr. Godber added:—

"The legal Government of South Vietnam receives substantial economic assistance, including defence support from the U.S.

"There is no reasonable doubt that the Communist rebels receive direction and help from the North and that many of the rebels are trained in North Vietnam and infiltrated into southern territory by both land and sea."

LAOS PARTITION PLAN

(From Page 1, Col. 3)

ment of a neutral Laos, which would be preferred by far over any partition suggestion. This is why American sources decline to get into discussion of such an alternative plan.

A key figure due here by air from New Delhi today is Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, India's Defence Minister, who will lead his country's delegation to the conference.

When the conference opens the U.S. and Communist Chinese foreign ministers will be confronting each other at the negotiating table for the first time since the 1954 Indo-China meeting.

GROMYKO'S MEETINGS

A Soviet spokesman said here yesterday that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, held meetings yesterday afternoon with leaders of the Chinese, Polish and North Vietnamese delegation to the 14-nation conference on Laos.

Asked who the Russians thought should represent Laos at the conference table, he replied "this is an internal question. It would be preferable to have only one group representing the three parties- but it is for the people of Laos to decide."

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia would after all attend the conference, a British foreign office spokesman said in London yesterday, adds Reuter.

The Prince was expected to reach Geneva next Tuesday, he added.

Prince Noredom took this decision following an appeal to him by King Savang Vatthana of Laos to carry out his "generous idea" for arranging a guarantee by the great powers for a truly neutral Laos."

The King issued this appeal in a speech from the throne delivered at a session of the Laotian national assembly, in Vientiane yesterday.

King Savang Vatthana also expressed satisfaction that the three-power Commission, "whose neutrality and impartiality we never doubted" had returned to Laos

Phouma's Nephew Assassinated

VIENTIANE, May 11 (Reuter).—An unknown gunman assassinated Major Tiao Ekarat, nephew of the neutralist ex-Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, last night just outside Vientiane, on the road to Wattay airport.

Major Ekarat, who worked in the Planning Department of the Ministry of Defence, was peppered by 13 bullets from a sub-machine-gun, it is reported.


Major Ekarat was assassinated while driving his car between Vientiane and the city's airport, AFP adds.

It was not known whether the motive for the killing was political or simply criminal. The car was stopped by an unidentified man who fired several shots from a revolver killing Tiao immediately.

FIGHTING REPORTED

PEKING, May 12 (AFP).—The "New China" News Agency, in a dispatch from Hanoi, today reported some recent fighting in Laos despite the proclaimed cease-fire.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.



Institute, Melukote Collection

E FACTO" CEASE-FIRE IS IN FORCE

Laos Body Report To Co-Chairmen

SEN SATISFIED OVER TALKS WITH REBELS

GENEVA, May 12.

THE International Commission for Control and Supervision in Laos has reported to the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva conference that there is a "de facto" cease-fire in force in the kingdom.

The commission, consisting of India (chairman), Canada and Poland, has returned to Vientiane from a visit to Xien Khouang, headquarters of the Pathet Lao forces, and conferring with the former Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. Samar Sen, Chairman of the Commission, told newsmen in Vientiane last night that he was satisfied with the results of his talks with Prince Souvanna and Prince Souphanavong, the Pathet Lao leader.

Following the receipt of the commission's report the fourteen-nation conference, the start of which hung in the balance, is expected to get into stride late this afternoon.

According to INS-UPI, Britain and the U.S. refused to agree to open the conference until the commission had certified that the Laotian truce was effective.

A few hours before the opening of the conference, official sources disclosed U.S. plans to present a double-barrelled programme to the conference to guarantee Laos' neutrality and police it against foreign intervention.

The sources said the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, was ready to demand firm agreement by China, the Soviet Union, and all other conference participants to respect the neutrality of the next Laotian Government, and the creation of "machinery" to alert the world if any of the signatory countries tried intervention.

INITIAL SESSIONS

But U.S. officials said the initial session of the meeting would probably be confined to formalities, with the hard work of the conference put off until Monday.

Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, met last night to work out final procedural arrangements. Mr. Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, conferred with his advisers. Lord Home and Mr. Gromyko, are expected to confer again today before the opening of the conference.

Mr. Gromyko and Lord Home decided that they would alternate as chairman of the conference, with Mr. Gromyko presiding over the opening session.

They also discussed the question of Laotian representation, but came to no conclusion. Three Laotian delegations, representing the Boun Oum Government, the rebels and the neutralists, will be here.

AFP adds: The one big central issue of the Laos conference, in the opinion of the Americans, is the actual content of the motion of neutrality for Laos. The Soviet Premier, Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, has argued for an Austrian-type neutrality for Laos, an idea Western nations could endorse, but whether the various governments mean the same thing by the term was the big question.

A public declaration of neutrality by the Laotian Government and by participants in the conference would presumably be the basis, but the international machinery to guarantee it might be a major subject of negotiation, along with some way of controlling arms shipments in the view of Americans.

PARTITION PLAN

Reports of the consideration of a plan for eventual partition of Laos along the lines of Vietnam were not confirmed in American circles. It was not entirely ruled out as a possibility however.

The present goal is the achieve-

(Turn to Page 7, Col. 3)

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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THE ARMED FORCES

Laos—The Pathetic Neutral

By Our Military Correspondent

ways happenings in Laos e an instructive commen- number of military the- are a pointer to the which military alliances in times of stress and the "staffer" gives the fighter. They also sug- military bases, even dodged from their high are quite a going con- Third wars erupt. They al- how a small state be- drawn in the game of tics, and what tactics ers employ in order to r wars.

the happenings are al- entary on the famed neutrality. "Neutral" rather in demand these UNO, its offshoots and and many say they have sumed the status of a But, if one remem- who was a neutral state Out of the French there came into be- Viet-nam (Communist), m (pro-West), and and Laos, both neutrals. ther did Laos become China regarded it as to S.E. Asia. America ld be "a cork in the ent communism could Within Laos leader- ngly, and while help sought from one or side, there were also of neutrality. Now Russia are fighting a mimia- thousands of miles away homelands, because they to be neutral! Next time demand for neutral state ear test ban committee etariat, Laos will be a candidate.

ed Leadership

e neutral, falls within ction of SEATO Treaty udes Australia, Britain, w Zealand, Pakistan, nes, Thailand and the ates. Last month the mbers did their first apparently their last. and decided to warn ist intervention in Laos. g was sleepy and stale. esitated and prevari- as in Korea, they did want to fight and they eserved in wanting the ear the brunt. The peared but a frail ver- he NATO, having a fat ble of skimpy perfor- that will happen to mili- in a major war is yet but so far they have the enthusiasm for con- limited conflagra- which is the spearhead has found in Thailand for mounting its assault. ritory there have come an supply depots and re- pair workshops for helicopters. The American maritime battalions aboard a task force in the Gulf of Siam were a link in the American military moves from homeland to Thailand. When Mr. Khrushchev said that bases had become useless he was obviously thinking in terms of big weapons such as guided missiles and nuclear bombs. "If it comes to war", said he to Mr. Lippmann "we shall only use the biggest weapons". But Laos is no theatre for big weapons, Mr. Khrushchev did not use any and yet he was fighting a war. Laotian war is a war of guerrillas, fought with old style weapons and primitive technique, and a country such as the USA or Russia, situated thousands of miles away, could not fight it without forward bases.

Foreign Intervention

Many are inclined to believe that reports of foreign intervention in Laos are exaggerated. But facts are emerging and it is obvious that Laos has been trampled upon by outsiders in a big way.

Military aid has filtered into the country from the north for months. Nearly 50 tons of war material has poured into it everyday by planes, and additional equipment by trucks through the tortuous mountain passes. There have been dumped into it 85 mm and 100 mm guns, armoured cars, ammunition and fuel, and also skilled military leadership and communist fanaticism.

On the American side military move have taken place reminiscent of the days of Pacific War. The Seventh Fleet converged on South East Asia, with its carriers and cruisers and 70,000 men. It was backed by the entire United States Pacific Fleet, of 400 ships and 3200 planes. In Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines the bomber and fighter units were alerted, and in Laos the American engineering and guerrilla battalions were already operating.

What kind of a neutral is Laos? Among the neutrals, or one-time neutrals, of the last war there were Turkey, Finland, Sweeden and Spain; and a writer has described them respectively as neutral ally, fighting neutral, armed neutral and unneutral neutral. Laos can only be descried as a pathetic neutral.

* * *

In the stormy defence debate in the last session of Parliament, the opposition asked for an inquiry into defence. The demand was that the Parliament appoint an enquiry committee or, alternatively, the President as supreme commander should set up an enquiry committee under the chairmanship either of the Vice-President or a person of equal status. The demand was rejected out of hand.

Enquiry is a term of unpleasant connotations, which presumes that there is guilt and there are the guilty. Under the existing climate nobody is prepared to admit wrong or charge the old-guard with bungling. Indeed, some may even suggest that the Opposition bleat is rigged up around the personality of Defence Minister. But few will deny that Indian defence affairs need a judicious look-in.

Defence has been the subject of probe in more than one country in the post-war period. Five or six years ago Britain scrutinised her defence posture and thereby formulated a new strategy and a new weapon system and introduced changes in the structure of military high command. Not everything then presumed or decided was correct, but that is what happens to every dynamic body: it needs constant vigilance and periodic rectification. At present Britain is conducting a review of her Intelligence system and has for this purpose appointed a high-level body. But, shrewdly enough, she calls it a "review", not an inquiry.

If inquiry has an odious slant, "review" should be considered. If we do not wish to utilise the President's position as supreme commander and also wish to keep out the Parliament at present, an independent body could be appointed to report on the prevailing national strategy, adequacy of the strength of forces and their weapons, defence structure and organisation, and the psychological climate pervading the defence services. Times indeed have changed and are changing fast.

Experts will of course not be excluded from such a body. Equally, it should not be that such a body should be composed only of experts. The fact is that such experts already exist, and are decently paid, in the Services HQs and Ministry of Defence, but if at crucial junctures defence is not what it should be, hide-bound brass alone could not be considered enough.

Co-ordination

Imagine specialists from Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence, joined by those at Service Headquarters reviewing the intelligence system, as Americans and the British are doing. They will say the system lends itself to perfect co-ordination, which it doesn't. They will not say that their Directorates consist of personnel neither intelligent, nor versed in intelligence. Deficiencies in their instruments will not be noticed. And they will prove that the Chinese occupation of Indian territory unnoticed for years is normal.

It will do the country, and Mr. Menon, a lot of good if defence is pulled out of the specialists' corridors for a while and given the fresh air of common sense.

Boun Oum May Soon Be Ousted

WASHINGTON, May 12 (Reuter).

A BELIEF among some foreign diplomats in Washington that the Government of Prince Boun Oum may soon be deposed by the National Assembly was reported here yesterday.

Paul Ward, the 'Baltimore Sun's diplomatic correspondent, quoted foreign diplomats possessing specialised lines of communication with Vientiane for the view that Prince Boun might be replaced by Prince Souvanna Phouma, the neutralist leader.

The deplomats were quoted as saying that they knew King Savang Vathana, who has summoned Parliament into session, was determined not to initiate a move to Prince Souvanna's restoration as Prime Minister.

But, they asserted, there is reason to believe that he will not resist a demand for Prince Souvanna's restoration if it originates in the National Assembly and has majority support there," Ward stated.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

Research Institute, Melukote Collection

CHAOS IN LAOS

DELHI, DECEMBER 11, 1960

Laos is fast becoming a classic example of a small country distracted by the machinations of more powerful ones. Left to themselves, its politicians might repeatedly quarrel but might also come together again in one of the face-saving compromises familiar in that part of the world. "Successful negotiations" between a delegation of the National Assembly and the Right-wing Revolutionary Committee were in fact announced early this month; a coalition Government was to be formed. The immediate result was violence in Vientiane by crowds with Leftist sympathies, and an intensification of the three-cornered civil war; the coalition seems to have made no progress. The clue to the riddle is the variety of warlike supplies suddenly at the disposal of the Leftist and Rightist contenders. Helicopters, heavy armament and the rest were not provided out of the country's own resources.

Foreign supporters of the embattled factions have not bothered to conceal their stake in the struggle. In November Thailand's Premier spoke of the threat to peace "because Communists are about to take possession of Laos". Later that month the U.S. Government warned Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government in much the same sense. A Peking statement of November 20, while incidentally denouncing "crude intervention by U.S. imperialism", made no bones about Communist China's interest in the outcome. The pro-Communist Pathet Lao have obtained their arms through China's friends in North Viet Nam, the Right-wing champion, General Nosavan, gets his through Thailand and South Viet Nam. The General's supporters are fighting the Pathet Lao outside the dynastic capital of Luang Prabang and the pro-Government neutralist forces outside the administrative capital, Vientiane. There also seem to be smaller affrays within the bigger ones.

Vientiane has just experienced two military "coups" by its own defenders in 24 hours, although Prince Souvanna Phouma chose to dignify the first as "a demonstration of loyalty". The two groups concerned wear respectively red and white armbands but not apparently in memory of England's Wars of the Roses. Last year the U.N., if only by holding a debate, was able to do something to restore a semblance of short-lived harmony. Preoccupied with its unhappy experience in the Congo, it is unlikely to have time for the unfortunate Laotians. Nor does there seem any use in reconvening the International Control Commission under the 1954 agreement. In Viet Nam this is largely ineffective because sometimes divided in opinion and often receiving insufficient co-operation, while interpretation of the agreement is not always uniform. The prospect in Laos therefore is instability with no group in secure control.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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Think It Over . . .

Mental activity is easy if it doesn't have to conform to reality.—MARCEL PROUST.

The Losing Game In Laos

A CEASEFIRE is no peace. This is particularly true of Laos which has passed from conflict to ceasefire, a truce and an agreement and back again into conflict. There have been two distinct phases through which the kingdom of Laos has passed since the Geneva agreement of 1954, which left the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly in Pathet Lao hands.

The Communist Pathet Lao in the north and the Royal Laotian Government and even the armed forces were merged. It looked good as well as true, until the trial of strength began between the Pathet Lao and the southern factions. From sharp rivalry to dominate the neutral Souvanna Phouma regime, it developed into open conflict, with external support which saw in it an opportunity to gamble for all of Laos. As the struggle showed signs of becoming long-drawn-out and relentless, thoughts of calling the whole thing off gained ground.

Active interest in a ceasefire under the supervision of the International Control Commission began in the first week of March and the actual Anglo-Soviet call for a ceasefire was made in the last week of April. Running neck-and-neck with the desire to end the conflict has been the calculation of stalling to gain just a little ground or vantage.

This and the far from comforting thought that all have yet to sit round a table, that there will be hard bargaining when they do, and the possibility already envisaged of there being two Laoses, do not augur well for any basis of East-West understanding. It is still the same old pattern of staking claims, enveloping border regions in "cold war" confusion and drawing them into the vortex of conflict, ceasefire, division and dismemberment. In this pattern of embroilment relieved by temporary truces the constant motif is that whatever goes behind the "iron curtain" passes into the Communist sphere irrevocably.

This is an inevitable process inherent in the disposition of forces. There is the Communist force with a single overall overriding purpose. The freedom offered by Communism is the freedom of conforming to the essential Communist pattern which never varies though it may grow larger in size. The democratic force does not impose a pattern. It is based on a kind of local option to adapt it to the traditional, geographical and political requirements as well as to evolve it into a different pattern. Option to adapt and to change is the essential principle of democracy. It is when this option is exercised in favour of Communism that the right to change is lost.

It is, in short, an unequal disposition of forces in which the resultant will always favour Communism. Hence the advantage to Communism of dividing Laos. The disadvantage to the West is that the loss of much more than half of Laos is involved, namely, the reaffirmation of the principle that Communism has only gains—no losses.

It is a heads-I-win tails-you-lose proposition, the willingness to entertain which is characteristic of democracy. Communism will not entertain any such proposition even for a moment.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri

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IN TURBULENT LAOS

Big Powers Eye Small Kingdom

From A Correspondent

THE Kingdom of Laos achieved complete sovereignty by the Paris agreements of December 29, 1954—a sequel to the earlier general agreement which called for the dissolution of French Indo-China and the creation of the States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Various conditions, in part economic and geographic, have made the country highly vulnerable to Communist penetration. The Kingdom is one of the least developed and most sparsely populated areas in the Far East with fewer than two million inhabitants occupying its 91,500 square miles.

Like many other countries of South and South-East Asia, Laos has jungle-clad, mountainous border areas that afford cover for Communist infiltrators from Communist China in the north and Communist North Vietnam in the north-east and east.

The two northern-most provinces—Sam Neua and Phong Saly—are both bordered on three sides by Communist territory. These provinces have long been strongholds of the Pathet Lao Communist movement and armed forces.

The Communist infested provinces flank Luang Prabang province, with its royal capital of the same name, seat of the royal Government and residence of King Savang Vatthana. The administrative capital, Vientiane, lies much further south on the Mekong river, which also marks part of the Laos boundary with Thailand.

U.S. Aid

When the Royal Laos Government (RLG) in accordance with the Geneva agreement assumed full responsibility for its own defence, its economic and financial resources were insufficient to support even minimal security forces. The Geneva agreement authorized the introduction into Laos of military equipment "necessary for the defence" of the Kingdom and the R.L.G. therefore requested financial assistance from the United States.

Under the terms of agreements between the R.L.G. and the U.S., dated July 6 and 8, 1955, the U.S. expanded the scope of aid furnished through the earlier economic co-operation agreement.

By the end of 1960 the economic, financial, and military aid provided by the U.S. totalled approximately $300 million (a large part of it allocated to budgetary support of the Lao army, police, and certain government services. In addition to the military assistance programme, U.S. technical assistance has been provided in the fields of Agriculture, health, education, power and transport facilities.

In addition to its Communist guerillas operating in purged border areas the Pathet Lao has long maintained organized contingents in the two northern provinces, which receive training and arms from Communist North Vietnam. The Pathet Lao, itself was established in 1950, virtually as an offshoot of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Previous to the Geneva agreement of July 1954, the Pathet Lao joined with the Viet Minh—the military arm of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (D.R.V.)—in the insurrection against French rule. In 1953 troops of both groups penetrated deep into Sam Neua province, where the Pathet Lao set up a Communist "Government".

No Pathet Lao Move

The Geneva agreement, operative in principle through the International Commission for supervision and Control (ICSC), called for the abolition of the Pathet Lao armed forces as such and t[illegible] into the royal ar[illegible] Pathet Lao and [illegible] Communist P[illegible] while publi[illegible] to the [illegible] dish[illegible] ICSC [illegible] rights o[illegible] establish [illegible] northern p[illegible]



The shaded portion in this map shows Laos with its provincial boundaries. Vientaine is the administrative capital, and Luang Prabang, the Royal residence city.

that this be accomplished "without further delay".

The R.L.G. in compliance with the decision of the ICSC, had offered the Pathet Lao half the civil offices in the two provinces in question as early as April 1955. But the Pathet Lao made no move to accept the offer until November 1957.

Meanwhile, in January 1956, the Pathet Lao set up a "Laotian patriotic front—the Neo Lao Hak Xat, or N.L.H.X., a political counterpart of the then illegal Pathet Lao—which was given legal status by the royal government.

Prince Souvanna Phouma, who first served as Premier from 1954 to 1958, held a conference on November 12, 1957, with his half-brother, the so-called "Red Prince", in Vientiane. A military agreement signed on that date, provided for the integration of Pathet Lao forces into the royal army. Although 1,500 troops were integrated, only part of the total equipment of the Pathet Lao contingents was surrendered.

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Anti-Red Steps

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Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri.

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IN TURBULENT LAOS

Big Powers Eye Small Kingdom

From A Correspondent

THE Kingdom of Laos achieved complete sovereignty by the Paris agreements of December 29, 1954—a sequel to the earlier General agreement which called for the dissolution of French Indo-China and the creation of the States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Various conditions, in part economic and geographic, have made the country highly vulnerable to Communist penetration. The Kingdom is one of the least developed and most sparsely populated areas in the Far East with fewer than two million inhabitants occupying its 91,500 square miles.

Like many other countries of South and South-East Asia, Laos has jungle-clad, mountainous border areas that afford cover for Communist infiltrators from Communist China in the north and Communist North Vietnam in the north-east and east.

The two northern-most provinces—Sam Neua and Phong Saly—are both bordered on three sides by Communist territory. These provinces have long been strongholds of the Pathet Lao Communist movement and armed forces.

The Communist infested provinces flank Luang Prabang province, with its royal capital of the same name, seat of the royal Government and residence of King Savang Vatthana. The administrative capital, Vientiane, lies much further south on the Mekong river, which also marks part of the Laos boundary with Thailand.

U.S. Aid

When the Royal Laos Government (RLG) in accordance with the Geneva agreement assumed full responsibility for its own defence, its economic and financial resources were insufficient to support even minimal security forces. The Geneva agreement authorized the introduction into Laos of military equipment "necessary for the defence" of the Kingdom and the R.L.G. therefore requested financial assistance from the United States.

Under the terms of agreements between the R.L.G. and the U.S., dated July 6 and 8, 1955, the U.S. expanded the scope of aid furnished through the earlier economic co-operation agreement.

By the end of 1960 the economic, financial, and military aid provided by the U.S. totalled approximately $300 million (a large part of it allocated to budgetary support of the Lao army, police, and certain government services. In addition to the military assistance programme, U.S. technical assistance has been provided in the fields of Agriculture, health, education, power and transport facilities.


In addition to its Communist guerillas operating in purged border areas the Pathet Lao has long maintained organized contingents in the two northern provinces, which receive training and arms from Communist North Vietnam. The Pathet Lao, itself was established in 1950 virtually as an offshoot of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Previous to the Geneva agreement of July 1954, the Pathet Lao joined with the Viet Minh—the military arm of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (D.R.V.)—in the insurrection against French rule. In 1953 troops of both groups penetrated deep into Sam Neua province, where the Pathet Lao set up a Communist "Government".

No Pathet Lao Move

The Geneva agreement, operative in principle through the International Commission for supervision and Control (ICSC), called for the abolition of the Pathet Lao armed forces as such and their integration into the royal army. In 1955, the Pathet Lao and its leader, pro-Communist Prince Souphanouvong, while publicly professing adherence to the Geneva agreement, did not disband its forces and boycotted the elections held in August 1955.

The ICSC on January 7, 1956, notified the R.L.G. and the Pathet Lao that the terms of the Geneva agreement with respect to effective R.L.G. control of the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly and Pathet Lao forces stationed there, had not been implemented. The [illegible] reaffirmed the "Sovereign[illegible] the royal government to [illegible] administration in the [illegible] provinces," and urged that this be accomplished "without further delay".



The shaded portion in this map shows Laos with its provincial boundaries. Vientaine is the administrative capital, and Luang Prabang, the Royal residence city.

The R.L.G. in compliance with the decision of the ICSC, had offered the Pathet Lao half the civil offices in the two provinces in question as early as April 1955. But the Pathet Lao made no move to accept the offer until November 1957.

Meanwhile, in January 1956, the Pathet Lao set up a "Laotian patriotic front—the Neo Lao Hak Xat, or N.L.H.X., a political counterpart of the then illegal Pathet Lao—which was given legal status by the royal government.

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A coalition cabinet, installed on November 18, 1957, included Prince Souphanouvong and one other NLHX leader. Souphanouvong pledged the allegiance of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces to the King and assured the delivery to the royal government of the "Administrative Organisations", troops, officials, and all weapons and equipment of the Pathet Lao. Despite this public gesture by the Prince, no such arrangements were ever consummated.

Lack Of Planning

During the ensuing months [illegible] balance was maintained [illegible] the Premier's majority [illegible] and the two NLHX re[illegible] in the cabinet—[illegible] Souphanouvong and Phouni [illegible] strategic position [illegible] with two cabinet [illegible] the party to form a "popular front" with the leftist Santiphap and Democratic parties—a situation greatly to the advantage of the Communists in the supplementary elections of May 4, 1958.

These elections were called in order to raise the membership in the national assembly from 38 to 59 deputies. Lack of planning and cohesion on the part of the non-Communist groups enabled the Communist bloc to win 40 per cent of the popular vote.

Awakened to the Communist threat, the two principal non-communist parties—the Nationalists and Independents—on June 12, 1958, combined as the Laotian People's Rally (L.P.R.). Its leaders included Premier Souvanna Phouma and Phoui Sananikone, author of the LPR's political creed—neutralism strongly keyed to anti-communism.

Anti-Red Steps

At this time, also a non-party group was formed, calling itself the Committee for the Defence of the National Interests (CDNI) which supported the LPR programme but with emphasis on youth appeal.

With the mandate of the International Commission fully implemented by the royal government and ostensibly complied with by the Pathet Lao, the ICSC on July 19, adjourned sine die. The seating of 21 additional Deputies, based on the special elections in May, was validated by the National Assembly on July 22. The Assembly was then composed of 39 non-communist deputies and 21 supporters of the NLHX bloc.

In accordance with the Laos constitutional processes, Premier Souvanna Phouma submitted the resignation of himself and his cabinet, and a government headed by Phoui Sananikone was formed, consisting mainly of members of the LPR and

(Turn to Page 9, Col. 4)

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IN TURBULENT LAOS

(Form Page 6, Col. 5)

CDNI but none from the NLHX.

On January 14, 1959, the national assembly granted special powers to the Premier for a period of 12 months and gave him authority to revamp his cabinet. This reorganization, ten days later, increased the cabinet to 26 members, including most of the previous 10 members.

By January 1959, the anti-communist measures taken by the royal government, including an increase in border patrols along the Laos-North Vietnam boundary, had aroused the Vietminh regime in Hanoi. As clashes of opposing patrols occurred along the frontier, the Hanoi radio began a campaign of violent denunciation against the RLG in Vientiane.

However, the first substantiated report of an incursion into Laotian territory by Vietminh military elements, on January 5, 1959, did not come from the northern provinces but far to the south, at a point just above the 17th parallel—the demarcation line between Communist North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam (South).

By January 1959, it had become apparent to the Royal Laos Government (RLG) that the Pathet Lao's sponsor, the Communist North Vietnam regime, was intent on aggressive action, mainly in the form of border incidents and forays by communist bands.

In May 1959, Premier Sananikone decided to attempt a settlement of the issue of his Government's control of Pathet Lao forces, as called for by the Geneva agreement of 1954. The Pathet Lao battalions, based in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, were ordered to accept "new ranks" in the national army, with a deadline of May 12, 1959. When the communists failed to obey, the royal army demanded that they surrender or be considered mutinous.

By the end of August 1959, the many-pronged communist offensive threatened both the royal capital of Luang Prabang and the administrative capital, Vientiane. On September 4, the royal government appealed to the U.N. for assistance in preserving its security and sovereignty. As a result, the U.N. Security Council sent a fact-finding sub-committee to Vientiane with instructions to weigh evidence of foreign intervention.

Before the committee arrived in Laos, however, Vietminh military units and heavy weapons were withdrawn from the country, and the 2nd Pathet Lao battalion retreated to its former base in North Vietnam. Thus, by the time the U.N. committee began its investigation, proof of North Vietnamese complicity in the rebellion was inconclusive, though evidence of Vietminh tactical guidance and support was not lacking.

On June 5, a Government was formed under Premier Tiao Somsanith, which was heavily weighted in favour of the militantly anti-communist SDP. This was the government overthrown on August 9, 1960, by leftist captain Kong Le, commander of a Paratroop battalion in Vientiane. The announced purpose of Kong Le's coup was to restore neutralism and negotiate a peace with the Communists.

Three weeks after the coup, Prince Souvanna Phouma again became Premier and immediately proclaimed a policy of neutralism between the contending groups—the NLHX on one hand and, on the other, the strongly anti-communist opposition of General Phoumi Novasan, whose forces were based at Savannakhet on the Mekong river.

Situation Deteriorates ..

During the ten weeks following the Kong Le coup the situation in Laos underwent progressive deterioration as Souvanna Phouma sought in vain to reconcile the warring factions. At the beginning of October 1960, delegations representing the Souvanna Phouma regime and the Pathet Lao initiated a series of "peace" talks in Vientiane. On November 18, the conferees issued a joint statement announcing that a coalition government would be formed to include Pathet Lao representatives, but no date has set for this action.

The communique also announced that a "new and clear ceasefire must be issued." In addition, according to a broadcast from Vientaine, Peking and Hanoi would send "good will missions" to Laos to exchange views on economics and culture.

Meanwhile, the Pathet Lao moved to consolidate its hold on Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces and also infiltrated Vientiane. At the same time, General Phoumi regrouped his forces near Savannakhet where another member of the royal family—Prince Boun Oum Na Champassk—was in residence.

On December 8, the anti-communist cause was further strengthened by the announced adherence of the Lao army Commander in Vientiane to General Phoumi. On the following day, the Kong Le force re-entered the capital while Premier Souvanna Phouma, faced by an armed conflict within the city, abandoned his ministerial post and fled to Cambodia with all but four members of his cabinet.

Complete chaos in administration ensued. On December 10, a six-man military junta assumed control after Souvanna Phouma had delegated his authority to the army. During this, leftist Minister of Information Olsena who had flown to Hanoi, returned on December 11, with promise of communist military aid. Therewith, the junta invested him with civil and military powers equivalent to a de facto Premiership. Within hours, self-styled "premier" Quinim ordered the integration in Vientiane of Kong Le's paratroopers and Pathet Lao armed elements. As the pro-communist forces prepared to meet those of General Phoumi, the promised Soviet arms arrived, including mortors and howitzers which were airlifted from Hanoi and deployed along the city's perimeter.

December 13, marked the end of the shadowy pretensions of the Quinim dictatorship. On that day, 38 deputies of the National Assembly passed a vote of censure against the Souvanna Government, and King Savang Vatthana issued the first of two royal ordinances covering the constitutional aspects of the situation.

Royal ordinance 282, of December 13, dismissed the Souvanna Phouma regime and delegated the powers of the Government to the committee of Savannakhet, headed by Prince Boun Oum. On December 14, the King in a second royal ordinance accepted the cabinet presented by the Prince.

During the battle for Vientiane, December 13-16 1960, Soviet airlifts continued without intermission and they persisted after the Pathet Lao and pro-communist rebels retreated from the capital northward.

Meanwhile, various proposals were advanced for ending the civil war. U.S. President John F. Kennedy in his state of the union message on January 30, 1961, summed up the U.S. position as regards Laos.

"We seek in Laos", said the President, "what we seek in all Asia and, indeed, in all the world—freedom for the people and independence for their Government. This nation shall preserve in our pursuit of these objectives".

On February 19, King Savang Vatthana proclaimed a policy of complete neutrality for his kingdom and proposed the establishment of a commission made up of his neutral neighbours—Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya—to stop the fighting. The plan was immediately denounced by Moscow and Peking. Moscow's newspaper Pravda on February 23 called for a revival of the international commission for supervision and control (ICSC), set up under the Geneva Agreement in 1954 and dissolved in July 1958.

US President Kennedy reaffirmed the U.S. desire for a neutral and independent Laos when he said at a press conference on March 23 that "if in the past there has been any possible ground for misunderstanding of our desire for a truly-neutral Laos, there should be none now."

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Courtesy: Lao Heritage and KS Mobi, Digit

SOVIET REACTION TO U.K. PLAN 'GOOD'

Moscow Talks On Laos

WASHINGTON, Apr 7.—The Soviet Foreign Ministry's reaction to the British plan on Laos has been "quite good", according to reports reaching here from Moscow, says Reuter.

Sir Frank Roberts, the British Ambassador in Moscow, met Soviet Foreign Ministry officials on Wednesday, when the Russians advanced several minor suggestions, it was stated. But these issues were expected to be settled soon.

The date of the proposed 14-nation conference on Laos is under review in Washington. A meeting towards the end of April or early May is envisaged.

The conference would probably take place at Foreign Ministers' level, at least at the start, with other experts taking over later.

Diplomatic sources in London said yesterday that the proposed international conference on Laos was most likely to take place at Geneva.

In view of its neutral atmosphere and unsurpassed facilities, Geneva remains one of the most acceptable cities of the world for an international conference, the sources said.

A decision for Geneva would have the logical basis that the new conference will in some respects continue the work of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indo-China which ended the eight-year war there.

MOSCOW TALKS

Meanwhile, a Foreign Office spokesman said in London yesterday that Britain and the Soviet Union have now got down to discussing in detail the arrangements for securing peace in Laos.

He was speaking after receipt of a report here from Sir Frank Roberts on his talk on Wednesday with a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Pushkin.

The spokesman said Britain and the Soviet Union were in the stage of discussing drafts of documents setting out the peace procedure.

The tone of the Anglo-Soviet exchanges was described in official circles as encouraging. But it was understood that the Soviet Union has not yet committed itself to the British view that a cease-fire in Laos must precede an international conference.

Britain and the Soviet Union have been acting in their protracted contacts in Moscow as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference which negotiated peace in the States of Indo-China. Sir Frank Roberts was expected to have further talks at the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

He and Mr Pushkin are believed to have discussed three draft documents handed over by Britain.

1. A draft joint appeal for a cease-fire.

2. A draft message to Mr Nehru, asking him to revive the International Supervisory Commission for Laos. India is Chairman of the Commission, the other members being Canada and Poland.

3. A draft invitation to 12 other countries to come to an early conference on Laos, as suggested by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia.

The feeling in diplomatic circles in London was that the Anglo-Soviet contacts were being drawn out because the Russians were not finding it easy to secure immediate Chinese consent.

Mr Krishna Menon said in London yesterday that Britain had been "working hard" on the Laotian crisis.

He said: "It looks better now that Russia, America and Britain are making progress. This idea of real neutrality seems a good one."

Mr Menon was passing through London airport on his way from New York to Delhi after leading the Indian delegation to the U.N.

A reliable source in Vientiane told Reuter yesterday that the Laotian Cabinet was prepared to begin cease-fire talks with Left-wing Pathet Lao insurgents immediately. He added the Government was willing to give the order for a cease-fire as soon as a similar order was given by Pathet Lao.

Hitherto, the Government has maintained that a cease-fire could only follow the withdrawal from Laos, under the supervision of the International Control Commission.

On Wednesday a declaration by the Defence Minister, General Phoumi Nosavan, that his forces were "ready to cease the fighting as soon as the order is given" was intended to be the first overture to the rebels following the break-down of last month's talks at Phnom Penh with the former Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the source said.

The General, in an interview with the official Lao Press agency, said: "I am authorized by my Government to declare. . . . we are still ready to meet any Lao leader with a view to settling the problem by the formation of a representative Government of national unity."

General Phoumi's statement has been broadcast at frequent intervals over the Laos Radio in the past 24 hours.

The same source said that if Pathet Lao reaction to the General's statement proved favourable, the Government would be prepared to send an envoy to begin negotiations for an immediate truce even before the arrival of the International Control Commission representatives.

RELEASED AMERICAN IN HONGKONG

HONGKONG, Apr 6.—Mr Robert McCann, the 60-year-old Tientsin business man released by the Chinese Government after serving nine years of a 15-year sentence imposed in 1951 for alleged illegal currency deals, arrived here today with his wife, says AFP.

Mr McCann, who is seriously ill, was released after an appeal by his wife who was given a visa to enter China to see him.

Mr McCann is not leaving for Manila en route to the USA immediately as scheduled.

His doctors are uncertain as to when his physical condition would permit him to travel by air.

Mr McCann has been admitted to hospital.

Funding: Tattva Heritage and IKS-MoE. Digitization: eGangotri



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POLITICAL COMMENTARY

LAOS AS A TEST CASE

By Our Special Representative

MR Krishna Menon, who will represent India at the 14-nation Geneva Conference, and others in Delhi who have for long worked in various ways for a settlement of the problem of Laos must keep their fingers crossed. Even though the fighting in the small kingdom has more or less stopped, their efforts to restore lasting peace there and immunize the region against big Power conflict may yet encounter many serious hurdles.

As a result of the personal contacts among world statesmen and diplomatic moves in a number of capitals during the past few weeks, the view which has generally emerged is that Laos' salvation lies in an Austrian type neutrality under which the conflicting big Powers withdraw their personnel, stop arms aid to the local factions and guarantee the area's neutrality. Mr Nehru, Mr Khrushchev and Mr Dean Rusk have already indicated their support for the idea and apparently this will form the basis of the deliberations in Geneva.

Significantly, however, China, which is deeply interested in the question of Laos, has studiously avoided endorsing this move. Any assurance of neutrality for Laos, whatever the model, to which Peking is not a party cannot for obvious reasons be an effective and lasting solution. Marshal Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, with a reputation for sternness and obstinacy, who is representing his country at Geneva, may not display the same measure of reasonableness and spirit of accommodation that his senior colleague, Mr Chou En-lai, did seven years ago and which largely contributed to the success of the earlier Geneva Conference.

Even if it is possible to evolve a constitutional pattern acceptable to all parties, difficulties may arise over the composition of a coalition Government. The present Premier, Prince Boun Oum, is unacceptable to the Communist bloc which supports Prince Souvanna Phouma. But will the USA be able to overcome its misgivings regarding the latter's neutrality? To many, the Prince appears to lean perceptibly to the Left.

In his endeavour to reconcile the different attitudes, Mr Krishna Menon will have to move with considerable speed because, as is strongly felt in New Delhi, a long time-gap between a cease-fire and a political settlement may lead to highly undesirable consequences. As has often been demonstrated in different parts of the world, wherever cessation of hostilities is not followed soon by a political agreement, the cease-fire has virtually developed into partition.

Quite apart from its impact on the South Asian region, the deliberations at Geneva may offer some glimpses into the inner tensions of the Communist bloc. Since they developed their ideological differences, t[illegible] is the first time that the Soviet Union and China are sitting round a table with the Western Powers. In 1954, China was unquestionably the junior member of the bloc but it has since acquired much power, influence and arrogance. It should be interesting to watch how they act when they are in full view of their ideological adversaries and to what extent the Soviet Union succeeds in retaining the leadership of the group.

*

WHILE he spoke with firmness against communalism, in his address to the Congress Parliamentary Party on Wednesday, Mr Nehru made no specific reference to the recent controversial move for a ban against communal parties. If the Prime Minister refrained from referring to an issue which has agitated many in his party it is not because public memory of the Jabalpur riots is daily growing fainter and as such the subject has lost some of its urgency but because there is growing realization among senior leaders that the proposed ban, though seemingly desirable, is perhaps not the ideal solution of the problem.

On the basis of a voluminous note drafted by the Law Ministry and the Cabinet Secretariat, the Government discussed the subject at some length recently. The Home Ministry has now been directed to report on certain aspects of it while the Election Commission has been asked to state whether under the election law it can effectively discourage the recognized political parties from acting along communal lines. The issue is thus obviously alive and the Government is expected to take a decision soon. Nevertheless, the indications at present are that support for the move is not as enthusiastic as some time ago.

Not many among those who ardently plead for legal action against communalism probably realize that under the Constitution no ban can be imposed on a communal organization, howsoever narrow its outlook and blatant its methods, without infringing the provisions assuring freedom of association as a fundamental right.

Parliament may, however, enact a law under which it would be possible for the Government to curb communal bodies but such a law will have to be of a general nature, a sort of a "Preventive Detention Act for Parties" and not specifically directed against communal bodies. Whether the challenge posed by the Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh is serious enough to justify delegation of such wide powers to the Executive is a matter which must be studied dispassionately and with care.

Political parties have been banned in the past. The Congress itself has often faced such orders. But after a ban every time the party only added to its appeal and following. It has been argued at a fairly high level in the Congress Party that unlike the Congress, the existing communal parties do not have the stamina and basic strength to withstand a ban. If this assessment of the communal bodies' strength is correct, it may be all the more reason why Congressmen should not seek elaborate legal measures but try to fight them ideologically.

*

A FEW days ago when members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha left their chambers and met jointly in the high-domed Central Hall of Parliament House for an animated debate on the Dowry Prohibition Bill, for some of us in the Press gallery the occasion revived nostalgic memories of the time when the Constituent Assembly used to meet there.

Once every year, MPs assembl[illegible] in the Hall to hear the Presi[illegible]dent inaugurate the Budge[illegible] session. Sometimes they als[illegible] meet to welcome a visiting VI[illegible] but it was only now with all th[illegible] excitement and lobbying ove[illegible] amendments, series of forcefu[illegible] speeches and frequent interrup[illegible]tions that something like th[illegible] atmosphere which prevaile[illegible] over a decade ago was re-creat[illegible]ed.

The recent years in India have been a period of such rapid transition that it seems ages since Dr Rajendra Prasad occupied the canopied chair in the Hall, regulating the proceedings with firmness and courtesy while Sir B. N. Rau, Constitutoinal Adviser, sat by his side occasionally whispering advice. Almost daily political and intellectual stalwarts like Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, Pandit Pant, Dr Ambedkar, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee—none of them with us any more—fought fierce wordy battles.

Besides these top national leaders, there were others who attended to their task of framing the Constitution with refreshing vigour and enthusiasm. There was Mr Alladi Krishnaswami, physically so infirm that he had to be carried everytime to the microphone but mentally remarkably alert and agile, Professor K. T. Shah, who almost wrote an alternative Constitution, and Mr Nazir-ud-Din Ahmed from West Bengal who never let even a misplaced punctuation mark in the draft go unchallenged.

The country's leaders, intellectuals and political workers, fresh from the struggle for independence and in a buoyant mood, were assembled there applying themselves to the task of framing the fabric of a new nation. Watching them at work, one inevitably experienced what might be described as a sense of history.

RIGHT OF LAOS TO NEUTRALITY

(From Page 1, Col. 2)

vanna Phouma, the self-exiled neutralist Prime Minister, that a tripartite conference be held today between representatives of Pathet Lao, the left-wing and the right-wing Governments at Na Mon, near Vang Vieng.

He said he believed "the problem of Laos must be settled in the first place by the Laotian people themselves and for this a conference of the parties concerned must be called at once".

He called on all countries concerned to do their best to see that the 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos is held as scheduled on May 12.

In Bangkok, Mr. Luang Vichit Vathakarn, the Thai Prime Minister's executive secretary, told reporters today that a coalition government in Laos including the Communists was much better than a divided Laos.

He said Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, should not and could not be ignored. If left out of a Laotian Government, he would set up his own Government and this would mean partition.

Mr. Vathakarn said he believed the 14-nation conference on Laos would not be held in Geneva on May 12 as scheduled. The Laotians had expressed the wish to settle their own problems by themselves and it would be much better to leave them alone.

Mr. Averell Harriman, roving U.S. Ambassador, also arrived here this morning from Phnom Penh and called on Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat.

At a press conference here before his departure, Mr. Harriman said the purpose of meeting the Prime Minister was to know the Thai approach to the problems in this area so that he could report to President Kennedy.

Mr. Harriman said he had a brief talk with Prince Souvanna Phouma at Phnom Penh this morning before leaving for Bangkok.

In reply to a question he said Prince Souvanna did not indicate to him when he would return to Laos.

He also said he did not know of any plan by the Prince to visit Washington.

Referring to the cease-fire in Laos Mr. Harriman said it was good news but not the end and only the beginning of a series of steps and negotiations in order to achieve a truly neutral Laos similar in status to Austria. It should be a truly neutral country in which Communist activities and outside interference should not be tolerated.

NO FOREIGN HAND

There was no question that at present the Pathet Lao was being supported by highly trained cadres and soldiers from outside Laos, he said.

Mr. Harriman said the U.S. will recognise the Government of Boun Oum as the legal Government in Laos. He had met Prince Souvanna at the airport in Phnom Penh this morning but exchanged no more than courtesies with him.

Mr. Harriman said he had long talks with all the heads of States in the countries he visited and all of them agreed that Laos should be neutral and truly neutral, so that it could not be used for Communist infiltration in the area".

Mr. Harriman said he talked to the King of Laos in Luang Prabang over the week-end and found him determined to stress the right of Laos to neutrality. He said the King did not tell him that he had objections to a 14-nation conference in Geneva which would determine the future of Laos.

In Phnompenh, Prince Souvanna said today he did not intend going to the Geneva conference.

He said he expected to stay a few days before returning to northern Laos "in order to satisfy myself that measures taken and in the course of realisation are being correctly carried out."

He added he would later return to Phnompenh to establish a channel of communications between Laos and Cambodia.

Prince Souvanna said he could not say what his position would be regarding the proposed formation of a new Laotian government. His only information was from press reports that a new government was expected following a meeting of the national assembly next Thursday.

In Manila, the Philippine National Security Council voted unanimously early today to commit troops to Laos should the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) decide to take military action there.

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CEASE-FIRE IN ORIENTALE

Bid To Win Over Gizenga Govt.

LEOPOLDVILLE, April 18.—A cease-fire has been ordered along the borders of Orientale and Equateur provinces in an apparent move to bring the leftist Stanleyville regime into the camp of the Central Congolese Government, it was reported today, says INS-UPI.

Army officers of the rival Congolese Government of Mr. Antoine Gizenga have recognised the authority of Maj.-Gen. Joseph Mobutu as Commander-in-Chief of all Congo troops; Central Congolese Military Headquarters said yesterday.

Informed sources said that the agreement to recognise Gen. Mobutu as the Congo's top military chief was based on a message received from the border region by the Congolese headquarters. Gen. Mobutu has been there for the past week and was reported to have talked with army commanders in the area.

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